and many more ....
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDITOR’S NOTE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CENTRE STAGE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda for the New Army Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India not Immune to Jihadist Fires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sushant Sareen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEBATE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Muslim Clerics Oppose Madrasa Modernisation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RNP Singh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIPLOMACY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Needs to Tread Cautiously in Defence Deals with US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Radhakrishna Rao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEIGHBOURHOOD</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will President Xi Jinping’s Visit change the Contours of Sino-Indian Ties?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gujarat Model of Development: Can it Work for Nepal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prof Hari Bansh Jha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEFENCE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Defence and A Mountain Strike Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lt. Gen (Retd) Gautam Banerjee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Impact Analysis – An Essential Element of Policy Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Debashis Banerjee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning the Ganga: Need for a New Management Paradigm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dr M N Buch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOOK REVIEW</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churchill and the Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVENTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vimarsha on Transforming Centre-State Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion on Christine Fair’s Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with Ms. Kavita Kewal, Department of Defence, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit of Nepalese Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminar on West Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with Dr Moeed Yusuf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk by Amb Hussain Haqqani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in the articles published in the e-journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation.
Editor’s Note

Hundred days is too short a period to assess the performance of a Government which came to power riding on lot of hopes and has full five years at its disposal to keep the promises it had made. Yet, like the box office collections of movies counted every week, the media makes a circus of such events. While it would be too early to pass any judgement on the Modi Government, its over three month long tenure clearly points to certain discernible indicators pertaining to the nation’s economy, security, social security etc. Of course, the most visible changes have been seen on the foreign policy front right from the word go.

On display is a strong and decisive leadership, which is willing to take bold steps and initiatives, secure national interests yet retain the consensus and traditions. It would take some time for changes in other crucial sectors to become visible on the ground given the enormity of the challenges. Nevertheless, the NDA Government’s first baby steps have restored the pride and confidence of a demoralised nation and instilled hopes that good days are not far away.

In this issue of Vivek, Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal outlines the challenges and opportunities before the new Chief of Army Staff, while veteran bureaucrat M N Buch presents a blueprint for the success of the proposed project to clean river Ganga.

Also on the menu are two insightful and analytical articles by RNP Singh and Sushant Sareen on topics hitherto skirted by mainstream media and the intelligentsia: the opposition of Muslim clerics to modernisation of Madrasas and India not being immune to Jihadists as is widely publicised and perceived.

Do keep us posted with your invaluable inputs.

K G Suresh
Agenda for the New Army Chief

General Dalbir Suhag’s highest priority must be to address the ‘critical hollowness’ in the army’s operational preparedness

- **Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal**

On taking over as the COAS from General Bikram Singh, who served with distinction for over two years, General Dalbir Singh Suhag said his priorities would be to “enhance operational preparedness and the effectiveness of the Indian Army.” He also said that force modernisation, infrastructure development, optimisation of human resources and the welfare of personnel are issues that are close to his heart.

In March 2012, General V K Singh, the then COAS, had written to the Prime Minister about ‘critical hollowness’ in the army’s operational preparedness. He had pointed out large-scale deficiencies in weapons systems, ammunition and equipment in service in the army and the fact that many of the weapons and equipment were obsolete or bordering on obsolescence. In particular, he had brought out that the artillery and air defence arms needed the infusion of modern guns, missiles and radars and the aviation corps required new helicopters to replace the ageing fleet.

Two consecutive reports of the CAG of December 2011 and November 2012 brought out that the state of defence preparedness was a cause for serious anxiety. The Standing Committee on Defence (SCD) in Parliament has also noted these developments with concern several times. In an unprecedented move, the SCD insisted on meeting the three Chiefs to take stock of operational preparedness. The SCD has repeatedly urged the government to increase the defence budget to enable the armed forces to undertake meaningful modernisation.

Weapons, ammunition and equipment shortages have persisted for long and several Chiefs before General V K Singh had written to the PM and the Defence Minister for help to make

*Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Visiting Fellow, VIF*
up the shortfall. During the Kargil conflict the nation had heard General V P Malik, the COAS, make the chilling statement on national TV, “We will fight with what we have.” Though the conflict was confined to Kargil District, 50,000 rounds of artillery ammunition had to be imported as an emergency measure because the stock holding was extremely low. If it had become necessary to open another front, the shortage of artillery ammunition would have seriously hampered operational planning.

Military modernisation has two major facets: the replacement of obsolete and obsolescent weapons and equipment with modern ones, which results in increasing combat effectiveness; and, the qualitative upgradation of combat capabilities through the acquisition and induction of force multipliers. General Suhag, like his predecessors, faces a major dilemma: given small budgets, how can the army improve operational preparedness while simultaneously make concerted efforts to modernise. Logically, operational preparedness takes precedence over modernisation. The art of military leadership lies in finding an optimum balance so that all efforts that are made to enhance operational preparedness also contribute substantively to modernisation.

The most critical operational deficiencies include the inadequacy of artillery firepower due to the obsolescence of guns and mortars and the consequent degradation in their performance in battle. No modernisation has taken place since the Bofors 155mm howitzer was purchased from Sweden in the mid-1980s. The night blindness of the army’s mechanised forces needs to be rectified immediately. The F-INSAS (future infantry soldier as a system) programme for the modernisation of infantry battalions must be implemented on an urgent basis.

Air defence guns and missile and their radar systems are reported to be 97 per cent obsolescent. The Aviation Corps urgently needs 197 light helicopters. The old and
inefficient intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition systems available today adversely impact command and control and ‘targeting’ during war. Hence, the C4I2SR system needs a complete overhaul. The logistics support system also needs to be revamped, with the concept of ‘just in time logistics’ being implemented.

The new COAS will preside over the modernisation process during the remaining three years of the 12th Defence Plan, including the raising of 17 Corps for employment on the border with China. This Corps, being raised as a ‘strike corps’ for the mountains, is expected to cost Rs 64,000 crore to raise and equip over a period of five to seven years. Approximately 90,000 new personnel will be added to the army's manpower strength, including those in ancillary support and logistics units. New weapons and equipment will have to be procured for the divisions, brigades and battalions of this Corps. It will be a retrograde step to milk these from existing battalions to equip new raisings.

Recruiting additional manpower of the requisite qualifications has so far not posed any problems for the world’s third largest volunteer army. However, finding officers for 17 Corps will be a major challenge as there is an ongoing deficiency of approximately 10,000 officers. Transferring officers from existing battalions will further dilute their command and control and weaken them intrinsically. The methods for remedying this shortcoming are well known; it is for the NDA government to take appropriate action in an early time frame.

General Suhag wishes to ensure that relatively softer issues like human resources development and the welfare of serving personnel and veterans are not neglected. Morale is adversely affected if these issues are not appropriately handled. As a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the General will help in the formulation of the recommendations of the armed forces for consideration by the Seventh Pay Commission. This has been a rather contentious issue in the past and will require sage handling. Finally, civil-military relations have not been good in the recent past and need to be improved.

If one may take the liberty of using a few well-known American buzzwords and catch-phrases, the ‘revolution in military affairs’ had whooshed by the Indian army in
the 1990s. The ‘transformation’ process that followed must be gradually implemented even though it is a decade late – primarily due to budgetary constraints. The COAS will be responsible for the transformation of the army to a ‘network centric’ force capable of executing ‘effects-based operations’ over the full spectrum of conflict. General Suhag must forge a light, lethal and wired army that can fight and win India’s wars on the battlefields of the 21st century – jointly with the navy and the air force.

Back to Contents
India not Immune to Jihadist Fires

- Sushant Sareen

The recent revelations of four Mumbai youth who joined the ranks of the abominable Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) should shake the Indian political establishment and civil society out of their reverie that India is immune to the Jihadism that is infecting Muslim communities around the world. For far too long, India has been in denial over the growing attraction of jihadist ideology and propaganda for Indian Muslim youth. Partly out of the ignorance of the phenomenon of Jihadism that is sweeping the Islamic world and partly out of political correctness and a fallacious understanding of the concept of secularism, India has peddled the fiction that its pluralism and democracy is a perfect antidote to the jihadist virus. But for some years now, reports have started coming in about Indian Muslims getting involved in international jihadist causes.

For the last ten years, India was saddled with a Prime Minister who couldn’t sleep in the night thinking about what the mother of the failed suicide bomber of Indian origin who bombed the Glasgow airport must be going through. With no clarity, much less direction, coming from the political leadership to what was clearly an emerging, but also extremely serious, threat which was politically a very sensitive issue, almost a hot potato, even the security establishment underplayed it. But with things now heading for the proverbial tipping point, it is critical that the government, the Muslim community, civil society, media and public at large start taking counter measures to ensure matters don’t get out of hand. Fortunately, with a new government in place, the somnolence on vital security issues will become a thing of the past.

After the 9/11 attacks and the start of the US-led Global War on Terror, many countries suddenly became aware of the involvement of their Muslim citizens in jihadist activities. While it was natural for most Muslim countries to find their citizens involved, the real surprise was the involvement of

* Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, VIF
Muslims and recent converts to Islam in Western countries in jihadist activities. India however gloated that not one Indian Muslim was involved with terrorist groups like the Al Qaeda. While this may have been technically correct, it ignored the fact that Al Qaeda was less of an organisation and more of a phenomenon. The radicalism that the Al Qaeda espoused and practised was not very different from a whole lot of radical Islamic groups that had started to emerge in India, not just after 9/11 but also much before that outrage was perpetrated. Apart from terrorist groups active in Jammu and Kashmir – for eg. Hizbul Mujahideen – there were other groups like al Umma, PFI, etc. that had mushroomed in India. In the first decade of this century, the Indian Mujahideen erupted on the scene. Initially, the IM comprised of young Indian Muslims who had lapped up the Pakistani propaganda and worked on its instructions. But in recent years, there are reports of the IM being more inspired by the international jihadist movements and are tying in with them. There have also been cells busted of Indian Muslim youth who were trying to go to Afghanistan to fight with the Al Qaeda/Taliban against the US-led international forces.

Admittedly, this trend of young Muslims in India getting attracted to or seduced by international jihadist phenomenon hasn’t as yet spiralled out of control. At the same time, it would be a terrible mistake to underplay or ignore this trend until it erupts. There is clearly a lot of churning taking place among the Indian Muslim youth, only it isn’t quite manifesting itself yet in the national life. This in itself is a cause for worry because despite the tall claims of pluralism and secularism for which the previous governments have ad nauseam been patting themselves on the back, it appears that there is very little connection or even contact between youth of different communities. It is almost as though the Muslim youth are living in a parallel world in which they are being subjected to influences that connect them more
with international jihadist causes than with national issues.

The internet is undoubtedly the single biggest recruiting ground. Chat rooms, websites, videos are all becoming tools for inciting, influencing and enlisting young Muslims. All sorts of disinformation and misinformation is being spread through this World Wide Web. Unlike mainstream media where any assertion can be challenged and counter, in many of the internet sites, there is really no counter narrative. Compounding the problem is the absence of any counter narrative even outside the internet that could serve as an antidote to the poison that is being spread through the internet. Young impressionable minds are therefore ripe for the picking, more so because of the utterly false and self-serving manufacturing of some real but mostly imagined grievances by the so-called ‘secular’ forces. Interestingly, however, it isn’t so much local grievances that are pushing the youth towards Jihadism as it is international Islamic causes and conflicts as well as lure of becoming part of a global Islamic movement that seeks to regain the glory of Islam and establish Islamic rule and recover lost Islamic territories.

Many in India were somewhat surprised to learn of the growing attraction of ISIS for Indian Muslim youth. What we seemed to have ignored is the fact that Muslims of the subcontinent have always had a thing for institution of Caliph. Nearly a 100 years back, while the then Caliphate in Turkey was practically on its death bed and hardly a tear was being shed anywhere in the Islamic world, the Indian Muslims were agitating in favour of the Caliph. Worse, Mahatma Gandhi made a strategic blunder by tying in the freedom movement with the Khilafat movement. Instead of making Indian Muslims seek inwards and strive for liberating their own country, the Mahatma ended up encouraging them to think in terms of the mythical and amorphous concept of Ummah. Not surprisingly, charlatans and brutes like Mullah Omar of the Taliban fame and Abubakr al-Baghdadi a.k.a Caliph Ibrahim, have been quick to bestow upon themselves grand titles of Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of faithful) and Caliph respectively. This was simply because of the resonance that such titles (even if self-styled) strike among many Muslims who
seem to once again long for global unity under a single leader. Indian Muslims it seems are particularly susceptible to this concept, partly because of the sustained propaganda on the internet and partly because of a certain class of Muslim clerics that have been infusing this concept in their sermons.

