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Editor’s Note

The repeated violations of the ceasefire along the LoC by Pakistan hogged the national headlines all through August. While initially it appeared that the Indian security forces suffered some setback due to the unprovoked firing from across the border under the new regime of the peace posturing Nawaz Sharif, the Indian Army paid back in kind in a befitting manner subsequently. The blatant violations by the Pakistani troops were apparently an outcome of frustration over their inability to push in more infiltrators due to the eternal vigilance maintained by our gallant officers and men and a desperate attempt to provide covering fire to the Jihadis planning mayhem in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere.

By month end, our highly competent intelligence agencies were also able to corner two of the most wanted ISI sponsored pawns – bomb maker Abdul Karim Tunda and the elusive brain behind the Indian Mujahideen (IM) – Yasin Bhatkal. Apart from nailing the Pakistani lie of having no links with home grown Indian terror outfits, these arrests have also exposed political leaders who have questioned the very existence of IM for the sake of perceived vote banks.

As part of his highly acclaimed series ‘Neighbour from Hell’, VIF Joint Director Ambassador P P Shukla has in this issue busted many a myth surrounding the India-Pak relations. One sincerely hopes that this timely piece would not only open the eyes of the Mandarins in South Block planning a summit between the two Prime Ministers but also expose the utopian peaceniks of the ‘Lahore Club’ who hold night long candlelight vigils along the Indo-Pak border dreaming about fraternity with Pakistan.

VIF Senior Fellow Sushant Sareen too has highlighted the reasons behind Islamabad blowing apart the LoC ceasefire. He has very aptly pointed out that the Pakistan army isn’t very comfortable with Nawaz Sharif at the helm of affairs and feels spooked by his emphasis on civilian supremacy over all policy matters.

Defence and Strategic expert Brig Gurmeet Kanwal has analysed in detail the Government’s plans to set up a mountain strike corps along the India-China border while VIF Visiting Fellow Radhakrishna Rao has dealt with the strategic importance of the Chabahar port in Iran.

With the Indian economy also passing through one of its most turbulent phases, it is time the leadership rises to the occasion and brings back the country on the path of stability and progress.

K G Suresh
The Neighbour from Hell

Some Common Myths About India-Pakistan Relations

“Phir ek baar kiya, to dekhna” is not effective policy

- Ambassador PP Shukla

As tensions rise between India and Pakistan, the usual arguments are being repeated on both sides of a serious divide in India on how to deal with that country. The reason we are unable to get the relationship right is that the country and the public discourse is in the grip of some fallacies that we have adopted unquestioningly, particularly at the official level. What follows is an attempt at busting some of the myths. This is important because it is these errors that are leaving us lurching from one failed start to another.

A hard line response will strengthen their hardliners

It is commonly argued that if India were – hypothetically – to adopt a firm line in responding to Pakistani provocations, that would only play into the hands of the military and the terror networks supported by the military. A bit of history will be useful here. The Pakistan army first took power in 1958. Since then, it has been in effective control of security policies more or less without let-up till today. There have been some moments, though, when the military was weakened. The first was in 1971, after the defeat in Bangladesh. The second, less stark, moment was in 2011, after the US incursion in Abbottabad, to kill and snatch Osama bin Laden. On that occasion, the head of the ISI had been forced to apologise to the “bloody civilians” in the Pakistan National Assembly and offer to quit.

Both these were occasions when hard power had been exercised against the army, and it had been defeated. Indeed, this is a basic rule of statecraft: when you defeat a policy, you defeat the authors of that policy.

Parallels from other countries

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abound. Hitler was not stopped by appeasement; he was finally stopped only by war. And it was only when defeat looked certain that there was a move from within to unseat him, in July 1944. Similarly, Khrushchev was strengthened and the Soviet military weakened after the Cuban Missile Crisis ended with the Soviets pulling their missiles from Cuba.

To look at it another way: if it is true that a hard line on our side strengthens the hardliners in Pakistan, then the corollary must be that a soft line [appeasement, which we have been practising for decades now] should strengthen the moderates. But this has clearly not happened; in fact, over the years of appeasement, the contrary has happened, and the military has only got stronger, as its policies of bleeding India have gone unchallenged.

**We shall all grow together or none will grow**

It is also sometimes formulated in terms that suggest that peace is vital for the Indian economy to grow. Again, history is a good guide. We had peace with Pakistan in the 1970’s, and indeed, Gen Zia-ul-Haq called it the golden period in Indo-Pakistan relations. And yet, the decade of the 1970’s was the very bleakest in the economic history of independent India. By contrast, the period after 1993 has been the most turbulent in the subcontinent, and this has been the period of the best Indian economic performance.

Pakistan has maintained its own pace through this period, somewhat better than India in the 1970’s and significantly worse since the 1990’s, to the point where it has become the sick man of Asia. There is no correlation between the rates of growth in India and Pakistan. And there is logic in this. There is little trade between us — for India the total trade turnover with Pakistan is less than 1% of our global trade turnover of US$ 600 billion. Our GDP is ten times that of Pakistan, a fact our analysts rarely mention, though we are constantly told –
wrongly – that China’s GDP is four times that of India.

**We have to help [current leader] survive and strengthen him/her**

Time was when it was the Americans who used to tell us that this or that leader was our “best bet” – it started with Ayub, and thereafter, we did not need to be told. We sold this hokum to ourselves. After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – the man who promised a thousand-year war, it was Gen Zia. Of course, it was but natural that it had to be Benazir after that, and then it was Mian Nawaz Sharif. And so goes the dreary cycle – it turns out it is now in our own interest to strengthen Mian Nawaz.

This begs two questions: is any leader worth strengthening at the cost of our own interests, and can it be done by any outsider? As to the first, the proposition that we need to strengthen this or that leader is dangerous nonsense. It was in this mistaken belief that even as shrewd a leader as Indira ji was led astray at Simla in 1972. Her laudable motivation was to shore up Bhutto, so that he, in turn, could keep his promise to settle the Kashmir issue on terms acceptable to both sides. But just as soon as he could, he turned his back on the understanding, and we are paying in the blood of our soldiers and innocent citizens for the misplaced generosity. Yet again, the same Bhutto’s subsequent career is instructive on the second point too: by 1977, he was overthrown, and by 1979, he was executed.

Admittedly, this is an extreme case, even by Pakistan’s gory standards. However, the case is illustrative of what these kinds of simplistic ideas can lead to. It needs to be borne in mind, because once again, voices are being raised that we need to help Mian sahib strengthen his position. No, we do not need to, and we should have the modesty to accept also that we do not know how to go about it. Ignoring hostile acts and going ahead with business as usual – even if we accept for argument’s sake that it is the army that is behind the latest burst of hostility – will not strengthen him; in all likelihood, it will weaken him and further embolden the army.

**If you don’t talk, you are pushing the subcontinent to war**
This is an argument that crops up each time there is a flare-up in tensions between India and Pakistan. “Talk” is actually a euphemism for the more accurate description for what we have been doing – appeasement. The Pakistanis are particularly good at using this argument, and this is then amplified by like-minded persons on our side. The reality is that there are any number of options between appeasement and war. There are diplomatic, economic, political, and, yes, military measures that can be employed, all below the level of conventional war. We do not need to look very far: Pakistan is doing all of this quite successfully against us, and we just need to pay them back in the same coin.

The odd thing is that Pakistan is much the weaker country in this stand-off – its GDP is one-tenth that of India, as has already been mentioned. Its military cannot match ours even after decades of under-spending on defence by India. We have mesmerised ourselves by how far China is ahead of us by exaggerating the gap, but we never look at the gap between India and Pakistan. It is vulnerable to economic pressure, both on water and on power – and we are holding out a lifeline to them on both. This can be changed, and must change.

Similarly, we need to get our perspective right on the issue of MFN treatment for Indian exports to Pakistan. Hardly any of the talking heads have pointed out that this is not really a decision for Pakistan to make in exercise of its sovereign rights. It is an obligation under WTO rules. And for sixteen years, it has flouted this obligation, and we have accepted this without either withdrawing MFN from our side too, or taking the country to the Dispute Settlement Procedure in WTO. This is how we encourage hostility from Pakistan – by making it a cost-free policy.

In talking of options short of war, it must nonetheless be kept in mind that we are operating in a dangerous security environment, and war may be visited upon us, whether we wish it or not. For that contingency, we need to be fully prepared to defend ourselves, and along multiple fronts.

**Cannot change geography**
This is especially hard to understand, coming from India. We have seen geography change right from the dawn of Independence. The creation of Pakistan itself was a change of geography, and a very important one, from our perspective. Then China became a neighbour, and a country called Tibet was removed from the map of sovereign countries. Bangladesh emerged in 1971. All three happened right on our borders, and yet we keep saying one cannot change geography.

In point of fact, change of geography has only gathered pace since the end of the Cold War. The USSR disappeared and fifteen independent countries emerged in its place. Yugoslavia disappeared and six new countries replaced it. More recently, new countries called Timor Leste [East Timor] and South Sudan have appeared on the map.

The point is that we should be clear that, contrary to our officially-stated position, we have no interest in a strong, stable, united Pakistan. We cannot hold it together if it is on the way to becoming a failed state. And we do not need even to try and do so either. What we need to do is to prepare for this contingency, should it arise.

**Pakistan is itself a victim of terrorism**

This is a particular favourite of the Pakistanis. They frequently mention that they have lost forty thousand lives to terrorism, of which four thousand are soldiers. This is a figure of losses over at least a decade, and works out to some four hundred a year on average. That is admittedly a large number, but not such a number as to deter an army from its strategic goals. The Indian army was losing more than this number in the 1990's – to Pakistan-sponsored terror - but that did not deflect us from our aims.

More to the point, the terror that has taken this toll in Pakistan is a creation of that country itself. It is as if a bomb-maker dies because the bomb goes off prematurely, as has been known to happen, he should be regarded as a victim. Surely, this is a grotesque misrepresentation of the reality.

**Morality and an eye for an eye**

Finally, there is that hoary old chestnut – we are the land of Gandhi. An eye for an eye makes
the whole world blind – very emotive, completely fallacious. An eye for an eye makes two adversaries one-eyed, and keeps them on par in respect of physical ability. Nothing more, nothing less.

But more substantively, it is important to remember that Gandhi [who never said what is attributed to him about an eye for an eye] was fighting against a very different enemy. There is a quote from President Kennedy in his letter to Nehru written just after the 1962 war had begun, where he refers to Nehru’s efforts for peace and Nehru was surely the most devoted of followers of Gandhi unlike the ersatz variety so much in evidence these days. Here is what Kennedy wrote:

You have put into practice what all great religious teachers have urged and so few of their followers have been able to do. Alas, this teaching seems to be effective only when it is shared by both sides in a dispute. [Emphasis added].

And this is the element that the votaries of no-change towards Pakistan seem to miss. The other party does not share the teaching, and, ironically, it was none other than Gandhi himself who failed in his dealings with the future leaders of Pakistan.

What is more, it is ahistorical to call for us to persist in this failed policy. This is precisely the policy that India has followed at least since the days of then-Prime Minister VP Singh – all to no avail.

The purpose of this myth-busting is not to score debating points. India is facing very serious security threats, probably the most serious in our independent history. This is no time for woolly thinking or ego-driven policies – even less is it permissible to look to vote banks. Statecraft demands that we unshackle our minds from thoughts that have held us hostage for far too long, and work out alternative policies that will address our security challenges.

Tailpiece.

New York, 26 September 2013 (Agencies)

This just in.
It is reported that the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met in New York, and had a highly successful meeting. Prime Minister Singh had prepared well for the meeting and told his counterpart: “This time I really mean it. Phir ek baar kiya to dekh lena”.

The use of the word “really” caused some ripples, and one of the Party General Secretaries, who knows so little about so much, felt that Singh had been unnecessarily jingoistic in the conversation. He suspected that some “communal elements” had smuggled this into the Prime Minister’s talking points.

Nonetheless, the meeting was a grand success from the Indian point of view. The Prime Minister personally briefed a correspondent, who occasionally writes for a misleadingly-named newspaper. This correspondent reported after the briefing that the Pakistanis were shaken by this remark of the Prime Minister.

This is the same correspondent who recently broke the story about the existence of a group in India called the “Teach Pakistan A Lesson” school, which was propagating irresponsible ideas like upholding the sovereignty of India. It was he who also broke the story that this same school was wrong to suggest that the Pakistanis were indeed shaking after the meeting – with laughter.

A large group of deshbhaktas, who see Pakistan much better than the rest of the country because they see it by candle-light, averred one more time that Pakistan was changing. They confirmed that the Pakistanis had indeed been shaken to the core by Mr Singh’s remarks, and promised that terror attacks would never happen again.
Why Pakistan Is Blowing Apart Loc Ceasefire?

- Sushant Sareen

Even though there have been occasional violations by Pakistani troops of the ceasefire agreement on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, the recent flare-up has placed an enormous strain on the Confidence Building Measure (CBM) that had been mutually agreed by the two countries in late 2003. The violations of the ceasefire are no longer limited to either a small section of the LoC or to use of small arms but are taking place all along the LoC with higher calibre ammunition being used. What is more, the exchange of fire has continued unabated in one or the other sector of the LoC for nearly three weeks now. On the Indian side, the restraint that was being shown by the army in the face of regular provocations by the Pakistan army and its jihadist paramilitaries – pushing in infiltrators, firing on Indian positions, carrying out cross-LoC raids etc. – has now all but run its course. With the gloves coming off, the Indian Army has started to retaliate in a calibrated and proportionate manner.

