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Editor’s Note

The recent controversy surrounding a serious confrontation between India’s premier investigating agency, the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI), and the nation’s internal intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), was not only in bad taste but also detrimental to national interests.

Subversion of national institutions for vested political interests has become a norm with the present Government whether it be the CVC, CBI, CAG or even the NIA. As Dr M N Buch, former Secretary to the Government of India, aptly puts in his enlightening article, “If IB starts hitting back, we may have a turf war in which both national security and control over heinous crime will suffer devastating body blows. Government can no longer remain a silent spectator. The time for action is now.“

The terror attack in Bodh Gaya raised several questions, some of which have been dealt by Dr N Manoharan in his article while Rohit Singh has dealt with portents of increased terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Allahabad High Court order on caste based political rallies has reignited the debate on the role of caste in Indian politics, which has been discussed extensively in the current issue.

Prof B K Kuthiala, Vice-Chancellor of Makhanlal Chaturvedi National University of Journalism and Communication, has highlighted in his article the role of strategic communication planning in governance and security matters.

Review of books which contribute to the national discourse is a new section which we have added to the website. We look forward to your contributions and suggestions in this regard.

*KG Suresh*
Uttarakhand Tragedy: Lessons Galore

The state of Uttarakhand faced one of the worst tragedies in recent memory. Several hundreds were killed and property worth thousands of crores was damaged by the floods. Man made problems turned a natural calamity into a national disaster. If the armed forces once again won the hearts of millions of countrymen, by displaying immense courage in the face of adversity, the political class and the bureaucracy let the people down.

Yatras and pilgrimages take place across India. What is required is to put in place logistics and infrastructure to cope with the rush and regulation of traffic wherever necessary. It is beyond comprehension as to why preventive and remedial steps were not taken once the Met office had made predictions of heavy rains. If pilgrim traffic to Vaishno Devi and Amarnath can be regulated, why was an unmanageable number allowed to proceed to Kedarnath? A routine registration process would have helped in gathering accurate data of casualties and missing persons. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was set up in the wake of the Tsunami to macro guide and holistically manage such situations rather than being response centric. They were mandated to fill up the gaps of other civilian agencies and coordinate efforts including rendering timely advice to the state Governments concerned. It is apparent that it did not live up to the desired level. It also needs to be analysed whether this 1000 troop strong agency was not allowed to function due to the turf battles within the system.

The need for pre-locationing of troops in the areas of possible impending disasters has been emphasised time and again. Such a step would not only allow agencies such as the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) to familiarize themselves with the area but also enable them to know the civilian Government personnel for better coordination during an emergency. Similarly, ever since the Kosi floods in Bihar, there has been a demand for setting up a national reserve of stores including hygiene and sanitary material, medicine, tentage etc so
that they can be readily available in times of crisis.

Continuing deforestation, rampant construction activity in blatant violation of land use and environmental laws and regulations, reckless building of dams and reservoirs in eco-sensitive zones are matters of serious concern, which need to be factored in while preparing a roadmap for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas.

While a political blame game does not help, fixing of responsibility is important to ensure that such criminal negligence does not recur. The people of Uttarakhand are resilient by nature. It is for the Governments at the Centre and the state to heal their wounds and make Uttarakhand a role model for sustainable development and recovery.

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Intelligence Vs. Investigation, Or CBI Vs. IB?

- Dr M N Buch

The controversy surrounding a major confrontation between India’s premier investigating agency, the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI), and the nation’s internal intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which has been aired in the media emerges out of the Ishrat Jehan case of Gujarat in which the woman and her companions were shot dead by the Gujarat Police in what is claimed to be an encounter between a terrorist group of which Ishrat Jehan was a member, whose objective was to target the Chief Minister of Gujarat personally and the police which took counter measures. The source of information on the basis of which action was taken is said to be an intelligence report prepared by an IB officer in which the connection between Ishrat Jehan and her companions with a Pakistan based L-e-T terrorist group was mentioned.

CBI is investigating the case on the direction of the Supreme Court. One of the suspects, whom CBI wants to interrogate, is the Special Director, Intelligence Bureau. The subject of investigation apart, let it be understood that CBI is exercising police powers in this case, whereas IB is governed by its own mandate which is to do counter espionage work within India, neutralise espionage by hostile powers within the country, obtain information about likely threats to law and order, internal security and the integrity of the country and to keep a watch on all anti national activity which can result in harm to India. In performing police functions, the CBI has to follow in substance and in practice the provisions of chapter XII, Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and for the purpose of proving a case, it has to function according to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Anything that CBI does in this behalf has to follow the rules of evidence, including relevance and admissibility of evidence and its credibility. Chapter XII, Cr.P.C. is very well drafted and any investigation carried out under its provisions is bound to be

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just and credible. If evidence is planted or falsely generated, the rules of evidence would expose this and a trial court would reject the evidence. Therefore, CBI is a police force exercising the powers of investigation of the police when dealing with a criminal case. This governs the Ishrat Jehan case also. The only duty of the CBI is to arrive at the truth, not to try and mould evidence to fulfil a predetermined theory of who is guilty, in this case the Gujarat Police.

The Intelligence Bureau does not have a mandate to investigate offences. It is not governed by the rules of evidence as prescribed by the Indian Evidence Act, it does not have police powers and, therefore, does not have to follow the procedure laid down in chapter XII, Cr.P.C.

The Intelligence Bureau does not have a mandate to investigate offences. It is not governed by the rules of evidence as prescribed by the Indian Evidence Act, it does not have police powers and, therefore, does not have to follow the procedure laid down in chapter XII, Cr.P.C. It has no power to prosecute and, therefore, it has no interaction with courts. At the same time, it has at its disposal agents who can obtain human intelligence, it has electronic devices for intelligence collection, it has friends and well wishers and, perhaps, double agents to obtain information and it has other sources, primary and secondary, through which information is collected which might be of interest to India. It is the job of IB to sift through all this matter and then identify that which is of relevance for maintaining the security of India. There are many ways through which intelligence is collected. For example, in Britain, SIS had a whole psychiatric and psychological division during Second World War, whose main objective was to study the psychology of enemy leaders, including Hitler and thereon build a portrait which would enable the Allies to predict how Hitler and other leaders would react to a given situation. The psychological warfare division was then required to suggest counter measures which could psychologically neutralise the enemy. The work of an intelligence organisation, therefore, is to develop sources of information, quite often totally informal sources, collate and analyse the information and then suggest alternative methods of neutralising any adverse action.
against India which the information indicates.

The world of intelligence and espionage is grey, hazy and all outlines are blurred. The world of investigation is aimed at bringing into sharp focus facts which can be proved in a court of law, to create a realistic image of a criminal, bring the criminal to justice and by presenting proof of guilt, obtain a conviction. We now, therefore, have one world which is spooky and with blurred outlines, with a combination of fact, fiction and imagination and, through analysis, a course of action which can neutralise all adverse influences and factors. This is so vastly different from the world of investigation that the two must be kept resolutely and definitively apart. Investigation has to live in a glare of public scrutiny in order to prove its credibility, but intelligence must at all times be anonymous and secretive.

Intelligence is a matter of probabilities based on such information inputs as are available. An intelligence agency has to sift the probable options, but cannot ignore them, however outlandish. Every time a terrorist strike takes place, whether in Bombay on 8th November 2010, or in Chhattisgarh on 25th May 2013, whether a bomb blast takes place or Pakistani intrusions are there in border areas, the first cry is that there is an intelligence failure. Should intelligence agencies, therefore, pass on every bit of unverified information and constantly cry wolf? Or does the agency restrict itself to passing on only that which is possible and most likely probable, inviting the criticism that for the time when verification was being done the intelligence agency held back information which, if it had been passed on in time, could have prevented an incident?

Because intelligence officers work in a grey area, because their identity and outline must be hazy so that individuals are not compromised, all intelligence agencies work in the background and try and merge into it. The police and CBI seem to delight in discussing in public every stage of investigation. An intelligence agency by definition must remain in the dark, must not discuss its operations and must pass on information which can be acted upon. An intelligence agency works on the twin premise of “need to know” and “deniability”. This means that only those who need to know should be privy to
information and at all times intelligence operatives and agencies should be in a position to credibly deny any statement attributed to them. Under no circumstance should an intelligence agency or an individual officer reveal sources because a compromised source in the world of intelligence is as good as a dead source. That is why no intelligence agency ever acknowledges as its own any of its agents who have been caught and charged with espionage. This is a part of the doctrine of deniability and it must be respected.

In the Ishrat Jehan case, the CBI is attempting to question the Special Director of IB, with a view to making him an accused, on account of some intelligence report he is stated to have given. This is what revelation of the contents of an intelligence report would amount to. Such a document is not a confessional statement. It is not a document in the public domain and it is not a confession and in fact it is not a document which can be admitted as evidence at all under the Indian Evidence Act. If there is a case against the IB officer concerned it would have to be proved by evidence other than the intelligence report which has allegedly been made by the officer concerned. It is certainly not a public document as defined by section 74, Indian Evidence Act.

There are certain fundamental questions which are a cause of concern. The Intelligence Bureau is charged with ensuring that the security of the State and the integrity of India is not jeopardised on account of the actions of anti national and anti social elements. This can only be done by penetrating anti national bodies and collecting intelligence on the basis of which they can be neutralised. It is acknowledged that because this intelligence does not meet the test of proof as laid
down in the Indian Evidence Act, a great deal of it may be misinformation deliberately planted by the enemy, information which has an element of gossip and information which may be dated and, therefore, no longer relevant. The Intelligence Bureau of course has to sieve out all questionable information, but at no stage can it afford to ignore a source which may not prima facie appear to be credible. Information which can be acted upon must be passed on to operational agencies such as the police and these agencies are required to act, albeit with caution. Even over reaction is better than no reaction or no information. To let the blame be on an IB officer because on verification the information turned out to be not very credible is ridiculous because any operational agency would be foolish if it paid no heed to intelligence reports. The report and the officer both must enjoy anonymity.