In the case of the ISIS recruiting Indian Muslims, both the internet and the clerics have come into play. Parties like the Jamaat Islami and clerics like the head of the Nadwa seminary have openly endorsed al-Baghdadi and promised him support. What also makes the ISIS so attractive is that it combines medieval barbarism with modern means of communication and manages to connect with the youth, not just in India but also around the world. Compared to the ISIS, the Taliban remained medieval in their outlook and just were not able to make their jihad appear ‘cool’ to the youth. ISIS’s successes on the battlefield have also propelled its growing popularity, in part because its brazen brutality conveys a sense of machismo that strikes a chord among many young people. It is of course another matter that one has to be completely depraved to be attracted by the beastly antics of the ISIS. Be that as it may, what is most disconcerting and disturbing is the fact that it isn’t the uneducated or madrassa educated Muslim who is in the forefront of joining the ranks of international jihadist groups like ISIS. On the contrary, it is the educated Muslim – doctor, engineer, graduate, technician etc. – who is getting willingly seduced by Jihadism. These are technology savvy people with a bright future, which they give up in the cause of Jihad. And this trend is only growing because in India there is just no concerted effort either from the state or from society, much less the Muslim community or families, to create a climate in which anyone subscribing to this radical philosophy or ideology is shunned, sanctioned or scoffed at for indulging in unacceptable behaviour.

The Indian state needs to get its act together and ensure that jihad is not regarded as anything ‘cool’ by the Muslim youth. A counter narrative has to be developed to
counter ‘Jihad cool’. For this, while on the one hand the Muslim community will have to be engaged, on the other hand, legal and administrative steps will have to be taken to crack down on anyone indulging in unacceptable behaviour or for that matter anyone inciting, misleading or indoctrinating young Indian Muslims. Alongside, intelligence and surveillance capabilities will have to be beefed up to pre-empt and prevent this trend from growing. Law enforcement agencies will have to build capabilities to both understand and maintain an unremitting vigil over any jihadist or radical activity in the Muslim community. There is also a need for undertaking sociological and psychological studies to try and figure out why young Indian Muslims are getting attracted to Jihadism. Ideally, all this should have been done yesterday. But even if this happens today things might be still controlled. Tomorrow however might be too late.
Why Muslim Clerics Oppose Madrasa Modernisation Programme

- RNP Singh

During his electioneering, Narendra Modi had assured Muslims a better life while preserving their culture. He had stated “I want to see you with a laptop in one hand, Quran in the other”. After taking over as Prime Minister, Modi’s initiative was revealed by President Pranab Mukherjee in his address to Parliament about the BJP government’s concept of modernizing madrasas. No sooner the government’s concept was announced, leading Islamic seminaries including Darul Uloom Deoband and Karnataka based madrasa Jamat-e-Islamic Hind decided to stall the Prime Minister’s agenda to revamp madrasa education in India. Darul Uloom Deoband has been campaigning extensively against the National Madrasa Modernisation Programme. They are giving excuses such as absence of clarity about government’s programme and are pushing the community into darkness without providing them with a viable option of development.

While opposing the madrasa modernization programme Mufti Mohamadullah of Darul Uloom Deoband said “from the day one in our history over a century, we have refused government help, whether Indian or foreign. The government wants us to join the Central Madrasa Board. We will never do it as it will ruin the madrasa education”. Even the first Minister for Education of Independent India, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had tried to establish an All India Madrasa Board to stabilize the religious education by offering pay scale for teachers and proper examination for students, but he met with utmost resistance notably from his close aides including Maulana Shibli Nomani and Maulana Hifz-ur Rahman.

The Sachar Committee had reported that just four percent of Muslim boys attend Madrasas. “Why is the government so concerned about the four percent and ignores the rest 96 per cent

* RNP Singh, Senior Fellow, VIF
who study in secular school?. One proof of the state governments’ apathy towards Muslim education is its dilly dallying in granting land for Aligarh Muslim University campus in the state”, says Maulana Mehmoood Daryabadi, General Secretary, All India Ulema Council. He said as far as teaching computer, English and science subjects are concerned; many madrasas are doing it on their own.

Muslim clerics want the government to recognize madrasa education on par with high school without bringing it into the Madrasa Education Board as according to them, this attempt of the government is nothing but a ploy to damage their religious system. In India, five state governments - West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam and Uttar Pradesh have already set up Boards of Madrasa Education that frame the syllabus for madrasas affiliated with them, consisting of both traditional Islamic as well as modern subjects.

In India, five state governments - West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam and Uttar Pradesh have already set up Boards of Madrasa Education that frame the syllabus for madrasas affiliated with them, consisting of both traditional Islamic as well as modern subjects.

five states have damaged Islamic learning irreparably.

If we look into the history of madrasa education in India, the evidence of madrasas in north India dates back to the late twelfth century when Sultan Muhammed Ghori conquered Ajmer in 1191 and set up a madrasa in the town. As Turkish rule expanded over other parts of India, Muslim rulers established madrasas in their domains, providing them with extensive land grants (Jagirs) for meeting expenses and scholarships for their students. Muslims nobles and scholars followed suit and set up educational centres. In due course of time, great centres of Islamic study emerged in various parts of India and madrasas of Gujarat, Uchh (Sind), Multan (Punjab), Delhi, Pandua and Gaur (Bengal), Bidar, Gulbarga and Aurangabad (Deccan) were among the most renowned in the entire Muslim world in their time.¹

With the establishment of British rule, the madrasas were faced with what was seen as a grave
threat to their existence and identity. In the 1830s, Persian was replaced with English as the language of official correspondence by the East India Company in the territories under its control. State employed ‘quazis’ were replaced by judges trained in British law, as the application of Muslim law was restricted to personal affairs. A new system of education was gradually set up where Islam had no place. Many modern schools were established by Christian missionaries, whose antipathy for Islam was well known. Thus, increasingly bereft of royal patronage and finding their avenues of employment greatly restricted, the madrasa system and the Ulema as a class had now to contend with a major challenge to their survival.

With the participation of several Indian Ulemas in the revolt of 1857, the threat on their existence further increased. Therefore, to save their identity many Ulemas turned now to setting up a chain of madrasas, for it was felt that under British rule Islam was under grave threat and that it was only by preserving and promoting Islamic knowledge that the younger generation of Muslims could be saved from sliding into apostasy and preventing from falling prey to the blandishments of the Christian missionaries. The educational Jihad that they launched to preserve traditional Islamic learning was seen as taking the place of the failed physical Jihad against the British, and working to train a class of Ulema who would take revenge on the British for having overthrown the Mughals².

The setting up of the Dar-Ul-Uloom Madrasa in Deoband in 1865, today which is the largest traditional madrasa in the world, marked a turning point in the history of madrasa education in India. This madrasa relied entirely on public donations. In the absence of any Muslim ruler as patron, it was now ordinary Muslims who came to symbolize the survival of Islam in the country. A few years after its establishment, its graduates had established their own small madrasas in various parts of India, spreading Deobandi teachings of Islam. The free education, board and lodging provided by the madrasas attracted many poor Muslims who could not afford to study in schools that charged fees. The hope of getting employment as ‘muezzins’, ‘imams’ and madrasa teachers, also attracted many poor Muslims
with no other reasonable job prospects. Thus, increasingly, and especially after 1947, the madrasas came to be associated with the lower classes, and today it is only very rarely that rich Muslims would send their children to study in madrasas.

Another leading madrasa Nadwat-ul-Ulema was set up in Lucknow in 1892 to train Ulema well versed in both the traditional Islamic as well as modern disciplines. However, teaching of modern discipline in this madrasa faced stiff opposition from the conservative Ulemas and therefore, it failed to develop a new class of Ulema. However, to include modern education in its syllabus remained a powerful source of inspiration for reformers in post 1947 India.

Muslim advocates of reform in contemporary India include both trained Ulema, products of madrasas, as well as men who have been educated in schools. Their approaches to the nature and extent of the reform they advocate. There seems, however, a consensus that the core of the reform project should consist of modification in the madrasa syllabus and the methods of teaching.

Such Muslim reformers feel that madrasas must also teach new subjects that would enable their students to play a role in national development such as the natural and social sciences, the philosophy of the Indian constitution, civics and the principles of the social justice, human rights, justice, equality and freedom³. This would lead to a transformation in how the Ulema see the rest of the world and how the world views them. Because madrasa students and Ulemas are said to be cut off from the fast changing world around them, they suffer from an intense inferiority complex, hating everybody with modern education and hated by them in turn. If they were to prove their relevance and usefulness in the modern world, they would be able to recover for themselves the position that Islam gives them of guides of the community⁴.

Muslim advocates of reform in contemporary India include both trained Ulema, products of madrasas, as well as men who have been educated in schools.
However, the views of those Muslim advocates who want reform in madrasa education clash with that of the Ulema, who see the madrasas as institutions meant only for the preservation of Islamic knowledge and for the training for Ulema. Hence, they insist that the teaching of modern subjects if allowed must strictly subordinate to that of religious subjects. This differing perception of the role of madrasas—along with the fear that the introduction of modernization of the authority of the Ulema as interpreters of faith—accounts in large measure for the distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of most madrasas for the madrasa modernization programme of the states and central government.

In recent years, the government of India, as well as some state governments have launched some small schemes ostensibly to assist some madrasas, such as providing them paid teachers to teach modern subjects. These efforts have, however, failed to make much of an impact, and only a few smaller madrasas have taken advantage of these schemes, for fear of government interference and control, which they see as aimed at weakening their Islamic identity by introducing the teaching of government—prescribed books in the social sciences which, in their opinion often provide anti-Muslim slant⁵. Given the fact that almost all Madrasa teachers and students come from lower and lower middle class backgrounds and they remain largely insulated from development in the wider society, the need for reform is not felt urgently as it should be. Reform is also seen threatening their privileges and their position as sole interpreters of normative Islam. The existence of fierce differences of school of thought and sects have made impossible the task of setting up an all India body to regulate the policies and activities of the schools and efforts to do so in the past have all failed. Almost all madrasas are administratively independent, which means that efforts to reform have so far been scattered and sporadic. But the Muslim community does not realise that the clerics and also leaders, by refusing modernization, play the politics of vote bank just to acquire state patronage for themselves and their coterie. The madrasa management also makes things difficult by not accepting government grant because they will lose their autonomy and will
have to report to the government over its expenditure. But they fail to understand that the community as well as the country cannot progress unless the Muslims move ahead.

References

1. Qamruddin, Hindustan Ki Dini Darisgabe (The religious schools of India,) Hamdard Educational Society, 1996, pp-33-40
India Needs to Tread Cautiously in Defence Deals with US

- Radhakrishna Rao

The statement that the Defence Minister Arun Jaitley, who also holds finance portfolio, made to the Indian Parliament recently reveals that India had spent Rs.32,615.18-crore on acquiring defence hardware from US. This goes to show that US has replaced Russia as India’s largest arms supplier. By no means, this development augurs well for India. For it is no more than a case of jumping to the fire from the frying pan. Both USA and Russia have proved to be far from “fair and reliable” defence partners. USA, which on earlier occasions, had denied India certain types of high end fighting equipment is now more than keen to make available to India a range of combat hardware featuring latest genre technologies. The reason for this overeager US drive rests on the one point agenda of sustaining and keeping alive the American aerospace and defence industrial units faced with the cold prospect of “poor orders” and a” possible closure.” There is no denying the fact that American origin defence equipment are overpriced. To make the matter worse, the conditionality that US attaches to the use of arms acquired by India is certainly “irritating and intolerable”. And on the top of these, the US combat equipment in service with the Indian defence forces are constantly under the Damocles Sword of sanction that US is capable of invoking at the drop of a hat. Clearly and apparently, sanction at one fell swoop can render US origin fighting equipment unserviceable and in turn unusable. So much for the American concern to bolster Indian defence preparedness as a cornerstone of stability in South Asia region. Of course, Modi Government should make it very clear to USA that arms, ammunition and combat equipment bought on commercial terms should not end up as a victim of changing political and geo-political dynamics.

When it comes to arms supply,

* Radhakrishna Rao, Visiting Fellow, VIF
Russia is no better than USA. For over pricing and sudden and shocking escalation the prices after the final contract is signed on some “self imagined, flimsy grounds” as well as the delay in the supply of spares which in most cases come with poor quality have all become the hallmark of Indo-Russian defence deal. How Russia blackmailed India into coughing up a huge amount over and above the amount stipulated in the final contract for the refurbishment and modernisation of the decommissioned warship Admiral Gorshkov renamed by India as INS Vikramaditya is now a part of the history. And recent media reports suggest that Israel, which in recent years has emerged as one of the major arms suppliers to India, is also trying to exploit the opportunities provided by the Indian need for certain high tech defence equipment and extract benefits far out of the proportion of the deal. Israel, like Russia and USA, knows for sure that India is now the largest arms importer, a far from salutary distinction that should send India into a mood of deep introspection. For a country that has already launched a cryogenic fuel driven launch vehicle and is on the job of building its own aircraft carrier, the tag of being the largest arms importer is certainly a kind of “black mark”.