The message being sent is clear: unless the Pakistanis back off (after all they started the shooting match with the killing of five Indian soldiers on the Indian side of the LoC), there is a clear and present danger of the ceasefire agreement collapsing. If this happens, things will return to the pre-ceasefire situation in which both sides suffered heavy casualties of not only troops but also civilians living close to the LoC. The problem for Pakistan is that open hostilities breaking out on its eastern front is the last thing that the over-stretched military can afford at this point in time. As it is, Pakistan is sinking in a sea of crises, not the least of which is a tanking economy, rampant terrorism, two and a half insurgencies (the Islamist one in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, a separatist movement in Balochistan, and the stirrings of a nationalist insurgency in Sindh), abysmal state of law and order with sectarian violence and

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criminal mafias tearing the country apart. Add to this the looming spectre of instability and chaos post 2014 after the Western forces withdraw from Afghanistan. By all standpoints of normal rationality then, it just doesn’t make sense for Pakistan to ratchet up tension with India at this stage. Or does it?

Many Pakistani analysts, assuming an air of injured innocence to mislead both domestic and international opinion, wonder what Pakistan stands to gain by heating up the LoC, and that too at a time when the new government has expressed its keenness to reach out to India and normalise relations. Asides of the fact that Pakistan has been quite adept at playing both sides of the game – professing commitment to peace on the one hand and surreptitiously promoting terrorism and proxy war on the other hand – there are a number of reasons why the Pakistani military establishment, if not the entire Pakistani state machinery, could be turning normal rational behaviour on its head and actually coming to the conclusion that rising tension on the frontier with India serves not just the corporate interests of the Pakistan army but also the security and strategic interests of the Pakistani state.

The most benign explanation for the LoC flare-up is that the Pakistanis made a tactical miscalculation by crossing the LoC to attack an Indian patrol and kill 5 soldiers. The strident reaction from the Indian side hadn’t been factored in because for some time now such actions by the Pakistanis never evoked any major response from India. But this time things spiralled out of control and the pressure of public opinion coupled with the anger within the army forced the hand of the government to raise the ante and give back to Pakistan as good, if not better, than it got. With India refusing to back down or climb down from the escalation ladder, the Pakistanis might have bitten more than they can chew and are now trying to bring things back to normal. But this explanation doesn’t quite explain why, for a number of months now, the Pakistanis have been trying to reignite the flames of Jihad in Kashmir. The sharp
rise in number of infiltration attempts, ceasefire violations and ambushes and attacks inside the state of Jammu and Kashmir suggests a more sinister game plan than just testosterone imbalance among Pakistani troops which made then indulge in needless adventurism along the LoC. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that Pakistan could once again be preparing the ground for putting Jammu and Kashmir back on the boil and both the recent heating up of LoC as well as the spike in acts of terror within the state are part of this plan for Kashmir Jihad 2.0.

Yet another reason why the eastern front has become hot, while tangentially related to the issue of Kashmir, has to do with Pakistan’s domestic power play between the military establishment and the civilian government. The Pakistan army isn’t very comfortable with Nawaz Sharif at the helm of affairs and feels spooked by his emphasis on civilian supremacy over all policy matters. There is a widespread perception inside Pakistan that Nawaz Sharif is unlikely to let the army wield the veto on foreign and security policy and will sooner or later make a play for whittling down the military’s influence in domestic politics. If the army has to remain top dog, it must pull Nawaz Sharif down a few pegs. The best way for doing this is raising tensions with India, a ploy that catapults the army to the centre-stage, and allows it to acquire the image of the saviour of the nation in the face of a hostile India. Related to this is the discomfiture of the Pakistani military establishment with Nawaz Sharif’s desire for normalising relations with India. The overtures made by Nawaz Sharif to restart some sort of an engagement with India hasn’t gone down well with the army. There are reports of the Pakistan army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani cautioning Nawaz Sharif not to be hasty in reaching out to India. Renewed hostilities along the LoC effectively sabotage the peace moves of Nawaz Sharif. In other words, the Pakistan military has killed two birds – arrested any possibility of political irrelevance and shot down Nawaz Sharif peace moves – with one stone – ramping up tension on LoC. For his part, Nawaz Sharif too is believed to have been spooked by the sudden rise in temperature on the eastern front. Whispers in corridors of power in Islamabad suggest that Nawaz Sharif and his close associates fear and suspect
that the Pakistan army could be doing another ‘Kargil’ to him. He, therefore, is trying to play down the LoC incidents and not fall for the trap which he thinks has been set for him by the army.

Domestic politics aside, there are other advantages also that the Pakistani establishment could be hoping to reap from the rising tension with India. Hints of this came in a report by one of the embedded journalists who quoted an unnamed senior army officer as saying that Pakistan was considering withdrawing troops on the border with Afghanistan and redeploying them on the border with India. This is a thinly disguised ploy of inviting US intervention on Pakistan’s side. At a time when the US is in withdrawal mode from Afghanistan and is to all intents and purposes outsourcing Afghanistan to Pakistan, the last thing it would want is for Pakistan to shift its focus from its western border to its eastern border, or so the Pakistanis calculate. The expectation is that the US will, at the very minimum, lean upon India to cool things down and there is also a reasonably good chance that it could also go a step further to press India to seek a Kashmir solution which satisfies Pakistan. This sort of Pakistani calculation fits in well with the old and tired narrative (but one which has once again acquired some traction) that the problem in Afghanistan is not one of radical Islam or Islamist terror but actually an India-Pakistan proxy war. This nonsensical narrative peddles the line that the road to Kabul runs through Kashmir and the end point of this is that once the Kashmir issue is settled, radical Islam will die a natural death and South Asia will transform into a land of milk and honey. Ratcheting up tensions with India on LoC is therefore the first step in drawing the attention of the international community, in particular the US, to the Kashmir issue.

What is important to note is that Pakistan is willing to dismantle its security grid against the Taliban in order to beef up its defences against India. At one level, this is tantamount to an acknowledgment
that Pakistan sees India as a much greater threat to its existence than the terrorism and devastation caused by the Taliban, and as such punctures holes in the airy-fairy talk about internal threats (Taliban and Islamic radical groups) replacing India as the primary threat to Pakistan's security. At another level, such a redeployment of troops and shift of focus will help the Pakistani authorities create space for a dialogue, even a deal, with the Taliban. On their part, the Taliban (about whom the Pakistanis never tire of insinuating that they are being funded by India!) have announced that they will ‘defend Pakistan's borders’ from any Indian aggression and that while their fight against Pakistan army is for the sake of Islam, they would not allow the enemies of the country (India) to attack their homeland. India therefore serves as a perfect excuse for both the Taliban and Pakistani authorities to enter into an accommodation of sorts, which in turn will create the opening for a possible peace deal. That any such deal will probably be very tenuous and at best tactical is of course another matter. But in the immediate at least, it will reduce the violence inside Pakistan and as such provide breathing space to both the Pakistani authorities and the Taliban.

The big question is whether Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is party to this double game, in which he plays good cop and is all sugar and honey to disarm India while his armed forces play bad cop to hurt and bleed India. His past record is rather mixed. The last time he was PM, Pakistan was merrily exporting terrorism into India even as he was engaging India in the Bus diplomacy. Members of his last cabinet used to openly hobnob with terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and some of them provided support and sanctuary to Kashmiri terrorists. There are reports of his links with Osama bin Laden and his turning a blind eye to sponsoring of Jihad International by his handpicked ISI chiefs. In his first term as PM, the ISI carried out the serial bomb blasts in Mumbai in 1993. In his second term, there was Kargil and other acts of terrorism. Even in the last five years, his party’s government in Punjab has been funding the activities of the parent organisation of LeT, Jamaatud Dawa, from the provincial budget.

Of course, if Nawaz Sharif is the changed man that many claim he is then he will need to prove his
bona fides about wanting to improve relations with India by acting against his own jihadists, both the uniformed variety and the ones in Shalwar-Kameez. Until Nawaz Sharif walks the talk on peace with India, he can never be considered a credible partner in the normalisation process. India, meanwhile, must respond and react appropriately and proportionately to any and every provocation from Pakistan. Equally important, India needs to disabuse the West (especially the US) of any notions it might be harbouring of playing a mediatory role between India and Pakistan on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The US must be made to understand that if it couldn’t pressure Pakistan into stopping support for the Taliban despite the heavy cost such a Pakistani policy was imposing on the US in men, money and material, then there is not much traction it will get from India on Jammu and Kashmir or for that matter on Pakistan.
Conflict does not end for all the time once it breaks up in a country. It happened so in Africa, Latin America, Asia and other parts of the world. Experience shows that conflict re-emerged in at least 40 per cent of the countries that at one or the other point of time were engulfed by conflict. Though unfortunate, certain ominous symptoms of another conflict have already appeared in Nepal that was triggered by violent conflict between 1996 and 2006 and in which more than 18,000 innocent people were killed and there was huge loss of property. What would happen to the Himalayan country and in its neighbourhood, particularly in India, if another violent conflict arises? Time has come to ponder over this.

The violent conflict in Nepal had started in 1996 after the then Prime Minister of Nepal Sher Bahadur Deuba failed to meet 40-point demands of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Like in 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) with its leader Mohan Baidya (alias Kiran) submitted 70-point demand to the leader of Unified Communist Party of Nepal –Maoist (UCPN-Maoist) and Prime Minister of Nepal, Baburam Bhattari, on September 10, 2012. However, the difference in the situation in 1996 and 2012 is that Baburam Bhattarai submitted the 40-point demand to the government of Nepal as a rebel leader of Maoists. But now Bhattarai is Prime Minister and the 70-point demand was submitted to him by none other than his own colleagues of CPN (Maoist) who split from the mother party UCPN (Maoist) on June 19, 2012.

Strikingly, many of the demands covered in 40-point demand in 1996 resemble the 70-point demand in 2012 and this is more so when it comes to opposing deals with India. In their bid to lend a nationalist fervor to their demands, the Maoists in 2012 as in 1996 tried to raise different issues like the scrapping of all the
“unequal” treaties and other deals with India. Towards this end, emphasis was laid on scrapping the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India, which is virtually a security pact between the two countries. Besides, abrogation of Arms Treaty of 1965, Mahakali Treaty of 1996 and Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement of 2011 with India has also been demanded. Other issues that have been covered in the demand include stricter control of the Nepal-India border, scrapping of contracts given to the Indian contractors such as to GMR and others for the construction of Karnli and Arun III hydropower projects, preventing the movement of vehicles with Indian number plates, and banning Indian Hindi movies as well as Indian music in Nepal.

The Mohan Baidya led Maoist party even threatened to take resort to violent means if their 70-point demands were not met. As the Bhattarai-led government in Nepal did not do anything about the 70-point demands as it cannot be done, the CPN (Maoist) in the first phase of their struggle declared ban on the movement of vehicles with Indian number plates in Nepal. Cinema halls across the country have been threatened not to show Hindi movies and play Hindi music. Argument has been placed that some of these measures were essential to give opportunity to the Nepalese industries to grow, which many of the intellectuals have questioned.

Of course, the Prime Minister of Nepal, Baburam Bhattarai, has given instruction to the security agencies to deal with the miscreants if at all they tried to stop the vehicles with Indian number plates because that could create shortage of basic essential goods in Nepal, including petroleum products and food items. But in reality, the Maoist call seems to have been working as most of the vehicles with Indian number plates have stopped plying on the roads in Nepal out of fear of attack. Even buses that used to bring Indian tourists to Nepal have been affected. On top of that, the cinema halls do not want to
take the risk of showing Hindi movies and playing Indian music.

In the meantime, Nepal’s other political parties like the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) and the Madheshi parties have opposed the 70-point demand of the CPN (Maoist). There is certain news of retaliation across the border in India when effort was made to stop the vehicles with Nepalese number plates. In Nepal itself, many people are dissatisfied with the move of CPN (Maoist) as they have started facing shortage of petroleum products and other essential items. Even the cinema viewers who like the Hindi movies and Indian music are disappointed. Most of the Nepalese media have also opposed the Maoist demands.

Notwithstanding the opposition, the CPN (Maoist) cadres are not in a mood to retreat from their 70-point demands. Media reports confirm that the CPN (Maoist) have among their cadres those elements who could not be accommodated within the mother UCPN (Maoist) led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (alias Prachand). At a time when the political situation in the country is fragile and the law and order situation is fragile, efforts are being made by the party to bring to its fold those Maoist fighters who were discharged from the Maoist cantonments in 2012. Of the 19,000 plus Maoist fighters, more than 16,000 have already been discharged from the cantonments as they opted for voluntary retirement scheme. Now effort is being made to bring those people into the fold of the party. Besides, those thousands of Maoist workers who were disqualified in the cantonments in the initial stage for being child soldiers or on other grounds are also being mobilized. Consequently, the Maoists’ spirit is emboldened and the cases of forced donation, bandh and other such activities have started growing.

However, it is beyond comprehension as to how the Maoists, who took shelter in India for years during the conflict period, are targeting India. It was through the Indian intervention that the Maoists and the seven political parties of Nepal entered into 12-point agreement in New Delhi in 2005, which ensured safe return of the Maoists in Nepal. In a way, the 12-point agreement paved the way for the second People’s Movement in Nepal in 2006 and the emergence of the
Maoists as the single largest party in the Constituent Assembly in 2008. It was then only that the monarchical institution of 239-long years was abolished and the Maoists were able to head the government in 2008-2009.

