Articles

How should we interpret the latest terrorist attack in India?

Because it occurred when the Indian prime minister was in Bangladesh charting a new relationship with that country (which, until Sheikh Hasina came to power, had provided a safe haven for terrorists targeting India), the attack could be construed as a reminder that covering our flank does not lessen India’s vulnerability.

One of the infirmities of our national security discourse is our skewed approach to the issues involved. We get disproportionally focused on the threat – its intensity, manifestations, damage caused etc. than the response required to address them. National security essentially pertains to what the state does, or should do, to effectively meet the anticipated threats - both at the strategic and tactical levels. Correct threat analysis and anticipation is an essential prerequisite but by itself provides no solution. It is useful only when followed by a determined and real time response.

Hardly anyone will dispute that May 2011 has been a mensis horribilus for Pakistan.

International terrorism will not be wiped out with Osama bin Laden, who had long ceased to be its driving force

Osama bin Laden’s killing may have closed one chapter, but the list of Af-Pak issues is long. The US has to depend on Pakistan, but question its reliability.

Good sense dictates that we remain open to the possibility of settling our differences with Pakistan, but common sense demands that we do not anxiously chase solutions. We seem to believe that our over-display of readiness to engage Pakistan will goad it to respond constructively. Our repeated overtures in fact give Pakistan more political room to make demands and lay the terms of a revived dialogue.

Abstract
This paper aims to explain how and why London came to be a hub for Pan-Islamist jihadism during the 1990s. It posits that the origins of the ‘Londonistan’ phenomenon lie in a long British tradition of using intelligence to obtain strategic benefits. The present jihadist threat to the United Kingdom (UK) is partly the result of a failed attempt by Whitehall to influence world affairs. Londonistan was the fallout of a policy of tacitly sheltering radical groups in order to enhance the UK’s global clout and advance its overseas interests.

The ministry of external affairs press release of February 10, and our foreign secretary’s press conference of February 8, clearly indicate that the latter and her Pakistani counterpart agreed at Thimphu to resume the stalled India-Pakistan dialogue in a “composite” plus mode. Thus, while the press release reveals that the resumed dialogue would cover “all issues”, the foreign secretary, in her press conference, made out not only that the dialogue would be “comprehensive...

Cut through the claptrap of diplomatese and it is clear that the Manmohan Singh government has accepted all of Pakistan’s demands and put the Composite Dialogue back on the rails; only the word ‘composite’ has been replaced by words like ‘comprehensive’, ‘continuous’, and ‘constructive’ to put a positive spin on what is clearly a capitulation by India.

India is on a surge; a great destiny awaits it. If there is one single factor that could negate or retard it, it will be its failure to govern itself. Ensuring safety and security of its people, upholding the rule of law, managing change with order and ensuring legitimacy of power by those who wield it shall be critical components of that governance. Should it fail to happen, history will once again lament India couldn’t do what it could.