But then on the positive side, the hope for India to become self reliant in defence production lies in the commitment of the Narendra Modi led Government to end Indian dependence on imported fighting equipment by putting in place a vibrant Indian military industrial complex. Since he took over as Indian Prime Minister in May 2014, Modi has on more than one occasion reiterated the need for India to become an exporter of arms from being an importer of defence hardware now. The massive outgo of precious foreign exchange involved in the import of arms along with scams and scandals associated with certain high ticket defence deals have proved terribly costly for the Indian economy as well as the defence preparedness of the country.
Against this backdrop, the Modi Government should not be enamoured of the “sweet talks and alluring offers” made by US administration whose previous track record in dealing with high technology transfer to India is far from reassuring. And this talk of so called bureaucratic red tape stymieing the efforts to boost India-US defence cooperation is nothing but a clever US move to dump its defence products on India. During his recent visit to New Delhi, US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel had stated that “Bureaucratic red tape within either of our governments must not bind the limits of our partnership and initiatives”. Certainly, US bureaucracy is known to act in swiftness only in cases where the deal benefits US more than the country importing the US origin equipment and technology. The notorious US multi lateral control regime conspicuous for its vexatious and irritating “bureaucratic expressions” with long winding sentences makes the process of high tech weapons import from US an exasperating experience. Will the US administration allow its defence and aerospace majors like Boeing and Lockheed Martin make available to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) certain high end technologies that India would need to give a practical shape to its manned flight programme is a question that cries for answer. Hagel should also make it clear that whether the defence hardware of US origin being acquired by India will enjoy immunity against the notorious sanction regime?

Modi Government should also seek assurance from USA that in future it should not interfere with the deal India may enter into independently with a country of its choice for acquisition of arms or high technology systems. In this context, the Indian side should bring to the attention of USA how it prevented Russia from transferring the cryogenic engine technology to India in 1990s. At that point of time, USA had coerced Russia into going back on its contractual commitment to India to transfer the technology of cryogenic propulsion to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to help develop the three stage high performance Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) on the ground that it constituted the violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). From US perspective, the cryogenic
propulsion is a sensitive and dual use technology. But then US should know that cryogenic propulsion is not a preferred choice to propel missiles.

In the context of the broader canvass of a highly disturbed history of Indo-US strategic relations, India should not walk into the trap set by US to push the sale of its arms and fighting equipment with the sole objective of saving its arms and aerospace industrial entities from moving into red. Even the argument of Hagel that India’s look East Policy and US rebalance in Asia were in sync with convergence in the security interests of two countries stands in sharp contrast to the policy that US had pursued in the second half of the last century to arm and prop up Pakistan which considers India its enemy no one. Rightly and appropriately, strategic analysts see a “design and motive” behind more than usual enthusiasm of USA to expedite the pending proposals of acquiring US defence equipment. Of course, Modi Government need not rush into the act of clearing the pending proposals made during the second term of Congress led UPA Government. These proposals centre round the plan to acquire 22 Apache attack helicopters, 15 Chinook heavy lift choppers and four P-81 long range maritime and anti submarine aircraft.

By all means, India would need to study seriously and analyse carefully the offer of co-production and joint development of defence equipment offered by USA. While in New Delhi, Hagel had stated that US had come out with a dozen proposal to India under the bilateral Defence Trade and Technology Initiative for producing military equipment under joint venture partnership. “We have offered to not only co-produce but also co-develop the next generation Javelin anti tank guided missiles. This is an unprecedented offer,” said Hagel. Of course, India should cautiously weigh the option of US offer with particular reference to its cost, terms of technology transfer, intellectual property rights and the chances of the joint venture project attracting the sanction. India’s own experience in terms of acquiring high end technology from foreign
partners has been far from satisfactory. In fact, the efforts that Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had made to take forward the development of home grown Kaveri engine— which could not generate the requisite thrust it was designed for—in tie up with the French engine major Snecma had come to naught after it was realized that the French company was not ready to part with certain advanced technological elements that India was keen on mastering. As such India, should exercise restraint while evaluating the US offer of co production and joint development. For in the ultimate analysis, there is no substitute for indigenous research and development and a self reliant base for manufacturing high end defence equipment. In fact, the world’s major arms producers started approaching India with offers of high tech equipment only after India’s strength in many of the advanced areas of technology was recognised globally.

In particular, US wants greater access to Indian “defence bazar” only with an eye on bolstering its defence and aerospace industry which accounts for a lion’s share of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product). With global sales of US arms showing a steady decline and China slowly emerging as a “decent player” in the multi billion dollar global arms market, USA is all set to lose its clout in the international defence trade. This is a reality India should take cognisance of. And on its part, India should leave no stone unturned to enter the arms export market even while moving on the path of self reliance in the development and production of defence hardware.

India, which now imports two third of the defence hardware required by its defence forces, should initiate a national mission fully well supported by a forward looking Defence Technology Commissions as well as a empowered National Defence Industry Committee to clear the decks for the creation of a vibrant military industrial complex. It is also important that the Indian Government should start looking at private and public sector industrial units active in defence production as a holistic entity forming part of the vital national defence sector. Thrust should be on harnessing the capabilities and expertise cutting across the private-public sector juridisctional boundaries to attain self reliance in defence production speedily and
efficiently. Some other areas where India should come out with proactive measures with a view to transform the country into a major exporter from being the world’s largest defence equipment importer include: removal of entry barriers for industrial units taking up defence production, upgrading the manufacturing expertise of Indian defence industry, thrust on enhancing the quality of defence products, encouraging competition, promoting private-public partnership as well as incentivising research and development that would help India sustain its lead in defence production.

However, the way ahead of India’s strategic independence championed by Modi, is challenging and strewn with a variety of complex obstacles. But with a Government fully well committed to defence self reliance, nothing can prevent India from becoming a thriving hub of defence development and production.

Back to Contents
Will President Xi Jinping’s Visit change the Contours of Sino-Indian Ties?

- Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand

The coming visit of President Xi Jinping is being viewed as a visit that could define the next decade of engagement between the two Asian giants. It is generally accepted that Sino-Indian relationship could turn out to be more important than the Sino-US engagement if leadership of both the countries were to cooperate and give substance to the conception that the locus of global economy and power has shifted to Asia. Notwithstanding the fact that there is dissonance between the two countries on a number of issues, both nations do share common perceptions on many of the international issues and especially so on the nature of the emerging world order.

Further, the visit also needs to be seen in the backdrop of the unprecedented two summit meetings between PM Li Keqiang and Manmohan Singh last year, recent visit of Vice President Hamid Ansari to China to celebrate 60 years of Panchsheel and not to be left behind the visit of Indian Army Chief Gen. Bikram Singh to China in first week of July (after a gap of 9 Years). All these engagements were topped by Xi and Modi meeting on the sidelines of BRICS where both leaders established a good rapport. These multifarious engagements have already brought to fore the Indian concerns and have indicated the direction in which both countries want to proceed further. One thing which is certain is that no dramatic breakthroughs in the relationship should be expected.

Modi’s mantra is development and growth and that has been the basis on which he has come to power. Having had firsthand experience during his visits to China as Gujarat Chief Minister, he has been thoroughly impressed by the development and economic growth of China and especially its infrastructure in terms of roads, ports, highways and some of the new cities and towns. Therefore, he is keen to conclude agreements with the visiting President regarding Chinese infrastructure companies undertaking projects in India. India is looking for infusion of China’s surplus funds in Indian infrastructure and in other avenues of investment. Though an MOU for setting up an Industrial Park has been signed by our Trade and Commerce Minister during Vice President Ansari’s visit to China, it is just a small step; Modi is looking for a
framework agreement on investment by China. Modi is keen to push infrastructure development by the Chinese in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

India’s requirements of funds are a huge 1 trillion US dollars as per its current Five Year Plan and it is hoped that China can contribute possibly 30 percent of such requirement over a period of time. But a Sino-Indian agreement for anything closer to 30 billion USD or even somewhat lesser amount in the coming visit could be a game changer. There would be some problems like the absorption capacities and many other difficulties connected with the local environment but all such issues can be overcome provided the political will is there from both sides. Recently, a country like UK offered 1 billion pounds (around 1.75 billion USD) for infrastructure development in India. Obviously, China’s capacities are much beyond this amount.

Second agreement that could give a positive momentum to Sino-Indian ties needs to be in the field of trade and commerce. The trade imbalance between the two nations is now to the tune of around 35 billion USD which needs to be addressed. In all the previous top level political engagements, while promises have been made to come to grips with the issue, no substantial progress has been made. Therefore, in the coming visit, New Delhi is looking forward to an agreement that grants greater access of Indian goods and services to the Chinese market, for instance Indian pharmaceutical products, IT enabled services, cotton textiles & home furnishings etc. There are many non-tariff barriers on Indian exports of goods and services. Removal of these would enable India to close the trade gap; though it is also not expected that the trade should always be balanced yet another way is that China invests in India. Under the present circumstances, it appears unlikely that the projected bilateral trade figure of 100 billion USD by 2015 can be achieved.

Thirdly, whenever a bilateral visit takes place, there is a pattern of behavior from China’s side which needs to be avoided. Such a behavior has been exhibited with regularity on the eve of all previous political visits. Before the Indian Vice President’s visit, a controversial map was released by China besides transgression by PLA troops in Pangong Lake. Last year before PM Li Keqiang’s visit to New Delhi, there was the Depsang valley intrusion. In fact, it is difficult to recall any visit where before the event there
has been no negative incident. Largely, the perception is that such events/incidents are deliberately planned to put Indian decision-makers on the back foot and in order to test their resolve.

Though it may not be necessary to have any written agreement on the above aspect, both leaders can reach an understanding that such incidents should be avoided in order to give positive atmospherics to the bilateral meets.

While many agreements have been signed culminating into Border Area Development Cooperation (BADC) agreement of 2013, the border incidents continue to take place. Several incursions in Ladakh sector by Chinese troops have taken place since January 2014. PLA’s posture has become increasingly very assertive and it has been attempting to expand its claimed areas (which are in any case ill-defined). After the signing of BADC, such incidents should have been a rarity; both leaders need to reach an understanding on the same and need to enforce their writ; any fresh formal agreement on the issue would not be of any avail if the previous agreements are not adhered to in their true spirit. There is a need to arrive at a mutual modus vivendi on the issue. Peace and tranquility along the border remains an important element for growth and development. This has been recognized so in the previous agreements.

Fourthly is the question of lack of Chinese sensitivity to India’s core concern of Kashmir issue. Since nineties till 2005, China had been following somewhat of a neutral approach but after 2005 or so, there has been perceptible difference in China’s approach with its tilt towards Pakistan. China’s developmental and other activities in Pakistan occupied Kashmir have a negative impact on India’s security. It also needs to be remembered that even Pakistan considers Kashmir as disputed therefore; if China wants to reduce dissonance with India, then China’s return to a neutral stand would add to positivity of Sino-Indian relationship.

Fifth is the Tibet question. This year is being celebrated as the 60th year of Panchsheel Agreement. India is not much enamored with the Panchsheel Agreement as it recognized China’s suzerainty over Tibet without any concession to India in the bargain. It is considered as a lack of strategic vision on part of Nehru. While the Five principles of peaceful coexistence are quite all right, it was the preamble of the agreement that became more significant than the clauses in the main text. The fact that India was represented at the celebratory event in China by its Vice President is also some kind of message that Panchsheel does not hold that level of significance. In the bilateral summits for last three years or so, even though India has been adhering to one China policy, the same is not being
mentioned in the Joint Communiques issued after the summits. This has been largely as a response to China’s failure to recognize J & K as part of India. There have been many other irritants like the stapled visas issue to residents of Arunachal Pradesh.

Further, the presence of Lobsang Sangay, Kalon Tripa / Sikyong of Tibet Administration at Modi’s swearing ceremony also indicates the current government’s stance in some measure though there is no change in Indian government’s policy that Tibetans cannot carry out any political activities in India etc.

Another significant issue that needs further discussions is the damming activities on Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra River; some discussions took place during VP Hamid Ansari’s visit to Beijing; the two governments signed an implementation plan on provision of hydrological information on the Brahmaputra River in flood seasons by China and India. Expansion in areas of cooperation in this field has to take note of the interests of lower riparian nations like Bangladesh and India. So far Chinese policies on the issue are not conducive to good relationship.

Coming to the regional situation, the most important issue would be that of Afghanistan post 2014. Both sides largely share similar perceptions on the emerging scenario and have common concerns on the security implications of the unfolding scenario. There is a JWG on the subject; both sides are expected to explore practical ways of cooperating in Afghanistan so that peace and stability is brought to that nation. However, on the question of terrorism, China still continues to see through Pakistani prism. While the Americans, the Western nations and possibly the Chinese have seen through the double game of Pakistan, they feel constrained to take any action against Pakistan for a number of geo-strategic reasons. The negative role of Pakistan needs to be recognized by China otherwise peace and stability in the region including in Xinjiang would remain elusive.