It is also difficult to understand as to why several Maoists want to maintain closer relation with China when the Chinese government provided even lethal weapons to Nepal to crush the Maoists during the time King Gyanendra ruled the country in 2005.

It appears that the CPN (Maoist) might try to take Nepal on the path of conflict again to serve their motto of capturing power, though such a move might prove disastrous to Nepal. They might do so with the help of the old fighters who were heavily indoctrinated during the conflict period in Nepal. Yet the ground reality does not favour the Maoists. Perhaps, many of such cadres might not return to the jungle and work as guerillas as they did in the past because they have been so much accustomed to the life of the cities and towns now. They have neither genuine support from the common mass of the Nepalese population nor do they have any international backing as such. Even the decade-long conflict made the people so much wary that they cannot that easily be diverted. They are in no mood for any conflict as they are disgusted with the selfish nature of the leaders. But this does not give room for complacency. In case the conflict of even low intensity breaks, of which there is some probability, it might not only have an impact within Nepal but also it might affect India most as being the closest neighbour and also due to the fact that there is an open border between the two countries.

Therefore, before the situation goes out of control, all the Nepalese and other international stakeholders including India should see to it that peace and stability in Nepal is not disturbed. Conflict anywhere is threat to peace everywhere.

(The author is former Director, Centre For Economic and Technical Studies, Nepal)
India’s Defence Diplomacy As A Component Of Its Look East Policy

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand

The dominant impulse of India’s Look East Policy (LEP) that was launched in 1992 was economic and cultural, the objective being to reintegrate India economically and culturally with our civilisational neighbours of South East (SE) Asia. In December 2012, the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit was held in New Delhi to signify two decades of India’s LEP. Growing trade ties have corresponded with the expansion of relationship in the areas of defence and security and thus the engagement which was primarily political and economic has acquired strategic content in the recent years. India and countries of South Asia share many threats and challenges especially in the areas of non-conventional security. India and SE Asian nations have been strengthening their defence and security relationship both at bilateral and multilateral levels to address such threats. Defence cooperation with ASEAN members is geared primarily towards exchanges of high-level visits, strategic dialogues, port calls, training exchanges, joint exercises and provision of defence equipment.

Prime Minster Dr Manmohan Singh during his visit to Myanmar in April 2012 observed that both India and Myanmar need to “expand our security cooperation that is vital not only to maintain peace along our land borders but also to protect maritime trade which we hope will open up through the sea route between Kolkata and Sittwe.”

India ramped up cooperation with Myanmar through high level visits by the Defence Minister Mr AK Antony in January, 2013 and last year through the visit of Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Air Staff, ACM Norman Browne from November 26 to 29. Myanmar army has been looking for hardware and India has been providing items such as transport aircraft, helicopters and other defence equipment. India is also focussed on expanding

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training and capacity building of the Myanmar armed forces. Further, Myanmar navy has been regularly taking part in India’s Milan series of naval exercises since 2006.

Malacca Straits is the pivotal transiting point through which most of the oil and gas transportation of India, Southeast and East Asian countries take place. Increasing incidence of piracy for ransom and smuggling in the high seas, which threatens uninterrupted transportation of oil and gas, has prompted these states to secure the sea lanes. Here cooperation with Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia to secure Malacca Straits and the neighbouring areas remains strategically important.

Malacca Straits are important to both India and Indonesia and the two countries signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2001 and have had regular defence exchanges including the exchange of high level visits, ship visits, officers studying in Staff Colleges in either country and joint coordinated patrols in the mouth of the Malacca Straits. Indonesian Navy ships have consistently participated in the Milan series of exercise conducted near the Andaman and Nicobar islands by the Indian Navy.

Last October, Antony visited Indonesia to attend the first Ministerial level biennial defence dialogue between the two countries, where he observed ‘We have a vital stake in the evolution of balanced security and cooperation mechanisms through which we can build consensus and pursue dialogue. We seek to improve our partnership with all countries in the Indian Ocean Region on bilateral basis as well as through multilateral fora like Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) etc’. India has also been supporting the freedom of navigation and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) through South China Sea where some of the ASEAN countries are at the receiving end of China’s assertive policies.
Further, as part of deepening its engagement with the Southeast Asian countries through military to military relations, India has provided access to Singapore armed forces to use Indian training facilities like Air Force and Artillery firing ranges. Singapore has signed Defence Cooperative Agreement in 2003 and a “Bilateral Agreement for the Conduct of Joint Military Training and Exercises in India”. Naval exercises between both the Navies are being conducted annually since 1994; in 2011, the naval exercise between both the Navies were conducted in South China Sea and the shore phase of the exercise was conducted at the Changi Naval Base of Singapore.

During Mr Antony’s visit to Singapore in June this year, India and Singapore signed a fresh agreement to extend the use of training and exercise facilities in India by the Singapore Army for a further period of five years. A bilateral agreement for utilization of facilities in India by the Singapore Air Force and Army was signed in October 2007 and August 2008 respectively. Singapore is the only country to which India is offering such facilities.

The third country which remains important in the context of Malacca Straits and adjoining maritime area is Malaysia. India-Malaysia defence relations have been growing over the years after signing of MOU on Defence Cooperation (MIDCOM) in 1993. The ninth meeting of the MIDCOM was held in Kuala Lumpur in January 2012. India’s Chief of Air Staff visited Malaysia in February 2012 and Malaysia’s Chiefs of Army and Navy both visited India in April 2012. The IAF Training Team deployed in Malaysia trained Malaysian pilots on the SU-30 MKM aircraft for two-and-a-half years since February 2008. Malaysia has also been looking for training its Scorpene submarine crew and maintenance of the submarines. These are areas where both sides can cooperate as India is also acquiring such submarines.

Thailand is another important Indian Ocean littoral state with which India shares maritime boundary. Cooperation between the two countries is based on the Joint Working Group on security established in 2003 has been now upgraded to include defence exchanges. The first meeting of India-Thailand Defence Dialogue was held in New Delhi in
December 2011 and a bilateral MOU on Defence cooperation was signed in January 2012. The current Defence cooperation comprises regular joint exercises, coordinated maritime patrols near the international maritime boundary to counter terrorism, piracy and smuggling; training of officers at each other’s Armed Forces Training institutions and participation as observers in military exercises. Defence Minister Mr AK Anthony visited Bangkok in June this year. The two Ministers reviewed regional security situation and expressed their support for collaborative regional mechanisms such as AEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus for maintaining regional peace and security, freedom of navigation, keeping open sea lanes of communication, and cooperation in areas such as anti-piracy, disaster relief and rescue.

Securing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and Malacca Straits is also important for the South East countries like Vietnam that has intensified its defence relationship with India. For the ASEAN countries, it is geo-strategically prudent to forge a defence relationship of a greater or lesser degree with India and the US as some sort of balance of power arrangements possibly against a rising and assertive China that is hardly going to remain status quoist.

An MOU between Vietnam and India was signed in 2009 for defence cooperation though the defence exchanges between both nations pre date this period. India and Vietnam face a common challenge from China and both have been target of its muscular policies. Some of the engines of Vietnamese MiG-21 aircrafts have been overhauled in India. There are also mechanisms for sharing of strategic perceptions and naval cooperation between the two countries. Coordinated patrols by the Vietnamese sea–police and the Indian Coast Guard are conducted jointly in addition to training of Vietnamese air force pilots. Besides providing some defence equipment, India has also been helping Vietnam to set up a domestic defence industry.

Similarly, India has defence cooperation and exchanges with Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and
Philippines. For instance, India is setting up an Air Force Academy in Laos. An Indian military delegation led by the Army Chief visited Laos in December 2011. Discussions revolved around ongoing defence cooperation initiatives between India and Laos. The Army Chief reaffirmed India’s commitment to the capacity building of the Lao People’s Army and discussed a range of defence cooperation initiatives with the Lao army leadership. The delegation visited the Kaysone Phomvihane Academy for National Defence, where a two-member training team from the Indian Army has been in place for the last 15 years.

Exchange of visits of defence officials, goodwill visits by Indian Naval Ships to Cambodia’s ports, gift of medical equipment & other stores and imparting of training courses to Royal Cambodian Air Force (RCAF) personnel in demining and peace keeping operations have been part of the defence exchanges. On the security front, India and Cambodia have signed an Agreement on Combating International Terrorism, Organized Crimes and Illicit Drug Trafficking in December, 2005. With Brunei, there has been some degree of defence cooperation with Indian naval ships participating in the first-ever Brunei International Fleet Review to mark the 50th anniversary of Royal Brunei Armed Forces.

So far as Philippines is concerned, an impetus to defence cooperation has been imparted in recent years. With defence cooperation between the two countries having been formally established through the 2006 Philippines-India Agreement Concerning Defence Cooperation, Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships regularly visit the Philippines. The participation of officers of the armed forces of both countries in various specialized training courses in each other’s countries has increased. There are also arrangements for sharing of intelligence and perceptions on certain other sensitive issues. To enhance the defence cooperation further, a Joint Defence Cooperation Committee was constituted which had its first meeting in Manila in January 2012.

At the multilateral level, India has also become a member of ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meet –Plus Eight (ADMM-Plus). The basic objective of creating this framework was to bring about co-
operative security, especially in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime security, counter-terrorism and peace keeping operations. ADMM-Plus Eight has also proposed furthering of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and sharing of expertise among the military forces of member states. The arrangement also advanced proposals to counter particular threats and issues such as piracy and natural disaster through joint military exercises.

Both India and ASEAN members have been on an upward economic trajectory and as they grow, the security and strategic environment has also been becoming complex. While these nations have been in a beneficial economic relationship with India and China, they remain wary of China’s growing assertion and irredentist tendencies. India’s efforts in defence cooperation with ASEAN also aims at addressing its own strategic concerns both in the Indian Ocean littoral as well as in South China Sea. Both Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs need to coordinate their efforts in order to add meaningful substance to the evolving defence and security relationship with the ASEAN members as part of a composite endeavour to achieve success in the strategic objectives of its LEP. The MOD also needs to allot more vacancies to the defence officers of the SE Asian countries for training at our defence establishments. Frequency of joint military exercises also needs to be increased to improve levels of interoperability. There is also a case for reviewing our restrictive policies on export of defence hardware to South East Asian nations.

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Will China Checkmate India On Chabahar?

- Radhakrishna Rao

In a development that could very well upset India’s geo-strategic apple cart, China is making deft and vigorous moves to woo Iran to accept its offer of US$80-million to upgrade the Chabahar port located on the coast of Gulf of Oman, off the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps it could be a well thought out move on the part of China, which through its “string of pearls” strategy is busy expanding its area of influence across the Indian Ocean region, to keep India away from the project and slowly intrude into the Indian geopolitical space in Tehran. A toehold in Iran could drive China to cast its “net of influence” far and wide, across the West Asian landscape, with serious consequences for the American presence in this oil rich part of the world.

From building the deep sea ports and launching satellites to constructing all weather highways and putting in place telecom networks, China has become a “partner in progress” for many countries in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Bangladesh are among the Indian neighbours where an impressive “Chinese presence” has become a fait accompli. In the context of the administrative control of the Gwadar port located on Makran coast, overlooking the Arabian sea, in Pakistan’s sparsely populated and restive Balochistan province, passing on into the Chinese hands, Chabahar has come to assume immense strategic and economic significance for India. Clearly and apparently, India’s participation in Chabahar port development could, to some extent, work as a counter-poise to the advantages that China could derive from managing Gwadar port.

Gwadar port, which stands out as a vibrant symbol of strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, could very well give China an easy access to the key energy markets in the Middle East. Further, it could also provide China a convenient access to the

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warm waters of Indian Ocean and a listening post near the Strait of Hormuz. Incidentally, about 20% of the world’s petroleum and 35% of the petroleum traded by sea pass through the Strait of Hormuz, described as one of the world’s busiest and most strategically located sea lanes.

As part of the ambitious US$18-billion economic corridor project connecting Kashgar in China with Gwadar, it is planned to build a pipeline as well as road and rail links that will involve engineering of around 200-kms of tunnels across the treacherous mountainous landscape. The road link will involve upgrading and realigning the strategically located Karakoram highway.

The road link will involve upgrading and realigning the strategically located Karakoram highway. Kashgar is located in China’s disturbed western Xinjiang province where Muslim Uighur separatists are quite active.

Of course, the Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline may help China reduce its dependence on Malacca Strait in so far as transporting oil from West Asia is concerned. Further, it could help meet a part of the energy needs of the Western parts of China. More importantly, this pipeline makes a strategic sense for China in terms of strengthening its long term energy security. On another front, in order to bring down its reliance on the Strait of Malacca for transporting crude, China has invested heavily in building an oil and gas pipeline in Myanmar. As things stand now, China is expected to overtake US as the world’s largest crude importer in 2014. Currently, three fourth of China’s crude import from Middle East are channelled through the Strait of Malacca which is vulnerable to piracy and geopolitical uncertainties. But then the economic corridor project is still at a conceptual stage and it would be sometime before it gets going. However, both the countries, while highlighting the economic importance of the project, have downplayed its strategic aspects. Meanwhile, reports emanating from Beijing quote Chinese Government officials as saying that security concern could hinder the 2000-km long economic corridor project.