In the Ishrat Jehan case, the CBI is obviously under the twin pressure of a government hostile to Narendra Modi and the Supreme Court which pictures itself as St. George on a white charger out to slay the dragon of communalism in Gujarat. Therefore, CBI seems to have been swayed from the path of honest investigation as it is required to do under chapter XII, Cr.P.C. and has preferred to follow the trail of red herrings drawn across its path. This has led to direct confrontation between CBI and IB, which does not bode well for the future of India’s security.

How can the situation be remedied? The Supreme Court insists that government should have nothing to do with CBI. The logic of this completely defeats me because whether the Supreme Court and the so-called activists like it or not, the CBI is a police force and is neither above nor below any police force. In fact, in view of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, List 2 which makes police a State subject, even the existence of CBI as a legal entity is very much in doubt. Because the CBI is a police force, superintendence over it must vest in government and whereas it has to enjoy complete legal autonomy in investigation of offences, its accountability has to be to the government, which must have the power to take action if such accountability is not properly discharged. Superintendence can never be passed on to anyone other than to an executive authority. Under Article 227 of the
Constitution, superintendence over all courts vests in the High Court and this superintendence cannot be diluted. Under the Indian Police Act and even the Model Police Act drafted by the Soli Sorabjee Committee, superintendence vests in government. CBI cannot have a separate provision because it is, when all is said and done, a police force. The parameters of superintendence can be laid down and in fact that is exactly what the Soli Sorabjee Committee has suggested. The exercise of superior powers by government has to be as per prescribed laws, rules and regulations and cannot be arbitrary, but the ultimate accountability has to be to government and government must be armed with powers to ensure that not only is there accountability but there is action for failure to discharge it. It is because by various pronouncements, the Supreme Court has made the concept of CBI’s accountability somewhat hazy that CBI is running riot by acting on the one hand as the hand maiden of the party in power and on the other hand by misusing its police powers to harass rather than investigate. We must let the Intelligence Bureau perform its function without fear or favour and under no circumstances should we either jeopardise the source of information nor use this information to incriminate IB officers. This has to be made very clear to CBI because if it continues in its present attitude, the country’s intelligence set up will be damaged. Let government step in immediately to protect IB and to remind CBI of how it must function as a police force. This intervention must be effective and any officer who defies government must be immediately sacked, even if it be the Director, CBI himself.

The present anarchy that prevails in CBI functioning is very disturbing, especially in the context of federalism. In British days, the Centre had very few policemen to call its own. It had the Agency Police in the Princely States to perform Railway Police functions and to enforce the writ of the Resident. It had a couple of battalions of the Crown
Representative’s Police, the CRPF of today, to help the States to maintain order, but for the rest, the executive force was the Provincial Police. Because the objective of government, Central and Provincial, was the same, the maintenance of imperial rule, there was mutual trust. Today there is no trust between the Centre and the States and, therefore, we have huge numbers of Central Armed Police Forces over whom the States have no control, with the State Police Force being deliberately allowed to run down and become ineffective. If they are partisan, unfortunately, so are the Central Forces, with one ethos being applied to Gujarat and another to Assam. The answer to mutual distrust is not more centralisation. It is meaningful Federalism in which both the Centre and the States feel part of a larger whole. It is what Babulal Gaur, then BJP Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh told a somewhat discomfited Mrs. Sonia Gandhi when Arjun Singh took him to meet her. Gaur said, “Rest easy, Madam. I have not come to in any way embarrass you, but to remind you that Madhya Pradesh is part of India”.

The tragedy is that gradually the Centre has taken over even forensic investigation and left the State Police high and dry. As the police’s impartiality becomes doubtful, so its capability declines, so the Centre inflates CBI and creates the National Investigation Agency (NIA). The CBI of today is not the Force of D.P. Kohli. The downfall of CBI was censured by D.Sen who, as Director during the Emergency, sank it to a depth which makes the Mindanao Deep look like a shallow trench. The same CBI, which became Indira Gandhi’s hatchet, then turned on the Congress when Janata Dal came to power. I am witness to this because in 1978-79, when I headed the Delhi Development Authority, my permission was sought to prosecute, amongst others, Jagmohan, my predecessor, along with Sanjay Gandhi, for demolitions at Kapashera and Andheria Mod. The supervision note written by the S.P. concerned read, “The purpose of this investigation is to bring home offences under sections 427, 442, 448, 145, 147, 34 and 120B IPC against Sanjay Gandhi, Jagmohan, Ranbir Singh and others”. B.R. Tamta, the Municipal Commissioner of Delhi at whose behest and as whose agent DDA had carried out demolitions, was spared because he had agreed to turn approver.
This is not permitted to the police under chapter XII, Cr.P.C. Pardon can only be granted by a Magistrate at the time of enquiry, investigation or trial, but only in a case triable by a court of session where the minimum sentence is seven years imprisonment. The maximum sentence under the sections with which the accused were charged in this case is three years and, therefore, Tamta could not have been pardoned. I, therefore, refused permission because the investigation was tainted and biased against Sanjay Gandhi and Jagmohan.

The CBI then, through its Special Director, R.D. Singh, tried to browbeat me, going to the extent of threatening me. The lasting impact on me was that the Force has degenerated to an extent where it needs to be disbanded and then reconstituted to become an impartial, professional instrument for investigating complex crimes, but always in partnership with the State Police. Today the CBI is targeting Narendra Modi. Will Sonia Gandhi be the victim tomorrow? The case against the Special Director, IB, is obviously only a means of reaching Modi. This is disgusting.

If IB starts hitting back, we may have a turf war in which both national security and control over heinous crime will suffer devastating body blows. Government can no longer remain a silent spectator. The time for action is now.

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Doubts persist both in India and the United States on the substance of their strategic partnership. High-sounding declarations about the partnership being one of the defining ones of the 21st century, or one between “natural allies,” have not erased uncertainties in the two countries about the capacity and willingness of each side to meet the expectations of the other.

Growing India-U.S. convergence on several issues has not eliminated significant divergences emanating from huge disparity in power, different priorities, conflicting regional interests and differing views on structures of global governance. India has moved from distrust to positive engagement and greater acceptance of basic U.S. goodwill towards it. The U.S. is devoting higher attention to India than ever before in recognition of its growing international importance. But this improved atmosphere in bilateral relations is not sufficient for ironing out real differences.

Wide Gaps

While there is like-mindedness on issues of democracy, pluralism, human rights, economic liberalisation, terrorism, religious extremism, non-proliferation and the like, their treatment in concrete situations exposes wide gaps in the thinking of the two countries. India notes the selective manner in which “universal values” are promoted, sparing friends who spurn them and sanctioning adversaries for similar repudiation. Even in the case of terrorism, the conduct of some is condoned while that of others invokes steps to bring about regime change.

On Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Climate Change, the Doha Round, sovereignty issues, global governance, etc., India and the U.S. have different perspectives. While differences between the U.S. and some of its allies on important issues do not call into question the basic assumptions about their mutual relationship within an
alliance system, in India’s case the “strategic relationship” gets stress-tested in public opinion each time the two countries are in discord.

Our strategic partnership with the U.S. cannot presume identity of views on contentious international issues or adjustment of Indian policies to suit American preferences alone. Yet, when India speaks of strategic autonomy, U.S. votaries and Indian champions of a strong India-U.S. friendship decry such thinking as mired in India’s defunct nonaligned credo. If the Indian Parliament passes a nuclear liability law imposing supplier liability on nuclear vendors, particularly after Fukushima, U.S. and Indian strategic affairs specialists become petulant. Similarly, if U.S. companies are excluded from defence contracts, there is interrogation about India’s commitment to a strategic partnership with the U.S. Elements in India characterise genuine policy differences as fence-sitting, reluctance to accept burden-sharing in upholding the international order and free-loading by India on the back of those powers who make hard choices, sometimes at the cost of their own immediate interest, to maintain peace and security.

Recurrent doubts in India about the quality of its U.S. relationship are fuelled by the inconsistency, lack of steadiness and even transparency of U.S. policies. The U.S. can change gears to suit its interests at a particular juncture, shaped by electoral considerations or lobbying. It is adept at giving varying spins to its policies as circumstances demand. The U.S. policy towards Pakistan, despite its terrorist affiliations and disruptive role in Afghanistan, exemplifies this. Washington’s military and economic aid to Islamabad continues despite Pakistan’s complicity in sheltering Osama bin Laden. Notwithstanding Pakistan’s abetment of terrorism in India and the strategic headaches it causes to the U.S., the American tendency to equate India and Pakistan resurfaces from time to time.

Our strategic partnership with the U.S. cannot presume identity of views on contentious international issues or adjustment of Indian policies to suit American preferences alone.
disregarding India’s fundamental strategic doubts about politically rehabilitating the Taliban by dialoguing with it. The U.S. now seems open even to the Haqqani network’s participation in the political end-game in Afghanistan. On China, the signals waver, with the declaration of a pivot towards Asia with China’s rise in mind, which is then diluted to “re-balancing” detached from China-related fears and, finally, the wisdom of any beefed-up Asia-Pacific policy is questioned by the would-be U.S. Secretary of State.

US Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit in June for the fourth round of the strategic dialogue illustrated these cross-currents moulding the India-U.S. strategic partnership. The joint statement issued on the occasion omits any mention of Pakistan, even in the context of the Mumbai attack. The references to terrorism and “violent extremism” and to dismantling of terrorist safe havens in the region are worded to avoid finger-pointing at Pakistan. There being no risk of any other political force being excluded by design or choice, the reference to “inclusive” Presidential and Provincial elections in Afghanistan in 2014 is puzzling, as it suggests that India too is advocating the “inclusion” of Taliban in these elections. The rhetoric about the reconciliation process being Afghan-led and Afghan-owned sounds hollower with the U.S. decision to talk directly to the Taliban at Doha, as Kabul will not dictate the negotiating script to Washington. The red lines drawn by the international community for any deal with the Taliban have been blurred in the joint statement which speaks in general terms about preserving “the historic political, economic and social progress made over the last decade,” though in Kerry’s speech at the Habitat Centre these red lines are reiterated. It is not clear how India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid could say in his joint press conference with Kerry that the U.S. “will ensure that none of the concerns of India is overlooked or undermined,” when the very act of talking to the Taliban under Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s benign oversight subverts India’s interests.