While at the international level, both nations largely identify with each other’s aims, objectives and interests in the multilateral forums, on climate and trade issues, WTO etc. yet, China is yet to endorse India becoming a permanent member of UNSC as also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Meanwhile, China led by President Xi Jinping has become increasingly aggressive and assertive in Asia both militarily and economically indicating that it aspires for leadership role in Asia. Promotion of a number economic corridors and silk roads, offering...
funding by establishing Asian Infrastructure Development Fund, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Development Fund and many other economic initiatives by China are aimed to enhance its strategic presence.

On the other hand, China needs India on its side for the success of its view of the new Asian security architecture where according to Chinese perceptions the US and the others have no role. India favours a strategic equilibrium in Asia whereas China is anti-status quo aspiring to dominate the Asian firmament. Thus, Modi’s visit to Japan, Australian PM Abbot’s visit to India before President Xi’s visit and later Modi’s visit to the US need to be seen in the context of India attempting to balance the emerging strategic equations.

Overall, the forthcoming visit of President Xi is unlikely to change the fundamental nature of Sino-Indian relationship as China is not ready to relent on issues considered by India to be part of its core national interests. Some advances on economic and connected issues are possible. Modi’s approach includes management of the conflict areas between the two nations while at the same time striving to have enhanced economic, political, diplomatic and people to people engagements.

Back to Contents
The Gujrat Model of Development: Can it Work for Nepal?

- Prof Hari Bansh Jha

The 'Gujrat Model of Development' has become synonymous with Narendra Modi, formerly the Chief Minister of Gujarat state between 2001 and 20014 and now the Prime Minister of India. Sometimes, this model is also called 'Modionomics,' in which development is treated as a movement. Primary role for the development is given to the private enterprises. Strong focus is given to the development of sound infrastructure, creation of business friendly regulatory environment, simplification of procedures, promotion of entrepreneurial spirit, and adoption of intolerant attitude towards bureaucratic red tape. The underlying principle is to give a vigorous boost to the economy by increasing the supply side economics.

In Gujrat, the red-tape was slashed at the state level. To maintain unnerving grip on administration, interference in transfers and postings was disapproved. Each year, the state administration was equipped to achieve one or the other new goal. If in one year the goal was to make Gujrat Nirmal (sanitary); in the other it was to achieve Nirogi Balak (healthy child).

Most importantly, the idea of 'minimum government, maximum governance' was executed in letter and spirit to secure utmost participation of people in development activities. Since 2003, Chintan Sibir (Thought camp) was organized annually for two-and-half days with the objective of making governance least formal, reducing the communication gap between the top and bottom rungs of officials and also developing networks to get the work done on the spot. Apart from the Chief Minister and Ministers, the IAS officials, top police officials and the principal forest conservators participated in the camp right from early morning till 8:00 PM. Each participant, including the Chief Minister, was

* Jha is Professor of Economics and Executive Director of Centre for Economic and Technical Studies in Nepal
expected to follow the queue and they were free to sit anywhere for meals. Interestingly, Yoga exercises and cultural events were also organized to trace out the inherent talent among the participants.

In the infrastructure sector, modern ports were constructed in Gujrat. A network of high speed roads was created to connect all important cities of the state. Congenial environment was created for guaranteeing energy security to the investors. Huge chunk of resources was invested in thermal, atomic, hydel, and renewable energy sector. Altogether 23 conventional power plants were installed. Production of wind power was raised to 3,147 MW in 2013. Installed capacity of solar power reached over 900 MW. A 2,200 km gas grid was constructed. Within a short span of time, Gujrat began to produce surplus power.

As industrial peace was guaranteed in Gujrat, the number of unrest cases declined drastically from 42 in 2003 to 28 in 2011. Trade unions were made more compromising than confrontational. As many as 200 industrial estates were established to accommodate most of the small and medium enterprises. Many of the industries were located at enclaves like Vapi.

Following the agitations against the location of the Tata Motor factory at Singur in West Bengal, Modi offered 1100 acres of land at Rs. 900 per square yard to this company at Sanand, adjacent to Ahmedabad, for the establishment of Nano car factory. The manufacturing of Nano could not prove that much profitable venture for the Tata Motors. But for Gujrat it was a blessing. Sanand has now been able to attract internationally famous companies like Ford and other auto component manufacturers.

A survey conducted in 2010-11 revealed that Gujrat had 21,300 factories, which formed 10 per cent of total factories in India. Manufacturing sector accounted for one-fourth of state's GDP. This state alone has been able to employ nearly one-tenth of the country's total factory labour. All such factories are large entities as
they employ on an average over fifty workers.

While industrial sector was given a key role in Gujrat model, the agricultural sector was not overlooked. To promote this sector, the land records were computerized and information about the land use was provided on the website. Irrigation was given top most priority. The Narmada dam project proved to be a game changer. Agricultural extension programme was launched on a vigorous scale. Agricultural planning activities reached the blocks and villages and even to the doors of the farmers. *Krishi Mahotsavs* were organized in agricultural outreach. Over a-hundred-thousand officials from eighteen departments of the state had to visit the farmers in their villages for a month before the onset of monsoons. Their job was to test the soil, prescribe nutrients, suggest hybrid seeds and give advice for making the agricultural activities profitable. The traders, processors and even the retailers were allowed to purchase agricultural products from the farmers directly. Consequently, agriculture no more remained a subsistence activity and it emerged as a business-like venture. Despite being a semi-arid state, Gujrat was able to achieve 8 percent farm growth against the national average of 3.1 per cent in the last one decade.

Vigorous drive was given for increasing the enrolment of students in education sector. The number of schools was doubled; many of which were government schools. Almost 79 per cent of the total population in Gujrat above seven years turned to become literate. In the knowledge sector, a number of universities related to agriculture, petroleum, defence and security, Sanskrit and Yoga were established.

In the social sector, the infant mortality rate fell from 64 per thousand live births in 2001 to 38 in 2013. People below the poverty line dropped down to 14 per cent. Investment commitment in the state rose spectacularly to $450 billion in 2011. All this helped Gujrat to achieve over 11 per cent, which was highest among all the Indian states.

Success achieved in Gujrat took a new dimension as the focus on development changed from the state to national level when Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of India in May 2014. Soon after this event, Modi developed a new vision to
transform India into a modern, vibrant and fast-growing economy. A tough decision was taken to upgrade the level of technology. An ambitious project to connect Mumbai with Ahmedabad is in offing. One hundred mega cities are being developed. Nearly 800 million toilet houses are being constructed within five years until 2019 to end the problem of open defecation in the country. The Sagarmala project is introduced to interconnect all the coastal cities in the country through roads, rail, ports and airports. Effort is on to ensure transparency in government functioning, increase the performance in education, health care and commercial sector, which is likely to have trickledown effect in the Indian economy sooner than later. So here is a growing public opinion that the government of India should make the Gujrat development model as the main tenet in India's foreign policy, especially in relations to the neighbouring countries. There is ample opportunities for Nepal to emerge as an economic powerhouse in South Asia if an effort is made to execute this model by slashing red tape, developing infrastructure, and modernizing agricultural, industrial, trade and service sectors.
Strategic Defence and A Mountain Strike Corps

- Lt. Gen (Retd) Gautam Banerjee

“Begin, be bold and venture to be wise” - Horace

Cause for a Mountain Strike Corps

Right from the days when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) decided to use military power to address its border issues with India, the Indian Army suffers from a serious operational debility. This debility arises from an absence of counter-offensive capability across the watershed of the Indo-Tibet Border or the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Indeed, India’s defence oriented military strategy remains inconclusive unless it has within its ambit a viable component of autonomous counter-offensive or riposte capability to confront the aggressor with counter-threat(s) that forces him to divert or recoil from his venture.

The decade past has found that Beijing, perhaps buoyed by fruition of her military modernisation, is no more able to restrain from exercising her tactic of forcing gradual migration into claimed territories. Having already firmed up her possession of the Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley, she is engaged in preparing grounds for her next phase of expansionism through outlandish claims over the Arunachal Pradesh and many other bits. Accordingly, the LAC is subject to increasing intrusions at Hayuliang-Fish Tail, Asaphila-Longju and Lungma-Kerang areas in the Eastern Sector, Thag La – Barahoti areas in the Central Sector and Chumar, Demchok, Pangong Tso, Depsang Plains and Daulat Beg Oldi areas in the Western Sector of the Indo-Tibet Border. In the process, the PRC has advanced its notional claim-lines well into the Indian territory.

Offensive-in-Defence

Captain B H Liddell-Hart had

* Lt. Gen (Retd) Gautam Banerjee, Executive Council, VIF
argued, with substance of historical proof, that though neither flamboyant nor spectacular as the offensive, it was the defensive strategy in most cases that brought assured victory in the end. However, there is a caveat. According to the universal ‘Principles of War’, for a defensive strategy to come successful, an effective offensive content must be intrinsic to each level of its prosecution. It is so that the various stages of defensive operations to harass, delay, resist, limit and cause attrition to the enemy’s attacking forces have to be infused with offensive characteristics. At the tactical level, this principle manifests in the form of the defender’s raids, spoiling attacks, reinforcing manoeuvres and local as well as deliberately planned counter-attacks, the last named being an exclusive operation for which contingency plans are made and forces earmarked.

Further, as the history of warfare teaches, to trigger final collapse of the enemy’s aggression, a capability to undertake autonomous counter-offensive – as distinct from the aforementioned ‘counter-attack’ phase of a defensive battle – at a place and time of the defender’s choosing must be but imperative to what may essentially be an ambit of defensive strategy.

Beyond the Line of Defence

Navies perform their mandate of defending national waters and coastlines by engaging in operations beyond the nation’s maritime boundaries. The Air Forces too target the enemy beyond the national air space; only in case of hostile ingress would they direct their attack into own territory. In similar vein, in order just to maintain the sanctity of a given line of defence but no more, ground forces have to resort to offensive action across that line. To be really effective, these offensive operations – call it counter-offensive or riposte – have to be launched from distinct firm base(s) and at timing(s) that are well clear from the tumult of defensive engagements; needless to state, in the contemporary context, all of these would be joint service operations. The purpose here is to exploit those sectors
where the aggressor prefers to remain in relative dormancy, and so upset his strategic designs by disrupting his force-matrix, terrain-orientation and ‘task-to-time’ equation. The United Nations Forces’ offensive on Inchon in the Korea War of 1951-53, India’s counter-offensive in the Lahore Sector during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and Israel’s encirclement of the 3rd Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War are apt demonstrations of this principle.

The Idea of 17 Corps

By the Year 2007 or so, the extent of build up of the PRC’s military infrastructure along the Indo-Tibet Border had at last stirred the Indian Government’s conscience. Thus, it raised two army divisions and beefed up air power to round off India’s defence capability in the Eastern Sector. However, the void of that element of autonomous offensive action which must be intrinsic to any defensive strategy, remained unaddressed. That is the deficiency which is sought to be filled by the raising of a ‘Mountain Strike Corps’, the proposal for which had been pending with the Government since some years past; the Depsang La incident in April 2013 may have been the last straw. That was when the Chinese troops set up camp well behind India’s LAC and refused to budge, just as it had done earlier in the Zimithang, Asaphila and Hayuliang areas in Arunachal Pradesh and Demchok area in Ladakh, thus highlighting – for the nth time - the helpless situation that could confront India should Beijing decides to spurn India’s entreaties to vacate intrusion.

According to the official version and its implications, the 17 Corps is under raising at Ranchi, where during the Second World War, General William Slim’s 14th Army had geared up to win back Burma from the Japanese, and where the Eastern Command Headquarters was located till 1953. Once fully raised, the Corps Headquarters would move to establish itself at Panagarh in West Bengal, another World War II logistic base from where the wars in Burma and China were sustained. The Corps would have two specially structured mountain divisions - 59 & 72 Divisions - headquartering at Panagarh and Pathankot respectively. Besides, there would be two each of independent armoured and infantry brigades, one of each being located in
Ladakh in the West and the other two stationed in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh in the East. A Corps being a very large formation of nearly 70,000 troops and vast paraphernalia of weapons, equipment, transport etc., the brigades and units, numbering above 200 odd, would be located variously from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. Another division is reportedly being considered to be orbatted to this Corps in which case the strength would be around 90,000 troops. Of course, there would be many changes affected in the force-structure and their locations as the Corps shapes up in step with its evolving concepts of operations.