On their part, US security analysts believe that China could very well make use of its control
over Gwadar for furthering its military interests. In the ultimate analysis, there are many strategic gains that China can derive from the port with particular reference to protecting its long term interests in the Indian Ocean region in addition to ensuring its energy security. Significantly, Gwadar is located just 72 nautical miles east of Chabahar. However, the daring pre dawn attack on a check post of coast guards near Gwadar in late July has exposed the vulnerability of the port to the prevailing volatile conditions in Pakistan’s restive Balochistan province. This attack is believed to be the handiwork of the banned militant group, Balochistan Liberation Front.

Though the development of the Chabahar port has been on the agenda of India-Iran bilateral discussions since 2003, the political leadership in New Delhi was far from serious about Indian participation in this vital maritime project from which India can stand to make substantial gains. After sitting on this project proposal for nearly ten years, the ruling elite of the country has suddenly realized the vital importance it holds for country’s long term geo political interests. This appears to be a sequel to Chinese move to edge out India.

Of course, India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid during his visit to Teheran earlier this year had driven home the point that India could provide upto US$100-milliiion assistance to upgrade the port. About the project, Kurshid had this to say, ”The two sides have pushed for transit pact between India, Iran and Afghanistan which would help India get access to the land locked and resources rich countries in Central Asia. We are going ahead with the Chabahar project. Cabinet has already cleared it”. As things stand now, Iran is yet to give its final clearance for the Indian investment in project. However, political observers are clear in their perception that India should seek fast track negotiations with Tehran to pave the way for the Indian participation in the upgradation of this port. This could prevent China from upstaging India.

But then USA has all along been hostile to the Indian proposal of joining hands with Iran for this maritime project. Unfortunately, India’s track record in standing up to the US “political pressure and psychological intimidation” is far
from impressive. As such, in the backdrop of the Chinese move to corner India, New Delhi should be driven by its own domestic compulsions and interests and get the decks cleared for Indian participation in Chabahar port development without any loss of time. There is no need for India to buy the American argument that Iran should be isolated for its nuclear weapons development programme.

Meanwhile, in Tehran, in early August, the new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani while addressing the Majlis (National Parliament) stated that if the West wants an “adequate response” from Iran, it should not speak the language of sanctions but that of respect. There is no denying the fact that Iranian economy has suffered heavily due to US and European sanctions and threat against the countries that continue to do business with Iran.

But the grim ground reality is that the routine trade between India and Iran have been affected by payment issue following sanctions. The recent visit of an Iranian business delegation to the tea gardens in north east India has raised the hopes of exporting an “appreciable volume” of high end tea varieties to Iran. As it is, early last year, the powerful American Jewish Committee had told the Indian Ambassador to USA, Nirupama Rao, that it was “deeply troubled” by the recent reports of India’s efforts to intensify trade relations with Iran” at the very moment when the US and fellow democracies are applying new economic pressure to persuade Tehran to halt its nuclear programme.

In May this year, Hassan Nourian, Consul General of Iran in Hyderabad, had observed that the bilateral trade between the two countries is poised to cross US$25-billion within four years. "We have already entered the second year. Currently, most of the exports from Iran to India are primarily based on oil and petroleum products. To effect this, both have encouraged focussing on non oil exports from India in order to strike a balance between the two countries,” he said. Following sanctions, the annual Iranian crude import by India valued at
US$15-billion is being paid for in the Indian Rupee. However, the annual Indian export to Iran is pegged at around US$2.5-billion per annum. It is planned to boost this to S$4-billion. Even with this figure, it means a surplus credit balance of US$11-billion in favour of Iran. How to offset this huge trade imbalance happens to be the crux of bilateral trade discussions between the two countries.

There is no denying the fact that Indian investment in Chabahar is important for India to protect its “business and commercial interests” in the landlocked Afghanistan as Pakistan has denied India transit access to Afghanistan through its land route. It is planned to construct a railway network connecting Chabahar with Zahedan in Afghanistan. Moreover, the port is already linked to the city of Zarang located in south western Nimroz province of Afghanistan. This road link can serve as India’s entry point to Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond. Indeed, Chabahar could invest India with ability to move quickly goods and supplies and if necessary even defence personnel straight to Afghanistan through Iran which assumes significance in the backdrop of US and allied troops planning a phased pull out from the war torn Afghanistan. Of course, India should nudge Iran to agree to the idea of moving military forces to Afghanistan through Chabahar. But this would again be subject to Iran getting some long term strategic benefits in such an arrangement. However, India is yet to take up this issue with Iran.

Chabahar has been designated as a Free trade and Industrial zone by Tehran. It has also been described as Iran’s best access point to Indian Ocean. Iran has already spent US$350-million on the development of this port. Without doubt, Indian participation could help the port, which because of the sanctions, has not been in a position to corner the business in proportion with its potential, to earn more revenue from catering to the Indian needs on a variety of fronts. India, Iran and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to give Indian goods heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar. With many of the Indian enterprises keen on entering the lucrative mining sector of Afghanistan, Indian participation in Chabahar project
could prove a win win deal for India Inc.

As it is, India’s growing role in Afghanistan focuses on the plan to extract iron ore from the mountain ranges at Hajigak, located about 100-kms to the northwest of the capital city of Kabul. According to Ali Jalali, a Professor at the US National Defence University in Washington and a former Afghan Interior Minister, Indian and Chinese investment will be a major contributor to Afghanistan’s stability as the US is preparing to withdraw its main combat forces between now and 2014.”

On another front, India and Iran are also discussing building a gas pipeline between the two countries along the bed of the Arabian Sea to bypass Pakistan using Chabahar port. Rattled as it is by India’s drastic reduction in purchase of its oil, Iran deemed it prudent to offer India oilfields on lucrative terms along with a proposal to route the gas through the undersea pipeline. Of course, in the wake of sanctions, New Delhi has difficult times paying for the imported Iranian oil in foreign currency. Further, there is also difficulty in getting ships to ferry oil along with the insurance cover.

As it is, India was forced to pull out of Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project on account of a variety of factors including security issues, differences over pricing as well as US pressure. The security concern stemmed from the fact that the pipeline will pass through Balochistan where Baloch separatists and Islamic radical outfits could pose a threat to the safety of the pipeline. But then a section of strategic analysts hold the view that India’s withdrawal from this vital energy pipeline project was a sort of geo-political blunder as India lost an opportunity to create a new equation in the region.

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As envisaged now, a consortium with state owned JN Port and Kandla port on-board, is likely to take up the development of Chabahar port. The Indian side is proposing a phase wise development of Chabahar on long term operations, maintenance and transfer basis spread over 60-90 years. Iran has successfully
positioned Chabahar as the focal point for development of the east of the country through expansion and enhancement of transit routes among the countries situated in the northern part of the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. But then as is the case with Gwadar, Chabhar too could face a threat from Sunni Baloch insurgents who have no love lost for the regime in Teheran.

For quite sometime now, India has been more than keen on getting a convenient access route to the landlocked Afghanistan through Iran. And in this quest lies the importance of Chabahar for India. By all means, Chabahar is the best option left for the country to reach Afghanistan in a hassle free manner. Indeed, India, Iran and Afghanistan are now edging closer to concluding a transit treaty that would facilitate easier linkage between India and Afghanistan through Iran. As it is, both New Delhi and Kabul are keen on ending their dependence on Pakistan for transit. Both India and Iran have agreed that “the project would provide connectivity with Afghanistan and provide an impetus to Afghanistan’s economic development.”

Going beyond Indian investment on the development of Chabahar, Iran has also made a proposal to India for joint investment and production sharing contract for oil exploration. Indeed, this offer has tremendous strategic significance from the point of view of ensuring Indian energy security. But then New Delhi will have to devise ingenious ways and means to circumvent sanctions if it wants to participate in the Iranian oil exploration venture. For the energy deficit India, collaboration with Iran in the area of oil and petroleum cannot but be a positive development.

By all means, India’s interest in developing strategically important south eastern Iranian sea port of Chabahar as well as New Delhi’s craving for better bilateral relations is seen as a positive step towards regional cooperation and economic gains for the participating countries. India’s construction plans for Chabahar port could also be viewed as reviving of old links and building new bridges of friendship through collaboration. While Iran is all set to derive benefits from positioning Chabhar as a logistical hub and a potential alternative to Bandar Abbas, for Afghanistan, Chabahar could be an alluring alternative to
the dependence on Pakistan’s Karachi port for carrying out its international trade. In the ultimate analysis, it is advantages all the way from the Chabahar project for Afghanistan, India and Iran.
Strike Corps For The Mountains: Upgrading India’s Military Strategy From Dissuasion To Deterrence

- **Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal**

On July 17, 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finally approved the army’s proposal for raising a Strike Corps for the mountains. Though the approval came after considerable delay, it is a pragmatic move that will send an appropriate message across the Himalayas. It will help India to upgrade its military strategy against China from dissuasion to genuine deterrence as the Strike Corps, in conjunction with the Indian Air Force (IAF), will provide the capability to launch offensive operations across the Himalayas so as to take the next war into Chinese territory.

The new Strike Corps will comprise two infantry divisions and will be supported by three independent armoured brigades, three artillery brigades to provide potent firepower, an engineer and air defence brigade each, an aviation brigade and units providing logistics services. The Corps will cost Rs 64,000 crore to raise and equip over a period of five to seven years. Approximately 90,000 new personnel will be added to the army’s manpower strength, including those in ancillary support and logistics units. The army has already raised 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions and deployed them in Arunachal Pradesh to fill existing gaps in the defences. Some elements of these divisions will act as readily available reserves for the new Strike Corps to add weight along the axis of attack and exploit success. These divisions will also be employed to secure launch pads for offensive operations across the Himalayas. Hence, these must be seen as playing a significant supporting role for the Strike Corps.

**Territorial Dispute**

Of all the areas of concern that have dampened relations between India and China, it is the long-standing territorial and boundary
dispute that is the most disconcerting. Since well before the 1962 border war, China is in occupation of large areas of Indian territory. In Aksai Chin in Ladakh, China is in physical possession of approximately 38,000 square kilometres (sq km) of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. China surreptitiously built its alternative route from Tibet to Xinjiang through this part of Aksai Chin. In addition, in March 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in the Shaksgam Valley of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (north of the Siachen Glacier and west of the Karakoram Pass) to China under a bilateral boundary agreement that India does not recognise. Through this area China built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between Xinjiang, Tibet and Pakistan.

In India’s north-eastern region, China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory that includes the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, even though physically the territory has always been under Indian control. In terms of area, Arunachal Pradesh is over three times the size of Taiwan. Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, had publicly reiterated this claim just before President Hu Jintao’s visit in November 2006. The ambassador single-handedly ensured that his President received a cold shoulder in Delhi and the visit turned out to be inconsequential. Since then, Chinese interlocutors have claimed several times that the Tawang Tract is part of Tibet because one of the Dalai Lamas was born there. Chinese scholars visiting New Delhi always hint that the merger of the Tawang Tract with Tibet is non-negotiable. China’s often stated official position on such issues is that the reunification of Chinese territories is a sacred duty.

An inherently destabilising situation stems from the fact that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China, implying de facto control after the 1962 war, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The LAC is quite different from the disputed 4,056 km long boundary between India and Tibet. The undelineated LAC is a major destabilising factor as patrol face-offs are common and could result in an armed clash between patrols.
Also, incidents such as the Nathu La border clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung standoff of 1986 can recur. Such incidents have the potential to escalate into another border conflict similar to the war of 1962. Also, over the last decade, China has spent considerable time, effort and resources to upgrade the military infrastructure in Tibet. The PLA has stepped up the number of military training exercises that it has been conducting in Tibet every year. An airborne division, which is a dedicated rapid reaction force, has also practised induction and deployment in Tibet.

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In any future war that the armed forces are called upon to fight in the mountains, gaining, occupying and holding territory and evicting the enemy from Indian territory occupied by him will continue to remain important military aims. While these will be infantry predominant operations, no war plan will succeed without achieving massive asymmetries in the application of firepower to destroy the enemy’s combat potential and infrastructure. Therefore, army-IAF operational plans must be fully integrated. These must be jointly evolved, meticulously coordinated and flexible enough to

Joint Operations during War in the Mountains

Hence, despite the ongoing border talks between India and China to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute, often punctuated by ugly incidents like the PLA incursion in the Daulat Beg Oldie sector in April-May 2013 and repeated incursions into Chumar since then, a limited India-China border conflict cannot be completely ruled. As the territorial dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is also in the mountains, there is a very high probability that the next conventional conflict involving India will again break out in the mountains. Since the war will be fought under a nuclear overhang, particularly with Pakistan, there is a fair possibility that it will remain confined to the mountains so that it does not escalate out of control to nuclear exchanges. Hence, it was time for India to pivot to the mountains in its quest for building military capacities and it is creditable that the government has given the go ahead to raise a new Strike Corps.

Hence, despite the ongoing border talks between India and China to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute, often punctuated by ugly incidents like the PLA incursion in the Daulat Beg Oldie sector in April-May 2013 and repeated incursions into Chumar since then, a limited India-China border conflict cannot be completely ruled. As the territorial dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is also in the mountains, there is a very high probability that the next conventional conflict involving India will again break out in the mountains. Since the war will be fought under a nuclear overhang, particularly with Pakistan, there is a fair possibility that it will remain confined to the mountains so that it does not escalate out of control to nuclear exchanges. Hence, it was time for India to pivot to the mountains in its quest for building military capacities and it is creditable that the government has given the go ahead to raise a new Strike Corps.
be fine-tuned to exploit fleeting opportunities and to take advantage of the enemy’s reactions during execution. This is especially so in the mountains where the military aims and objectives are limited in scope because of the terrain. Both the Services must work together to create the capabilities that are necessary to take the battle into enemy territory during the next war in the mountains.