The joint statement omits any mention of China, the South China Sea or U.S. “re-balancing” towards Asia, though Kerry affirmed in his press statement that the U.S.
leadership considered India a key part of such a re-balance. There is only a general reference — in the paragraph dealing with the Indian Ocean and the Arctic Council — to maritime security, unimpeded commerce and freedom of navigation! Iran and Syria are absent from the statement. The India-U.S. strategic dialogue thus ignores or obfuscates key strategic issues.

**Arm-Twisting**

Kerry pushed India unreasonably on the civilian nuclear front by unilaterally affirming in the joint press conference with Khurshid — beyond the joint statement’s non-committal language — that the two sides had agreed that a commercial agreement between Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India should be reached by September this year. This is hardly possible when highly complex issues such as capital investment, financial mechanisms and the per-unit tariff rate have to be finalised, besides meeting other regulatory requirements. Is Kerry suggesting that the “full and timely implementation of the civil nuclear deal” requires India to hasten the finalisation of nuclear contracts with U.S. firms, irrespective of any consideration? Perhaps this arm-twisting is related to the Prime Minister’s expected visit to Washington in September.

The extraordinary emphasis on climate change issues by Kerry during his visit unnecessarily risks converting a complex global issue into a contentious bilateral one. Kerry waxed eloquent on the new energy market being the “biggest market ever seen on earth ... a $6 trillion market with 4 billion users,” suggesting powerful commercial considerations behind his push. The wisdom of creating a working group headed by Kerry and Khurshid to intensify bilateral efforts to address “forcefully” this “urgent” issue — which means increasing the weight of non-technical foreign policy considerations into bilateral discussions — is questionable.

Positive features were, of course, not missing from Kerry’s visit, given the much improved tenor of
India-U.S. ties and the extraordinarily rich agenda of bilateral cooperation which in many unspectacular ways can be productive for India. The short point is that the cogs of the strategic partnership still grate with each other and the machine is not adequately lubricated yet by the diplomatic grease of coherence, clarity, balance of interests and a sense of true partnership.
Has China Upstaged India In Space Diplomacy?

- Radhakrishna Rao

Space exploration, once a preserve of the advanced industrialized countries, is no more being viewed as an area of esoteric research involving a huge investment and complex technological systems. Indeed, space technology has now become an indispensable tool for improving the quality of human life on earth in addition to helping boost the war fighting capability in a substantial manner. And on the international arena, space cooperation has emerged as a platform for furthering the diplomatic clout and political ambitions besides helping project “soft power”.

And this is an area where Communist China has made rapid forays in expanding its influence over many of the third world countries keen on entering the space age. By making available space services—by way of building custom made satellites followed by their in orbit-delivery—China not only stands to expand its business interests but also seeks to strengthen its diplomatic clout. By arranging soft loans and providing knowhow and expertise for building and launching satellites on reasonable terms, China is all set to become a recognised player in the multi-billion dollar global space market. Indeed, this dual offer of technological support and financial assistance on reasonable terms has made China the most sought after “space partner” for the developing countries.

Against such a backdrop, the possibility of India’s Himalayan neighbour Nepal turning to China for its satellite project is very much on the cards. Nepal which is now examining the feasibility of getting its first satellite launched before the middle of this decade, has however revealed that it would look at launching the satellite “through a joint venture of national and international firms along with the Government of Nepal”. Further, the Nepalese Government sources in

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Kathmandu also stated that “If Nepal is unable to entirely use the satellite for its internal consumption, it can be leased to either China or India or both for commercial purposes”.

Given the aggressive pitch by the China Great Wall Industries Corporation (CGWIC), the commercial arm of the Chinese space programme, the Nepalese satellite project contract going the Chinese way is considered a “strong possibility.”

Rapidly expanding Chinese influence over this erstwhile Hindu kingdom along with the rabid anti India stance of a section of the political spectrum in the country implies that in all probability, Nepal will turn to China for getting its satellite project off the ground.

There are no clear cut clues as of now on what steps India would initiate to wean Nepal away from China in the crucial area of satellite technology enterprise,. Of course, India can offer Nepal a co branded and co owned satellite that both the countries could share. For the ground reality is that Nepal may not need the entire capability of a satellite to meet its needs. Here India should play its card very shrewdly by bringing in diplomatic finesse to win the confidence of Nepal. Moreover, India should offer an economically alluring and technologically superb package to meet the Nepalese needs of satellite capability. As it is, the allotment of an orbital slot to Nepal to position its satellite by the Geneva based International Telecommunication Union (ITU) will expire by 2015. This implies that Kathmandu is required to launch the satellite before this deadline.

As it is, Indian security and intelligence agencies are already perturbed over the inroads made by China in forging space cooperation with Sri Lanka and Maldives, the two Indian Ocean island nations with which India has had a long history of cordial relations. Bangladesh too is known to be moving closer to the Chinese offer to build and launch a dedicated satellite.
In fact, there is dismay in New Delhi over Bangladesh, whose emergence as an independent country owed much to the Indian support, inviting CGWIC for realizing its "space plan." The Request for Proposal (RFP) floated in 2011 by the telecom regulator of Bangladesh seeks to get a domestic communications satellite named “Bangabandhu” launched. And the addition of Nepal to the “celestial orbit” of China cannot but be a disturbing development for India with strong strategic, diplomatic and political overtones.

Indeed, India’s missed opportunities in terms of strengthening ties with its immediate neighbours through space cooperation has been the centrepiece of reports recently brought out by Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The thesis of R&AW is that China capitalised on India’s indifference to the needs of the neighbouring countries. Indeed, an Inter-Ministerial meeting held in February this year stressed the need for Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to play a “pro active” role in helping Maldives and Sri Lanka realize their space dreams. It was felt that India could offer some of its vacant orbital slots for positioning of the proposed communications satellites of Sri Lanka and Maldives.

According to ISRO, “a mutually beneficial cooperation arrangement for building satellites and operating them with increased coverage areas over India can be worked out so that capabilities of the satellites can be used by India and Sri Lanka.” But this strategy is not likely to work. For Sri Lanka’s first partly owned satellite SupremeSAT which was launched by a Chinese Long March -1 rocket in November last has been hailed as a landmark event in Sino-Sri Lankan high tech collaboration. What does this development imply for India? Is this yet another addition to the String of Pearls strategy being vigorously pursued by China? Will Sino-Sri Lankan handshake in space give a new edge to China’s geopolitical game plan in the Indian Ocean? This partly owned satellite perched up over the Indian Ocean region could prove a trump card for China in providing a boost to its commercial, strategic and military interests in the Indian Ocean region. For both Sri Lanka and China, this space endeavour representing a joint venture between Colombo based regional satellite service provider SupremeSAT and CGWIC is a win
win deal. As part of this joint venture, a second SupremeSAT satellite is planned to be launched sometime this year. Also a fully owned Sri Lankan satellite will be launched by 2015.

Responding to the Indian concerns, Sri Lankan Government sources in Colombo had made it clear that the satellite launch was a private sector initiative by Supremesat which entered into an agreement with CGWIC for the satellite launch.

“From a larger geopolitical perspective, it sends a message to India that a country in its own backyard is cosying up with China” says Brahma Chellany, an expert on strategic affairs at the New Delhi based Centre for Policy Research.

Of course, India’s strength in building world class satellites has widely been recognised but all said and done, the Bangalore based commercial arm of the Indian space programme, Antrix Corp lacks the kind of resources and expertise at the command of CGWIC. In particular, India lacks an operational launch vehicle powerful enough to deliver a communications satellite weighing over 2-tonne.

Also, India is yet to develop a base resurgent enough to launch a satellite on commercial terms. For the Antrix Corp to grab international orders for building and launching satellites, the Government of India should increase funding to strengthen and expand the infrastructure good enough to accomplish commercial orders.

On the other hand, China has a sound track record of building and launching communications satellites on turnkey basis for the developing countries including Pakistan, Nigeria and Venezuela. CGWIC has also signed satellite and ground systems export contracts with Bolivia and Laos.

China, which already boasts of three land locked launch centres, is now close to commissioning its new ultra modern coastal launch complex at Hainan Island which also happens to be the epicentre of
the massive Chinese naval build up. This launch station, besides helping China launch its heavier class launch vehicles, would help attract more international customers for its commercial space launch enterprise. In contrast, India boasts of a solitary launch complex in Sriharikota Island on the eastern coast of the country. Though for quite sometime there have been reports to suggest that ISRO is looking at setting up a second launch centre, concrete, ground level action to realize this seems to be lacking. A single operational launch pad makes for a poor strategic sense from the operational point of view.

Moreover, the Indian side had not responded to the Maldivian Government’s tender for a satellite. Though six aerospace outfits from across the world responded to the Maldivian tender, the Government at Male responded positively to the Chinese offer. In fact, sometime back, the Maldivian Government sources had said that India had not sent any proposal for the satellite project. But China which has already dug deep in the “developmental landscape” of Maldives, is making all out efforts to bag the satellite project order.

The view in New Delhi is that ISRO could send a delegation to Maldives to impress upon the political leadership of the country on the feasibility of the Indian offer to build and launch a satellite. Whether this approach would help India win Maldivian confidence, only time will tell.

Indeed, China views its space forays as a pathway for its technological excellence and strategic supremacy. For China, space ascendancy is a major step towards its emergence as a global military power at par with US. No wonder then that China’s political leadership has a strong conviction that its forays in space provides it...
with a spring board to boost its national prestige, showcase its technological prowess, further its military and strategic goals, strengthen its diplomatic and political clout and expand its business interests by offering assistance to the third world countries keen on entering the space age. In contrast, India’s political leadership seems to be long way off from nurturing such a vision.

Notes

1. SupremeSat Chairman R.M.Manivannan has said that Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is cool to his offer of making available the Supremesat-1 capability to the users in India. ISRO is the nodal agency for providing leased satellite capability to users—mainly in broadcasting and telecommunications sectors—in India. Incidentally, India is experiencing an acute shortage of satellite capacity in the context for the phenomenal expansion of telecom and broadcasting services in the country.