The idea of 17 Corps is unique in military history. No field formation has ever been assigned to operational contingencies so fluid, across so distinctly separated frontages and axes spread over 4000 odd kilometres, over freezing deserts of 4300 to 5300 metres altitude where living itself is no less a battle, to prosecute offensive operations as a corollary to strategic defence. These challenges are sought to be tackled over the next seven odd years, to which end elaborate surface and air transportation, communications and base infrastructure are to be created along the border belt. Formations and units are to be located close to air bases and surface communication hubs, expansion of the Air Force transportation, railways and border roads being a step complementary. Even then, it would have to be a formation that is structured to operate at the far ends of tenuous lines of communications, build up and deploy astride rudimentary axes after acclimatising the troops over one to two weeks, and prosecute offensive operations in confrontation with a great military power.

The charter is mind boggling. It is doable of course, but there are complexities and concerns to be dissected in all seriousness and addressed with strategic sagacity. Therefore, a discussion on the core considerations would be in order.

**Role and Objectives**
The likely role of 17 Corps, within the overall ambit of the nation's defensive strategy, may be envisaged in light of the preceding discussion. Foremost, it would be to launch in counter-offensive - autonomous or conjoined with other formations - to unhinge any military aggression. Next, it would be to balance out territorial loss in one sector by sallying out in sector(s) of choice, to secure, in part or whole, the Indian version of the boundary alignment. Other roles could be to deploy to limit and destroy the attacking forces, or to invest the adversary’s ingress and to evict it if necessary. In other words, besides its classical counter-offensive role in war, even in ‘no-war’ scenarios when the option of forcible eviction of the intrusion may not be exercised in order to avoid escalation, it would be possible to, firstly, contain the intrusion, and secondly, to counter it by advancing the LAC in some other location – a sort of tit-for-tat.

Proceeding further, the first question to arise in the context of any worthwhile ‘strike’ relates to the possible objectives of significance. Obviously, the objectives would be such as to unhinge PRC’s military aggression, and that purpose would be indicative of the optimum depth of operations. Starting from the Indo-Tibet-Myanmar Tri-junction and ending at the Aksai Chin, the Western periphery of Gongrigabu Qu (River)-Chayu, the Southern periphery of Yarlung Zangbu (Brahmaputra River)-Langquen Zangbu (Sutluj River) and the Eastern periphery of Lingzi Tang-Kailash Range - inclusive of the Western Tibet Highway or its subsidiaries - could be that reckonable depth.

Within the aforementioned belt, one class of objectives could be territorial in nature. Considering the historical legacy, these territorial objectives may be broadly identified as: one, in the North-East, the areas West of Chaya (Rima) and South of Nyngchi, Tsona Dzong, the Chumbi Valley, Khamba Dzong and the Brahmaputra River; two, the Mansarovar (Mapam Yumco)-Sutluj River Belt in the Central Sector; and three, in the Western Sector, the Pangong-Indus (Senge Zangbu) Valleys and the Depsang-Soda Plains. Herein, any of the tactically feasible axes of operations, single or multiple, leading to territories across the LAC or up to and beyond the Indo-Tibet Border may be activated.
Indeed, there are many possible areas which may be logistically upgraded within a decade or two to support offensive operations of battle formations ranging in composition from brigade group size to two divisions plus; some of these axes may even be upgraded in just a few year’s time. Notably, while the desolate terrain may not offer classical military objectives, the very act of pulling off territorial riposte would be sufficient to lever India’s cause. Besides, targeting logistic hubs at Nyngchi, Gyangze, Ngari, Rudog and some more, denial of bridges over Yarlung Zangbu and Langquen Zangbu, and breach of the Western Highway or its subsidiaries would definitely tell upon the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) aggression.

The other class of objectives could aim at force-destruction, in which the attacker would be contained in hostile terrain, weakened and then destroyed. Notably, the modest scale of India’s retaliatory strike in comparison to China’s doctrine of massive offensive may not be an issue – just penalising and holding up a giant would dampen his blustery, and therefore could be seen as a politico-military redemption.

**Organisational Structure**

By far the biggest challenge in raising the 17 Corps would be to structure a potent and cost-efficient force and equipping it for the kind of terrain - and as a corollary the kind of warfare - it would be called upon to master. In that context, recourse to replication of orthodox tactics, structures and equipment profile would offer strong attractions. However, having seen that the force, terrain and mission, all three are unparalleled, adoption of templates would be a grave mistake. For the right organisation to be devised therefore, it would be appropriate to evaluate the functions of the terrain and conceptualise appropriate battle tactics to harness its nuances.

From India’s view point, the terrain is like a funnel, its narrow
stem widening into an expanse as the watershed is approached and the Tibetan Plateau unfolds. Resultantly, for nearly three-fourth of the 300-450 kilometres to the watershed, deployment of forces would have to be along relatively narrow, steep, winding and rugged valleys, mostly over single axes, with availability of shunts and laterals few and far between. Obviously, forces would have to move and deploy in echelons over restricted axes till they cross over to the plateau-land whence they would have the option of either diverging or converging combat power to reduce selected objective(s). Indeed, in that remote and desolate expanse of cold high altitude desert, the quantum of force-application would be decided by the logistic capability to field and sustain battle formations. As a corollary, the Corps may need to divide itself to operate astride multiple axes, even across multiple sectors – North-East, Central and West – in varying combinations of divisions and independent brigades to sally out into the plateau-land. The severe dictates of the terrain attributes may be turned into tactical advantages provided organisation, tactics, equipment and logistics are customised in exclusivity. For example, induction, establishment of logistic bases and movements through the rugged mountains on Indian side of the watershed may well be rendered much safer from air and missile attacks as compared to the enemy on the plateau-land who would be open to detection and interdiction from air-ground operations. Even from the consideration of time and space, the factors would not be adverse towards India when the traversing distances, communications and altitudes are weighed in comparison. Lastly, when well reconnoitred and adapted to, the plateau-land would offer to the Indian forces good scope for ‘behind the line’ operations. Factoring analogies from past campaigns as well as concurrent tactical concepts, the tactics would hinge upon manoeuvre of multiple combat elements to shape the battle-matrix and followed up with
sharp engagements, rather than a replay of mass assaults of the kind propagated before the advent of Revolution in Military Affairs. The objectives could either be communication and logistic hubs, or opponent forces. Indeed, the campaign would follow the eternal practice of what is currently described as ‘Hybrid Warfare’, in which 4th Generation battles would shoot-off from field formations engaged in deliberate offensive campaigns. Of course, dominance in air power would play a singular role in reconnaissance, information war, destruction, interdiction, support to ground operations, troop mobility and logistic sustenance of the war effort.

In the overall context therefore, organisation and equipment for the 17 Corps have to be exclusive. For example, the Corps may be composed of integral scout, reconnaissance and special service units and brigade groups integrated into flexible mix of light and heavy combat arms. It may also have to be structured for transportable, manoeuvrable and higher volume of fire-power and enhanced grouping of support arm elements. Similarly, provision of in-built force-multiplication elements of information warfare - like command and control warfare, reconnaissance, intelligence preparation and deception – and geo-spatial survey teams would be mandatory for the Corps to fulfil its role. Above all, the Corps operations must be tuned to true articulation of air power for manoeuvre, air assault and operational logistics.

**Equipment**

Needless to emphasise, it would be wise to equip 17 Corps with transportable and manoeuvrable war-like equipment, the loss of mass being compensated by higher scales of holdings and brisk operational momentum. The problem is that the global arms industry has not found it profitable to invest in development of weapons and equipment that answer to the characteristics of high altitude mountain warfare, and therefore most such equipment do not form part of importable inventory. Most of its theatres of war being mountainous, India’s defence planners could have turned this dearth into self-advantageous force-superiority through indigenous research and development. Regrettably, they failed to adapt to that rather obvious need, confined as they
were with dated notions about ponderous characteristics of mountain warfare. Equipping the 17 Corps in a manner operationally desired would therefore require specific design modifications, field trials and mix of import and customised production under an overarch of economical viability. Given India’s system of functioning, the officially promulgated time-line of seven to eight years to acquire the right range of weapons and equipment may therefore turn out to be rather tight.

But more than that, optimal equipping of the 17 Corps would be an exercise advantageous only if the Indian military fraternity sets out to assimilate what weapons and equipment that may be readily acquired, and subsume the qualitative shortcomings into specifically devised battle-tactics and operational procedures. In other words, to begin with, it would be wise to foster tactical ingenuity to customise orthodox tactical concepts, and accept redundancies in scales to overcome lesser performance from what military hardware is available at hand. Great armies are known to do so; Indian Army has done so before.

**Logistic Springboard**

The quantum of force that can be committed to offensive operations through a given sector would be dictated by the extent of sectoral logistic capacity, existence of operational axes therein, and the robustness of these. Besides, final outcome of trans-Himalaya operations would be decided by logistic survivability of that force in a terrain so unliveable. By implication therefore, based on the intended counter-offensive tasks of the 17 Corps, logistic infrastructure would have to be developed, both in terms of sectors and axes of possible operations as well as the quantum of likely force-application along those sectors and axes.
rations and fuel. Besides, once across the watershed, the burden of logistic sustenance would require to be extended, insulation, portability and mobility being the key determinants in this case. Further, logistic capacity-building would have to be maximized to conform to foreseeable operational contingencies. No doubt, planning and build up of logistic infrastructure calls for intelligent forethought and deliberate time- and cost intensive undertaking at the national level.

Even if well within India’s engineering capabilities, infrastructure development projects would necessitate deployment of additional construction agencies and enormous funding; these two factors would determine whether the projects would take a decade or double that to be in place. As for the turnover or replacement of expendables, the challenge would be even more complex. Life-cycle stocking and turnover of ammunition in itself would be a tedious and costly commitment. Lastly, in environs so excruciatingly hostile, air-power would have to play a lead role in forward provisioning to the forces for them to survive and fight. The period of seven or eight years for the Corps to be fully operational must have been decided based on such considerations. But as to the implementation, there must be alacrity - India’s traditional elephantine pace would not deliver.

In adopting the above mentioned measures, logistic services to be integrated at unit, formation and theatre levels would have to be freed from the standard templates and reconstructed according to the unique conditions of Himalayan warfare, grouping of detachments, manpower, load handling equipment, mobility and communications being the thrust areas. The orthodox advocates of the ‘teeth-versus-tail’ issue may have to reconcile to larger complements of logistic services if they set their hearts to winning a war in the High-Himalayas.

Notably, not just the raising of a Mountain Strike Corps, it would be the build up of commensurate military infrastructure that would signal to the adversary, the scope and options of India’s military deterrence. To forestall military adventurism from PRC therefore, Indian defence planners would be wise to break out of the festering stagnation that grips
infrastructural development in border areas.

A Larger Strategic Dividend

If there is one matter to which the Indian psyche would never reconcile, the military debacle and political drubbing India got in 1962 from Mao’s China would be that one. No wonder therefore that even when conscious of the People’s Liberation Army’s overwhelming combat power, making China pay heavily for any future aggression remains a matter of faith for all Indians, indeed the Indian Armed Forces. So far this aspiration had been stifled by the void of autonomous offensive capability that, to reiterate, must form part of any worthwhile defensive strategy. 

Raising of a Mountain Strike Corps will therefore round-off the Indian strategy for the defence of its territories. No doubt, the cabal of India baiters cannot be enthused by the advent of the 17 Corps. Raising of the 17 Corps is one of the landmark events of India’s military strategy. However, to make the best of this unique military formation, the Indian defence fraternity must prepare to prosecute wars that are exclusively ‘Indian’ in nature – exclusive in terms of tactical concepts, force-composition, and balance in deployment.

Finally, as military history tells us, when marshalled with tactical innovation, a strategic force of the nature of the 17 Corps will invariably offer a range of strategic options which may go beyond its role initially mandated. *Articulated with free flow of strategic acumen, this military asset therefore may offer exponential peace dividends.*

Back to Contents
Regulatory Impact Analysis – An Essential Element of Policy Making

- *Debashis Banerjee*

Regulations are an essential part of the toolkit of policy instruments governments can use to achieve the intended objectives. But regulations usually have widespread ramifications. A ‘good’ regulation will be both effective and efficient. Effective in the sense of achieving its planned goals and objectives, and efficient in terms of cost implications i.e. in terms of achieving these objectives with minimum costs, in terms of government administrative costs and costs percolated to the economy as a cost of compliance to this regulation. A systematic approach is required to ensure that the regulations that are developed and implemented are of high quality. A poor quality regulation increases compliance costs for business and other groups, leads to unnecessary complexity and associated uncertainty and adversely impacts the Government’s ability to achieve its targets.

“Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)” is a process of systematic identification, appraisal and estimation of the likely impacts of new regulatory proposals and efficacy or relevance of existing regulations. To gauge such impacts, RIA generally uses a consistent analytical tool like cost-benefit analysis. Basically being a comparative process; RIA is based on determining the underlying regulatory objectives being sought and identifying all the policy interventions that are capable of achieving them. RIA has been globally acknowledged as a promising tool to analyse the need and relevance of existing as well as new regulations on the basis of set criteria, developed though a consultative process, and matching with the context of the particular country.