As artillery batteries and regiments cannot be moved and re-deployed easily, operations in the mountains place a premium on battlefield air support. Operational mastery over air-to-ground strikes can influence the outcome of tactical battles in the mountains extremely favourably. Firepower ratios can be enhanced to levels necessary for achieving overwhelming superiority only through a major upgradation in the availability of artillery guns, rocket launchers and missiles and offensive air support. A contract for the acquisition of 144 howitzers of 155 mm caliber has been hanging fire for long and needs to be expedited. The new artillery units that will be raised must be equipped with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can engage targets deep inside Tibet from deployment areas in the plains. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) need to be acquired in large numbers both by the artillery and the IAF to accurately destroy important targets such as communications centres. The government must also hasten the acquisition of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.

Ancillary Support

The peculiarities of terrain and the lack of sufficient road communications, particularly lateral roads that connect the road axes leading to the border, will place heavier demands on helicopter lift for the movement of reserves within divisional and brigade sectors. At the operational level, only an “air assault” formation can turn the tide through vertical envelopment and enable deep offensive operations to be carried out when employed in conjunction with Special Forces. An air assault brigade group inducted across the LoC or LAC by helicopters after the IAF has achieved a favourable air situation can seize an objective in depth. Ideally, each of the infantry divisions of the strike Corps must have one air assault brigade with the requisite air lift. Air-
transported operations can also play a major role in influencing the course of the war. During Operation Parakram in 2001-02, almost a complete brigade group was airlifted to Kashmir Valley to enhance the reserves available in 15 Corps for offensive operations. In addition to attack helicopters, which will provide sustained firepower support, a large number of utility helicopters will be required to support offensive operations across the Himalayas, including medium- and heavy-lift helicopters.

The successful launching of Strike Corps operations will depend on the availability of good infrastructure, including double-

lane roads with all-weather capability and suitably placed logistics nodes. India’s plans to upgrade the infrastructure in the states bordering China have not been progressing at an adequate pace. In fact, there have been inordinate delays due to the lack of environmental clearances and other reasons. While the new Strike Corps is being raised, equipped and trained, the government must make vigorous efforts to speed up the completion of infrastructure projects. Otherwise, the army will have a new Strike Corps and not be able to launch it effectively.
Cross Media Ownership - A Threat to Vibrant Democracy

- Shivaji Sarkar

India has been debating the issue of cross-media ownership for the last over 60 years. However, it is only now that it is being raised by Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) at the behest of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting for the first time.

In fact, TRAI in its paper expresses limitation on checkmating cross-media ownership. Rather, softly it has given it up. TRAI Chairman Rahul Khullar said the regulator would, with the help of the Competition Commission of India (CCI), attempt to ensure that there are a minimum number of mergers and acquisitions. A consultation paper will spell out restrictions, make mandatory disclosure requirements, spell out levels of market share which will ensure plurality and diversity, list general disqualifications, recommend how cross media ownership can be dealt with, set rules for disaggregated markets, and ensure minimum mergers and acquisitions.

The Indian Media and entertainment industry is estimated at about Rs 1052 billion and is growing by the day. Apart from the monetary value, the industry is important as it can influence opinion in political domain and trends in business. Groups owning a cross section of media have the capacity to tilt the balance in their favour though the industry does not accept it.

Veteran journalist Paranjoy Guha Thakurta says the sheer number of media organisations and outlets often conceals the fact there is dominance over specific markets and market segments by a few players – in other words, the markets are often oligopolistic in character. The absence of restrictions on cross-media ownership implies that particular companies or groups or conglomerates dominate markets both vertically (that is, across different media such as print, radio, television and the internet)

* Shivaji Sarkar
as well as horizontally (namely, in particular geographical regions).

It is also well-known that political parties and persons with political affiliation own/control increasing sections of the media in India. There are two kinds of such newspapers or channels. The one which are known to be published by political parties while others are published as independent papers or run as independent channels but show a marked tilt in favour of the owner’s political preference.

There are a few instances where the promoters have used the profits from their media operation to diversify into other unrelated businesses. These are the issues that need to be addressed to strengthen the democratic principles. But even TRAI guidelines are not so specific.

The credibility of news has always been an issue. But despite concerns about it, the Nehru government did not do much to control varied interests of newspaper owners. It was debated often. Everyone stressed on the merits of having a free press. Many agreed that when a newspaper owner has varied interests to serve, it compromises with news publication.

Journalism evolved in India over a long period since the first newspaper, Bengal Gazette and Calcutta Advertiser of James Hickey, was published in 1780. Journalism took a new turn in the history of the sub-continent and the Indian press gradually reached a stage where it could begin to influence the country’s economics, politics and culture. Here we are talking of a period when the Indian press was confronted with the might of British imperialism in whose domain the sun never set, as was the common refrain.

The press in the Indian subcontinent developed precisely for awakening of the masses in the pre-independence era, pitted against colonialism and imperialist tyranny. Marx had also commented in 1853, while discussing about the probable results of British rule in India, that this was the first time a free press, owned by the common
inheritors of Indians and Europeans, had originated in Asiatic societies, and it would become a new and powerful instrument of India’s regeneration. In so far as the first half of the 20th century is concerned, the press played precisely this role in the subcontinent.

However, here we must bear in mind that the evolution of the press took place in the subcontinent on a totally different line after the country’s independence and partition in 1947. The Press Commission, formed under the chairmanship of J.S Rajyadhyaksh in 1952, thus drew attention to this aspect in the first part of its report, submitted in 1955.

He wrote, “Formerly, most of the Indian Press had only one objective and that was political emancipation of the country. Most of the journalists of that era were actuated by fervent patriotism and a feeling that they had a mission to perform and a message to convey. Political emancipation having been achieved, the emphasis has shifted and the newspapers are no longer run as a mission, but have become commercial ventures.” (Press Commission, p. 482).

In the same report, the Commission also commented that now the big newspapers, in particular, either kept mum on important occasions or hesitated from leading the public opinion, because they have to take care of certain business interests; they moved very cautiously and they had to act on the orders of the powers-that-be.

Therefore, “some of them are partisan in the presentation of news in respect of the financial interests with which they are allied; there is a certain timidity to expose courageously the shortcomings of those who are in a position of power and authority; there is a tendency to suppress facts which are unfavourable to their own interests or to the financial interests with which they are associated”, Press Commission noted.

It was precisely this press which the late V.K. Krishna Menon, an important member of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Cabinet, had dubbed as “the Jute Press”. The term originated as in early independent India most of the press was owned by jute industry barons and was
used to further their own interests. There was another that was called “steel press” being owned primarily by the steel industry owners like the Tatas. The Mahalanobis Committee, which developed the Second Five-Year Plan of the country, also made very trenchant criticism of the role the press played in the concentration of wealth in a few hands.

The Commission found that there was a great deal of scurrilous writing often directed against communities or groups, of indecency and vulgarity and personal attacks on individuals. It also noted that yellow journalism was on the increase in the country and was not particularly confined to any area or language. The commission, however, found that the well established, newspapers on the whole, had maintained a high standard of journalism.

It remarked that whatever the law relating the press may be, there would still be a large quantity of objectionable journalism, which, though not falling within the purview of the law, would still require some checking. It felt that the best way of maintaining professional standards of journalism would be to bring into existence a body of people principally connected with the industry whose responsibility would be to arbitrate on doubtful points and to ensure the punishment of any one guilty of infraction of good journalistic behavior. An important recommendation of the commission was the setting up of a statutory Press Council at the national level, consisting of press people and lay members.

The Second Press Commission was appointed on May 29, 1978 under the Chairmanship of PC Goswami. Later KK Mathew became the Chairman and submitted its report in 1982. The Second Press Commission wanted the press to be neither a mindless adversary nor an unquestioning ally. The Commission wanted the press to play a responsible role in the development process. It opined that the press should be widely accessible to the people if it is to reflect their aspirations and problems.

The question of urban bias too received attention of the
Commission. The Commission said that for development to take place, internal stability was as important as safeguarding national security. The Commission also highlighted the role (and, therefore, responsibility) of the press in preventing and deflating communal conflict.

The recommendation of the First Press Commission for the first time provided the idea of what a responsible press should be.

The Second Press Commission formulated in a clear manner that development should be the central focus of the press in a country, which is building itself to become a self-reliant and prosperous society. The Commission declared that a responsible press could also be a free press and vice versa. Freedom and responsibility are complimentary but not contradictory terms, it said.

The Press Commissions recommended that newspaper industries should be separated from industries and commercial interests. It also recommended that newspaper industries should be relieved from the impact of foreign capital.

Much of it remained on paper. In 1955, the cabinet agreed on restraining foreign capital in newspapers but it was relaxed in 2000, which allowed 26 per cent foreign equity in newspapers but it ordained that the Editor has to be an Indian.

Does it make much of a difference? If we go by the First Press Commission, it does not. It noted that even in early 1950s, there was decline in the status of the Editor particularly in daily newspapers. It has only accentuated as some papers like Times of India sometime back had even stopped giving the name of the Editor in their publications. In many newspapers, editorial control is being taken over by the advertising and managerial functionaries.

Promoting news of other group industries either directly or surreptitiously has become more a rule than exception. The line between objective journalism and promotion of group industries has blurred.

Why should it not be? A group like Times of India owns 40 different media and other businesses. So does Hindustan Times, Ananda Bazaar Patrika, Jagaran,
Malayala Manorama, Zee and Bhaskar group.

It is possible to visualize three types of accumulation of ownership interest in the media: cross-media ownership across the various carriers such as television, radio or print; consolidation, including vertical integration among media operations of content, carrier and distributor within a media segment such as television or radio; and market share dominance in a given geography within each media segment.

In the diverse cultural, lingual and social settings in our country, it may be difficult to visualize conditions of media dominance leading to market monopoly.

However, there are already at least six states where a single media house has a clear and growing dominance. These are media groups that are emerging as national conglomerates. They are all in the news business as well as in entertainment, media distribution and network business. They own newspapers, magazines, radio, cable TV and television channels, to name their key businesses.

The latest development of purchase of The Washington Post in the US by Amazon is an instance of the emerging threats and interests of powerful groups in vibrant media organisations.

Most media companies in India and abroad are integrating vertically to sell cross-media, often acquiring or building multimedia platforms. News Corp.’s Star TV India and Sun TV Network Ltd, Zee group and others already own DTH and cable distribution platforms. Star’s cross-media India operations include television channels, Internet offerings, radio, mobile entertainment and home video (incidentally, 11 cable distribution companies provide some 400 television channels in India).

Sun Network has 14 TV channels in four states, cable assets, four magazines, radio stations and two newspapers. In Tamil Nadu, the dominance of Sun in cable and satellite TV (channels and distribution network) and now in the DTH market is quite visible.
Sun TV and Jaya TV have evolved as rivals not only in the business sector but also the political set up as they represent two important political parties in the state.

In Andhra, dominance of Eenadu group was challenged by YS Rajashekar Reddy’s Sakshi – a television channel and some magazines. Some years back some of the news channels of Eenadu group despite bearing the name have changed hands. Some of these have been taken over by TV 18 group.

In India, there is no general policy on ownership and cross-media restrictions, as far as restrictions between print and electronic media are concerned. However, the restrictions for different segments within the broadcasting sector are dictated by the policy framework for each segment, such as DTH guidelines or FM radio policy.

It is indeed time to debate regulatory issues for cross-media ownership and, in the absence of an independent media regulator, the TRAI discussions have long-term implications for the critical and booming Indian media industry, says P.N. Vasanti, Director of New Delhi-based multidisciplinary research organization, Centre for Media Studies.

The Hyderabad-based Administrative Staff College of India (ASCI) in its 200-page report has pointed out that there is “ample evidence of market dominance” in specific media markets and argued in favour of an “appropriate” regulatory framework to enforce cross-media ownership restrictions, especially in regional media markets where there is “significant concentration” and market dominance in comparison to national markets (for the Hindi and English media). The government sat over the report for three years till the parliamentary standing committee pulled it up.

Paramita Das Gupta of ASCI named Sun TV, Essel Group, Star India, and Reliance ADAG as the top houses with large-scale horizontal and vertical cross media ownership, while five other major groups owned the largest number of TV and radio channels.

She referred to the Broadcast Services Regulation Bill 2007, and wondered how the government had arrived at the figure of 20 per cent cross-media ownership.
In India, there is proliferation of publications, radio stations, television channels, and internet websites. It ensures one thing - plurality, diversity, and consumer choice. There were over 82,000 publications registered with the Registrar of Newspapers as on 31 March 2011. There are over 250 FM (frequency modulation) radio stations in the country (and the number is likely to cross 1,200 in five years) – curiously, India is the only democracy in the world where news on the radio is still a monopoly of the government.

The Ministry of Information & Broadcasting has allowed nearly 800 television channels to uplink or downlink from the country, including over 300 which claim to be television channels broadcasting “news and current affairs”. There is an unspecified number of websites aimed at Indians.

But number of registration and domination is not the same. The media scenario is dominated by less than a hundred large groups or conglomerates, which exercise considerable influence on what is read, heard, and watched, says Guha Thakurta. One example will illustrate this contention. Delhi is the only urban area in the world with 16 English daily newspapers; the top three publications, the Times of India, the Hindustan Times, and the Economic Times, would account for over three-fourths of the total market for all English dailies.

