




Vivekananda International Foundation

Security and Development:

An Appraisal of the Red Corridor

Ramanand Garge



VIF Paper - January 2019

About the Author



Ramanand Garge is an alumnus of the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Pune. He is also alumnus of National Security and Law Institute, University of Virginia, USA. His specialization in research includes terrorism, counter terrorism jurisprudence, besides other matters of internal security and maritime security.

Abstract

Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is recognised as one of the most serious threats, not only to India's internal security but indeed to the very basic values of the democratic, pluralistic political order enshrined in our Constitution. Since 1967, when the movement started in a few 'Parganas' in West Bengal, it has gradually spread its tentacles into nearly 90 districts in nine states. Over the past 51 years, the armed activists of the movement have accounted for widespread death and destruction. According to Ministry of Home Affairs data, 12686 civilians including women and children have been killed since 1980, while 3292 members of the Central Armed Police Forces and state police personnel are estimated to have been martyred while fighting this menace. Apart from heavy casualties, LWE activists have also caused massive damage to government and private property. As a result, the entire LWE affected region has completely lost out on the trajectory of comprehensive development that the rest of the country has been experiencing.

While different aspects of the dreaded phenomenon have been studied by experts from different angles, in this paper, the discussion has been limited to certain specific aspects of developmental initiatives and the tremendous work being done by the state police and Central Armed Police Forces under extremely challenging conditions. Before analysing the impact of these, this paper also briefly gives a historical overview of the LWE insurgency in India and its overall impact on internal security. The paper, in addition, attempts to suggest certain measures which can be considered for the more proactive implementation of security and development strategy in LWE affected states.

Introduction

Over the last 25 years, India has transformed itself from an impoverished developing country to one that is destined to play a key role in shaping the future, of not only its people, but also those living in this region and beyond. Despite the remarkable growth-story of India over the last few decades, the country continues to face many challenges on the internal security front - the Maoist movement, also known as the Naxalite uprising and in recent years as Left Wing Extremism (LWE), being the most serious one, that is severely impacting the developmental efforts of the state in the affected districts. LWE has emerged as a politico-socio-economic challenge, making it a complex phenomenon that cannot be effectively tackled only through the use of kinetic methods. In other words, it's not a mere law and order problem. In the recent past, though the area of influence of the LWE movement has been gradually shrinking and incidences of violence are significantly coming down, LWE continues to pose a major security challenge for India along with its socio-economic-political ramifications. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had described it as 'India's biggest internal security challenge ever' (Akhoury 2006). Recognising the LWE movement as a serious problem, PM Modi also urged the ultras to, "shun the gun for a few days and visit the families affected by their violence". "Those children would certainly inspire misguided youth to lay down arms forever...This experiment will force you to change your heart and make you shun your violent means". He asked the administration to "Stop the spread of LWE in the country" with the Ministry of Tribal Affairs playing a key role in this regard (Press Trust of India 2015).

Over the years, successive governments have attempted to deal with this issue, largely as law and order problem. However, the ineffective governance mechanisms at the state level have created persistent deficits in the social and political architecture of many states that led to the rise of the phenomenon of LWE. At present, the problem occupies a larger space in the overall threat profile of India, spanning over 90 districts in nine states. While a copious amount of research has been done to analyse the phenomenon of LWE, the focus in this paper will not only be on analysing the various security aspects of the challenge, but will also cover certain specific aspects of the development related progress achieved in the LWE affected states. While doing so, the problems faced by the security forces in conducting counterinsurgency operations in this region will also need examining. Based on these, an attempt will be made to suggest certain measures for more proactive implementation of security and developmental strategies in the LWE affected states. While reviewing these issues, emphasis has been placed on the use of primary source material from government agencies, interviews with various stakeholders and also open source material.

History of LWE Movement in India

Before proceeding further, a brief historical review of the LWE movement would be in order. As is well known, the Naxalite movement began from the small village of Naxalbari situated at the tri-junction of India, Nepal and then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), where in 1967, a group of tribals picked up arms against the oppression of the landlord. However, initially, the movement was restricted only to the three police station areas of Naxalbari, Khoribari and Phasidewa in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. As per Mao's dictum, the Communist Party of India - Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML) was established on April 22, 1969 (Jongman 1988).

Later, over the decades that followed, the movement assumed alarming proportions, threatening peace and security over a vast stretch of land spread across 10 states, described as '*Red Corridor*'. The Chinese Communist Party welcomed the formation of CPI-ML in India, as it encouraged it in other countries like UK, Albania and Sri Lanka, where it accorded recognition to Indian CPI-ML. Since then a steady rise in the communist movement drawing inspiration largely from the Maoist ideology was observed. This party, due to its violent activities made its presence felt amongst other political parties. The rise of CPI-ML made the government conscious of the fact, that it was not only a law and order threat, but that its agenda was more sinister, challenging the very existence of the democratic structure of India.

The Naxalite movement prominently focused on major issues like:-

- Reallocation of land resources;
- Ensuring minimum wages for the labour working in the farms;
- Running a parallel government and impose tax and penalties;
- Run parallel Kangaroo Courts;
- Destruction of government property and abduct its officials;
- Attacks on police and law enforcing machinery;
- Enforce its own social code of conduct (Singh 2016).

The rapid growth of left wing communist movement in states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh was characterised by intense violent activities. The Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), established in Bihar, led the cadres and perpetrated violent activities. MCCI later changed its name to MCC in 1975 (Bose 2013). Since then violent activism became the legitimate means for these cadres to overwhelm the existing socio-economic and political structure of India. During the 1980s, another like-minded group, the People's War Group (PWG) was formed in Andhra Pradesh. The upsurge of the PWG was marked by the rise of Naxal leader Kondapalli Seetharamiah (Bose 2013). This violent activism paved way for People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) as an armed wing of the Communist Party of India- Maoists (CPI-M). The merger of the Andhra PWG with MCCI in 2004 strengthened the military capabilities of CPI-M and significantly upgraded the combat capabilities of LWE groups (M. Government of India 2005). Since then the LWE movement has drawn its strength from internal fault lines like poverty, disparity and discontent amongst the masses in the developing states of India.

The LWE movement derived a certain amount of 'legitimacy' from the grievances of the masses in the impoverished areas of the affected states and became a prominent security challenge due to the following factors:-

- The rapid spread of the LWE movement over a large geographical landscape;
- The rise in the potential of violent activities of these LWE Cadres;
- Unification of the PWG and the MCCI.

Broadly, the growth of the LWE movement can be classified into the following three phases:-

- **Phase I** – Early formative years of CPI.
- **Phase II** – Relative decline and revival in the late 1980s.
- **Phase III** - Militarisation of LWE Movement with merging of MCCI and PWG in 2004.

Current Status

Over the years, at the peak of the LWE movement, nearly 40 per cent of India's land mass, covering approximately 35 per cent of its population, was affected (Morrison 2012). However, according to a recent security review by the Ministry of Home Affairs, (MHA), violence in LWE affected region is now spans 90 districts across 10 states. In 2017, among the 90 affected districts, 30 districts spread over nine states, accounted for 88 per cent of violent incidents and 94 percent of the fatal casualties. On the basis of the intensity of violence, these 90 districts have been classified as most affected districts by the MHA. The statewide classification of the most affected districts is as below.

LWE Most Affected Districts		
No	States	Districts
1	Andhra Pradesh (1)	Vishakhapatnam
2	Bihar (4)	Aurangabad, Gaya, Jamui, Lakhisarai
3	Chhattisgarh (8)	Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, Rajnandangao, Sukma
4	Jharkhand (13)	Bokaro, Chatra, Garhwa, Giridih, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Khunti, Latehar, Lohardaga, Palamu, Ranchi, Simdega, West Singhbhum.
5	Maharashtra (1)	Gadchiroli
6	Odisha (2)	Koraput, Malkangiri
7	Telangana (1)	Bhadradi-Kothagudem


(Source - M. Government of India 2018)

From 2001 till July 2018, one observes a steady decline in violence, despite a peaking of violent incidents in 2010. The year 2010 witnessed the highest numbers of fatal casualties -1005 – along with the arrests of about 2878 LWE cadres by the state police in the same year. The highest number of LWE incidents i.e. 2013.

Similarly, in 2016 a rising trajectory of violence was observed in certain parts of the LWE affected states. In continuous counter-insurgency operations, a total of 222 LWE cadres were eliminated and 1840 cadres arrested in 2016. Likewise, in 2017, a total of 263 fatal casualties were recorded and 1888 CPI-Maoists cadres were arrested, which is the highest till now. Till November 2018, a total of 772 LWE incidents were recorded in these states. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs data placed on the floor of Lok Sabha, 1118 CPI-M cadres were arrested till July 15, 2018. In this century till July 2018, total 25496 LWE incidents took place, in which 10362

fatal casualties were recorded (L.M. Government of India 2018). The overall detailed LWE threat profile can be seen in the graphical representation below.