RIA is a tool that can help governments make their policies

---

*The author recently retired as Joint Adviser (Industry & Infrastructure Planning), Planning Commission*
more efficient and also to examine their qualitative aspects. With today’s more open international markets and growing budgetary constraints, minimising the cost of reducing competition pressures is essential. Regulatory quality immensely contributes to good governance, which is increasingly recognised in assessments of a country’s competitiveness and attractiveness for investment. RIA does not in itself determine decisions, but it provides empirical data that can clarify the options available to a decision-making process.

RIA is an adjunct to good decision-making, not a replacement for political accountability. RIA attempts to clarify the factors relevant to making of policy decisions. It pushes regulators towards making balanced decisions that trade off possible solutions to specific problems against wider economic and distributional goals. By strengthening the transparency of regulatory decisions and their rational justification, RIA strengthens the credibility of regulatory responses and increases public trust in regulatory institutions and policy makers.

The origin of RIA can be traced back in the US in 1970s, when it was used to examine perceived burden of certain regulations and the related inflationary pressure, if any in the economy. Between 1995 and 2000, RIA became almost mandatory in the Office of Management & Budget (OMB), USA and its scope widened with inclusion of non-quantifiable costs and benefits and expansion of focus to look into the areas of risk assessment of regulations. In the United Kingdom, practice of RIA made a modest beginning during 1980s, but gained momentum since 2006 with constitution of Better Regulation Task Force and subsequently, Better Regulation Commission. Alongside UK, European Union was prompt to adopt RIA procedure as a part of the better governance agenda. Another early adopter of a RIA requirement was Australia (1985). By the mid-1990s approximately 12 OECD countries had implemented RIA requirements of some form, although the scope of the required analysis varied considerably. By 2000, 20 of 28
OECD countries had implemented RIA requirements. Currently, almost all OECD countries use RIA. Requirements of RIA had also begun to be strongly promoted to its client countries by the World Bank. As a result, RIA has attracted attention in many emerging and developing countries as a key element to improve regulatory policy making and an increasing number of developing countries have now adopted RIA requirements.

The process of RIA usually involves a series of five logical elements that structure the analysis: problem identification, objective definition, option development, impact analysis and option comparison. By providing transparent and evidence-based analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the rule options with regard to defined objectives, decision-makers and stakeholders are given a solid reference framework for discussion and, informed and evidence-based decisions. RIA development is therefore a process that is integrated with the rule development process of the Agency.

Consultation and collection of expertise through rulemaking groups can run throughout the whole process.

Many guidance documents are available on how to conduct an RIA and produce the related document for decision makers. A Guideline for introducing and practicing RIA has been developed by OECD, which has been widely accepted by a number of developing countries. The guideline undergoes intermittent refinements based on lessons learnt. As a general approach, the document prescribes to go for getting reply to the following questions (Box I) prior to commencement of actual process steps for RIA (Adopted from OECD (2008))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the problem correctly defined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is government action justified?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is regulation the best form of government action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a legal basis for regulation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the appropriate level (or levels) of government to take action and specifying effective systems of co-ordination between levels of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do the benefits of regulation justify the costs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the appropriate level (or levels) of government for this action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the distribution of efforts across society transparent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the regulation clear, consistent, comprehensible and accessible to users?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How will compliance be achieved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Adopted from OECD (2008).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Undertaking RIA and preparation of the related outcome document follow a rational policy process, which takes moorings in the indications received through the reply to questions enlisted in the Chart 1. The process comprises a number of phases (Box II). (Adopted from OECD 2008)

The depth and scope of the impact assessment is determined by the importance and expected size of the impact of the new policy. Generally speaking, all new proposals that apply to a new policy area or introduce a new approach that affects a high number of people need to be preceded by a fully detailed impact analysis. More limited policy changes in an area, which is already regulated, require only a limited impact assessment. Table 1 below summarizes the three categorizations of RIA based on the nature or degree of impacts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIA Types</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Cage where applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No RIA, any policy occasion</td>
<td>Possible effects are only discussed in the policy proposals</td>
<td>Only negligible impacts expected, recurrent rule-making, updating of rules, one options available, obvious solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light RIA</td>
<td>Only qualified discussion on the impacts. All relevant element used and discussed.</td>
<td>Limited impacts, possibly sufficient information from other sources (eg. economic / socio-economic evaluations) limited stakeholder consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full RIA</td>
<td>Quantified where possible, soft questionnaires if necessary. All elements of the RIA discussed, quantified or not, comparison of options using an appropriate methodology, significant and wide stakeholder consultations.</td>
<td>Significant impacts expected, new rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above processes, despite their wide acceptance as a common framework for taking up RIA exercise, should not be interpreted as the ‘one-size-fits-all’ best practice model for evaluation of relevance and efficacy of the existing or proposed regulation. On the contrary, reckoning it as an overall guideline, one has to devise and design RIA process model that remains compatible with the needs and resource constraints specific to a country. In the process, careful consideration has to be given on a number of issues. Firstly, RIA has to be championed across the government towards building up of a strong political commitment.
to integrate RIA with the policy-making process. Secondly, appropriate skills for RIA have to be built within the government machinery. This skill set, apart from capturing and enumeration of costs implications and potential benefits, should invariably involve application of judgmental and subjective evaluation of qualitative impacts of the regulation under the scanner. Thirdly, RIA process should include an extensive confabulation and exchange of views among all the interested parties and stakeholders so that appropriate information and reactions are gathered and analyzed before finalization of views. Fourthly, RIA system would have to be made robust enough to combat regulatory capture or dubious opposition by special interest groups. Finally, RIA system should have proper system of monitoring and ex-post evaluation. Evaluation should comprise four separate parameter i.e. content, output, outcome and impact evaluation. This will not only facilitate overcoming of snags in the present process but bring efficiency in future regulations.

In India, a concerted effort for regulatory reform has commenced long back, but ironically development of a comprehensive system and framework for RIA is still in the nascent stage. There have been some small moves. SEBI has used RIA in some cases albeit with a limited scope. It has initiated a process of introducing RIA in its board’s decision-making for introducing new regulations around 2007, but has since not been used routinely. Likewise, Central Electricity Regulatory Commission has developed RIA tool customized to carry out impact assessment of CERC regulations. In the Indian context, it is required to be recognized that the use of RIA is not merely semantics but forces a strong analytical framework for judging and introspecting before new regulations are introduced. RIA, in *ex ante* as well as *ex post* manner should
be adopted by each and every regulator (financial or otherwise) along with the wide public consultation process into every proposed regulation. This will create the seemingly impossible duality of better regulation with less regulation at the same time.

Over the past 15 years, the OECD has played a pioneering role in bringing the issue of regulatory reform to the fore and spreading the culture of RIA. Much has been achieved over the years, with many countries hitherto adopting practice of RIA and benefitting from the positive effects of quality regulation. Although temporal modifications from lessons learnt have been fetching improvements, still some limitations in RIA cannot be ruled out. The recent global crisis exposed massive flaws in regulatory activity, as well as in supervision and enforcement. Other phenomena are also testing the limits of regulatory frameworks. Regulatory policy is currently at the crossroads, and it needs to integrate a broader governance perspective to address current and future challenges. Reinventing trust in government through effective regulatory governance is the need of the hour. This involves completing the policy cycle, closing the loop between regulatory design and evaluation of outcomes, with evidence-based approaches to support proportionate decisions, policy coherence and better assessment of the benefits of regulation.

Bibliography

3. European Aviation Safety Agency (September, 2011), Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) Methodology, Cologne, Germany


Cleaning the Ganga: Need for a New Management Paradigm

- *Dr M N Buch*

The Ganga is considered the holiest of holy rivers in India, though people who live on the banks of the Narmada would hotly deny this. Both the Narmada and the Ganga are known as the “Jatashankari”, or that which descends from the locks of Shiva. Both are also known as Rewa. Legend has it that every year Ganga comes to the Narmada for a dip which purifies it. The Ganga is a relatively young river when compared with the Narmada, which flows through land which is geologically amongst the oldest in the world. Therefore, the Narmada is millions of years older than the Ganga. Despite this, the Ganga has the prime position in sanctity of all the rivers in India. The belief is that the Ganga is self cleansing, that no matter how much of pollution there is at Varanasi, the water remains pure and that stored Ganga water retains its purity indefinitely. In the psyche of the Indian people and of Hindus in particular, the Ganga is synonymous with India, or the land of Bharat.

What the Ganga is to India the River Thames is to England. But look at the difference in scale. Thames rises at Thames Head at an elevation of 110 metres above msl. The Ganga rises at Gangotri at the height of more than forty times that of the Thames. The length of the Thames is 346 kilometres and the Ganga 2510 kilometers. The total basin of the Thames covers 12,935 square kilometres whereas the drainage area of the Ganga is over one million square kilometres. But one thing the two rivers did share in common and that is the extent of the pollution. In England in late nineteen and early twentieth century, the Thames was so polluted that in 1858 the stench of the river reached such extremes that the House of Commons no longer sat at Westminster. Raw sewage and garbage were emptied into the Thames and between the years 1832 and 1865, four serious cholera outbreaks killed tens of thousands of people. Ultimately

---

*Dr M N Buch, Dean, Centre for Governance and Political Studies, VIF*
this led to a firm decision of the British Government to clean the Thames and under the supervision of Joseph Bazalgette, a dedicated public health engineer, massive sanitary sewers were built on the north and south of the river embankment to intercept all sewage flowing into the Thames. In the mid twentieth century, the Thames Conservancy was set up and this took up the task of cleaning the Thames from its source up to its mouth very seriously. Heavy industry and tanneries along the Thames were shifted, oil pollution reduced, sewage treatment systems modernised and a number of steps taken to ensure that the water quality improved. A dead river was revived and aquatic life has now returned to the Thames. Today, of course, the Thames Conservancy has been merged with the Environmental Agency which, together with the Port of London Authority, is responsible for ensuring that the river Thames remains clean and healthy.

The scale of the Ganga being what it is, obviously there can be no real comparison between it and the Thames, except in terms of the attitude of the people and of government. In the case of the Thames, the people and government united to clean up the river, whereas in the case of Ganga the people are indifferent to what happens to the river and the government is clueless about what to do with the river. So much so that even at Rishikesh and Haridwar, where the river debouches into the plains, not a single town has a fully integrated sewage system, nor are there interception sewers which could prevent the fall of raw sewage from open drains or sewer lines into the river. That is why at Har-Ki-Pairi, the main river has been bypassed through a canal which creates a pool of relatively clean water in which pilgrims bathe. Certainly at the confluence of the Ganga and the Yamuna and, perhaps, at one time of the Saraswati, the entire town drainage of Allahabad enters the river and that is where the world’s largest religious congregation, the Kumbh, is organised once every twelve years, when tens of millions of people over a period of one month bathe in the Ganga. What is more, the
Yamuna carries with it the sewage load collected at cities such as Delhi, Mathura and Agra and dumps it into the Ganga at Allahabad. Even today, with the cleaning programme of the Ganga, we have not been able to tackle the pollution at Allahabad. The Ganga has located on its banks a number of large cities and towns. These include Kanpur, Mirzapur, Varanasi, Patna, Bhagalpur, the cities of Bengal, especially Kolkata. Between Haridwar and Allahabad, for example, there are the industrial towns of Moradabad and Rampur, both contributing their mite to pollution of the Ganga.

The basin of the Ganga is over ten lakhs square kilometres in area and contains just about the finest alluvial soil in the world. This is the granary of India growing wheat, rice, lentils, sugarcane, potatoes, oil seeds, legumes, chillies, jute, and just about every other types of crop that one can think of. Alluvial soil is friable and, therefore, during the monsoon the top soil has a tendency to run into the river, which then carries an enormous silt load. Honest soil is not polluted, but agriculture in India today is so heavily dependent on synthetic fertilisers, insecticides, weedicides and other chemicals that the silt which flows into the Ganga is almost equal to several chemical factories emptying into the river. To this should be added the fecal matter which flows into Ganga throughout its length, as also the solid waste generated by the huge population inhabiting the most densely populated area in India, the Gangetic Plain. In the upper reaches of the Ganga, the population pressures are less and the steep gradients ensure a self cleansing velocity which neutralises through aerobic and anaerobic action the pollutants which enter the river. Because the river is snow fed there is dilution of the pollutants so that the human waste is rendered harmless. But once it enters the plains, the Ganga has a gradient of 1:8000, which means that it flows through extremely flat land and, therefore, the velocity of flow is minimal and the movement of the river is sluggish. Also, whereas the river tends to be very wide in the plains, it is also relatively shallow, especially as silt accumulates in the river bed. During the dry season, the river becomes confined to a very small part of the total bed and is only a trickle. In the wet season, the river flows into the flood plain and is like an enormous shallow pool.
which has a length of about 1,500 miles. There is stagnation and when stagnant water is polluted, it forms a toxic combination. Not to mince words, far from being pure at Varanasi, the Ganga is actually a huge cauldron of toxicity because the pollutants together form a deadly combination. There is a build up of poisonous chemicals, there are pathogens which promote infections, there is rotting organic matter which releases gasses, noxious smells and provides a fertile bed for the breeding of harmful germs. This is the river which the government of India has promised to clean up.