Similar is the situation Kolkata which is dominated by Telegraph, Ananda Bazar Patrika, (both ABP group, which has partnership with the Star News), Times of India, Pratidin and Vartaman. Chennai has The Hindu, New Indian Express and some Tamil papers. Mumbai has Times of India, DNA, Free Press Journal, and Marathi papers.

Every other region has one or the other group that dominates certain geographical areas.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on IT, headed by Congress MP Rao Inderjit Singh, noted that the issue of restrictions on cross-media ownership “merits urgent attention” and needs “to be addressed before it emerges as a threat to our democratic structure”. It urged the Ministry to “formulate” its stand on the
issue in coordination with the TRAI “after taking into account” international practices.

Indeed, it is so important as Kuldip Nayar said sometime back. He says, “A reader may be shocked to know that the news he avidly reads is paid for. His frustration and helplessness are heightened because he does not realise which part of the story is news and which part is fake.” Nayar was speaking in terms of the violation of editorial standards by the Bennet Colman group, which “does not bother the Jain brothers because they treat the profession as an industry to earn money. They feel proud that they have torn ethics into tatters and have still remained the No. 1 newspaper in India. Not only that, they make more money than probably any other newspaper in the world. The great Rupert Murdoch's empire is 20 times bigger than the Times of India. Yet he earns less profit”.

Media is beset with problems and blatant violation of norms. Working Journalists Act that governs the wages and service conditions of journalists and newspaper workers as well as ensures freedom to the journalist has become a virtually a dead law. The government never tried to enforce it. Media remains the worst employer.

However, as we have seen, the large conglomerates of the Indian media are usually groups that own different companies. This allows them to have controlling stakes both in broadcasting and distribution by acquiring licences under their different subsidiary companies, thus totally bypassing current restrictions and defeating the purpose of their existence in the first place.

In a scenario like this, imposing curbs is a complex task. But it is not insurmountable. The US forced Rupert Murdoch to abide by the restrictions. Most other countries in the world, including the United Kingdom, France, and Canada have such provisions. The UK swooped down on Newscorp for malpractices.

While TRAI is making a feeble bid, it remains to be seen how much it succeeds. For the functioning of a vibrant democracy, cross-media ownership remains a threat. It needs to be checked. Stringent norms are the need. But would it ever happen amid divergent interests of the people who own the media and also those who have
enough clout to influence those who are in power. The nation would be watching the developments with baited breathe.

But there are reservations also whether TRAI, which has an entirely different mandate should be entrusted with the job or not. Disagreeing with the current demands of the telecom regulator, Rohit Bansal, CEO and Co-Founder, India Strategy Group, Hammurabi & Solomon Consulting remarked, “Conceptually, I don’t see the legal basis in the reference made to TRAI. Since when is it in TRAI’s jurisdiction to be sitting in judgement over media ownership?”

Bansal further asked, “These messiahs of ‘plurality’ cannot see an elephant in the room called the internet – the mother of ‘plurality’ among print, television, radio, broadcast distribution platforms, smart phones and the social media? If they do, how about eschewing the smokescreen of ‘plurality’ and setting the telecom terrier tilting at owners of the Internet!”

Meanwhile, supporting the regulator’s move, John Thomas, Former Editor, Operations, Vijay Times Bangalore said, “TRAI’s notification is a positive step in establishing transparency in the system. Because the media publishes news, and the same may be taken as a product if a media company has an interest in any corporation. I believe that in a step ahead, even journalists should declare their interests in the form of equity shares in any company so that a reader knows that the publisher or writer of this particular issue has an interest in the sector.”

(The author is National Secretary with the Indian Media Centre)

Exposing the harsh reality of Jihadi Networks

What strikes the reader almost immediately is that there are none of the soothing bromides that many apologists offer about the so-called “true” nature of Jihad: the book takes it as a given that Jihad is war and violence. The Haqqani network is among the oldest in this line, but has preferred to keep a low profile – and did so at least until the public remarks made by Admiral Mullen.

The three major conclusions the book offers are worth summarising in some detail. First, it reveals that the first call to Jihad was made by Haqqani pere – Jalaluddin – as far back as 1973 against President Mohammed Daoud of Afghanistan. The latter had removed his cousin and King, Zahir Shah, in a bloodless coup, and was pushing Afghan society towards greater equality for women, and was taking on the
religious establishment on both sides of the Durand Line.

This is important because it reveals that Jihad against Afghanistan began well before either the advent of the Peoples Democratic Party to power in Kabul in 1978, or the Soviet invasion in 1979, contrary to the standard narrative which would have us believe that the Jihad started as a response to the Soviet invasion.

The second important insight it offers is that of the nature of the Jihadi groups in Pakistan and the border areas. At one end of the spectrum of such groups is the Quetta Shura, headed by Mullah Omar, who is also the accepted Amir-ul-Momineen – the leader of the faithful. This group is loyal to Pakistan, and does not attack any State establishments; it also asks its followers likewise not to attack the State. Next comes the Haqqani network itself, which recognises the Amir, and offers allegiance to him – at least in words. This last is said because at the other end, it is also very close to [the book calls them the enablers for] the activities of al-Qaeda, which is willing to attack Pakistani interests as it sees the Pakistani State colluding with the US to fight groups like itself. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, in terms of being hostile to the Pakistani State, is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP], with which, too, the Haqqani network maintains good working relations. At another level, the Haqqani network smoothed the passage of the Arab groups into Afghanistan through the 1980’s and beyond, and thus also abetted the spread of Salafi ideology in the AfPak region – and this is emerging as one of the serious causes of worry among even sections of the traditionalist Islamic establishment in the subcontinent.

From the Indian perspective, it is worth noting that groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose primary target is India, also work closely with the network, and the two were together responsible for the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in 2008 in which the Defence Attaché and a Counsellor were killed. As we know, the ISI was directly involved in this attack.

The third major conclusion that the book offers is that the Haqqani network is also very active against India. The attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul has already been referred to. Equally, the
network has been, and continues to, train the tanzeems active in Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of India. According to the authors, the ISI asked them to take up this task, and they obliged, thus becoming the “strategic asset” that the Pakistan army describes them as. It quotes Jalaluddin as telling a religious gathering in Karachi in the early 1990’s: “We have trained thousands of Kashmiri mujahideen, and have made them ready for Jihad”. Interestingly, the book also tells us that when Pakistan was conscripting tribals from its Pashtun areas in 1947 for the invasion of Kashmir, the Afghan ulema had issued a fatwa denying that there was any need for a Jihad in, or against, India.

Considering all this, it is surprising that the US designated this group a Foreign Terrorist Organisation only as late as September 2012, a year after it had been publicly denounced by Admiral Mullen. The authors suggest that the network has shown political acumen over the decades, knowing where the red lines of the different organisations were, especially of the ISI and the Quetta Shura.

This book is very helpful in understanding the true nature of the Jihad that faces not just Afghanistan after 2014 and India, but also the broader framework in which the Jihad is being conducted by a spectrum of groups, all of which have mutually reinforcing agenda, though their geographic focus is different. The Haqqani network is primarily focussing on Afghanistan, though with increasing involvement in India too. The TTP is targeting Pakistan, and Al-Qaeda has a global reach. And, of course, overarching this entire complex is the ISI. The TTP remains out of control because it has bases in Afghanistan, but that is part of the uneasy dynamic of the terrorist campaign that all sides are playing in the AfPak region.

The book is also very useful as a summary of the history and spread of Jihadi ideology in Pakistan. It provides a healthy antidote to the emerging narrative, particularly in India, about Pakistan having had enough, and being ready to turn away from extremism and rejecting Jihad. The reality is far from this, and the authors themselves are pessimistic about the future of any peace process. They point out that the nature of
the Haqqani network is such that any peace settlement is unlikely to last – as shown by the several “peace settlements” made by the Pakistan army too, earlier in the mid-2000’s. They also provide a rebuttal to the view that it is the US presence that is fuelling the Jihadi campaign. They make the entirely valid point that Al-Qaeda spread its ambition and ideology in the late 1990’s - well after the Soviets had been defeated in Afghanistan and – by implication - there was no need for another Jihad.

For India, there is a stark warning, adding to the considerable body of intelligence already available in the public domain regarding trouble to come in 2014 and beyond: Many Jihadis in the region will be emboldened by the US drawdown and eventual departure from Afghanistan, viewing the event as a victory in their quest to reclaim Muslim lands and rid those areas of Western influence. ... If history is any guide, many of the Jihadi groups active in the region will turn their sights to Kashmir, or support those that do, to reclaim Indian-occupied Kashmir from perceived Hindu dominance.

All of these insights make this a useful book for those concerned with national security issues. It serves as a timely reminder of the harsh reality of the Jihadi networks in our region and of the fact that India is one of their priority targets.

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Thoughts For Change - We Can Do It

A Guide to Greatness

The ancient civilization Sindhu/Indus/Hindu/India-steeped in arts, culture, administration and most of all science and a great reserve of natural resources, became a lucrative target for marauders who converted or killed and either way, plundered, pillaged and ruled for a thousand years. What has been compiled in Thoughts for Change: We Can Do It, by two of India’s accomplished Missile-Men, is an important motivating reminder and a wake-up call to present day Bharat.

Particularly at a time when India’s political scenario is brimming with corruption and scams, its achievements in information technology and aerospace engineering/rocket technology should inspire India’s large community of youth - to whom the book has been dedicated - and who, it is hoped, will influence India’s political leadership to straighten its spine and make the nation break out of its reputation of being a soft state and become a country to be reckoned with.

That means, a nation which has the requisite technology with economic clout and weapon systems and equally importantly, the will to use the appropriate conventional ones at least whenever necessary and not repeatedly hesitate to retaliate when attacked so as “not raise the level of confrontation” and thereby become a laughing stock not only of its adversaries but of the world at large. And not only a laughing stock but one with which becomes too frequent a target to be attacked not only on its borders but throughout inland too.
In this book spread over five parts, the authors have covered a wide array of subjects not only related to their field, but also those under the gamut of science and technology. The first part, Dynamics of Change begins with the scientific temper and specialization of a number of Indian sages and scholars of India’s ancient period of a prosperous and cultured civilization living in well-planned cities and some of the discoveries and inventions of these great minds, which revolutionized science, beating the western world hollow by some centuries. This chapter also goes into the great obstacles placed before India by way of western regimes of denial of the fruits of the industrial revolution and the ensuing technological progress in the pre-Independence era and sanctions in the post-Independence period, which Indian scientists were able to circumvent by their ingenuity to indigenize.

Part 2, titled Mission Mode Programmes and Technological Push, covers science and technology which enabled the Green Revolution, Operation Flood (milk production), industry initiative, nuclear energy, space venture, missile projects, IT and the pharma industry.

Part 3 – Futuristic Technologies is the longest one spread over 170 pages, which begins with Technology Through Ages, Bio and Nanotechnologies and their Convergence, Robotics, Sensors Technology, Materials and Processing, Nuclear Energy, Space, Missile Technology, Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS), Cruise Missile BRAHMOS, Hypersonics, Emerging Battlefield Technologies-C4I2SR and Green Technologies. It is worth mentioning that on 17 June 2013, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) announced that the BMDS produced by it has is capable of countering missiles with ranges of upto 5000 kms.

BrahMos, developed jointly in a strategic partnership between India’s DRDO and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya, is a stealth cruise missile with a range of 290 km and a speed of Mach 2.8 to 3. Dr. Sivathanu Pillai, CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace was recently quoted in media saying: "We take pride in the fact that BrahMos, world's only supersonic cruise missile, a symbol of Indo-Russian cooperation, where India
provided the guidance, avionics, software and airframe components, etc, has been successfully delivered to both the Indian Navy and the Indian Army and the aerial version for the Indian Air Force too shall be ready in few years time....The equivalent of BrahMos is yet to built. And, in the next 20 years, it cannot be intercepted by an enemy.”

Part 4, Technology Spin-offs to Society, begins with a blurb of quotes by Dr. Abdul Kalam expressing his rising levels of elation following the successful orbit of India’s SLV-3 (satellite launched vehicle) in July 1980; test firing of intermediate range ballistic missile Agni in May 1989; India’s “five nuclear experiments” in May 1989. His last quote is indeed touching: “When I saw happy tears rolling out from the eyes of the parents of a polio-affected child, on seeing him walking after the fitting of lightweight caliper developed from missile technology—it gave me bliss.” The spin-offs covered in this part are from nuclear, space and defence technologies. And some of these spin-offs have proved to be invaluable to medicine, particularly in orthopedics and dental implants, prosthetic devices, acoustic detector for detecting noises from debris and many others.

Part 5, begins with the English translation of a verse titled Youth by Jalaluddin Rumi, the 13th Century Persian Sufi poet, followed by observations on India’s growth and appropriate recommendations for what India should become by 2020 and beyond. However, all the desirable aims will be achievable only if corruption can be considerably reduced, as its total elimination does not seem possible-worldwide—as it is an old virus of human nature.

Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha, the brilliant visionary scientist has been quoted in the book: “The acquisition by man of knowledge of how to release and use atomic energy must be recognized as the third epoch of human history. He beat Independent India’s first government by four years, when in 1944, he set up the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research and the Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment (now named after him) both of which became the hub for development of India’s nuclear weapons.