LWE Threat Profile 2001 - 2018



[Source - (M. Government of India 2018)]

The violence profile of LWE has been witnessing a steady drop. Amongst the 10 LWE affected states, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are assessed as the worst affected states accounting for the highest number of LWE incidents. Till July 2018, in Chhattisgarh, a total of 240 and in Jharkhand 113 LWE incidences of violence were recorded (M. Government of India 2018).

From the above graphical representation, it is clear that security forces have seen a steady decline in fatal casualties. This also highlights the operational fact that effective intelligence followed up by timely operations, have enabled the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to achieve area dominance in the LWE affected states. As a result, the overall trend analysis depicts a cumulative steady decline. Simultaneously, due to the consistent development outreach and security measures, the CPI-M cadres also have started realising the core reality of exploitation in CPI-M and as a result, there is a steady rise in the voluntary surrender by CPI-M cadres at all organisational levels.

Trend Analysis of LWE conflict situation 2009-2018							
Year	Fatal Cas-ualties	SF Per-sonnel Killed	Civilians Killed	LWE Cadres Killed	No of En-counters	No of SF personnel injured in landmine blasts	No. of Arms Recovered
2009	908	317	591	220	309	0	572
2010	1005	285	720	172	272	0	642
2011	611	142	469	99	223	177	636
2012	415	114	301	74	216	189	591
2013	397	115	282	100	218	170	628
2014	310	88	222	63	221	183	548
2015	230	59	171	89	247	159	724
2016	278	65	213	222	330	145	800
2017	263	75	188	136	234	153	591
2018	97	31	66	119	104	79	301
Total	4514	1291	3223	1294	2374	1255	6033

Source - (L. M. Government of India 2018)

Declining Human Resources and Operational Capacity of the LWE

The recovery of huge caches of arms (automatic and semi-automatic) and relentless intelligence based counter-insurgency operations conducted in the dense forests and remote locations in LWE affected states have adversely impacted the Maoist firepower. This, coupled with people-centric developmental activities undertaken by the state, have encouraged a large number of LWE cadres to shun the path of violence and join the mainstream. In the year 2016, a total of 1442; in 2017 685; and till May 2018, a total of 284 CPI-Maoists cadres surrendered before police authorities. Over the last eight years, a total of 9396 armed CPI-M cadres have surrendered. Besides this 24453 armed CPI-M armed cadres were arrested (M. Government of India 2018).

Successful implementation of various development initiatives focusing on critical issues of *Jal* (water), *Jamin* (land) and *Jungle* (forest), has been perhaps the single most important factor in making it difficult for the LWE movement to attract large numbers of fresh recruits. It may be mentioned here, that some villagers in the Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra launched a mass protest against Maoist appeal to observe a martyr's week from July 28, 2018 (Report 2018). Also, villagers in the Bhamragad taluka of Gadchiroli district destroyed the monuments built in memory of Naxal commanders killed in encounters (Mulye 2018).

These incidents signify the rising levels of disenchantment with the Maoists and to an extent, the absence of effective leadership at the grass-root level. Interrogations of recently arrested and surrendered cadres, also endorse the growing resentment against the CPI-M leadership among the lower and mid-rank members. The cadres believe that higher ranks of CPI-M have become money minded and do not much care for the ideology of the Party (Chauhah 2018). The surrender of senior leader Ginugu Narasimha Reddy alias Jampanna, a Central Committee member of CPI-M along with his wife Anitha, on December 25, 2017, before Telangana police, confirmed the above-mentioned fact. Jampanna had been working for CPI-M for 33 years and was involved in more than 100 incidents of violence and was wanted by the 'Greyhounds'¹ for last two decades. He was also a core member of the CPI and played a decisive role in the formation of the Kalahandi-Kandhamal-Boundh-Nayagarh divisional committee of CPI-M. The reward amount of ₹ 25, 00,000 for his arrest, was given to the couple for rehabilitation, by Telangana Police (FP Staff 2017).

Is the End of LWE Imminent?

Do these developments and the declining trend of LWE violence, signify the likely end of the LWE problem in the near future? Analysts doubt this assumption for various reasons. They maintain that despite the intense outreach of the government at the Centre and the states on the development front, coupled with the kinetic measures, the recruitment of new LWE cadres from the remote villages of Dandakaranya² has not stopped, though the direct confrontations of LWE cadres with the security forces have reduced. However, IED blasts still pose a considerable threat to the presence, movements and operations of CAPFs in LWE affected region³ (Press Trust of India 2018).

1. Greyhounds are a police special forces unit operating in the Indian states of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh which specialise in anti-insurgency operations against Naxalites.

2. The Dandakaranya geographical region roughly equivalent to the Bastar division of Chhattisgarh state of India. It encompasses 92,220 sq. km of land that includes the Abhujmar Hills in the west and the Eastern Ghats in the east in states like Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Odisha. It spans 300 km from north to south and about 500 km from east to west.

3. For effectively dealing with this challenge the CRPF has established an institute exclusively dedicated for training its personnel in IED detection and defusing. Canines are also used for proactive detection of IEDs by Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF).



(Picture Courtesy – 207 Cobra Battalion, CRPF)

This further endorses the shift in the tactical capabilities of LWE cadres from conventional bows and arrows and country-made firearms to advanced types of automatic weapon systems, rocket launchers, landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and reveals the hi-tech weapon capabilities of Maoists. The rise in the numbers of IED incidents points to the possible nexus between LWE cadres and the mining industry which facilitates the easy availability of explosives for indigenously made IEDs.

CPI-M pamphlets recovered during numerous *Tactical Counter Offensive Campaigns*⁴ (TCOC), have been found to contain detailed directions for making IEDs. The central leadership of Maoists, while exhorting their cadres to focus on training and procedures, also exhorts the cadres to attack the various establishments of security forces (Ahuja 2018).

Mobilisation of LWE Supporters in Urban Areas

Concurrently, even when the LWE movement is under intense pressure, because of a combination of proactive security and effective development measures, a steady rise in pro-Naxal activities in urban India is being observed. The recent trend of strong coordination between parent organisations like the CPI-Maoists and other like-minded organisations is being reflected in the various programmes carried out by these organisations, against the alleged state violence and for protection of democratic rights like displacement of local communities. It remained the main rationale for mobilisation for civil society organisations like the Niyamgiri Suraksha Samitee, actively agitating in the Niyamgiri Hills area and the Jharkhand Visthapan Virodhi Jan Vikas Andolan, a front of CPI-M agitating against amendments to the Chhotanagpur and Santhal Pargana Tenancy Acts. These amendments pertain to modifications in the domicile policy etc.

Maoist affiliates also organised protests and resorted to anti-government propaganda over alleged atrocities by the security forces (M. Government of India 2017). They organised meetings over the issue of Kashmir and called for a plebiscite in the state (Communist Party of India M 2016). After the major failure of urban mobilisation in 2004–2011 along with subsequent losses of the core operational areas of the LWE, Maoists ceased expanding their areas of operation and emphasised on survival imperatives as a tactical retreat.

4. The objective of the TCOC is to review vulnerabilities against the targeted attacks by LWE cadres against political leadership as well as CAPFs.

In this backdrop, a systematic approach was initiated by the CPI-M to mobilise resources and achieve the following objectives through urban mobilisation, taking advantage of their anonymity in the urban centres:-

- a. **Mobilise masses and strengthen organisational structures** – Under this programme, the Maoists mainly targeted students, workers, middle-class employees, and focused on social issues like women's rights, the grievances of Dalits, and religious minorities and politicised issues in accordance with the communist ideology.
- b. **Develop a United Front** – Another component of the above strategy was to unify like-minded organisations of workers, students from urban localities, organisations opposing globalisation, etc and to consolidate them.
- c. **Military Task** – The military wings of CPI-M, PGI and PLGA, were to carry out the military tasks in the rural and least developed regions of the country while the urban Naxals were to complement their efforts by recruiting cadres and sending them into the countryside, infiltrating 'enemy' ranks, creating unions in crucial industries, sabotaging actions with the support of armed cadres, arranging financial and logistical support for armed cadres hiding in the remote localities, etc. (Communist Party of India M n.d.).

Amongst the above three, the first task of mobilising and organising masses is fundamental in nature because it shapes the course of the other two tasks.