2. SupremeSat has inked a US$215-million deal with China Great Wall Industries Corporation(CGWIC) for the in-orbit delivery of SupremeSat-2 satellite. As per the contract, SupremeSat-2 will be launched by means of a Chinese Long March Vehicle in mid-2016.
Hard Power, The Only Currency That Works In Afghanistan

- Lt General (Retd) R K Sawhney & Sushant Sareen

The so-called Afghan endgame is really nothing more than the US endgame in Afghanistan. For the Afghans, there is unlikely to be any endgame. Even the Americans suspect, even fear, that their exit from, nay abandonment of, Afghanistan will most likely embroil the hapless Afghans in a deadly and brutal battle for survival. But the exigencies of domestic politics and economics, and the dwindling diplomatic and military support from its effete NATO allies, have created circumstances in which the Americans don’t want to exercise their will or expend their wealth in taking the War on Terror to its logical conclusion. Worse, they have no coherent policy or strategy against Jihad Inc. – questions are even being raised about their intent to fight Islamist terror given their tacit understanding, if not cooperation, with Al Qaeda affiliates in places like Syria – certainly not in the Afpak region which is really the epicentre of jihadist terrorism.

Under the mistaken notion that appeasing and accommodating the medieval Taliban will halt the spread of Islamic radicalism, the US seems to have bought into Pakistan's con-game in Afghanistan, which holds out the tantalising prospect of a 'honourable' withdrawal for the sole superpower. Of course, there is nothing very honourable in a withdrawal which seeks to bring back into power, albeit through a negotiated ‘settlement’ (surrender is a more appropriate term) the forces of evil against whom the war was fought. The US plan to declare ‘victory’ before exiting only invites sniggers, if not outright contempt, among its well-wishers as well as its enemies who have conspired, connived and contributed materially, morally and monetarily, in inflicting a humiliating defeat on it.

Even more outrageous is the

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 thinly disguised plan to outsource Afghanistan to Pakistan, in effect throwing the Afghans before the proverbial wolves. The Afghan anger and suspicion of the apparent US strategy of making Pakistan the pivot of their Afghan policy is, therefore, entirely understandable. Although the Pakistanis insist that they back an ‘Afghan-driven, Afghan-owned and Afghan-led’ peace process, only the Taliban qualify as Afghans for the Pakistanis. It is of course quite another matter that this disastrous policy of restoring peace and stability in the Afpak region will severely destabilise not just for Afghanistan but also for Pakistan and rest of the region.

The simple paradox about Afghanistan is that if the war against Taliban and their Al Qaeda associates and affiliates is not won, the peace will be lost. Capitulation before the forces of Islamic radicalism and terrorism is, however, being given the spin of ‘reconciliation’. For their part, the Taliban have given no indication that they sincerely desire any sort of reconciliation. Nor is there anything to suggest that they are ready for peaceful co-existence with those who do not subscribe to their medieval mindset. At least the Americans should know by now that the Taliban wouldn’t remain the Taliban if they were reconcilable.

The US clearly has a lot, in fact everything, riding on this ‘reconciliation’ plank hoping that it will bring the Taliban on board. What happens after the Taliban come on board hasn’t quite been thought through. Worse, the Americans don’t have any Plan ‘B’. Essentially, the US policy in Afghanistan is based on a hope and a prayer. They believe that the huge economic and political stakes that people have developed in the Afghan system and the new freedoms and empowerment that have been experienced by the ordinary Afghans will ensure that the Taliban won’t get a walkover if they refuse to reconcile. In other words, as far as the US is concerned, if Plan ‘A’ doesn’t work, the best case scenario in Afghanistan is either a civil war to keep the Taliban and their Al Qaeda associates and affiliates, or a situation where the Taliban dominate the political landscape.
Qaeda allies at bay. The worst case scenario is a Taliban takeover, which ironically is precisely what a successful ‘reconciliation’ of the sorts being tried in Doha i.e. Plan ‘A’, will lead to.

While the US will do what it thinks is in its best interest, and perhaps can live with the consequences of its ill-thought out strategy, the Indian government seems to be totally at sea on its options on Afghanistan. What is touted as India’s policy is really a clumsy rehash of the US policy. From a time when India was deeply sceptical about, if not completely opposed to, the reconciliation process, the Indian position has now regressed to a point where it is now open to a dialogue even with the Taliban. Clearly, the Ministry of External Affairs (and perhaps the entire Indian establishment, if at all there is such a thing anymore) hasn’t quite understood the organic links between Pakistan and the Taliban, summed up by the former Pakistani military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf who called the Taliban Pakistan's ‘strategic reserve that can be unleashed in tens of thousands against India’ whenever Pakistan wanted.

India’s problem with the Taliban is two-fold: one, the Taliban epitomise a barbaric, medieval and radical version of Islam which is antithetical to the very idea of India; two, the Taliban are not independent agents and as long as they are clients and proxies of Pakistan, there is practically no way India can engage with them. This means India can stay relevant in Afghanistan not by being a bystander but by actively bolstering the anti-Taliban forces monetarily, militarily, and politically. To do this, India will have to combine its considerable soft power with smart use of its hard power. Without putting boots on ground, hard power can be exercised by building alliances with other regional countries, pooling together diplomatic and political resources with these countries to campaign against the Taliban, and coordinating with them to support the anti-Taliban forces militarily. Even if such cooperation is not forthcoming, India should bring its own national power to play in support the anti-Taliban forces in every possible way. What India shouldn’t do is bank on things like UN-mandated international security force or a regional treaty forsaking interference in Afghanistan that are being
peddled either by people who don’t understand the play of forces in Afghanistan or by people who want to obfuscate and obstruct any meaningful measure to stall the onslaught of the Taliban and their sponsors across the Durand Line. This will be a mug’s game. After all, if Pakistan and Taliban could defy arguably the strongest military force on the planet, what are the chances of success of these well-meaning but woolly-headed ideas?

Unfortunately, whether out of naivety, or sheer pusillanimity or even a self-cultivated, if also self-defeating, image of being the perpetual nice guys (an image that India’s adversaries have no use for and which India’s friends find frustrating), India has decided to limit its assistance to building hospitals, roads, power plants, schools etc. but not supplying the much needed military assistance and support that will strengthen the anti-Taliban forces. India needs to realise that all its investment in social goods and infrastructure in Afghanistan will turn to dust if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan.

Unless India is ready to use its hard power, it should be ready to once again lock up the Indian embassy in Kabul and withdraw from Afghanistan, at least until the Afghan War 2.0 that will become inevitable after Islamist groups use Afghan soil to start spreading terror around the world.

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Allahabad High Court Ban On Caste Rallies: A Wake Up Call

- K G Suresh

The recent Allahabad High Court verdict banning caste based political rallies in Uttar Pradesh has reignited the debate on the role of caste in Indian politics. The reactions to the court order were on expected lines with the national parties welcoming it and most of the regional parties, particularly with strong caste affiliations, expressing their strong reservations about it.

However, notwithstanding the denials by political parties, caste continues to remain a crucial factor in electoral politics. If most of the regional parties unabashedly exhibit their caste preferences, the national political parties too are equally guilty of perpetuating the caste factor, whether it be in the matter of selection of candidates or projecting party leaders at the regional level. Of course, they often indulge in it under the garb of ‘winnability’, an euphemism for practicing caste and communal politics.

Even those regional Satraps who claim to possess a national vision have never shied away from playing the caste card, whether it be former Prime Minister H D Deve Gowda, who wears his Vokkaliga preferences on his sleeves or the new champion of secularism Nitish Kumar. Though Kumar often slams his arch rival and RJD Supremo Lalu Prasad Yadav as a politician preoccupied with caste, he himself was one of the first politicians in Bihar to organise a caste-based Kurmi rally in early 1992.

Though they cry hoarse from the roof tops that their utopian ideology does not believe in either caste or religion, the Communists, including the ultra left Maoists, have often identified caste with class and such ‘class wars’ have often ended up in ‘Caste Wars’, as was widely seen in Bihar.

The importance some of the national political parties attach to...
the caste factor can be gauged from the fact that barely a week before the High Court order, the ruling Congress party had sought a break-up of various castes in all the 543 Lok Sabha constituencies from its state units in preparation for the coming general elections.

According to media reports, in a confidential communication to all state party Presidents, the High Command asked them to submit population figures and caste break-up along with the complete details of sitting candidates and aspirants as well.

In the words of Noted Sociologist Andre Beteille the most important factor contributing to the caste system’s continuation in India is not the traditions of matrimony or occupation or ritual practices of purity, but politics.

Delivering a special lecture at the Gujarat University recently, the Padma awardee identified caste as the “most important political tool for the mobilisation of the electorate.”

While caste has for long remained a divisive factor in the Indian society, it was the British who laid the foundations of caste politics in the country.

Over eight decades back, the then British Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald announced the Communal Award granting separate electorates to minority communities including Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Anglo Indians, Europeans and Dalits, then identified as the depressed classes or ‘untouchables’.

The depressed classes were allocated a number of seats to be filled by election from special constituencies in which voters belonging to the depressed classes only could vote. The highly controversial move was opposed tooth and nail by Mahatma Gandhi on the grounds that it would disintegrate the Hindu society. However, it was supported by leaders such as Dr B R Ambedkar, with whom Gandhi held prolonged negotiations, leading up to the Poona Pact. The 1932 agreement envisaged that the Depressed Classes shall have
seats reserved within the General electorate.

Following the country’s independence, the nation’s founding fathers chose the Parliamentary system of democracy based on an electoral system which unfortunately tended to reinforce caste consciousness, instead of eliminating it and bringing about an egalitarian social order.

In the words of CPI (M) leader Sitaram Yechury, “Instead of guaranteeing equality, irrespective of caste, the electoral system, itself, nurtured the perpetuation of caste consciousness in terms of choice of candidates and the appeal to the electorate.

The implementation of the Mandal Commission report in 1989 by the then V P Singh Government was yet another landmark in India’s caste politics. Regional Satraps such as Mulayam Singh Yadav, Lalu Prasad Yadav and Deve Gowda rode the Mandal wave to electoral glory.

In his book, ‘Caste in Indian Politics’, sociologist Rajni Kothari argued that the process of politics is one of identifying and manipulating existing structures in order to mobilise support and consolidate positions. Where the caste structure provides one of the most important organisational clusters in which the population is found to live, politics must strive to organise through such a structure."

Unfortunately, the appeal of such caste leaders to their following was not to strengthen the common struggle to remove the inadequacies in the existing socio-economic system. The appeal was and continues to be to elect their fellow caste men to power.