In an interview with the Manchester Guardian in 1965,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said if India built the bomb, "we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own." In May 1974, India announced the testing of a Peaceful Nuclear Explosive. What deserves being mentioned is the very effective secrecy of both of India’s nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998, which accentuated the shock waves after they were announced. In his book Weapons Of Peace: Secret Story of India’s Quest to Be a Nuclear Power, (Harper Collins), Raj Chengappa provides glimpses of both the 1974 and 1998 tests. Although Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru founded the non-aligned movement, and generally promoted disarmament efforts, Chengappa cites his biographer S. Gopal stating in 1997 that Nehru actually opposed complete abolition of nuclear weapons [Chengappa 2000, pg. 83], and supported Bhabha's plans for developing an Indian nuclear weapons option (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/Bhabha.html). Also, according to Chengappa, in 1974, besides Indira Gandhi, only two of her advisers P.N. Haksar and D.P. Dhar were kept informed. The then Defence Minister Babu Jagjivan Ram, also out of the loop, came to learn of this test after it was conducted. The then Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh was given 48 hour advance notice. Apart from the 75 civilian scientists, only General GG Bewoor, the Army Chief and the Western Army Commander were kept informed. For the 1998 test, Chengappa mentions about Colonel Gopal Kaushik, commanding officer of Indian Army’s 58 Engineer Regiment, who wrote in his daily report: "... Jan 1998, Dummy exercise carried out. More tomorrow." The 58 Engineers were specially chosen for the crucial task of maintaining the shafts in which India's nuclear devices would be tested. They were told to take all measures to ensure total secrecy. So effective were the regiment's tactics that when India carried out five nuclear tests in May 1998, it went down as one of the CIA's biggest intelligence failures.

While India’s atomic-space-rocket-missile accomplishments are indeed commendable in developing the technology, strategic deterrence can only be achieved after optimum levels of production and deployment. And while India must forge ahead with production of its missiles, it must not neglect regaining and maintaining its edge in conventional weapons, on which it is at an all time low.
Further, India must also shake out of its known mode of a soft state and strive to develop the political will to acquire the requisite level of force and send the message that it will effectively be used, if attacked.

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India’s National Security: A Reader

Understanding India’s National Security Concerns

The book is part of a series by Oxford University Press dealing with ‘critical issues in Indian politics’. It is a compilation of papers on major national security challenges facing the nation. It looks at the different facets of insurgency, terrorism and state response, nuclear issues including nuclear weapons and strategic stability and defence reforms.

India’s national security interests are derived from the need to protect India’s core values and the attainment of the national security vision. Security of our sovereign territory, airspace and Exclusive Economic Zones, internal stability and security in all regions and states of the Union are essential aspects of national security. In addition to the traditional forms of security, non-traditional aspects of security have been gaining resonance.

Human security to include economic security, energy security, water security and many other forms of security have become issues of concern which could be as important as conventional security. For instance, providing access to opportunities and development resources for all citizens of India, making due consideration for the special needs of deprived communities and regions have assumed significance from the point of social cohesion and social security.

As the editors note, this volume does not delve into non-traditional security areas such as energy security, environmental security, food security, human security, and other related concepts. Corruption, maladministration, poor governance, divisive ideologies amongst many other factors have become significant internal security challenges. The volume
possibly could not include the non-traditional security threats and challenges to India because of the likely limited and specific mandate of this work. An additional chapter on essential aspects non-traditional security issues would have presented a more comprehensive picture of security threats and challenges being faced by India. Alternatively, it would be useful to publish another volume as part of the ongoing series that looks at the non-traditional aspects which could pose as much if not more challenges to the Indian decision-making.

The first section deals with insurgency, terrorism and response of the state. Internal security threats have been the most challenging aspect of independent India. Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan, who has studied in detail the counterinsurgency doctrine of Indian Army and has also written on what should be India’s approach, postulates that there has been an element of ‘conventional war bias’ in its counterinsurgency doctrine. He has dwelt at great length upon how Indian Army handled insurgency in the North East to support his argument before going on to offer Indian Peace Keeping Force’s loss against Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to support his argument. The loss to LTTE, he explains, was due to this ‘conventional war bias’. One can easily agree with his view that there can be no military solution to the problem of insurgency and a political solution would be more lasting. Military can only create conditions for political negotiations by reducing the levels of violence. Though Rajesh Rajagopalan’s chapter is very scholarly, most of the army officers may find it difficult to agree with some elements of his theory. It can be said that Indian Army’s handling of insurgency was flexible and depended to a great extent on the stage of insurgency/guerrilla campaign and tactics adopted by the adversaries.

The chapter by KPS Gill, who was Director General of Police during Punjab militancy, provides an account of State’s response to the issue. Here he argues that it was due to regrouping and redeployment of police force and change of strategy and tactics along with political support that ultimately led to the success of counter terrorism/militancy campaign in Punjab. He has covered in detail the reasons for earlier lack of success and how such weaknesses were overcome.
He also recalls how the state had abandoned its responsibility and emphasises that failing to exercise legitimate coercive authority is not an act of non-violence or of abnegation but an act of abdication of responsibility and intellectual failure.

Praveen Swami in his chapter critically examines the fundamentals of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and comes to the conclusion that it is rooted more in the ideological divide rather than any other particular raison d’etre. According to him, the challenge in Kashmir goes beyond counter-terrorism, use of security forces or devising strategies including winning the hearts and minds of the local population. He emphasises that essentially the conflict is between Pakistan’s self-perception as saviour of all Muslims of South Asia and India’s view of itself as a secular and democratic nation.

Reviewing the insurgency in the North East, Bethany Lacina’s basic premise is that the state should work towards building the rule of law, efficient governance and addressing the grievances of the people through appropriate mechanisms. According to her, the most important enabling condition of the present violence in the North East is poor rule of law, which neither continued military/para military presence in the region nor political concessions tackle directly. She asserts that India lacks the kind of laws against criminal conspiracies that other democracies have developed in order to punish the leaders of predatory organisations.

The next chapter is on Naxalism by Ajay Sahni who goes into the causes of Left Wing Extremism and offers some remedies to address the situation. He also supports the concept that basic governance and rule of law must be established in affected areas. Strengthening of police forces, improving their capacities to tackle the challenges of Naxalism effectively are some of the measures which need to be taken by the State. Thus, the first section of the book highlights internal security challenges to India and offers perspectives on how they might be better addressed.

The next section is on evolution of India’s nuclear policy and consists of chapters written by well known experts and authors on the subject. Bharat Karnad explores the cultural context of
moralpolitik in relation to development of the atom bomb. He opines that Indian strategic thought is fundamentally realist in nature and emanates from the ancient Hindu classics. He believes that even Mahatma Gandhi understood that violence was preferable to cowardice. He has explained the term moralpolitik as use of morality to advance national interests and this method was adopted by Nehru who was a realist to pursue India’s nuclear interests. K. Subrahmanyam, who is well known for developing India’s nuclear thought, in his chapter has traced the development of India’s nuclear policy from early sixties especially from China’s first nuclear test in October 1964 to India’s nuclear test in May 1998. He gives credit to Rajiv Gandhi for giving approval for weaponisation of nuclear programme. Since as a government official he was privy to many of the decisions taken on the nuclear issues, his account can be considered as very authentic.

In the next chapter, George Perkovich, who has written extensively on India’s nuclear programme, gives a perspective on factors that led to conduct of nuclear tests by the BJP government. He believes that it was India’s desire for international status and strategic autonomy that led to Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998. He also delineates other motives for BJP government testing the nuclear weapons. However, he concludes that the thermonuclear test was a fizzle.

The third section of the book deals with nuclear weapons and strategic stability. Sumit Ganguly argues that nuclear weapons have added to the stability by reducing the risk of a full-scale war in the region. On the other hand, S. Paul Kapur theorises that nuclear weapons in South Asia have added to the instability. He has offered several arguments to support his precept. Both Ganguly and Kapur have explained how the nuclear overhang has enabled Pakistan to pursue sub-conventional war against India. Walter C. Ladwig in his chapter talks about the impact of India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine unveiled in 2004 though as of now Indian military circles do not officially subscribe to it. He is of the view that such a doctrine would add to instability in South Asia as India may be inclined to use force in a future conflict with Pakistan. He concludes that although India and Pakistan have
so far managed to resolve resulting crisis without catastrophe, this outcome has in no way been guaranteed. Generally, the western writers compared to Indian writers are more pessimistic about strategic stability in the subcontinent.

The last section of the book has a standalone chapter where Anit Mukherjee recounts that defence reforms ushered after Kargil War have failed to deliver. There were a number of recommendations made by Kargil Review Committee that were approved further by a Group of Ministers. Many of the recommendations have not been implemented in letter and spirit, the most glaring being the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff.

Interestingly, after the writing of this chapter, the Naresh Chandra Committee was appointed in July 2011 to revisit the Kargil Review Committee’s recommendations. The report was submitted in August 2012 but the government could not muster up enough courage to institute the appointment of CDS or the diluted version of the same as recommended by Naresh Chandra Committee.

Overall the book provides an interesting account of India’s national security challenges and how the state has been responding to the same.
Interaction With Daniele Mancini, Italian Ambassador To India

On 1st August 2013, VIF welcomed the Italian Ambassador to India, Daniele Mancini for an interaction session. Mr Ajit Doval, KC, Director VIF, initiated the interaction session by briefing Amb Mancini about the aims and achievements of the Vivekananda International Foundation.

Amb Mancini expressed his frank thoughts on global issues that concern both India and Italy. Talking of global issues, he highlighted that these issues cannot be tackled separately today and that they all are interconnected which requires a broader spectrum of viewing them and calls for a collective action.

On the bilateral economic relations between India and Italy, Amb Mancini argued that tremendous amount of work needs to be done. Italy’s trade with India stands only at $8.5 billion. Comparing that with a small nation like Romania, he said Italy has a trade worth $ 12 billion. He mentioned that the tremendous untapped potential of developing relations between India and Italy was the precise reason why he chose to be in India. Amb Mancini expressed his pity at the failure in the early negotiation for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between India and Europe and hoped that the process will gain momentum after the completion of 2014 general elections in India.

Highlighting the situation in Italy, he admitted that Italy is still in deep recession. Even though Italy is expected to come out of recession by the end of the year, it has lost 5-6 % of its GDP, which is more than the total GDP of Greece. This has had bad effect on the people of Italy, especially the elderly and younger generations. He expressed that these difficult times could well be the platform for forging even stronger relations with a country as big as India. The talk was followed by a session of questions and answers which further explored Italy’s situation with respect to developments in Europe, in Arab world and globally.
Mr Ajit Doval thanked Amb Mancini for his visit and expressed hope of having more interactions with not just the Ambassador but other scholars and think tanks from Italy in order to facilitate a better geopolitical, economic and cultural understanding of each other.
Seminar On Pakistan After Elections And Prospects Of Relations With India

Vivekananda International Foundation organized a two-day seminar on “Pakistan after elections and prospects of relations with India” on August 5-6, 2013. The first day began with a keynote address by Amb K S Bajpai, former Indian Ambassador to the US.

The first session of the seminar was chaired by Amb Lalit Mansingh, former Indian High Commissioner to the UK, and it focussed on the challenges faced by the new Government in Pakistan. Mr Sushant Sareen, Security and Defence expert and a Senior Fellow at VIF, gave a presentation on the economic aspect of the challenges facing Pakistan, focussing primarily on the energy, fiscal and foreign exchange crises. A presentation was made by Dr Ashok Behuria of IDSA, on the political and governmental challenges faced by the new Pakistani regime. Dr. Behuria addressed issues such as the Centre-State relations, Baloch insurgency, opposition parties, governments in Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and relations with judiciary and media. The last presentation of the session was given by Mr Ajit Doval, KC, former Director Intelligence Bureau and Director of the VIF, assessing impacts on the internal security of the country. Containing and engaging radical Islamists, law and order situation and border management were among the many security threats which Mr Doval succinctly elaborated.

The second session of the seminar focussed on the prospects for India-Pakistan relations and was chaired by Amb Satish Chandra, former Deputy National Security Advisor and Dean, Centre for National Security and Strategic Studies. The first presentation of the session was made by Amb G Parthasarthy, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, who assessed Nawaz Sharif’s past track record and delineated his possible approach towards India in future. A presentation given by Amb Vivek Katju, former Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, focussed on bilateral conflicts and
disputes, suggesting the strategy for resolution and engagement. The final presentation for the session was made by Mr Jayadev Ranade, former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, who analysed the impact of the new Government in Pakistan’s equation with the US and China and its likely impact on India.

The third session on day two of the seminar was chaired by Gen (retd) N C Vij, former Chief of Army Staff and Dean, Centre for Defence Studies, VIF. The subject of the session was Security and Defence. The first presentation was given by Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Strategic Analyst and Visiting Fellow, VIF, who assessed various aspects of the Pakistan army, including its role in the new political dispensation, capability and willingness to contain internal terrorism, approach towards neighbours, and its linkages, along with that of the ISI, with various terror groups within and outside Pakistan. Major Gen (Retd) Dhruv Katoch followed by his assessment of Pakistan’s defence preparedness, focussing on its nuclear programme, its defence relations with China, with special focus on PoK, Gwadar port and maritime cooperation. The final presentation of the third session was made by Lt. Gen (Retd) Ravi Sawhney, former Director General of Military Intelligence and Distinguished Fellow, VIF, who analysed the history of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and the new Pakistan Government’s likely approach in Afghanistan post-2014.