Government of India's Approach

Successive governments at the Centre have over the years, evolved various strategies and action plans to curb the spread of Naxalism in the country. The present Government has opted for an integrated approach to address the LWE problem and launched its National Policy and Action Plan (NPAP) in January 2015. The NPAP focuses on security, development, ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities. The Central Government consulted all stakeholders including state governments and, their suggestions were incorporated in the NPAP (M. Government of India 2015).

Review Mechanism

For effective implementation of the NPAP, the MHA established a robust mechanism under which timely reviews are conducted and policies and strategies are amended or fine-tuned. The high-powered review group comprises of the union Home Minister, Home Secretary and the Special Secretary MHA. In these review meetings, the progress of various schemes is regularly monitored in coordination with respective departments of the LWE affected states. In addition, the Union Home Secretary also holds review meetings with secretaries of other central ministries, the Chief Secretaries, and Directors General of Police (DGP) of the LWE affected states and the Directors General (DG) of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). In the recent past, these review meetings have also been chaired by the Cabinet Secretary on December 12, 2016, August 3, 2017, and July 23, 2018.

Signifying the seriousness of the Government's approach, the Union Home Minister also convened a meeting of Chief Ministers of LWE affected States on February 9, 2015 and May 8, 2017. Apart from these review meetings the Union Home Minister and Minister of State, Home Affairs, Government of India (GOI) have been undertaking frequent visits to the LWE affected states reviewing the security situation and taking stock of the progress of developmental schemes etc. Besides this, the Union Home Minister also holds meetings with Union Ministers and Secretaries of Central Ministries and ascertain the status of various developmental initiatives in the LWE affected states (M. Government of India 2006).

SAMADHAN – A Comprehensive Policy Tool

The GoI's approach can be mainly classified into the two domains of: 1) Security; and, 2) Development.

Security

During the review meeting of the Chief Ministers of the LWE affected states on May 08, 2017, Union Home Minister unveiled SAMADHAN, (solution), an integrated strategy through which LWE can be countered with full force and competence. This is a compilation of short term and long-term policies formulated at different levels. SAMADHAN as defined by the home minister as:-

1. **S-** Smart Leadership;
2. **A-** Aggressive Strategy;
3. **M-** Motivation and Training;
4. **A-** Actionable Intelligence;
5. **D-** Dashboard Based KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) and KRAs (Key Result Areas);
6. **H-** Harnessing Technology;
7. **A-** an Action plan for each Theatre;
8. **N-** No Access to Financing.

(M. P. Government of India 2017)

Tracking Flow of Weapons


While executing SAMADHAN, various measures were introduced by the MHA in consultation with the state governments of the LWE affected states. For improving the operational performance of the CAPFs in the LWE affected region, the MHA approved the use of cutting-edge technology by the CAPFs in LWE theatres, like trackers for weapons, bio-metrics for smart guns and a Unique Identification Number (UID) for gelatine sticks and explosives.

Real-time technical intelligence plays a decisive role in any proactive counter-insurgency force and its timely receipt defines the strength of that force. In developing these capabilities, the MHA has deployed at least one Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or Mini-UAV for each CAPF battalions. More helicopter support is provided for CAPFs to rush in supplies and reinforcements. Joint Task Forces for operations along inter-state boundaries have been set up for better inter-state

coordination and intelligence sharing (Sandhu 2017). The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) is assisting the security forces deployed in LWE affected region, by providing technical support and real-time information (M. Government of India 2018).

Tracking Finances

Apart from robust kinetic measures, a pre-emptive approach warrants limiting the resources of LWE movement and its cadres through effective coordination and thorough investigation. In the case of LWE, after extensive investigation by various agencies, it was observed that Maoist leaders had amassed huge assets in property, as well as cash. For further detailed investigation and prosecution, the MHA has established a separate unit in the National Investigation Agency (NIA) which will exclusively investigate cases pertaining to the flow of funds to Left Wing Extremists (Special Correspondent 2018). The deployment of the NIA, which has an outstanding track record of handling cases across a range of fields, especially those relating to financial transactions to support terrorism and militancy related activities, will certainly have an impact. The NIA with its all India jurisdiction is investigating crimes that have national and international ramifications.⁵ The investigations conducted by the NIA have helped to unearth an entire range of illegal activities involving terror funding for specific incidents of terror involving the killing of innocent persons (Press Trust of India 2017).



(Source - (N. M. Government of India 2017))

Multi-agency Approach

Reflecting the seriousness and urgency of its approach, the Ministry of Home Affairs has also set up a Multi-Disciplinary Group (MDG) comprising officers from the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Enforcement Directorate, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), NIA, Central Board of Direct Taxation (CBDT), CRPF and the state police as well as their Special Branches, Criminal Investigation Departments (CIDs) and other state units (Press Trust of India 2018). This group is utilised by the MHA as a forum for evolving a well-coordinated approach for handling prolonged national security challenges such as the LWE movement. It will strengthen the capabilities of agencies to unearth various LWE conspiracies which are at times developed and executed in inter-state order with ramification across the Maoist belt. This multi-agency approach will also proactively enable agencies to identify the large financial network of LWE cadres who are largely dependent on '*Tendu Patta*' (Tendu leave)

5. The NIA started functioning on January 19, 2009. The first case was assigned to the NIA in June 2009 and as of end of July 2017, a total of 166 cases have been assigned to the NIA, for investigation till October 2017. These cases cover the entire spectrum of terrorism-related challenges relevant to India and have involved investigative efforts in 29 states and seven union territories (UTs). Of the 166 cases, 63 cases relate to 'jihadi' terrorism, 25 to terrorist acts by Northeast insurgents, 41 to cases of terror financing and fake currency, 13 to cases involving LWE while the remaining 24 cases relate to other miscellaneous terrorist acts/gangs.

commissions and other conventional transactions in the past. Today, they are involved in various dubious activities like extortion from private contractors of infrastructure projects, mining contractors, and transporters, owners of Medium and Small Scale Enterprises (MSME) and to prosecute them in a timely manner. According to the MHA, during the year 2016-2017, a total of 20 bank accounts of individuals/companies suspected to be involved in Naxal funding were investigated and funds to the tune of ₹ 14.09 cr rupees relating to Naxal funding was frozen by the Government (M. Government of India 2018).

The inter-state and international funding will be tracked and information shared by the Enforcement Directorate. Further, the involvement of the NIA, with its pan India jurisdiction, will expedite LWE cases in a timely manner. In this context, the NIA arrested Jarilal Mahto, a resident of Giridih, Jharkhand on July 16, 2018, from Vadodara, Gujarat. Mahto was absconding and wanted in many LWE financing related cases. The NIA confirmed that Mahto was a member of the proscribed organisation i.e. CPI-M, and had been involved in the laundering of money of top leaders and operatives of CPI-Maoists (N. M. Government of India 2018).

Similarly, the Chhattisgarh Police arrested Abhay Devdas Nayak who is an important part of the over ground urban network of CPI-M. A 'lookout notice' was issued against Nayak in May 2017 and he was arrested from the immigration counter of Delhi Airport on June 1, 2018. Since 2016, Nayak had travelled to Belgium, Mexico, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, Cambodia, Singapore, Indonesia, Russia, Vietnam and Nepal. He was also part of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Party and Organisation of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) and had mainly visited socially and economically under developed countries frequently to propagate Maoist ideology. (Ghose 2018). The CCOMPOSA⁶ is a broad front of 11 LWE groups from India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which was raised in 2001 (Ramana 2003). Though some experts believe that the CCOMPOSA has lost some ground; however, the recent arrests of Naxal sympathisers, working as over ground workers of CPI-Maoist highlight the fact that the influence of CCOMPOSA might have waned in the military operations of CPI-M in jungles, but its influence is significant in urban Naxal activities.

The recent arrests of five fundraisers and sympathisers in simultaneous raids by Pune Police at 10 locations in Mumbai, Pune, Goa, Telangana, Chhattisgarh,⁷ on August 28, 2018 (IANS 2018) bear testimony to the wide urban networking of the Maoists. The arrested individuals have been identified as Hyderabad based Varavara Rao, Vernon Gonsalves and Arun Ferreira from Mumbai, Sudha Bharadwaj from Faridabad and Gautam Navlakha from New Delhi. Varavara Rao had also been arrested on several occasions in the past, and was convicted for waging war and conspiring against the state in 1980, when he was imprisoned for two years. Later he was arrested by Andhra Pradesh Police in 2005. Similarly, Vernon Gonsalves was arrested in 2007 by Mumbai Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) and was later convicted under the UAPA and Arms and Explosives Act. Gonsalves and Sridhar Srinivasan were arrested by Mumbai ATS in 2007 for planning a terror attack in 2007 and nine detonators, 20 gelatine sticks, a walkie-talkie set, a computer and Naxal literature, were recovered from them. Arun Ferreira was also arrested by Pune Police in 2007 along with Naxal leader Arun Satya Reddy, alias Murli, from Nagpur. Eight cases are registered under UAPA against Ferreira (Talukdar 2018).