Uma Bharti is the Minister for Water Resources, to whom has been given the task of cleaning the Ganga. Of course the effort to clean the Ganga goes back into the hoary past, but it was Rajiv Gandhi who first tried to systematise the efforts. One welcomes the start but ultimately, like many other such schemes, the project lost momentum and ultimately very little has been done to clean the Ganga. Now Uma Bharti has announced that as a part of cleaning the Ganga, her Ministry will search for and unearth the mythical Saraswati. Incidentally, a study made by the National Geographic some years ago used satellite imagery to trace the course of the ancient river, the delineation of which ran through present day Haryana to include the Ghaggar, One of the most serious archaeologists in India, Professor Wakhenkar, who lived in Ujjain and discovered the ancient cave painting at Bhimbetka at Bhopal, did a sustained study of the Saraswati in which he averred that the river was not mythical but real. His finding was that tectonic movement in the past had caused major shifts in the Himalayan region which changed the course of the Yamuna, separated the Saraswati from the Gangetic system and caused the Saraswati to dry up. In fact it is believed that the entire Harappan Civilisation died because the river on which it was dependent, the Saraswati, had lost its Himalayan source of water, thus depriving a large part of Northern India of water. The National Geographic study confirmed Wakhankar’s views and, therefore, one can safely state that the Saraswati was not a
mythical river. But one has to equally accept that just as geological changes affect the earth, geological changes can make a river dry.

Making the Ganga pollution free is an issue so eminent and so praiseworthy that it stands on its own. Why only Ganga? Why not every river in India which is polluted, which means virtually every river in India? However, because attention is being focused on the Ganga, let us not go into byways or loiter into lanes with a dead end. Let us stick to the Ganga. Is there a holistic study of the river in which vulnerable points from Gaumukh to Sagar Island have been identified? Has the nature and quantum of pollution at all these points been studied and quantified? Has the river been divided into logical segments whereby the pollution of each segment upstream is tackled so that it is not transferred to the downstream segment? Have the major tributaries such as the Yamuna and the Betwa been similarly studied? Has anyone looked at the pollution coming in from Bangladesh? The Ganga Authority must look at the entire Ganga basin as a whole, cut it into convenient segments and then suggest specific programmes for its improvement. These would include the total elimination of all industrial pollution wherever it takes place. This is the relatively easy part because industries are sizable and their effluents are amenable to being diverted into outfall drains from where they can be moved for treatment. This is true even of relatively small scale operations like leather tanneries. Is there a single blueprint for dealing with all industrial pollution along the length of the Ganga with a view to its interception and treatment?

For human waste, which contributes the largest share of pollution, we obviously need to bring towns and cities under a designed sewage system, with a total elimination of wayside defecation. This means that every citizen must have access to a sanitary toilet, all excreta must be conveyed by sewer lines to outfall sewers and these must discharge into treatment plants which give at least primary and secondary treatment to all such waste. This is an expensive proposition, but it is capable of implementation and must be accorded a very high priority if we are to clean up the Ganga. This also applies to solid waste, a great deal of which finds its way by way of garbage into the
river. Surely we can prevent people from throwing garbage into the river and for this purpose we must have proper policing and deterrent penalties for those who act irresponsibly. If every act of improper disposal of garbage is detected and penalised, soon it will become a habit for citizens to deposit their garbage in designated places, after segregation of biodegradable and non-degradable material. Strict enforcement here would suddenly clean up the whole city and this would be a most welcome development. This is where strictness pays.

The Ganga cannot be purified till we take care of the vast quantities of chemical fertilisers and insecticides flowing into the Ganga as a byproduct of agriculture. Obviously one cannot build interception drains along the entire length of the Ganga and in any case they would have to be large almost to the extent of creating a parallel river. Obviously the answer here is to have a very massive programme of encouraging organic agriculture in which the use of pesticides and chemical fertilisers is virtually eliminated. This requires the intervention of the Agriculture Department on an unprecedented scale, taking into account the vastness of the Ganga basin. Have Uma Bharti and her team given any thought to this issue and to what extent has she co-opted agriculture scientists, researchers and practitioners in the project of cleaning the Ganga? The project to clean the Ganga also requires the active participation of the people. The habit of cleanliness, of proper garbage disposal, of cooperating in creation of an effective sewage system all call for a complete change in the attitude of the people who can become partners in cleaning the Ganga and, therefore, offer their active participation. What has government done to engender this, apart from pious statements, the occasional advertisements in newspapers appealing to the people to keep the river clean and the observation of the odd cleanliness day? Uma Bharti has proved her ability as an election campaigner in which she has been able to mobilise public opinion in favour of her party. Why can she not bring the same zeal to bear on
mobilising people to become partners in the Clean Ganga campaign?

It is obvious that the Ganga will not be cleaned merely because the Prime Minister participates in Ganga Arti in Varanasi. The Ganga can be cleaned only if there is a proper study of the river, identification of points and causes of pollution, specific programmes, including engineering works for interception of pollutants, adequate budgetary support to ensure that schemes are completed, mobilising of the people, the evolving of technologies to deal with the problem and constant monitoring and supervision of the works and the maintenance of the works. We need to create a new management and administration paradigm to be able to effectively implement the programme for cleaning the Ganga. For this we need a Ministry which is imaginative, innovative, open to ideas, able to organise a team and, above all, firm in decision making and stealfist in implementation. It needs to systematically prepare schemes which address the priority areas seriatim and which, collectively, will bring qualitative change to the river.

Back to Contents
Churchill and the Jews

(Author: Martin Gilbert; Published by: Harold Holt & Co., New York, pp 359; Price: Rs 1112)

Understanding Churchill’s Relationship with the Jews

- Prabhat P Shukla

It is a rare book where the reader gets the clear sense in the first fifty pages itself that the time and money spent on the book will be well recompensed. Churchill and the Jews by Martin Gilbert is such a book, and is rich in information that is little researched, and yet bears great relevance to the issues of the day.

For an Indian reader, there is information in the very opening chapters that is gripping. This concerns the role of Sir Henry McMahon, the man after whom the boundary between India and Tibet defined in the 1914 Simla Conference is named. After finishing up in Delhi, he was appointed High Commissioner to Egypt, and in that capacity makes an early appearance in Gilbert’s narrative.

While serving in Cairo, he opened a correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who was then the Custodian of the Holy Places as the appointee of the Caliph, the Sultan of Ottoman Turkey. Through Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet, the Hashemites claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammed.

The correspondence between McMahon and Sharif Hussein described the boundaries of the proposed Arab state after the presumed success of the Arab Revolt against the Turks. It gave the territory east of the line of Aleppo – Hama – Homs – Damascus to the Arabs, while retaining the western areas for their own disposal. In his private correspondence, McMahon clarified that this was done in the clear understanding that these areas were not primarily Arab-populated areas; it was these areas that Churchill proposed to carve out for the proposed Jewish state, promised under the Balfour Declaration.

The question that arose in my

* Prabhat P Shukla, Distinguished Fellow, VIF
mind when reading this was – did McMahon leave any private letters about the Simla Conference and the McMahon Line? I hope some scholar will try and examine this aspect, which may provide valuable information for our boundary in the North. Unfortunately, the British Archives are among the most unfriendly to the user, and one is hardly likely to find anything useful online.

Anyhow, not to get ahead of ourselves: the book is about Churchill’s relationship with the Jews, primarily, of course, the Jews of Britain, but also his approach to Zionism, to Bolshevism, and to American Jewry, with Zionism being the dominant narrative, the other two treated more summarily. These also covered the big issues of the day, from the First World War to the Second and a bit beyond. Churchill, of course, is a character whose study is the study of the great events of the first half of the 20th Century: from 1910, he was in Ministerial office almost without a break until 1929; and then, he was back in harness in 1939, as the Second World War began, initially in the Admiralty, and then as Prime Minister. Whether or not this was the finest hour of the Empire, as he claimed, it certainly was his finest hour. In fact, his second term as Prime Minister, after 1951, was quite unremarkable, even unsuccessful.

Some of the facts in Gilbert’s book are well-known, though perhaps not so in India. We have shut out Israel from our public discourse for so long that many of the crucial facts are not known, except among some conspiracy-minded persons. We learn that Churchill and Chaim Weizmann made each other’s acquaintance as early as 1905, when they shared a dais at a public function. As Home Secretary, Churchill signed Weizmann’s naturalisation papers. And as First Lord of the Admiralty, he asked for Weizmann to help the Navy meet its requirements of acetone, in order to manufacture cordite. The item was in short supply and Weizmann, a chemist by training, had developed a method of manufacturing it artificially.

The two men were early activists in favour of a Jewish state in Palestine, and this was the basis of a long-term friendship, which continued through the decades to when Churchill was Prime Minister and Weizmann was President of the newly-formed state of Israel. However, there is
only a sketchy treatment of the question of why the British made the promise of a Jewish National Home. Gilbert gives two reasons: one, to encourage Russian Jews to help Russia stay in the War; and two, to enlist more active American support for the War effort. The first did not work, for the Bolsheviks seized power five days after the Balfour Declaration. The second did work, though Germany did its bit – and more – to push the US into the War on the side of the Entente. One of the major developments that brought the US into the War was the Zimmerman telegram, in which the German Government promised Mexico the southern states of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona in return for Mexico declaring war on the US.

Inevitably, much of the book deals with the question of Palestine and the Jewish state. Once the mandate for Palestine had been given to the British, it was up to Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, to set about fulfilling the promise of the Balfour Declaration. One of his first acts was to divide the mandated territory into Transjordan and the rest – which then retained the name Palestine. Although Weizmann was keen that parts of Transjordan – up to the Hejaz Railway – should also form the Jewish home, Churchill was to boast later that he “created Transjordan one afternoon in Jerusalem”; in actual fact, he did it in Cairo.

But Churchill was quite clear that the Negev was to belong to the Jews. This is worth noting because it was across the Negev that the Germans, with enlisted Arab Bedouin levies, had tried during the First World War to attack and occupy the Suez Canal, and so the British wanted it to be secure for the future. At the same time, he was clear that the Jewish home would take generations to come into being and then too it would depend on the calibre of the Jewish leaders who would settle in Palestine – and it would fail if these leaders proved unworthy.

The official British position on the question of a home for the Jews in Palestine went through a process of steady erosion, both because of internal opposition, and because of the hostility of the Arabs. Chamberlain, of course, but several members of the House of Lords, Gen Wavell, all were opposed to Jewish immigration, as were several of the British representatives, civil and military, working in Palestine. On the Arab side, the figure of Haj Amin al-
Husseini, who was appointed Mufti of Jerusalem by the self-same British Mandate authorities in Palestine, emerges as one of the staunchest opponents of Jewish immigration and one who demanded an Arab state in the entire mandated territory. In later years, when he was out of office [but still an influential voice in British politics], Churchill would ask for al-Husseini to be arrested for fomenting anti-Jewish riots, “using violence against him” if necessary. At this stage, that is, through the 1920’s, Churchill was also against any partitioning – further partitioning, to be more accurate – of Palestine.

Churchill’s time as Prime Minister was, of course, dominated by the Second World War, and there were many urgent issues that he had to deal with. But he did seek to sideline al-Husseini and advise Weizmann that Saudi King ibn Saud was the man to deal with. This was quite a change for Churchill, who had established the British commitment to the Hashemites in the aftermath of the First World War. Easier said than done of course – ibn Saud had been a resolute opponent of the Jewish National Home project, and he was to express his strong objections not only to Churchill but also, later, to President Roosevelt. The latter was also more receptive to the views of ibn Saud. But what is startling is that some segments of the Foreign Office, and the local administrative authorities, were bypassing Churchill on major issues. The decision to suspend Jewish immigration during the Second World War, for instance, was taken without informing the Prime Minister. It was, no doubt, with this experience in mind that Churchill told his Cabinet Secretary that when the War Office says it will “carefully examine” an issue, “they mean they will do it in”. This sheds unusual light on a strong and clear-headed Prime Minister and war-time leader – even he could not entirely control the actions of his subordinates.