While it did bring about limited political empowerment, some assertiveness and a sense of pride among the Dalit and backward classes, nothing substantial in improving their socio-economic conditions including the much needed land reforms have taken place in any of the states where such caste leaders have acquired power and continue to wield wide influence.

Thus for their self interests, these parties and leaders have sustained and nurtured the exploitative caste system, in the process preserving and perpetuating the exploitative order.
The vehement opposition these caste leaders have shown to any rethink on reservation is aimed at not only protecting their vote banks but also preventing any unity among the poor for a common cause.

The decision to go for a caste based census in 2011, following demands by leaders of the ruling UPA and the Opposition parties, was yet another milestone in the country’s caste politics.

To quote Prof Beteille, “It is okay if sociologists include caste in their surveys. But the government should not give its official sanction, its official stamp to this presentation of Indian society.”

Even the Communist parties, who support the quota system, have gone on record stating that caste based reservation cannot be a lasting solution to the socio-economic disparities. In fact, Yechuri had stated once that, “Enough statistics can be adduced to show that despite reservations, the plight of these sections have not substantially improved.”

Ironically, the only instance of a caste count in post-independent India was carried out in Kerala in 1968 by the Communist Government led by E M S Namboodiripad.

While the intention of the High Court in banning caste based rallies is indeed laudable, it is unlikely to have much impact on curbing the role of caste in Indian politics in the existing scenario.

It would be naïve to expect the country’s political parties to take a lead in the matter.

Here, it is pertinent to mention the case of the State of Odisha, where caste has never been the criterion for popular choice. Whether it is due to the impact of the universal Jagannath cult or the role played by visionary leaders such as Pandit Gopabandhu Das, Biju Pattanaik or Nandini Satapathy, the politically enlightened electorate have time and again shown their preferences to candidates based on performance and not caste.

Though the Patel community continues to play a key role in the
BJP’s success in Gujarat, the overwhelming and repeated support to the Chief Minister, who belongs to a minority caste, is reflective of the changing orientation of the voters in favour of good governance vis a vis caste factors.

Apart from an enlightened choice on the part of voters and good governance on the part of ruling parties, it is also high time to consider whether a system based on proportional representation can be an antidote to caste politics in the country.

Under this system, people would have to vote for parties and not individuals, thereby minimizing appeals on casteist, communal or parochial lines.

The Allahabad High Court ruling has to be taken as a wake up call in national interest.
India’s National Security Management Needs Urgent Reform

- **Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal**

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) appears to have rejected the proposal of the Naresh Chandra Committee on Defence Reforms to appoint a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC).

This is a retrograde step as the proposal itself is a watered down version of the original recommendation of the Group of Ministers (GoM) of 2001 to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

For many decades, defence planning in India has been marked by knee jerk reactions to emerging situations and haphazard single-Service growth. The absence of a clearly enunciated national security strategy, poor civil-military relations, the lack of firm commitment of funds for modernisation beyond the current financial year and sub-optimal inter-service prioritisation, have handicapped defence planning. Consequently, the defence planning process has failed to produce the most effective force structure and force mix based on carefully drawn up long-term priorities. With projected expenditure of US$ 100 billion on military modernisation over the next 10 years, it is now being realised that force structures must be configured on a tri-Service, long-term basis to meet future threats and challenges.

In 1999, the Kargil Review Committee headed by the late Mr. K Subrahmanyan had been asked to “…review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir; and, to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions." Though it had been given a very narrow and limited charter, the committee looked holistically at the threats and challenges and examined the loopholes in the management of national security. The committee

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was of the view that the “political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo.” It made far reaching recommendations on the development of India’s nuclear deterrence, higher defence organisations, intelligence reforms, border management, the defence budget, the use of air power, counter-insurgency operations, integrated manpower policy, defence research and development, and media relations. The committee’s report was tabled in Parliament on February 23, 2000.

The Cabinet Committee on Security appointed a GoM to study the Kargil Review Committee report and recommend measures for implementation. The GoM was headed by the then Home Minister L K Advani and, in turn, set up four task forces on intelligence reforms, internal security, border management and defence management to undertake in-depth analysis of various facets of the management of national security.

The GoM recommended sweeping reforms to the existing national security management system. On May 11, 2001, the CCS accepted all its recommendations, including one for the establishment of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) – which has still not been implemented. The CCS approved the following key measures:

- Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was established with representation from all the Services. The DG DPS was merged in it.
- The post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), whose tasks include inter-Services prioritisation of defence plans and improvement in jointmanship among the three Services, was approved. However, a CDS is yet to be appointed.
- A tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command and a Strategic Forces Command were established.
- The tri-Service Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established under the COSC for strategic threat assessments.
- Speedy decision making, enhanced transparency and accountability were sought to
be brought into defence acquisitions. Approval of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP 2002) was formally announced.

- The DPP constituted the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) and the Defence Technology Board, both headed by the Defence Minister.
- Implementation of the decisions of the DAC was assigned to the Defence Procurement Board (DPB).
- The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was set up.
- The CCS also issued a directive that India’s borders with different countries be managed by a single agency – “one border, one force” and nominated the CRPF as India’s primary force for counter-insurgency operations.

Decision making is gradually becoming more streamlined. The new Defence Planning Guidelines have laid down three inter-linked stages in the planning process:

- 15 years Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), to be drawn up by HQ IDS in consultation with the Services HQ and approved by the DAC.
- Five Years Defence Plans for the Services (current plan: 2007-12), including 5-years Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP), to be drawn up by HQ IDS in consultation with the Services HQ and approved by the DAC.
- Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP), to be drawn up by HQ IDS approved by the DPB. Budgetary allocations for ensuing the financial year (ending March) are made on the basis of the AAP.

Ten years later, many lacunae still remain in the management of national security. The lack of inter-ministerial and inter-departmental coordination on issues like border management and centre-state disagreements over the handling of internal security are particularly alarming. In order to review the progress of implementation of the proposals approved by the CCS in 2001, the government appointed a Task Force on National Security led by Mr. Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary. The task force has submitted its report, which has been sent for inter-ministerial consultations.
Conclusion

A fluid strategic environment, rapid advances in defence technology, the need for judicious allocation of scarce budgetary resources, long lead times required for creating futuristic forces and the requirement of synergising plans for defence and development, make long-term defence planning a demanding exercise. The lack of a cohesive national security strategy and defence policy has resulted in inadequate political direction regarding politico-military objectives and military strategy. Consequently, defence planning in India had till recently been marked by ad hoc decision making to tide over immediate national security challenges and long-term planning was neglected. This is now being gradually corrected and new measures have been instituted to improve long-term planning.

It is now being increasingly realised that a Defence Plan must be prepared on the basis of a 15-year perspective plan. The first five years of the plan should be very firm (Definitive Plan), the second five years may be relatively less firm but should be clear in direction (Indicative Plan), and the last five years should be tentative (Vision Plan). A reasonably firm allocation of financial resources for the first five years and an indicative allocation for the subsequent period is a prerequisite.

Perspective planning is gradually becoming tri-Service in approach. It is now undertaken in HQ IDS, where military, technical and R&D experts take an integrated view of future threats and challenges based on a forecast of the future battlefield milieu, evaluation of strategic options and analysis of potential technological and industrial capabilities. Issues like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, air defence, electronic warfare and amphibious operations, which are common to all the Services, are now getting adequate attention. However, unless a CDS is appointed to guide integrated operational planning, it will continue to be mostly single-Service oriented in its conceptual framework.
Terror Attacks In Bodh Gaya: Prevention Is Better Than Cure

- Dr. N Manoharan

When serial blasts rocked Mahabodhi temple at Bodh Gaya on 07 July 2013, it was for the first time that a Buddhist holy spot was targeted in India. Ten of the 13 bombs planted at the temple were indeed of low intensity, but their psychological impact was huge. Though no group or individual has claimed responsibility so far, fingers are being pointed at four different directions as possible perpetrators.

Was there a political motive? Congress General Secretary Digvijaya Singh tried to connect the timing of the blasts with Gujarat Chief Minister and BJP leader Narendra Modi’s advice to the party workers to teach Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar “a lesson”. What Digvijay Singh was trying to suggest was that the BJP would be interested in projecting Bihar’s law and order situation in a poor light, especially after JDU-BJP split in the state. The speculation has no value other than to gain cheap publicity.

There were also conjectures on the possible involvement of Tamil extremist groups to express their resentment against Sinhala Buddhists for the latter’s treatment towards their ethnic brethren in Sri Lanka. Two Buddhist monks were attacked in Tamil Nadu in March this year; and, in January 2011, the Mahabodhi Society Temple in Chennai was attacked. But, the Tamil groups involved in those attacks clearly lack the capability of carrying out terror attacks, that too using bombs. They have no wherewithal to strike a target more than 2000 kilometers away.

Were Maoists behind the attacks? Gaya is indeed a hotbed of the Maoists, but when it comes to a possible motive, it is difficult to establish their involvement. Mahabodhi temple was neither a state symbol nor a camp for security/police forces. Maoists would not bother otherwise. There

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were doubts whether they did the attack on behalf of any jihadist organisation. There are opportunistic linkages between Maoists and jihadist terror groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). However, such linkages have so far not been so deep as to extend to the outsourcing of terror attacks.

The final possibility is the involvement of the Indian Mujahideen (IM). There have been alerts from the Intelligence Bureau over Mahabodi Temple as one of the prime targets of terror groups like the Indian Mujahideen. The Delhi Police had also sounded out Bodhgaya Temple as one of the targets based on interrogation of IM militants in its custody. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) that has been investigating the case has established IM hands in the blasts. What does the IM have against a Buddhist target? Two broad motives can be established.

The primary aim was to avenge “atrocities” against Muslims in Myanmar by the Buddhist majority. For quite some time, Pakistan-based terror groups like the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Bangladesh-based Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) and Jamaat-e-Mujahideen of Bangladesh (JMB) have been trying to establish a firm foothold in Mayanmar, especially in the Muslim-inhabited Arakan area. They have links with local radical groups like Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Jammat-ul-Arakan, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami Arakan and Difa-e-Musalman Arakan. These Myanmarese groups have training camps in neighbouring Bangladesh. Bodh Gaya is one of the popular pilgrimage destinations for the Burmese Buddhists.