6. The objective of CCOMPOSA is to 'coordinate and consolidate the unity among Maoist parties and organisations in South Asia. Further, lend mutual assistance and exchange expertise and deepen bilateral and multilateral relations amongst Maoist forces in the Indian sub-continent'. The CPI-M became the member of CCOMPOSA in 2004 after the merger of MCCI and PWG.

7. Raids and arrests were made under the relevant sections of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and the Pune Police have also invoked Sections 153 A, 505 (1)(b), 117, 120(b) and 34 against accused.

During the recent raids, Pune Police seized highly incriminating evidence in the form of electronic communications, letters between members of the banned CPI-Maoist and arrested suspects. Police also confirmed in a press release, that documents recovered from the seized electronic devices during raids, revealed a conspiracy by the Maoist to form a United Front to overthrow the government established by the law. In pursuance of this conspiracy, various efforts were made by CPI-M cadres in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra, etc. (Tare 2018). According to Police, these arrests and raids were the follow-up actions based on the preliminary investigation of Naxal sympathisers who were arrested on June 6, 2018, and who have since been prosecuted for sourcing funds from banned Maoists group. These accused include: Professor Shoma Sen from Delhi University; Rona Wilson from Delhi; Sudhir Dhawale of Republican Panthers; Jati Antachi Chalwal, Mumbai; Surendra Gadling and Mahesh Raut from Nagpur (Express News Service 2018). These developments endorse the fact that ideology only does not suffice for such an armed struggle which requires uninterrupted funding and other support. Hence, sympathisers or Over Ground Workers (OGWs) who provide such logistic support to Naxals, are as culpable as armed Maoists.

In response to the legal notice issued by the Supreme Court, the Government of Maharashtra and the Pune police submitted that the role of these five accused in the criminal conspiracy was not merely peripheral...but they were found to be playing a very vital role in the criminal offences committed and/or planned by others (G 2018). The Pune Police confirmed that, “it has cogent evidence that shows that these persons are part of banned terrorist organisations Communist Party of India (Maoist). There have been serious criminal offences made out against them and incriminating material has also emerged (Nanjappa 2018).

Bastariya Battalion

Alongside the above-mentioned security measures, the CRPF has decided to enhance local representation in its combat layout deployed in the Bastar area to provide the ‘*Bastariya*’ youth better avenues of employment under its Civic Action Programme (C. M. Government of India 2018). The Bastariya Battalion consists of youth recruited from the most LWE affected districts of Bijapur, Dantewada, Narayanpur and Sukma of the Chattisgarh state. The battalion also has female representation which is in sync with the GoI policy of 33 per cent reservation for women. The first batch of the Bastariya Battalion comprising 534 youth including 189 women recruits, were enrolled into 241 Bastariya Battalion of CRPF on May 21, 2018 (M. Government of India 2018).

Development Initiatives by Government of India

The pre-emptive measures initiated by various agencies reflect the coherent policy standpoint of the Government of India and are characterised simultaneously by security and development and by promoting good governance practices. Under such an institutionalised mechanism the Central Government has launched new, and also revived several existing initiatives in the fields of infrastructure development, education, health, skill development, agriculture etc. with emphasis on the comprehensive development of the LWE affected states. Some of the prominent schemes under implementation are various flagship developmental schemes such as the Integrated Action Plan or Additional Central Assistance (ACA) for LWE affected districts for creating public infrastructure and services; Road Requirement Plan – I (RRP

– I) for improving road connectivity in 34 LWE affected districts; Skill Development in 34 Districts of LWE under the Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojna (PMKVY); Fortified Police Stations for construction and strengthening of 400 police stations in the affected states; and installation of mobile towers for better communication connectivity.

The Government has accepted the suggestions of the Fourteenth Finance Commission and enhanced its net proceeds of Union taxes from 32 per cent to 42 per cent. Consequently, some schemes running in LWE affected states have been de-linked from central assistance and transferred to the states. This will give the states sufficient flexibility to conceive and implement schemes suited for local needs and aspirations. It will strengthen the roots of governance and subsequently bridge the developmental deficit gap in the remote regions within LWE affected states.

Status of Development Schemes

Road Connectivity Schemes

The Road Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I) is being implemented by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) with the objective of better connectivity in 34 LWE affected districts of nine states. Under Phase-I, 4544 km of roads, of 5422 km sanctioned, have been completed. The Road Connectivity Project -II has wider geographical coverage encompassing 44 LWE affected districts across 10 states. The RRP II envisions the construction of 5412 km of roads and 126 bridges/culverts. The MoRTH has sanctioned ₹11,725 cr which has been conveyed to states for 4065 km of construction (M. Government of India 2018).


Data Connectivity

The Department of Telecom (DoT) is proactively implementing schemes for better data connectivity of LWE affected states with the rest of the country. These efforts are yielding constructive results, helping the security forces with better data connectivity for executing counter-insurgency operations successfully. As per the DoT, exclusive phase-wise connectivity programme a total of 2335 mobile tower sites out of sanctioned 2355 sites, are already operational. These towers have improved connectivity in the LWE affected region and have established a basic connectivity network of 2G technology. For completion in Phase I, a sum of ₹4078.78 cr was sanctioned. These radiating tower sites have enhanced the operational bandwidth from 512 kilobytes per second (Kbps) to 2 megabytes per second (Mbps) at Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) sites which include 144 VSAT sites in Odisha.

Under the LWE Phase-II project, the MHA, in consultation with LWE affected states, has further identified 4072 tower locations to fulfil the communication needs of the security personnel deployed in 96 districts of 10 states and handed them over to DoT on October 27, 2017. The union cabinet approved ₹ 7330 cr under Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) (M. Government of India 2018). The USOF has the exclusive mandate to ensure widespread and non-discriminatory access of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in an economically efficient manner to the people in rural and remote areas of India (U. D. Government of India 2002).

In this phase, the technology has been upgraded from 2G to 4G as per the requirement of the stakeholders, as a better connectivity network established has also helped other essential services.

As a result, 358 new bank branches have been opened and 752 new Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) have been installed in 35 of the most LWE affected districts in the year 2017 (M. Government of India 2018). The geographical representations of RRP and Mobile connectivity schemes can be seen below:-



The state-wise budgetary allocations made for the above scheme is as below:-

State	Funds Allocated/released in Crore (₹) as on April 3, 2018			
	RRP - I	Skill Development Scheme	Special Central Assistance (SCA)	Road Connectivity Project for LWE (RCP-LWE)
Andhra Pradesh	1164	7.35	5	119
Bihar	559	75.21	30	243
Chhattisgarh	2056	62.58	40	96
Jharkhand	1162	126.63	80	259
Madhya Pradesh	190	6.84	00	14
Maharashtra	839	15.70	5	60
Odisha	884	41.56	10	102
Telangana	00	6.84	5	144
Uttar Pradesh	56	6.84	00	43
West Bengal	00	6.84	00	00
Total	6910	356.39	175	1080

Source - (M. Government of India 2018)

Electrification Initiatives in LWE Districts

The Ministry of Power has proactively started the electrification of the villages in the LWE affected districts under Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY). Amongst the 7164 un-electrified villages identified on March 31, 2015, 7065 villages have been electrified and remaining 99 villages are targeted to be electrified by September 2018 (M. Government of India 2018) (ANI 2018).

Employment Initiatives

Along with several infrastructural schemes, the Government of India is also executing several schemes under the Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojna (PMKVY) that are empowering the citizens with the required skill sets to earn their livelihood. Under this programme 47 Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs) and 68 Skill Development Centres (SDCs) are to be established by March 2019. For this skill development programme, the GoI has made a financial allocation of ₹ 407.85 cr. Till April 15, 2018, nearly 43 SDCs have been completed in 10 LWE affected states (M. Government of India 2018).