The seminar concluded with a presentation by Amb Kanwal Sibal, former Indian Foreign Secretary and Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF, on India’s options in dealing with Pakistan and a brief and highly focussed discussion.

Earlier, the participants observed silence for a minute to pay homage to India’s leading strategic thinker Air Commodore (Retd) Jasjit Singh, who passed away recently.

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Interaction With H. E. Mr Prasad Kariyawasam

On August 8, 2013, VIF welcomed the Sri Lankan High Commissioner to India, His Excellency Mr. Prasad Kariyawasam for an interaction on various aspects of relations between India and Sri Lanka.

Mr. Kariyawasam candidly expressed his views on the current state of relations between the two South Asian neighbours. He reiterated Sri Lankan President’s view that “for Sri Lanka, India is a relation while the rest are just friends.” He mentioned the fact that the relation between the two countries goes thousands of years back in history. He highlighted that there is a consensus in Sri Lanka that a strong India is good, not just for them, but for the entire region. India’s importance in Sri Lanka is further highlighted by the fact that India is Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner, the highest investor in Sri Lanka, and has helped the island nation militarily and on occasions morally in times of crises.

Despite some differences, Mr. Kariyawasam asserted that the Indo-Lankan ties have now reached a state of irreversible excellence. He asserted that as much as a strong Indian economy is important for Sri Lanka, a stronger Sri Lankan economy will prove beneficial to India reciprocally. Thus, he called for a better balance in trade relations between the two nations.

On maritime security, Mr. Kariyawasam again expressed a common Sri Lankan view of having a stronger India Navy managing security of the Indian Ocean region with assistance given by Sri Lanka and other littoral nations. He reiterated Colombo’s support to India’s candidature for a permanent seats at the UN Security Council.

Concluding his talk, His Excellency reaffirmed his belief that India and Sri Lanka are natural allies and that despite a few pending issues impeding the growth of this relationship, we are destined to remain closely knit in a relation that goes beyond friendship.
Press Statement On India-Pakistan Relations
By Members Of India’s Strategic Community

Reports indicate that with the change of government in Pakistan and the exchange of visits by special envoys, the Government of India is prepared to resume the composite/comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan, interrupted since January this year as a sequel to the beheading of Indian soldiers by the Pakistani army on the LOC in J&K. The possibility that discussions on Sir Creek and Tulbul Navigation may take place even before the proposed meeting of the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers in September in New York on the margins of the UNGA meeting has been aired in the media. Reports indicate that all these are being done without any linkage to the 26/11 terror attack or to the issue of Pakistan sponsored terrorism.

The Joint Statement issued after the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in 2009 alluded to the resumption of the Composite Dialogue Process, while proclaiming: “Action against terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue Process”.

The Dialogue that followed with Pakistan was identical in substance and form with the Composite Dialogue Process. This Dialogue Process was agreed to in 1997. It remained suspended after the Kargil Conflict and the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. It was resumed only after a cease-fire along the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir took effect in November 2003 and a categorical public assurance received by then Prime Minister Vajpayee from then President Musharraf in January 2004 that territory under Pakistan’s control would not be used for terrorism against India. The Sharm el-Sheikh Declaration and the business-as-usual Composite Dialogue that followed has emboldened the Pakistan establishment to stall, obfuscate and delay action against the perpetrators and masterminds of the 26/11 terrorist attack. The Pakistan establishment has quite evidently concluded that India does not expect firm action against those perpetrating terrorism from its soil and that terrorism and dialogue can go hand in hand.
The government would be well advised not to rush into a dialogue with Pakistan on the assumption that the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif, is ostensibly committed to improving ties with India. Good intentions are not sufficient to create conditions for productive negotiations; concrete actions on the ground are required. All the more so because of known structural impediments on the Pakistani side to normalization of India-Pakistan ties represented by the mind-set of the Pakistani military and the jihadi groups nurtured by them. The threat of India-directed terrorism from Pakistani soil is far from being eliminated.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promise to expedite the trial of those accused of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks and grant India MFN status agreed to by the previous government has not been kept. On the contrary, we see negative developments that can seriously set back the relationship. Our Consulate in Jalalabad has been subject to a terrorist attack for the first time, raising questions about the timing. This has been followed by the highly provocative killing of five Indian soldiers inside our territory in J&K a couple of days ago. Earlier on, the Pakistani Foreign Office issued a statement on a recent incident of firing inside J&K, the harshness of which was incompatible with a desire to turn a new page in bilateral ties. In this context, the implications of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s declared intention to focus on resolving the Kashmir issue need to be properly analyzed.

The trend lines of Pakistan’s hostile acts, both through its organs of state and sponsored non-state actors, which are accompanied by implausible and even insulting denials and explanations, do not show signs of reversal under Pakistan’s new government which has blandly denied even the occurrence of the latest incident of the killing of our soldiers. Since the beginning of this year, 57 incidents of border violations have occurred. The Raksha Mantri has informed Parliament that both infiltration by terrorists and ceasefire violations on the LoC have increased by more than 80 percent since last year.

In these circumstances, it is evident that the euphoria over the change of government in Pakistan, and its initial statements is misplaced. India would be well
advised to calibrate its approach to Pakistan not to mere assurances and promises of a desire for normalization of relations but to concrete indicators that the latter is moving away from the use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy.

Over the years, we have put behind us many instances of hostile acts by Pakistan, including the terrorist attacks against the symbols of our democracy, our centres of economic activity, our cities and our streets, in the hope that engagement and dialogue will change Pakistan's behavior in its own interest. The meagre results of this policy are apparent. It is unfortunate that we have learnt nothing from this and have gone to make compromise after compromise with Pakistan simply to keep some kind of engagement going. Such a policy of appeasement has manifestly failed to deliver results – as indeed all appeasement must fail. This is the ineluctable lesson of history.

The way forward is for all Indians, and the government in particular, to develop a national consensus on issues of national security, counter-terrorism and defence preparedness, de-linking them from electoral politics. Ill-advised attempts and measures to denigrate and undermine the functioning of vital institutions like the Army and the Intelligence Bureau through motivated assertions and leaks to the media are a cause of serious concern. These inflict incalculable damage on vital security institutions and systems, and on the morale of the personnel concerned.

At a time when Pakistan is day in and day out using terrorism against us, it would be ill-advised for the Prime Minister to meet with Nawaz Sharif as it would signal that relations between the two countries are in a business-as-usual mode. India should show no anxiety to hold a dialogue with Pakistan, keep a steady focus on the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in any conversation that takes place, abjure language that equates our problems with terrorism with those of Pakistan, and take Siachen out of the basket of issues to be discussed with Pakistan as and when a dialogue is resumed, in view of the evolution of the ground situation in the area.

India has for much too long meekly put up with Pakistan-inspired terrorism and our citizens across the country have paid a
terrible price. This has only encouraged Pakistan in its pursuit of such policies. It is time that policies are devised that will impose a cost on Pakistan for its export of terror to India, and thus change the cost-benefit calculus of these policies and actions. A proactive approach by India towards Pakistan must be the order of the day, as it will yield us much better results than those garnered by policies of appeasement which have regrettably been pursued by us for years.

We therefore strongly recommend that we do not rush into a dialogue with Pakistan, and the proposed meeting between the Prime Ministers of the two countries be cancelled.

LIST OF SIGNATORIES TO THE STATEMENT

1. Mr Anil Baijal, former Home Secretary
2. Amb Satish Chandra, former Deputy National Security Advisor
3. Maj Gen Ramesh C Chopra, Strategic Expert
4. Lt Gen Shantanu Choudhry, former Vice Chief of Army Staff
5. Amb Rajiv Dogra, former High Commissioner to Italy & Romania
6. Mr Ajit Doval, former Director Intelligence Bureau
7. Air Marshal Satish Inamdar, former Vice Chief of Air Staff
8. Mr DR Kaarthikeyan, former Director Central Bureau of Investigation
9. Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director Centre for Land Warfare Studies
10. Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch, Director Centre for Land Warfare Studies
11. Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, former Chief of Air Staff
12. Lt Gen NC Marwah, former CISC & GOC-in-C Andaman and Nicobar Command
13. Maj Gen Ashok Mehta, former GOC IPKF
14. Mr Nripendra Mishra, former Chairman, TRAI
15. Mr DC Nath, former Special Director Intelligence Bureau
16. Vice Admiral KK Nayyar, former Vice Chief of Naval Staff
17. Amb G Parthasarathy, former High Commissioner to Pakistan
18. Brig Vijay Raheja, Strategic Expert
19. Amb M Rasgotra, former Foreign Secretary
20. Mr RN Ravi, former Special Director Intelligence Bureau
21. Gen Shankar RoyChowdhury, former Chief of Army Staff
22. Mr CD Sahay, former Secretary Research & Analysis Wing
23. Lt Gen Ravi Sawhney, former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
24. Brig Vijai Sawhney, Strategic Expert
25. Amb JC Sharma, former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
26. Gen VN Sharma, former Chief of Army Staff
27. Amb Prabhat Shukla, former Ambassador to Russia
28. Amb Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary
29. Amb Rajiv Sikri, former Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs
30. Mr Dhirendra Singh, former Home Secretary
31. Lt Gen PK Singh, Director United Service Institution of India
32. Mr Prakash Singh, former DG Border Security Force
33. Lt Gen SK Sinha, former Vice Chief of Army Staff & Governor J&K & Assam
34. Lt Gen DS Thakur, former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
35. AVM AK Tiwary, former Chief Operations Officer, Air Command
36. Mr AK Verma, former Secretary Research & Analysis Wing
37. Gen NC Vij, former Chief of Army Staff
38. Brig RS Chhikara, Strategic Expert
39. Brig Vinod Anand, Strategic Expert
40. Col Karan Kharb, ex Commanding Officer, 21 Bihar Regiment
41. Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee, former Chief of Staff, Central Command
Interaction With H.E Mr Stewart Beck, Canadian High Commissioner To India

On August 14, 2013, VIF welcomed the High Commissioner of Canada to India, H.E. Mr Stewart Beck. Mr Ajit Doval, KC, Director, VIF, commenced the interactive session by briefing Amb Beck about the objectives and achievements of the Foundation as also a brief backgrounder about the relationship between the two countries.

Amb Beck began his highly informative talk by sharing little known information about the Governor Generals who have served in both the countries. He highlighted the cooperation between the two countries ranging from the Colombo Plan to the present nuclear technology, notwithstanding the difficulties faced during the Khalistan movement and following the Indian nuclear explosions.

Stressing on the need to ‘Walk the Talk’ in the relationship between the two countries, he identified food security including potash, food logistics, food processing, dairy, genetics; education; energy including hydro power and Canadian heavy water nuclear technology, oil and gas; and infrastructure among the areas with high potential.

Amb Beck also answered several questions raised by members of the distinguished audience and expressed hope that ties between the two Commonwealth nations would further strengthen in the days to come.

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Launch Of Red Revolution 2020 And Beyond: Strategic Challenges To Resolve Naxalism

Red Revolution 2020 and Beyond: Strategic Challenges to Resolve Naxalism authored by Lt Gen V K Ahluwalia, Army Commander, Central Command, was launched at a release function at the Vivekananda International Foundation on August 19, 2013. The book was jointly released by Mr Ajit Doval, KC, Director, VIF, Mr Ved Marwah, former Governor and Director General, National Security Guard and Lt Gen K M Seth, former Governor of MP and Chhattisgarh and a highly decorated officer, who led the counter insurgency operations in Nagaland.

All the speakers highlighted the need for concerted action against the Naxalites but highlighted the need to restore the rights of the tribals and win the confidence of the local population.

The book launch was attended by senior serving and retired Army officers. Union Minister for Rural Development Mr Jairam Ramesh, who was scheduled to release the book, sent a special message conveying his greetings to the author.

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Launch Of Public Money, Private Agenda - The Use And Abuse Of MPLADS

Public Money, Private Agenda – The Use and Abuse of MPLADS, a book written by Dr.A.Surya Prakash, Distinguished Fellow, VIF was launched at an impressive function at the VIF by Mr.Shivraj Patil, the Hon’ble Governor of Punjab on Aug 22, 2013. The former Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Mr.Purno Sangma presided over the function. Mr.Kishore Chandra Deo, Union Minister for Panchayati Raj and Tribal Affairs and Mr.Arun Shourie, former Union Minister spoke on the book.

The event was attended by many distinguished parliamentarians including Mr. Jaipal Reddy, Union Minister of Science and Technology; Dr.Subramanian Swamy, Mr.Venkaiah Naidu; Mr.Saugata Roy and Mr.D.P.Tripathi.

The book takes a comprehensive look at the Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS), which was launched twenty years ago in 1993. The scheme began with an allocation of Rs one crore per annum per MP. It has now been raised to Rs 5 crore.

Mr.Patil said that although there were deficiencies in the implementation of MPLADS, the scheme should not be scrapped. Mr.Kishore Chandra Deo, who is a veteran parliamentarian, also spoke of the efficacy of the scheme in meeting local needs of the people. Mr.Arun Shourie expressed concern over misuse of these funds and allegations of corruption and said the scheme should be scrapped. Mr.Sangma said Mr.Surya Prakash’s book provides the first comprehensive, independent and incisive analysis of this scheme. Mr.Ajit Doval, Director VIF and Mr.Kapish Mehra, Managing Director, RUPA Publishers, spoke on the occasion.