The second motivation was obviously anti-India. The Indian Mujahideen is part of ISI’s grand strategy of destabilisation by taking subversion and terrorism to the heartland of India using violent non-state actors. Thus, IM’s hand is evident in most of the terror attacks in India’s hinterland since the mid-2000s.

The serial blasts clearly established a serious security
It is not clear why the IB alerts were not taken seriously. It is also beyond comprehension why such a high-profile target was not guarded properly. The outer ring was manned by the state police, but with scant presence. Ironically, the security inside the temple premises was entrusted to private security personnel. The fact that 13 bombs were placed at diverse places to go off serially in a span of half-an-hour shows the level of incompetence of the security net around the Mahabodhi temple. This lacuna should be addressed on a priority basis.

An old adage “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” applies to internal security management. Two important preventive measures, among others, are suggested:

1. There should be adequate ‘target-hardening’ around the temple. It includes a professional security cover that should be in a position to deter prospective attackers. Given the importance of the place (a UNESCO heritage site and one of the holiest Buddhist shrines in the world), the idea of deploying a central security force at the outer ring should be explored. The other measures that require attention under ‘target-hardening’ include functional metal detectors, proper frisking, situational awareness, effective surveillance cameras, and check points at all approach roads. The objective is to make the environment as unfriendly and as difficult as possible for the terrorists to commit any subversive act.

2. Also, the key to success in fighting terrorism effectively lies in obtaining accurate and reliable intelligence about impending attacks and neutralisation of terrorist modules well in advance. Intelligence gathering in India, especially preventive aspects of intelligence, needs substantial improvement. Terrorist attacks occur either due to absence of precise/actionable intelligence or, more often, lack of follow-up action even when such intelligence is available. Specific intelligence should reach the concerned agency in real time. Cohesion amongst intelligence agencies and sharing of intelligence in a
far more integrated manner is an operational necessity. What is required is ‘intelligence convergence’ more than ‘intelligence coordination’, of both men and material.
Sometime during the autumn of 2012, security forces homed on to a communication between a terrorist commander in the valley with his handler based in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). The agitated handler was egging the commander to carry out some action on security forces and even threatened to block financial support to his men who had failed to launch any significant attack. This came in the backdrop of the valley passing through two successive summers without any civilian unrest and tourist footfall touching the figure of 13 lakhs which was the highest since the outbreak of insurgency in 1989. The year 2012 was also the most peaceful in terms of casualties inflicted on security forces and civilians by terrorists.

On 19 October 2012, two to three Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists, under pressure to pacify their handler across the LoC, appeared in front of an Army convoy at Pantha Chowk near the Badami Bagh Cantonment and fired on the windscreen of a moving Army vehicle. They, however, soon panicked and failed to inflict any casualty on the army men but killed two civilians in the adjoining Hotel Silver Star before making good their escape. Yet, the audacious nature of the attack surprised many as the ability of the terrorists to initiate direct attacks on security forces (with the exception of grenade lobbing) had been greatly eroded in the past several years. J&K had witnessed only two fidayeen attacks since 2008 and incidents of stand-off fire, ambushes, IED blasts, etc had almost come to a naught. On their part, handlers based in Pakistan stepped up infiltration into J&K and in November, two large groups were intercepted in Kupwara district resulting in the elimination of six infiltrators.

The Pakistan Army also started escalating tensions along the Line

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of Control (LoC) and there was a marked increase in incidents of ceasefire violations in Poonch and Rampur sectors since September 2012. The beheading of two Indian soldiers in Krishna Ghati sector in January this year and mortar shelling in Uri in October 2012, which killed three civilians, were part of its design to one, create a diversion to facilitate successful infiltrations by terrorists and two, to raise their fledgling morale by signaling its renewed support to them.

Meanwhile in the valley, there were strong murmurs that the next summer could see a revival of violence. Houseboat and shikara owners in the Dal Lake were on an overdrive to cash in on the steady stream of tourists who were flocking the hot spots of Gulmarg and Sonamarg even late into October and November 2012. The shutdowns and curfews witnessed in the aftermath of Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru’s hanging in February revived fears that the oncoming summer could see a return of street violence and economic disruptions. But the valley soon limped back to normal and there is no major decline in tourist arrivals.

However, the first few months of 2013 has witnessed a steep rise in casualty figures of security forces when compared to the corresponding period in the last few years. A total of 35 security forces personnel and 12 civilians have been killed in over 32 terrorist initiated incidents in the year (till 13 July 2013). Thirty two security personnel and 14 civilians suffered non-fatal injuries in these incidents including those that occurred on the LoC. In contrast, 17 security personnel and 16 civilians were killed throughout the year in 2012. The onset of summer has seen a sharp increase in the number of infiltration attempts by terrorists and conservative estimates of their total strength in the state has been pegged at around 350-400. At least 10 major infiltration attempts and an equal number of cease fire violations have been detected since May. On 18 May, a Junior Commissioned Officer was killed and a jawan injured while foiling an infiltration bid in Machal sector. In a highly provocative action, Pakistani
troops opened small arms and mortar fire on a forward Indian post in Naugam sector of Kupwara on 24 May during the visit of the local brigade commander who received superficial splinter injuries from a mortar shell. Intermittent exchange of small arms fire between the two sides continued for one week and on 01 June, three infiltrating terrorists were killed in that sector. More recently, on 09 July, five terrorists belonging to a joint infiltrating group composed of more than 10 LeT and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) cadres were killed in the Keran sector.

On 19 June, in a major escalation, Pakistani troops had fired simultaneously on several Indian posts in Mandi, Poonch and Krishna Ghati sectors of Poonch where joint border action teams of Pakistan Army and terrorists are planting IEDs and anti-personnel mines on foot tracks on Indian side of the LoC. In the past one week, two Army soldiers were injured in IED blasts on the LoC in Naushera and Poonch sectors. On 01 July, a lone terrorist was shot dead while infiltrating into the Indian side in Saujian belt of Poonch. The premature detonation of an IED strapped to his body led to suspicions that the terrorist may have been a suicide bomber who was heading towards an Indian picket to inflict maximum casualties on the troops. Frequent violation of the ceasefire by Pakistani troops have become common in this sector where the situation was described as “tense” by the Indian Corps Commander of Jammu division. On 08 July, one civilian porter was killed and three others were injured when a border action team detonated an IED when they were moving from one forward post to another, carrying supplies. Earlier in June, terrorists had intruded in the same area and threatened the porters to stop working for the Indian Army. In the valley, one Army soldier was killed in Rampur sector on 09 July in a suspected border action.

In the hinterland, the attack on an Army truck at Hyderpora in Srinagar on the eve of the Prime Minister's visit to the city on 24 June brought back focus on the valley but the situation could have been worse had the Army not exercised restraint and opened fire to engage the terrorists on the busy national highway which could have caused collateral damage. Eight Army soldiers were killed and nine injured in the attack. The fleeing terrorists also
fired at a picket few kilometers from the attack spot injuring two police personnel. Two days preceding this attack, terrorists had killed two policemen at Hari Singh High Street in the heart of Srinagar city. In fact, the Hyderpora attack was the seventh terrorist incident in the past nine months on the same 25 km stretch of the national highway between Narbal and Pantha Chowk which connects north and south Kashmir. In yet another incident, two policemen were injured when terrorists lobbed a grenade on their vehicle near Narbal crossing on 09 July. This is indicative of the consolidation of their support base in Srinagar city and adjoining areas of Budgam district. Additionally, Bemina (where the fidayeen attack on a CRPF contingent took place on 13 March) and Hyderpora are quite notorious when it comes to incidents of stone-pelting on security forces. Also, it is pertinent to note that this stretch of the highway falls under the administrative boundaries of the two valley districts from where Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was being proposed to be revoked.

LeT’s divisional commander for south Kashmir, Mohammed Qasim, a Pakistani national, is said to be behind most of these incidents which have been carried out with active logistical assistance from the HM. Interestingly, the Hyderpora attack was claimed by the HM to give an indigenous flavour to the “armed struggle” where as the tactics adopted in the attack bore resemblance to that of the LeT. Nevertheless, the HM has also managed to regroup after receiving serious setbacks in the past five years and was behind the killings of four policemen in a Pattan village on 26 April and four army soldiers in Tral on 24 May.

On their part, the security forces have also notched up several successes and 24 terrorists have been liquidated in the year so far both at the LoC and in the hinterland. Notable among them are the elimination of Altaf Baba, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Divisional Commander for south Kashmir who was active since 2008 and Sajjad Ahmed Mir, HM’s Divisional Commander for south Kashmir in two separate operations in Pulwama district.
The arrest of Qari Naved @ Fahadullah, a resident of Multan in Pakistan and LeT’s operational commander in North Kashmir in April from Sopore, was also a major success which led to the subsequent arrest of 10 LeT Over Ground Workers (OGWs) from Sopore and elimination of two top ranking LeT terrorists in Sopore and Srinagar respectively. Both Qasim and Fahadullah were instrumental in recruiting local youth and recycling former militants into their fold. The killing of a local HM cadre, an engineering graduate, in Tral on May 24 raised apprehensions in some quarters about the new generation in the valley once again taking to the gun.

The impending drawdown of ISAF troops from Afghanistan will have its fallout on the security situation in J&K as sponsors of terror will get further incentivized to unleash battle hardened Jihadis from that theatre into Kashmir. It will also provide an opportunity for anti-India terror outfits to seek new recruiting ground and tap more cadres from Afghanistan. LeT already has a sizeable presence in Kunar and Nuristan. The shrill rhetoric of some terrorist commanders including that of the Pakistani Taliban has indicated their desire to launch the next stage of Jihad in Kashmir. All this is nothing new, free-lance Pathan militants have fought in J&K in the 1990s and security forces have a multi-layered counter-infiltration grid bolstered by a robust counter-terrorist grid in the hinterland to thwart the evil designs of the enemy.