Other Initiatives

- GoI has approved ₹1000 cr per annum for three years to all 35 LWE affected districts, (though this number has gone down to 30) to bridge the gap in critical infrastructure.
- The Security Related Scheme has been extended till 2020, to strengthen state special forces in 10 LWE affected states
- The Special Infrastructure Scheme which was closed after the recommendations of 14th Finance Commission has been revived as a reimbursement scheme under the umbrella scheme of 'Modernisation of Police Force' with an outlay of ₹1048 cr for three years. The outlay is on a 60:40 basis between the Centre and states.
- Apart from these development initiatives, the Government of India is implementing the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. Under this initiative two skill development related schemes - Roshni and Skill Development Schemes - in 34 LWE affected districts have been launched by the Ministry of Rural Development and Ministry of Labour and Employment respectively.
- CAPFs have also started raising their local employment by giving preferences to the people from the LWE affected areas in recruitment.
- In agriculture, the Central Government is emphasising on timely implementation of the Minimum Support Price (MSP) for Minor Forest Produce (MFP) in the affected districts (M. Government of India 2015).

Challenges in LWE Affected Regions

Despite these security and development related initiatives, there is a feeling amongst the local people that the root causes of underdevelopment in the LWE affected areas need to be addressed in a more meaningful manner. Hence the continuing incidence of targeted attacks on schools, roads, railways, bridges, health facilities, communication infrastructure like towers, etc. in a major way (M. Government of India 2018). Recent developments also indicate new areas of CPI-M operation on the shared border region of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC), the most deadly armed formation of CPI-

M, is operative in this new region (Press Trust of India 2017). Challenges, therefore, continue to exist in both the fields of security and development. Some of these are discussed below.

Security

The CRPF is the nodal agency nominated by the MHA for security deployment in LWE affected states. The Force has achieved an extent of dominance in the Naxal-belt. It has established three permanent camps in the forests of *Abhujmadh*⁸ (which literally means ‘*Abhuj*’ – unknown, ‘*Madh*’ – hill) area of Chhattisgarh which is considered to be the hotbed of armed Maoists (Press Trust of India 2018). Abhujmadh region spans 36 village panchayats and 207 villages and is a common link between the Sukma, Dantewada, Bijapur, Narayanpur and Kondagaon districts. It is for the first time that the CRPF has been able to achieve this kind of area dominance in the LWE affected region. Due to the assured security provided by CRPF, the Chhattisgarh Government, in association with the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Roorkee is successfully completing its maiden revenue survey exercise to ascertain land records (Press Trust of India 2017).

According to MHA, nearly 45,000 CRPF personnel deployed in LWE affected states have been posted there continuously for over three years; in some cases even for more than five years. Vacancies in CAPFs add further complicate their situation (M. Government of India 2018).⁹ The over-stretch and wear and tear result in CRPF personnel being under-equipped, under trained and fatigued, thus adversely affecting their morale (Press Trust of India 2017).

The CRPF has decided to replace around 12,000 of its personnel with young and freshly inducted recruits. This will give it greater agility and revive its operational strength in its Counter-Insurgency (CI) operations against LWE armed cadres.¹⁰ In this backdrop, this operational strategy has revived the combat profile of the Force and its force-structure (Press Trust of India 2018). The Force is striving hard to establish more such camps in this region, which will also usher in development for the tribal and locals living in these dense forests.

To execute its expanded and crucial role in the internal security mechanism the CRPF has consistently been allocated the highest budget among all CAPFs.¹¹ Despite these budgetary allocations and other measures, the Force continues to be at receiving end and bears heavy fatalities. One of the major operational drawbacks, consistently highlighted by scholars and experts, is the non-regimental structure of deployment, which leads to the irrational deployment of personnel in various violence hit sectors. As a result, the force structure is stretched beyond its limits (Sahni 2017). Due to this passive defence, the offensive operations of CRPF are confined to ‘safe zones’ of about two kilometres from its permanent camps.

Poor Living Conditions

Another major challenge faced by the force is the poor living conditions in its forward camps. The CRPF relies mainly on state support during its deployment. But the personnel endure

8. Abhujmadh which falls in Bastar division of Chhattisgarh and spans across across 4000 Sq km. This survey was launched in April 2017 and will benefit 35,000 people and help them in getting title deeds (Patta) for their land in the Abhujmarh region.

9. According to Ministry of Home Affairs data provided in the Lok Sabha, till July 1, 2017, a total of 22,746 posts remain vacant, against the sanctioned strength of 3, 24,093. These vacancies coupled with irrational deployments have literally exhausted the force of CRPF extensively

10. The CRPF recruits nearly 20,000 men and women in 2016, 2017. The CRPF has deployed nearly 1, 00,000 personnel in LWE affected region.


11. Due to its intense engagement with LWE affected states, handling terrorist and insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and Northeastern states. CRPF being one of the oldest CAPFs has become a force structure of 242 battalions which includes 204 executive battalions, 6 Women Battalions (Mahila), 15 Rapid Action Force (RAF) Battalions, 10 COBRA battalions, 5 Signal Battalions and 1 Special Duty Group, 1 Parliament Duty Group, 43 Group Centres, 20 Training institutions, 21 Composite Hospitals (Ministry of Home Affairs 20017).

poor living conditions which adversely impact their operational efficiency. For example, at Sukma, most of the so-called barracks and operational bases are no more than tent-shades that do not even provide minimum basic comforts to mitigate fatigue after extensive patrol or combat operations. These camps not only offer poor living conditions and sanitation but the personnel also have to survive in oppressively hot weather conditions. As a result, most of the CRPF personnel suffer from rashes and infections.¹² Along with the furnace like conditions in the barracks, lack of communication facilities also affects the morale of the personnel.



(Image Source – *The Hindu* - <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/in-sukma-crpf-jawans-fight-hostility-on-several-fronts/article18401451.ece> and *Outlook* - <https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-foster-forces/292785>)

Due to the severe and overstretched operational duties along with poor living and sanitation conditions, suicides in the CRPF are on the rise. The data below, provided by the MHA on the floor of the Lok Sabha, confirms the rising number of such cases.



From the above graph it is clear that despite lower levels of operational deployments in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, the highest number of suicide cases have been reported in these states. This speaks volumes about the state support received by the CRPF for managing its requirements for deployment of personnel in forward operational areas. According to MHA data, details of fatal casualties of CRPF personnel clearly indicate the negligible support received by the Force in all aspects of counterinsurgency operations. The reasons for these suicides needed to be ascertained and corrective measures initiated.

12. Interaction of the author with CRPF jawans deployed in Chhattisgarh at HQ 13 Bn of CRPF, Chandigarh and CRPF North West Sector HQ, Chandigarh.

Year	CRPF Jawans martyred in Action	Deaths of CRPF Personnel deployed in LWE region due to			
		Heart Attack	Malaria / Dengue	Depression / Suicide	Others
2016	31	92	5	26	353
2017	40	156	6	38	435
2018	14	39	1	19	124
Total	85	287	12	83	912

(Source - M. Government of India)

From the above, it is clear that amongst the 1379 total fatal casualties in the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 (until July), 85 are operational fatal casualties i.e. 16.22 per cent, and the remaining 1294 are non-op fatal casualties, i.e. 83.78 per cent. It is ironic that most of the CRPF personnel lost their lives due to ailments and other reasons like accidents, snake and insect bites, infection, food poisoning, etc. rather than in actual combat action. This number is growing every year and need the immediate attention of policymakers who must study the causes and resolve them in a timely manner. There is an urgent need for a restructuring of the CRPF, mainly in training and personnel management. This further highlights the great need for improving living conditions in the base and forward camps. Providing adequate and timely medical support is also a major challenge. The CRPF relies mainly on Indian Air Force support for speedy evacuation which takes time, and may not even be readily available. At present 4 Composite Hospitals of 100 beds and 17 Composite Hospitals of 50 beds have been set up by the CRPF, but there is scope for improvement in casualty management for an organisation with 246 battalions with a deployment footprint across the country (C. M. Government of India 1939).

Some Course Corrections

As a preliminary course correction measure, the Ministry of Home affairs has empowered the CRPF to directly draw from Security Related Expenditure (SRE) funds. However, this has not solved the problem because before utilising these funds, it is essential to secure the prior approval of the respective states. However, certain bottlenecks have been removed for ensuring easy availability of funds to the CAPFs, under the SRE scheme. After designating the CRPF as the nodal agency for counter LWE operations, things have improved. The CRPF camps in Bijapur, Sukma and Dantewada have been constructed under the SRE Scheme.



(Image Curtsey – CRPF)

Better living conditions along with improved medical support, have boosted the morale of the personnel. Modern weapons and advanced communication systems will go a long way in enhancing their combat capabilities and effectiveness, giving them an advantage while operating in the tough terrains of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

The force restructuring is also believed to be crucial for the CRPF, for improving not only its operational efficacy, but also to sustain a credible force ratio to operate in a pan-India profile.