In the final countdown, Churchill was a reluctant convert to the idea of partitioning Palestine, but he also recognised that the post-War Labour Government would not be helpful to the Jews. He advised the Jewish leaders that their best bet lay with the US. Sure enough, the Labour Government informed the UN of its intention to lay down the mandate on 14 May 1948. It was the support of the USSR and the US that finally saw the
successful vote in November 1947 in the UN General Assembly that created the State of Israel.

The other, minor, narrative in the book deals with the other side of the Jewish activity in Europe during the First World War – in the Russian Empire. Though it was the scene of regular pogroms – indeed the word pogrom is itself a Russian word – the Jews were divided on how to respond to the opportunities presented by the First World War. A large number, of course, fought with the Russian Army against the Germans and the Austrians, and gave a good account of themselves. But the Germans were working with the Bolsheviks to destabilise the Russian Empire, and Churchill himself described the Bolsheviks as a “Jewish movement”. His reason for saying this was that Lenin was almost the only member of the Central Committee who was not of Jewish origin. Gilbert adds that, in fact, even Lenin’s paternal grandfather was a Jew.

Churchill was at pains to explain his stand on Bolshevism. Perhaps it is only the distance of time that allows this whole issue to be discussed with some degree of openness – in the Soviet Union, it was spoken of only in hushed tones. Churchill described the greatness of the “Jewish race”, and noted that Christianity itself owed heavily to the Jews. But there was always good and evil in mankind, and Bolshevism was the evil side – “It would almost seem as if the gospel of Christ and the gospel of Antichrist were destined to originate among the same people and that this mystic and mysterious race had been chosen for the supreme manifestation, both of the divine and the diabolical”. Not surprisingly, the Jewish Chronicle took exception to Churchill’s remarks, and made the point that these Bolshevik leaders were all atheists, and could not possible be regarded as representatives of the Jews. Nonetheless, at that time, it was widely felt that Zionism could be a counter to Bolshevism, and that was the belief Churchill was acting on. History has probably validated this view.

The author spends even less time on American Jewry, and few of the important leaders figure in the book. The exception is Bernard Baruch, who was not a supporter of Zionism. In fact, Churchill did tell Weizmann that there were many Jews in the US who did not support a Jewish home in Palestine. And yet, by 1845, he
was advising the Jewish leaders in Britain that their real hope lay in enlisting American support. Against the run of events, this was forthcoming and, as mentioned already, the state of Israel became a reality in the UN General Assembly vote.

Gilbert also provides some very useful maps in the book, which the reader will have to search long and hard to find anywhere else. All in all, a very enjoyable read, and a profitable one too.
Vimarsha on Transforming Centre-State Relations

Former Home Secretary Shri Dhirendra Singh delivered a talk on Transforming Centre State Relations under the Vimarsha series at VIF on July 11, 2014. The session was presided over by former Delhi Lt Governor Shri Vijai Kapoor.

In his opening remarks, Lt Gen R K Sawhney, Distinguished Fellow, VIF, recalled that the country’s leaders have had to grapple with the complex issue of Centre-State relations since the time of independence. The issue figured prominently in the debates in the Constituent Assembly which drafted our Constitution. The Constitution-makers had to contend with various formulations, keeping in mind the socio-political reality of India. There were those who felt that given India’s diversity, the Constitution must have a strong unitary tilt, as otherwise it would be difficult to hold the nation together. But, there were many others who felt that the Constitution must respect this diversity and the fact that India had emerged following the integration of many states. They therefore wanted the Constitution to have the features of a true federation.

After much deliberation, Dr.B.R.Ambedkar and his colleagues in the Constituent Assembly, which drafted India’s Constitution, eventually harmonized these diverse formulations and came up with a document that gave the states considerable legislative and executive powers, but vested the Centre with residual powers that would enable it to step in during emergencies like breakdown of constitutional machinery or when India’s unity and integrity was in peril, he said.

The diverse electoral preferences of the people of the country, the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations and the critical interventions of the Supreme Court such as in the S R Bommai and B P Singhal cases have raised the prospects for a more harmonious relationship between the Centre and the States, which augurs well for the future, he said.

In his presidential remarks, Shri Kapoor termed the period between...
1966 and 72 as the crisis period in Centre-State relations marked not only by the ‘Aya Ram Gaya Ram’ phase of politics but also 27 notifications for President’s rule and confrontational role of some state Governments.

He said the all India services were meant to be building blocks to maintain Centre-State relations but there has been a discernible change in the mindset of the all India officers who felt that the balance of convenience lay in aligning with the state Government.

In his talk, Shri Dhirendra Singh pointed out that though the Constitution does not speak of federalism, in the Keshavananda Bharti case, the Supreme Court had held that federalism is a basic structure of the Indian Constitution.

“If we have to transform Centre-State relations, we have to look at the Constitution in a holistic manner”, he said. Advocating collaborative federalism, he lamented that there were many states which were rich in minerals yet were home to the poorest of Indians. These people need to be compensated adequately, he said.

Shri Singh gave several suggestions including strengthening the Rajya Sabha or the Council of States entrusting it with special responsibility in matters concerning the state and revival of the Department of States under the Ministry of Home Affairs as also reactivation of the Inter-state council and the zonal councils.

The talk was followed by an interactive session, in which the distinguished audience actively participated.
Discussion on Christine Fair’s Book

American scholar and academic Dr C Christine Fair presented her latest book “Fighting to the end: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War” before a distinguished gathering of scholars, soldiers and diplomats at the Vivekananda International Foundation on July 14, 2014.

Dr Fair touched upon the main arguments she made in her brilliantly researched book, which set the stage for a very lively and engaging interaction between the author and the audience. Persuasively arguing that Pakistan was not a ‘security seeking state’ but a ‘greedy state’ which sought to acquire more territory not because it was needed for its security but for ideological reasons, Dr Fair shot down the fallacious theory that Pakistan’s behaviour can be changed by making it feel more secure. She debunked Pakistan’s case on Kashmir and said that Pakistanis keep parroting ‘UN resolutions and plebiscite’ without ever having read these resolutions.

Exposing the duplicitous policy that Pakistan has followed in the War on Terror, Dr Fair highlighted that the use of Islamic imagery, jihad and non-state actors is as old as the state of Pakistan. She dismissed the widely held view that extremism is the outcome of the Islamisation policies of Gen Ziaul Haq and argued that the foundations for this was laid during the Ayub era. Strongly advocating a policy that raises the costs for Pakistan, she said that the current US policy actually encourages Pakistan to continue with its duplicitous policies. She sounded a reality check to her audience by pointing out the oft repeated mistake of equating a whisky drinking and debauchery loving Pakistani general with liberal and secular values. But she admitted that she really admired the ability of Pakistanis to impress and influence their interlocutors with ‘pleasant lies’.

Back to Contents
Interaction with Ms. Kavita Kewal, Department of Defence, Australia

Ms. Kavita Kewal, Assistant Secretary, DOD, Australia along with other officials visited VIF on 22 July 2014 to interact with the VIF faculty on issues of mutual concern. Ms. Kavita Kewal explained Australian views on regional security environment including Australia’s role in America’s pivot to Asia strategy. She also dwelt on the ongoing process of formulating the Defence White Paper and Australia’s requirement of building up its defence capabilities. She stressed on enhancing Indo-Australian defence and security cooperation.

Gen (Retd.) NC Vij, Director, VIF briefed the Australian delegation on the political change that has occurred in India and the intention of Indian government to shore up its defence capabilities. He also spoke on the need to strengthen Indo-Australian defence relationship and the possibilities of military technical cooperation and joint ventures in defence industries. Lt. Gen. Ravi Sawhney, while speaking on regional security environment, discussed the emerging situation in Af-Pak belt and its implications for the region as well as for the international community.
Visit of Nepalese Delegation

A five-member delegation from Nepal Transition to Peace-Institute (NTTP-I) visited the VIF on July 24, 2014 for interaction on a variety of issues of mutual interest. The delegation was led by former Speaker of the Nepalese Parliament Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana, Senior Facilitator and Chairman of the Institute and included, among others, distinguished personalities such as Mr. Padma Ratan Tuladhar and Mr. Vidyadhar Mallik, both former ministers. The VIF delegation was led by the Director, Gen (Retd) N C Vij and included Mr. C D Sahay, Lt.Gen (Retd) Ravi Sawhney and others.

Extending a warm welcome to the visiting delegates, the Director VIF recalled the long traditional ties of history and culture between the peoples of Nepal and India that has withstood the test of time. He also recalled the extremely constructive discussions that were held during the earlier visit of the NTTP-I delegation to the VIF in August 2012.

In their opening remarks, Mr. Tuladhar and later Mr. Dhungana, warmly responded to and endorsed the sentiments expressed by Gen. Vij and proceeded to give a detailed assessment of the situation obtaining in Nepal with special reference to the constitution drafting exercise undertaken by the 2nd Constituent Assembly. They expressed confidence that the constitution drafting work was on course and that the main sticking issues such as federalism and ideological differences will also get resolved.

The visiting delegation expressed very positive sentiments over the new Indian Government’s initial moves in not only extending invitation to the leaders of the neighboring countries to the swearing in ceremony of the Modi-cabinet but also to the visit of the Indian Foreign Minister to Kathmandu. They expressed the view that the upcoming visit of Prime Minister Modi to Nepal next month would mark the beginning of a new era of Indo-Nepal cooperation, particularly in Nepal’s quest for economic revival.

Nepal Transition to Peace-Institute (NTTP) is a national
entity that supports Nepal's peace process by providing dialogue, mediation and facilitation services. Prior to being registered as an independent peace institute under the Home Ministry in May 2014, NTTP was run as a national peace support program designed in consultation with the Government of Nepal, its Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and political parties to build their capacity to engage in the peace process, create an inclusive multi-party dialogue to address all stakeholders' concerns, and institutionalize national transitional peace structures.
Seminar on West Asia

VIF organized a seminar on ‘Recent Developments in West Asia: Challenges and Implications’ on July 25, 2014 to analyse the situation in the strife-torn area and its broader ramifications for the region and India. The seminar, inter alia, focused on the sectarian violence in West Asia - its causes and spread, the regional security environment, the emergence of Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS), the external influences on the West Asian conflicts, the process of Arab Islamisation, India’s energy security and the safety of Indian workers in the region, the possible impact of violence on India’s internal security dynamic, and the diplomatic challenges facing India on the West Asian front.

Shri Ajit Doval KC, India’s new National Security Advisor (NSA) and the erstwhile Director of the Foundation delivered the keynote address, sharing his perspective on the prevailing situation in Iraq and other parts of the region.

The first session gave an overview of ‘Recent Developments in West Asia: Challenges and Prospects’. It was chaired by Ambassador RS Kalha and had two speakers on the panel – Ambassador Sanjay Singh and Ms Shebonti Dadwal. While the former spoke about the threat to peace and security and the role of regional and international players, the latter discussed the energy situation and its implications, especially in the context of India. The evolving situation in Iraq and its implications for India however came up for even closer examination during the second session. The second session, which included three panelists – Dr. Ajai Sahni, Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Ata Hasnain and Ambassador Arvind Gupta, was chaired by Ambassador Satyabrata. The panelists shared their perspectives respectively on international terrorism, faith and sectarian dimensions of the conflict and its impact on India and the possible future scenario for Iraq and Syria. Ambassador Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary, summed up the proceedings of the event.

Back to Contents
Interaction with Dr Moeed Yusuf

Dr Moeed Yusuf, Director, South Asia Program at the United States Institute of Peace, visited VIF on August 6, 2014 for an interaction with the VIF faculty.

In a frank and candid exchange of views, Dr Yusuf presented his assessment of the current state of relations between India and Pakistan and the prospects for normalization of ties. He spoke about the challenge posed by terrorism to Pakistan and the state of civil-military relations in that country.
Pakistan’s former Ambassador to USA, Hussain Haqqani, delivered a talk on “Pakistan: Democracy, Modernism, Jihad” before a distinguished gathering at Vivekananda International Foundation on August 13, 2014. Ambassador Haqqani who is currently the Director, South and Central Asia, at the Hudson Institute in Washington, said that Pakistan’s foreign policy is a function of the state of insecurity whose roots can be traced back to the origins of the demand for Pakistan and the worldview of the leaders of the Muslim League. From ‘Islam in danger’ being the rallying cry for mobilising support for the demand for Pakistan, to ‘Pakistan in danger’ once the demand was fulfilled was a natural progression. This was further buttressed by giving it an ideological twist that had to be protected at all cost. According to Amb. Haqqani, Pakistan has constantly and consciously cultivated a sense of insecurity among the people, and this has fostered an ideological baggage on the Pakistan Army which it finds impossible to shed.

A lively discussion followed Amb. Haqqani’s brilliant exposition of political and security challenges that Pakistan faces as a result of its ideological orientation. He also highlighted the threat that international jihadist movements like ISIS pose to the subcontinent especially given the attraction of the idea of a caliphate for the subcontinental Muslim.