But increase in terrorist incidents and cease fire violations demonstrates that there is no change in Pakistan’s state policy even after suffering enormously from the blow back effect of terrorism. It continues to pursue its unfulfilled dream of wresting Kashmir from Indian control and has stepped up mischief as it is sensing an opportunity for its proxies to regain lost ground in Afghanistan. It will also use increased violence in Kashmir and rest of India as a lever to deter it from playing an active role in post-2014 Afghanistan. With this backdrop, there is very little encouragement for India to initiate any dialogue with Pakistan, or grant them concessions on contentious issues like Sir Creek and Siachen unless the new dispensation in that country takes visible steps to roll back the terror bandwagon on its soil. There is no evidence of this
happening yet and incidents of cross-border infiltration and terrorist attacks have only spiked ever since Nawaz Sharif took office in May.

Finally, a word on the operating environment in the valley. Counter-terrorist operations have always been a complex task and require tremendous perseverance on part of the security forces to counter the asymmetric warfare unleashed by a hidden enemy. Increasingly, the atmosphere has become more vicious due to the active use of separatists, human rights activists and some sections of the local media, politicians, intelligentsia etc as force multipliers by the enemy. False allegations of human rights violations and raking up old cases of alleged fake encounters are quite common and these elements are always on the lookout for an opportunity to portray the security forces in a bad light. Active connivance and instigation (sometime due to monetary considerations) by the civil population has posed an additional challenge of crowd-control during ongoing operations. There have been recent instances where Army ambulances carrying injured personnel from the encounter site or those manning the outer cordon have been attacked by stone-pelters. In the already surcharged atmosphere during a gun battle, there is every possibility of security forces opening fire resulting in collateral damage which would then give the separatists a trigger to launch agitations and unrest similar to the kind that was witnessed during three successive summers from 2008 onwards. The Hyderpora attack and the incident in Sumbal five days later, when two civilians were killed in Army firing (where troops were set up by an informer planted by terrorists) are indicative of this dangerous trend. In the following days, the protesters even set fire to an Army Goodwill School in Hajan exposing their nefarious designs to vitiate peace in the valley.

The terrorists are working on a definitive pattern where in the first phase suspected informers of security forces were targeted and
they have now stepped up attacks on security forces albeit in a calibrated manner to keep incidents within a certain threshold. Their aim would be to step up the frequency and lethality of incidents as the Assembly and general elections draw closer. Therefore, the difficult task of the security and intelligence agencies that are operating in a complex and dynamic security environment needs to be appreciated and every effort must be made by the state to back them up. Indulging in unnecessary politics to appease their vote banks by advocating for the revocation of AFSPA and demonizing the security forces would be detrimental to national security. The window for making such political moves has closed as the unfolding situation in Afghanistan calls for a strategically proactive approach on Jammu and Kashmir.
A recent television commercial apparently meant to popularize Chinese noodles, in fact, establishes the superiority of products made in China. Over the years, Indian people have formulated a perception that products made in China may be considerably cheaper but actually are of very inferior quality and do not last long. This commercial is aimed to manipulate this popular perception and plant the thought in the minds of Indian children that Chinese goods are better and desirable. If the commercial was for only selling noodles, there was no need to project the mother as a Chinese woman wearing a Chinese dress. The child also tells his sister that not only their mom is Chinese but she also uses other products of China including the cell phone. Perception management through mass communication has been in vogue for long. Even during both the World Wars, all the stakeholders used pamphlets to either demoralize the enemy populations or to establish the superiority of their side.

Of all the fields including strategic planning, diplomatic moves, human resource management, troop deployment, financial maneuvering et al, it is communication planning that receives the least attention though at times it may prove to be vital and the most effective tool to achieve the desired goals. Economies all over the world may be receding, political stability may be becoming more vulnerable, social disharmony may be taking gigantic steps, cultures may be becoming more and more pungent but human connectivity is advancing by leaps and bounds. Not only in the developing societies but also in underdeveloped systems, penetration of mobile telephony and Internet is growing at an unprecedented speed. In the past, neither the radio nor television could reach the lowest strata of

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*Prof. B K Kuthiala*
the societies but new media has done a wonder by connecting the largest section of the human population. In the entire history of mankind, the quantum of social change that occurred during last two decades due to the new technologies of communication is the largest as compared to what happened over the last few centuries.

The service providers may have succeeded in strategic planning to distribute their hardware and services to masses but the content of the communication has received scanty attention of the strategic planners.

Today, USA is the most effective strategic planner and has been able to market its atrocities on people outside its jurisdiction as its sacrifice for humanity. At one point of time, the Soviet Union also communicated the superiority of its leftist ideology to the world effectively but failed miserably against the information onslaught of the West including the USA. China is a new entrant in the international information warfare. The example of the commercial of Chinese Noodles is only the tip of the iceberg. The manner in which China fed the Indian media about its justification of intruding into the Indian Territory is another example. The Indian media, both print and television, gave extra space and time to project Chinese assertions along with what our own government was conveying. The gradual perception management of the Indian population about China is a planned communication strategy by our unfriendly neighbour.

We in India appear to be using communication media quite extensively but in bits and pieces and certainly not for a sustained long term strategic effort. We hardly have a worth mentioning system of feeding the foreign media even in New Delhi. Most of the news and comments that foreign media persons create is based upon the reports of the Indian English media. In this process, both the real India and the views of the Government receive a scanty representation resulting in incomplete and distorted perceptions about India all over the world. In India, we may have a huge army of very able media persons yet we do not have even one communication strategist
worth mentioning. We have the expertise to use media on piece meal basis but perhaps we do not have even a felt need to plan communications in a strategic manner to achieve our goals within and outside our own territory.

The strategic planning of communications inter alia includes:

- listing the long and short term communication objectives,
- identifying and understanding the target audiences,
- designing a media mix to reach these audiences,
- creating media content so as to make lasting impressions,
- actually reaching the target audiences repeatedly in a planned manner,
- collecting feedback from the audiences,
- making midway corrections in media mix, media plan and the messages,
- conducting periodical impact analysis.

In his August 2008 paper, Rober T Hastings Jr. described strategic communication as "the synchronization of images, actions and words to achieve a desired effect." Steve Tathan of the UK Defence Academy argues that it is desirable to bind and coordinate communications together; it should be regarded in a much more fundamental manner than simply a process. The 'informational effect' should be placed at the very epi-centre and all action must be calibrated against that effect - including the evaluation of 2nd and 3rd order effects. This, according to him, is proper Strategic Communication.

He makes a distinction between Strategic Communication and Strategic Communications and prefers the former to achieve the objectives.

Another important aspect is that strategic communication cannot be an effort isolated from the primary project planning. In fact, the emphasis should be to make communication planning as an integral part of the plan and policy document. An approved NATO document on Policy on Strategic Communication highlights the desirability of integrating the communication efforts with the main plan in an inseparable manner. It states, "the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy,
Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims" (SG(2009)0794). "It is important to underline that Strategic Communication is first and foremost a process that supports and underpins all efforts to achieve the Alliance's objectives: an enabler that guides and informs our decisions, and not an organization in itself. It is for this reason that Strategic Communication considerations should be integrated into the earliest planning phases - communication activities being a consequence of that planning" (MCM-0164-2009).

In our own country perhaps the longest information campaign was that of Ministry of Health as a part of the population control measures. The campaign started in early fifties of the last century and is still on but success in changing perception in favor of small family and fewer number of children has only been partial. About one fifth of the population, mainly of minorities, has not been targeted so far. The apparent reason is that it was a campaign in bits and pieces and the thrust kept on changing. Assorted information events cannot succeed in changing the mind set.

The NDA Government’s India Shining campaign of about Rs 200 crores is another example. Out of the blue, the Indians were told that despite intense economic and social inequalities, India was shining. It failed to assess the perceptions of the people at the time when the campaign was launched. You cannot make a beginning from the point where you have yet to reach and that was the great disconnect. Perhaps the claim of shine was blinding for the common Indians. India Shining was a communication event management and not even a campaign what to talk about strategy.

Bharat Nirman advertisement bonanza of UPA of about Rs 600 crores seems to follow the same pattern. It has no connect with the Government advertisements of the recent past, neither there is any
A sign of strategic planning. A strategy unfolds gradually and adds on to the information and motivation step by step. But each ad of Bharat Nirman is complete in itself and does not connect with the past. An effective campaign like that of Amul is a progressive journey from one point to another, both points well defined by the planners in this case.

Communication theorist describes this non-strategic communication in terms of 'bullet theory'. Information is fired rapidly like bullets in the direction of the targets but without taking a precise aim. Result is huge redundancy and wasted effort. Long back Steel Authority of India took up a strategic communication campaign and over the years created an image for them as a company that is socially relevant and yet it also makes steel. Delhi Development Authority (DDA) during last decade or so has systematically managed to change the public perception of the people of Delhi about DDA from being a highly corrupt and inefficient organization to one with committed to transparency and public convenience.

Another failure of thinking and planning in terms of strategic communication planning is our war with the Naxals. We are hardly fighting the Naxals on the ideological front by taking up information to the minds of the already affected and likely to be affected populations. No one is shouting that Maoism has failed elsewhere and it is bound to create more problems than it can solve. Deployment of uniformed personnel and launching combat can be one part of strategy but psychological combat by way of information onslaught is hardly being planned. May be, it is essential to prepare the populations where Naxalites are likely to extend their wings to oppose Maoism on the ideological level.

We do not know whether Mahatma Gandhi consciously planned his communication strategy for non violent protest but there appears to be a shadow of
consistent progressive effort to inform and mobilize the people. Swami Vivekananda had a well laid down strategy to reestablish Vedanta and superiority of Hindu thought well before he physically left India to conquer the world. His was a victory by communicating effectively and strategically.