Role of States – Have they Met their Responsibilities?

Dealing with the LWE security challenge is clearly not only the responsibility of the Central Government. The vast experience of Indian counter-insurgency suggests that the state police led security response has always been more effective and successful. The experiences of states like Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra are classic examples where the deployment of police personnel on LWE operations is not a punishment posting. The experiences of Punjab and Assam are also equally telling examples, where the state police led the campaign and effectively dealt with counter-insurgency operations. Primarily, the greater interface of the local police with the local population, empowers them with credible intelligence which is critical for operations. Hence, it is of paramount importance for the LWE affected states to shoulder greater responsibility and emerge as the lead counter-insurgency forces of the state. For that to happen, there is an immediate need for the state police leadership to introduce necessary changes in terms of leadership, mandate and in strengthening its capacity to produce the desired results on the ground.

Status of Policing in LWE affected states

In this context, it is interesting to note that the LWE has deep roots in the states where the number of policemen available per one lakh population is amongst the lowest in the country, way below the national average of 135. There is a need to rectify this security gap by providing, in a time-bound manner, a minimum force ratio of 200 policemen per lakh of population.

Shortage of Police Forces in LWE affected states (Civil + Armed) as on April 04, 2018							
State	Geographical Area in km ²	Population, 2011 census	Density per Sq km	Shortage of Police personnel	Vacant posts of IPS Officers	No of Police stations	
Andhra Pradesh	1,62,970	49,386,799	308	11596	24	1017	
Bihar	94,163	103,804,637	1102	34484	42	1064	
Chhattisgarh	135,191	25,545,198	190	10704	8	428	
Jharkhand	79,714	32,988,134	414	25927	32	506	
Kerala	38,863	33,387,677	860	1309	43	520	
Madhya Pradesh	308,252	72,626,809	236	17260	40	1095	
Maharashtra	307,713	112,374,333	365	14749	49	1162	
Odisha	155,707	41,974,218	270	9730	71	614	
Telangana	112,077	35,193,978	307	16044	42	721	
Uttar Pradesh	240,928	199,812,341	829	214335	93	1528	
West Bengal	88,752	91,276,115	1028	38580	69	585	
Total	1724330	797370239	Avg 537.11	394718	513	9240	

Source - (C. Government of India 2011, M. Government of India 2018)

The data placed by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the floor of Lok Sabha in April 2018 clearly highlights the poor state of policing in LWE affected states. The worst affected states are Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand who have minimal policing manpower. The shortage of police officers is appalling. The state of affairs in policing is equally bad in densely populated states like Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal where the shortage of police manpower is more than 20,000. West Bengal is the most densely populated state, but has barely 585 police stations.

It is not just a matter of providing the numbers, the quality of policing also matters greatly. As rightly pointed out in the Padmanabhaiah Committee Report that, what India requires is a “highly motivated, professionally skilled, infrastructurally self-sufficient and sophisticatedly trained police force” (Doval 2013). In our federal political system, most of the policing responsibilities rest with the state governments, which usually possess their own counter-terrorism and intelligence units (Special Branch). However, time and again various review and research committees have observed that the state forces, especially the local police, are inadequately trained and mostly ill-equipped to effectively handle the 21st-century threat profile of India. It makes the internal security infrastructure of India highly fragmented and poorly coordinated (Pradhan and Balchandran 2008).


When states take up the task of developing an effective counter-insurgency force, their focus should not only be on the basic aspects of policing but also on the development of other aspects of security such as intelligence capabilities, training, and staffing and resource management etc. An effective counter-insurgency force guided by vision, mission orientation supported by quality training, and equipment, will enable the state police to transform it into an effective counter-insurgency force worthy of standing with CAPFs. Hence, it is of paramount importance for states to shoulder greater responsibility and emerge as the principle counter-insurgency force in the state while simultaneously introducing development initiatives. Comprehensive development, discharge of qualitative governance and the ability of the states to set good precedents are certain pre-requisites for assuring a peaceful future. Hence, the most affected states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar need to review their approach by harmonising their plans with those of the Central Government.

Developmental activities

While deliberating upon the developmental policies for the LWE affected region, the NITI Aayog has made certain observations, based on three prominent factors. These are:-

1. Despite the decline in LWE violence and its geographical spread, it remains a prominent security challenge;
2. The strong correlation between the incidence of extremism and poor socio-economic indicators;
3. Along with proactive security measures, there is a greater need for a developmental push to root out left-wing extremism.

Extremism – Vicious Cycle



States can thus play a decisive role in reversing the vicious cycle of extremism into a virtuous cycle of development.

Development – Virtuous Cycle



Summary of Recommendations

Security

What can be done to transform the CRPF from a ‘reserve’ force into a strong counter-insurgency force:-

- Nomination of CRPF as the nodal agency for LWE is a step in that direction.
- Need to introduce transformative reforms in the force structure of the CRPF with emphasis on:
 -
 - a) Addressing welfare measures for personnel thereby providing basic facilities for healthy living conditions, ample resources and prompt medical support;
 - b) Strengthening intelligence collection mechanisms and along with its timely dissemination;

- c) Providing advanced weapons and other critical combat equipment and appropriate training to effectively handle the 21st-century threat profile;
- d) Greater role of state police forces in LWE operations.

Development

In the present context, the overall governance mechanism is driven by the principle of 'Cooperative Federalism', under which the states are empowered with a greater share of revenue and comprehensive development policy options. The LWE affected states have to do their bit and play a lead role by:-

- Ensuring effective governance for the well-being of the affected sections of the population;
- Transforming the state police into an effective counterinsurgency force;
- Timely execution and completion of development schemes.
- Further, the states can also improve governance by playing a constructive role in:-
- Suggesting specific, actionable interventions in existing schemes which are being run by the Central Government in the state;
- Encouraging civil society and youth to act in a constructive way rather than resorting to mere right based agitations;
- Unleashing the competitive spirit among all stakeholders;
- Timely sharing of information on district-specific issues;
- Dissemination of best practices, removing bottlenecks and suggestions for special dispensations or relaxations as, and when, required (N. Government of India 2018).

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is evident that the incidence of LWE violence has been on a declining trajectory in all the affected states and the area of influence of the LWE movement has significantly shrunk since its peak in 2010. However, historical experience suggests that similar trends were noticed in the past, but the movement managed to revive with a greater degree of militarisation. Hence, there is still a need for sustained kinetic pressure on the activists, by strengthening the counterinsurgency capabilities of central, as well as state forces. States have to take a leading role in this campaign and provide quality equipment and specialised training to their police. For maintaining an effective synergy in operations and to ensure the timely flow of actionable intelligence, there is a greater need for the Centre as well as states to establish coordinated operational centres. While doing so, there is a need to provide security to the citizens of these states and address their core issues, pertaining to economic inequality, illiteracy, acute poverty, inefficiency and corruption at all levels of administration.

Proactive role by states will truly facilitate a multi-pronged approach which reflects the National Action Plan and facilitates qualitative governance. Proactive execution of a multipronged

strategy at the Centre as well as at the state level needs to function in a coherent manner for effective results. This will not only restrain the spread of extremism but will ensure effective discharge of citizen-centric governance. If implemented effectively, it will convince people, through actions as well as deeds, and neutralise the revolutionary political discourse targeted at them. The task is challenging, but mainstream political parties have to build a consensus amongst themselves and pool their resources in a constructive manner, keeping aside their narrow political and other sectoral interests. The present multipronged strategy followed by the Government of India is a step in right direction, highlighting the fact that there is ample scope for governments, both at the Centre and the states, to demonstrate that the people's confidence can be won back through meaningful political engagement and by discharging good governance and not through the barrel of a gun. This will truly conceptualise the *SAMADHAN* initiative without any crossfire between the Centre and the states.

References:

- Ahuja, Namrata Biji, "Sukma attack: Free flow of arms and ammo to LWE areas a cause for concern." *The Week*, March 14, 2018, at <https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2018/03/14/cpi-maoists-sukma-attack-arms-supply-Naxals-crpf-jawans-killed.html>. Accessed July 21, 2018.
- Akhoury, Nishant, "Naxalism is gravest internal threat: PM." *Times of India*, April 13, 2006, at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Naxalism-is-gravest-internal-threat-PM/articleshow/1489633.cms>. Accessed June 10, 2017.
- The Economic Times*, "Chhattisgarh government planning to electrify all households by September." February 2, 2014, at <https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/power/chhattisgarh-government-planning-to-electrify-all-households-by-september/63052184>. Accessed July 30, 2018.
- Bose, Sumantra, *Transforming India : Challenges to the World's Largest Democracy*. Harvard University Press, 2013 WEB ADDRESS??Accessed March 12, 2018.
- Chauhah, Neeraj, "Red surrenders rise as cadres resent 'good lives' of seniors," *The Times of India*, September 10, 2018, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/red-surrenders-rise-as-cadres-resent-good-lives-of-seniors/articleshow/65747001.cms>. Accessed September 10, 2018.
- Communist Party of India M. n.d. "CPI-Maoists Urban Perspective," *www.bannedthought.net*, at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/UrbanPerspective.pdf>. Accessed July 22, 2018.
- "Press Release on Uri Attack and Support for Azadi on Kashmir." *www.bannedthought.net*. October 2, 2016, at <http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/Statements-2016/161002-CC-OnSurgicalStrikeInKashmir-Eng.pdf>. Accessed July 12, 2018.
- Doval , Ajit, "Maoist War Against India: Time for United & Strong Response." *https://www.vifindia.org*. June 6, 2013, at <https://www.vifindia.org/print/1780>. Accessed August 18, 2018
- Doval, Ajit, "Intelligence in India's Internal Security." *http://www.vifindia.org*. March 27, 2010 at <http://www.vifindia.org/article/2006/october-december/Intelligence-in-India-s-Internal-Security>. Accessed September 12, 2017.
- Indian Express*, "Probing Maoist 'link' to Dalit event, Pune police arrest five activists." August 29, 2018 at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/elgar-parishad-probing-maoist-link-to-dalit-event-pune-police-arrest-five-activists-sudha-bharadwaj-5329959/>. Accessed August 29, 2018.
- First Post*, "Top Maoist leader Jampanna, wife surrender before Telangana Police following 'ideological

differences' with CPI (Maoist)," December 25, 2017, at <https://www.firstpost.com/india/top-maoist-leader-jampanna-wife-surrender-before-telangana-police-following-ideological-differences-with-cpi-maoist-4275155.html>.

G, Anantkrishan, "Activists held not for dissent, proof of their Maoist link: Cops to Supreme Court." *The Indian Express*, September 6, 2018, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/elgaar-parishad-event-activists-held-not-for-dissent-proof-of-their-maoist-link-cops-to-supreme-court-5342161/>. Accessed September 6, 2018.

Ghose, Dipanka, "Top Maoist propagandist Abhay Devdas Nayak held: Chhattisgarh Police." *The Indian Express*, June 13, 2018, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/top-maoist-propagandist-abhay-devdas-nayak-held-chhattisgarh-police-5215040/>. Accessed August 22, 2018.

Government of India, *Census 2011*, "States Census 2011." [https://www.census2011.co.in.](https://www.census2011.co.in/) at <https://www.census2011.co.in/states.php>. Accessed September 21, 2018.

Government of India, Central Reserve Police Force Ministry of Home Affairs, *First Ever PoP of Bastariya Battalion held in Chhattisgarh*, [https://www.crfp.gov.in.](https://www.crfp.gov.in/) May 21, 2018, at https://www.crfp.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/News/531_1_442052018.pdf. Accessed July 12, 2018

Government of India, Central Reserve Police Force Ministry of Home Affairs, *About CRPF*. <https://crpf.gov.in/>. July 27, 1939 at <https://crpf.gov.in/index.htm>, Accessed August 12, 2018.

Government of India, Group of Ministers Cabinet Secretariat, *Kargil Review Committee Report*, <http://www.vifindia.org>. September 1, 2000, at <http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf>. Accessed September 29, 2017.

Government of India, Left Wing Extremism Division Ministry of Home Affairs, *Comparative Important Parameters of LWE Violence During 2009 - 2018*, <https://mha.gov.in>. May 15, 2018, at <https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/LWEO300520180945.pdf>. Accessed July 12, 2018.

Government of India, LWE Division Ministry of Home Affairs, *State wise extent of LWE violence During 2009 to 2018*, <https://mha.gov.in>. August 8, 2018, at <https://164.100.158.235/question/annex/246/Au2451.pdf>. Accessed August 29, 2018.

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, *About the Division - Left Wing Extremism Division*, <https://mha.gov.in>. October 19, 2006, at https://mha.gov.in/division_of_mha/left-wing-extremism-division. Accessed September 24, 2018.

2018. *Annual Report - 2017-18*, <https://mha.gov.in>. April 30, 2017, at <https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/MINISTRY%20OF%20HOME%20AFFAIR%20AR%202017-18%20FOR%20WEB.pdf>. Accessed July 30, 2018.

Annual Report 2004-2005, <https://mha.gov.in>. April, 2005, at <https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/ar0405-Eng.pdf>. Accessed May 12, 2018.

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, *Annual Report 2016-2017*, Annual Report, Left Wing Extremism Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi: April, 3-7, at http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/EnglAnnualReport2016-17_17042017.pdf. Accessed June 12, 2017.

"Cabinet approves provision of mobile connectivity in Left Wing Extremism Areas ," <http://www.pib.nic.in/>. May 23, 2018, at

"Development Projects in Maoists Affected Districts." <https://loksabha.nic.in/>. April 03, 2018 Accessed July 20, 2018. <https://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/14/AU5968.pdf>. Accessed July 12,

2018. <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=179481>.
- "Districts affected by Naxal Violence." <http://www.pib.nic.in/>. March 14, 2018 at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=177450>. Accessed June 21, 2018.
- "Government's new policy paying dividends in containing Left Wing Extremism ." <http://www.pib.nic.in/>. April 16, 2018, at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=178704>. Accessed April 19, 2018.
- "Government's new policy paying dividends in containing Left Wing Extremism." www.pib.nic.in. April 16, 2018, at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=178704>. Accessed July 12, 2019.
- "Key Initiatives - Preempt, Prevent, Protect - Security with Sensitivity." <https://mha.gov.in>. at https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/Keyinitiatives_07062017.pdf. 2018. Accessed July 20, 2018. "LOK SABHA STARRED QUESTION NO. *190." <https://loksabha.nic.in>. July 31, at <http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/15/AS190.pdf>. Accessed August 1, 2018.
- "Lok Sabha Unstarred Question 3403." <https://loksabha.nic.in/>. August 7, 2018, at <http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/15/AU3403.pdf>. Accessed August 10, 2018.
- . "LWE incidents in the Country Since 2015." July 24, 2018. at <http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/15/AU970.pdf>. Accessed July 24, 2018.
- "New Multi-Pronged Strategy to Deal with Maoists ." <https://mha.gov.in>. March 11, 2015 at <https://mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/pdfs/par2015-pdfs/rs-110315/1502.pdf>. Accessed May 29, 2018.
- Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Press Information Bureau, "Union Home Minister addresses the Review Meeting of Left Wing Extremism affected States ," <http://pib.nic.in>. May 08, 2017 at. <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=161625>. Accessed June 18, 2017
- Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, "Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question 1672." *Rajya Sabha*. August 1, 2018, at <https://164.100.158.235/question/annex/246/Au1672.pdf>. Accessed August 1, 2018.
- "Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question 2467 ." <https://rajyasabha.nic.in/>, August 08, 2018, at <https://164.100.158.235/question/annex/246/Au2467.pdf>. Accessed August 13, 2018.
- "Rajyasabha Unstarred Question No - 1502." <https://mha.gov.in>. March 11, 2018, at <https://mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/pdfs/par2015-pdfs/rs-110315/1502.pdf>. Accessed September 12, 2018.
- "Shri Rajnath Singh attends passing out parade of 241 Bastariya Battalion of CRPF in Chhattisgarh ." <http://www.pib.nic.in/>. May 21, 2018, at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=179433>. Accessed July 21, 2018.
- "UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 3749 : Rajya Sabha." <http://mha1.nic.in>. April 05, 2017, at <http://mha1.nic.in/par2013/par2017-pdfs/rs-050417/3749.pdf>. Accessed June 19, 2017.
- Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, "Lok Sabha Starred Question No 49." <https://loksabha.nic.in/>. February 6, 2018, at <http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/14/AS49.pdf> and <http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/14/AU1616.pdf> . Accessed September 25, 2018.
- Government of India, National Investigation Agency Ministry of Home Affairs, "NIA arrests one absconding accused in an LWE funding case ." www.nia.gov.in. July 18, 2018, at http://www.nia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/PressReleaseNew/570_1_Pr.pdf. Accessed July 19, 2018.