In various management teaching programs, planning, finance, human resource, marketing etc. are essential components of learning but it would be worthwhile to introduce the theory and practice of communication strategic planning. It would not only help in business but it will also help in the process of governance. In addition, seminars, workshops and add-on courses may also be organized to produce communication strategic planners. But, alas, this also needs strategic planning, of which we are shy to a great extent. The author is the Vice-Chancellor of the Makhanlal Chaturvedi National University of Journalism & Communication, Bhopal

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Kashmir: The Unwritten History

An Underhand Pitch for Plebiscite

Over the last few months, there is suddenly a lot of unnecessary, unwarranted and self-serving focus of Western academics, analysts and authors on the India-Pakistan equation – the issue of Jammu and Kashmir inevitably being a centre-piece of the discord between the two countries. Essentially the argument being made is that the problem in Afghanistan is more than anything else an outcome of the India-Pakistan proxy war and that the road to Kabul runs through Kashmir. In other words, Pakistan’s perfidious conduct in the War on Terror against Jihad International being fought in Afghanistan can be altered if some sort of a solution, which by definition is acceptable to Pakistan even if not to India, is worked out to satisfy Pakistan’s irredentist claim over the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. With the US abandonment of Afghanistan in 2014 looming on the horizon, and the possibility of Afghanistan being outsourced to Pakistan becoming quite real, there seems to be a sense of urgency in attempts to create an intellectual environment in which the West (read US) can pressurise India to make concessions on Kashmir to Pakistan.

It is against this backdrop that former Australian intelligence officer and now academic Christopher Snedden’s book “Kashmir: The Unwritten History” has been published. While the timing of the book might seem mischievous, the fact of the matter remains that Snedden has been writing this book for some time now and just the kind of voluminous research that has gone
into the book – practically every assertion is annotated – suggests that the author wasn’t necessarily working on any ‘agenda’. Even though Part II of the book does fill some gaps in our knowledge about the part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir which is euphemistically called ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK, which is neither Azad nor Kashmir), the book plugs the Pakistani line on Kashmir even as it disguises itself as pushing the ‘Azad Kashmir’ cause. For instance, Snedden seems to subscribe to the pet conspiracy theory of Pakistanis that Gurdaspur was awarded to India in order to give the Indians access to Jammu and Kashmir. He ignores the documented fact that the Gurdaspur award had more to do with protection of Amritsar (which would otherwise be militarily vulnerable) than Kashmir.

Clearly, there are huge problems with the book, not the least of which is that almost all the sources that Snedden quotes are Pakistani, which in itself raises serious questions about the conclusions that are drawn in the book. Equally troublesome is the central thesis of the book which has to do with the Poonch ‘Uprising’ that Snedden projects as critical to developments that unfolded in the former princely state. And then there are the recommendations on how to solve the Kashmir issue that Snedden makes in the last part of the book, which are quite simply a convoluted pitch for plebiscite, albeit through the back door. Beguilingly presented as ‘Let the People Decide’, Snedden’s formula for solving Kashmir is nothing but a flight of fancy of an academic because it is unworkable, unacceptable and unreal.

The first impression that comes to mind after reading the book is that this is ‘Alistair Lamb 2.0’. Lamb was a British academic who in the 1990’s had published two books which not only questioned Kashmir’s accession to India but also portrayed India as the villain. Not surprisingly then, the Pakistanis used Lamb’s book to press their case on Kashmir, quoting from his works ad nauseam. But after it became known that the funding for Lamb’s book had come from Pakistani sources, Lamb suddenly stopped being quoted. This was a precursor to the sordid chapter involving the ISI funded shenanigans of Ghulam Nabi Fai of the Kashmir American Council. Surprisingly, however, Snedden’s book hasn’t received the
same traction that Lamb had got in Pakistan. Perhaps, this is because of the pre-occupation of Pakistanis with their internal troubles.

The central thrust of Snedden’s book, and indeed his entire argument, is built around three developments that took place in the Jammu region in 1947 – the Poonch Uprising which was followed by communal violence in the Hindu majority eastern districts of Jammu region and finally the declaration of a provisional government by the rebels in Poonch. The salience that Snedden gives to the Poonch Uprising is unconvincing because it was at best a sideshow in the entire drama that unfolded in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947. The importance that Snedden gives to the Poonch Uprising is unconvincing because it was at best a sideshow in the entire drama that unfolded in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947. The importance that Snedden gives to the communal violence in Jammu – he even blames the tribal invasion by Pashtun tribesmen backed by the Pakistan army on the Jammu violence and presents it as the catalyst for the eventual Partition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir – flies in the face of historical facts. The communal violence in Jammu needs to be seen in the context of the great disturbances and dislocation that accompanied the monumental changes that were taking place in the Indian subcontinent at that time. That the Jammu violence could have been a reaction to the Poonch Uprising in which Hindus and Sikhs were massacred has been conveniently ignored.

Snedden’s assertion that the J&K dispute was started by the people of the state and not by Pakistan and that the Pashtun tribals invaded the state because of violence in Jammu is almost like saying that the invasion was some sort of instant coffee, which it clearly was not. There is no way that the Pashtun tribesmen could have launched their invasion within a couple of days of the violence in Jammu. There is enough evidence available that the planning for the tribal invasion had commenced months before the Jammu communal violence. Snedden himself accepts this when he points out that Pandit Nehru had informed Sardar Patel about the shenanigans of the NWFP and Punjab governments in the newly created Pakistan to stir trouble in J&K.

While Snedden portrays the Indian position on Kashmir, which blames the entire trouble on the tribal invasion, as being disingenuous, the fact of the
matter is that all the troubles in the state that preceded the tribal invasion were localised and to an extent internal to J&K (notwithstanding the involvement of serving Pakistan Army officers and soldiers from the AJK region in stoking the fires and instigating the uprising in places like Poonch). The real problem arose because of open aggression by Pakistani proxies (to use a more contemporary phrase, non-state actors, which goes to show a certain pattern of behaviour on part of Pakistan in its dealings with India) to force the issue while maintaining plausible deniability. Snedden glosses over the rebellion by some state subjects and literally holds it up as a legitimate action. But surely, even he would agree that it is the legitimate right of every state to use every possible means (including accession to India in the case of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir) to defend itself from both internal disturbance and external aggression. To accept Snedden’s specious argument would tantamount to justifying the terrorism that erupted in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989.

Perhaps the biggest problem with Snedden’s book is that because of his advocacy of the position of the people of AJK, he glosses over the ugly reality of the Kashmir problem and doesn’t acknowledge that the entire issue started as an unvarnished communal problem (Muslim majoritarianism) which in the 1990s took on hues of communalism varnished by ethnic nationalism and later became part of the international jihadist narrative. By ignoring this critical facet, Snedden has ended up writing an utterly biased and incomplete history of the Kashmir issue.
Towards Expeditious Procurement and Indigenisation

1. Despite several initiatives undertaken by the Government, the stated goal of self reliance in defence production still remains elusive. One of the main reasons is that for too long India has been importing over 70 percent of its armament and hardly any worthwhile technology has been developed indigenously.

2. Even when India is willing to spend heavily to ensure that the preparedness of its Armed Forces is commensurate to its strategic challenge, the progress in procurements has been sluggish and tardy. It is because defence acquisition is a complex decision-making process that needs to balance out the competing requirements of expeditious procurement, development of an indigenous defence sector and conformity to the highest standards of transparency, probity and public accountability.

3. Defence Ministry has now undertaken a major initiative to rectify this anomaly through issuance of DPP 2013. This focuses on a twin pronged approach of ‘self reliance through indigenisation’ and ‘secondly setting up of a Defence Industrial Base within the country’.

4. The DPP 2013 has evoked great expectation amongst all experts and the progress in its implementation is being watched with great interest.

At Vivekananda International Foundation, a study group under Gen N C Vij (Retd.), Former Chief of Army Staff along with five more Senior Officers of different Services was set up to study this all too
important subject. This effort culminated in a seminar on the subject being held on 19 July from 1030-1600hrs. This was attended by over 120 participants; from the three Services, both serving and veterans, senior former government officials, representatives of FICCI, CII and ASSOCHAM and also DRDO and DPSUS.

5. Some of the major issues, on which there was a general consensus, are as under:-

(a) Public and Private sectors must be brought on par to achieve genuine indigenisation. To attain this goal, they will have to be provided ‘level playing field’,

(b) Decision taken by the Govt to share ‘Technology Perspective and capability Road Map’ with the industry is a giant Stride which will bring in greater transparency. This will also help provide the private industry a perspective of what the Services are looking for and also help them draw up their business plans,

(c) It was also felt that the DRDO should focus primarily only on ‘Core Technology’, which no one from outside will be prepared to share with India,

(d) The Govt decision to entrust the Industry with up gradation and serviceability of the equipment, as partners with the Public Sector, was widely welcome,

(e) Creation of a Corpus of Rs 550 Crores for the micro, small and medium scale industries through SIDBI was also a welcome step, and

(f) It was also agreed that there was a need to formally train Services Officers and the MOD officials specifically for dealing with this intricate subject of procurement in our Management Institutions,

Finally, the general consensus was that the issuance of DPP 2013 was an important and positive step towards the important goal of self reliance. Its success will entirely depend upon the quality and expediency shown in its implementation. VIF will be shortly putting out a detailed report on this subject on its Website and also bring out a brochure on the subject.
VIF organized Vimarhsa on Saturday, July 20, 2013, where senior advocate Mahesh Jethmalani dwelt at length on the topic ‘Institutional Subversion in India – Implications for the Nation and its Security’.

In his introductory remarks, Ajit Doval, KC, Director, VIF, regretted that the Indian society was more fragmented than at the time of Independence in 1947. He said there appeared to be some invisible hand that gave impetus to anything divisive and weakened anything that united.

In a sharp indictment of the ruling UPA, Jethmalani accused it of polarizing polity on religious grounds by demonizing the alternative (BJP in this case) and keeping minorities in a perpetual state of insecurity. He also charged the ruling Congress with portraying Hinduism and its political manifestations, both internationally and domestically, as irrational, militant, extremist and dangerously violent.

He alleged that the ruling party was using a vocal press, high profile NGOs, corrupt and pliable police force as also resorting to institutional subversion to camouflage its dangerous game.

He cited seven high profile cases in recent times in support of his argument. They included the burning to death of Hindus in Godhra, the Best Bakery Case. The Zakia case, Sohrabuddin and Ishrat Jahan case besides the Malegaon and Samjhauta blast cases where Hindus have been chargesheeted by the “constitutionally fragile” National Investigation Agency without any shred of evidence “only to exonerate the Muslim accused”.

Maintaining that the present Government was “hell bent on destroying every institution”, the noted jurist asserted that “nationalism requires Hindu spirituality and those who deny it...
are nothing but unmitigated morons”.

The session concluded with a thought provoking round of Q&A.