- "Union Home Minister to inaugurate NIA Hqrs Office Complex on 10th October ," [https://pib.nic.in.](https://pib.nic.in/October%208,%202017%20at,%20http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=171489) October 8, 2017 at, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=171489>. Accessed May 8, 2018.
- Government of India, NITI Aayog, "CHALLENGES AND STRATEGY FOR TRANSFORMATION OF ASPIRATIONAL DISTRICTS AFFECTED BY LWE." <http://www.niti.gov.in/>. January 4, 2018, at <http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Home-Affairs.pdf>. Accessed August 15, 2018.
- Government of India, Universal Service Obligation Fund Department of Telecommunication, "About us - USOF." www.usof.gov.in. April 1, 2002, at <http://www.usof.gov.in/usof-cms/usof-objective.jsp>. Accessed July 12, 2018.
- Business Standard*, "Pune Police arrest five Maoist sympathizers nationwide." August 28, 2018 at https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/pune-police-arrest-five-maoist-sympathizers-nationwide-118082800944_1.html. Accessed August 29, 2018.
- Jongman, Albert J. 1988. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide To Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, And Literature*, PLACE OF PUBLICATION?Transaction Publishers, 1988
- Ministry of Home Affairs, Central Reserve Police Force, "About CRPF." <http://crpf.nic.in>. December 31, 2017, at <http://crpf.nic.in/index.htm>. Accessed February 8, 2018.
- Morrison, Cha, "Grievance, Mobilisation and State Response: An examination of the Naxalite Insurgency in India ." *Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security* 2 (1): 55, 2012, http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/12687687/Chas_Morrison_JCTS_Naxalites_article.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1498637747&Signature=HcKK%2FaeY89FCJG7zI5MrX4Ooxz0%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DGrievanc. Accessed June 09, 2017.
- Mulye, Abhijit, "Maharashtra villagers 'challenging' Naxals," *The New Indian Express*, March 25, 2018. <http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/2018/mar/25/maharashtra-villagers-challenging-Naxals-1791995.html>. Accessed September 23, 2018.
- Nanjappa, Vick, "Urban Naxal: Activists were planning to ambush security forces." *One India*, September 6, 2018, at https://www.oneindia.com/amphtml/india/urban-Naxal-activists-were-planning-to-ambush-security-forces-2770338.html?utm_source=article&utm_medium=tweet-button&utm_campaign=article-tweet&__twitter_impression=true. Accessed September 6, 2018.
- Oetken, Jennifer L, "Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India." In *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, edited by Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler, PLACE OF PUBLICATION?129. Oxon: ???Routledge, 2008.
- Pradhan, Ram, and V. Balchandran, *High Level Enquiry report on 26/11*, Mumbai: Government of Maharashtra, 2008.
- Firstpost*, "Maoists trying to expand activities to newer border areas, reveals Ministry of Home Affairs." May 2017, at <https://www.firstpost.com/india/maoists-trying-to-expand-activities-to-newer-border-areas-reveals-ministry-of-home-affairs-3431660.html>. Accessed August 12, 2018.
- The Economic Times*, "Security forces on anti-Naxal operations face 40% increase in IED attack." July 14, 2018, at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/security-forces-on-anti-Naxal-operations-face-40-increase-in-ied-attacks/articleshow/49185416.cms>. Accessed July 15, 2018.
- The First Post*, "Chhattisgarh: First-ever revenue survey in Naxal-affected Abujhmad launched." April

30, 2017, at <https://www.firstpost.com/india/chhattisgarh-first-ever-revenue-survey-in-Naxal-affected-abujmad-launched-3414980.html>. Accessed July 30, 2018.

The Indian Express, "Anti-Naxal operations: CRPF to replace 12,000 older troops with young personnel in Chhattisgarh," April 24, 2018, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/anti-Naxal-operations-crpf-to-replace-12000-older-troops-with-young-personnel-in-chhattisgarh-5150048/>. Accessed July 21, 2018.

The Indian Express, "Government sets up multi-disciplinary group to choke Naxal funds," May 7, 2018, at <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/government-sets-up-multi-disciplinary-group-to-choke-Naxal-funds-5166843/>. Accessed May 10, 2018.

The Indian Express, "Not just Naxals, CRPF fighting water portability, soaring temperatures, fatigue in Chhattisgarh," April 30, 2017, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/not-just-Naxals-crpf-fighting-water-portability-soaring-temperatures-fatigue-in-chhattisgarh-4634452/>. Accessed August 12, 2018.

The Indian Express, "PM Narendra Modi asks ministries, NITI Aayog to frame strategies for tribal areas," January 21, 2015, at [read:http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pm-narendra-modi-asks-ministries-niti-aayog-to-frame-strategies-for-tribal-areas/](http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pm-narendra-modi-asks-ministries-niti-aayog-to-frame-strategies-for-tribal-areas/). Accessed July 12, 2017.

The New Indian Express, "Anti-Naxal operations: CRPF sets up permanent camps in Chhattisgarh's Abujmadh," March 28, 2018, at <http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/mar/08/anti-Naxal-operations-crpf-sets-up-permanent-camps-in-chhattisgarhs-abujmadh-1784064.html>. Accessed July 12, 2018.

Times of India, "NIA crackdown on flow of funds blow to terror groups: Rajnath Singh," October 10, 2017, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/nia-crackdown-on-flow-of-funds-blow-to-terror-groups-rajnath-singh/articleshow/61021523.cms>. Accessed September 12, 2018.

Ramana, P V, "Left Wing Extremism in India." <https://www.orfonline.org>. December 18, 2003, at <https://www.orfonline.org/research/left-wing-extremism-in-india/>. Accessed August 19, 2018.

Maharashtra Time, "Naxal martyr week suffers setback as village protest, burn banners," *The Times of India*, July 28, 2018, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Naxal-martyr-week-suffers-setback-as-village-protest-burn-banners/articleshow/59808842.cms>. Accessed September 12, 2018.

Sahni, Ajai, "The crisis ailing the CRPF: Sukma attack won't be the last if paramilitary training doesn't match counter-insurgency goals," *Hindustan Times*, May 12, 2017, at <http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-sukma-carnage-wont-be-the-last-if-paramilitary-training-doesnt-match-counter-insurgency-goals-2435404>. Accessed June 21, 2017.

Sandhu, Kamaljit Kaur, "12 takeaways from Centre's new strategy to deal with Naxal." *India Today*, May 8, 2017 at <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/Naxals-mha-rajnath-singh-narendra-modi-government-strategy-975991-2017-05-08>.

Scott, David, "The "Indo-Pacific" - New Regional Formulations and New." *Asia Pacific Review* 98, 2012.

Singh, Prakash, *The Naxalite Movement in India*. Third. New Delhi, Delhi: Rupa Publication, 2016.

The Hindu "Separate NIA unit set to probe funding of Naxalites." *The Hindu*, May 7, 2018, at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/separate-nia-unit-set-to-probe-funding-of-Naxalites/article23805134.ece>. Accessed May 8, 2018.

Talukdar, Sreemoy, "Bhima Koregaon raids: A case of over-the-top outrage, Congress hypocrisy, media's peddling of Leftist narrative." *Firstpost*, August 30, 2018, at <https://www.firstpost.com/india/>

history-robbed-gold-tiffin-box-diamond-studded-cup-stolen-from-nizams-museum-in-hyderabad-investigation-underway-5113741.html. Accessed September 3, 2018.

Tare, Kiran, "Arrested activists conspired to over throw government, says Pune Police." *India Today*, August 29, 2018, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/arrested-activists-conspired-to-over-throw-government-says-pune-police-1327001-2018-08-29>. Accessed September 1, 2018.

(The paper is the author's individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct).

About the VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

The Vivekananda International Foundation is an independent non-partisan institution that conducts research and analysis on domestic and international issues, and offers a platform for dialogue and conflict resolution. Some of India's leading practitioners from the fields of security, military, diplomacy, government, academia and media have come together to generate ideas and stimulate action on national security issues.

The defining feature of VIF lies in its provision of core institutional support which enables the organisation to be flexible in its approach and proactive in changing circumstances, with a long-term focus on India's strategic, developmental and civilisational interests. The VIF aims to channelise fresh insights and decades of experience harnessed from its faculty into fostering actionable ideas for the nation's stakeholders.

Since its inception, VIF has pursued quality research and scholarship and made efforts to highlight issues in governance, and strengthen national security. This is being actualised through numerous activities like seminars, round tables, interactive dialogues, Vimarsh (public discourse), conferences and briefings. The publications of VIF form lasting deliverables of VIF's aspiration to impact on the prevailing discourse on issues concerning India's national interest.



VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

3, San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021

Phone: +91-11-24121764, 24106698

Email: info@vifindia.org, Website: <https://www.vifindia.org>

Follow us on twitter@vifindia