US Security Posture

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Political Temperature of Pakistan

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India 2021: - Hazarding Guesses - Guessing Hazards

- Gopal Krishna Gandhi

The hazards that India is likely to face over the next ten years may be divided broadly into hazards posed by forces beyond our control and those posed by situations caused by human action, human decisions, and public policy.

Seismic hazards

Seismic and atmospheric disturbances are increasing in frequency. Suffice to say the Himalaya from Kashmir to Assam have been jolted over the last decade repeatedly. The brutal one that shook Kashmir on 8 October, 2005 left 79000 officially dead in POK and 1500 in Jammu & Kashmir on 18 September 2011. There occurred a most curious earthquake, epicentered in the Kanchenjungha region of Sikkim, which shook the whole of the Indo-Gangetic Plain, with tremors felt in Assam going right through to Delhi and beyond. This earthquake has earned the name of the ‘2011 Himalayan Earthquake September 2011 was an earthquake month. There were a total of 15 earthquakes of significance in India and its neighbourhood, as well as, all over the world in the chain of September 2011 earthquake

Earthquakes do not come on ceremonial state visits. They come,

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kill and leave without trace. They are rather like terrorists. But in reality it is not the earthquakes that kill, it is buildings collapsing in the earthquakes which kill. That’s why, today earthquakes are more hazardous than they were some hundred years ago when buildings were made of less heavy materials and fewer people lived in and around them.

What is a seismic zone? Earthquake zoning divides India into 4 seismic zones (zone 2, 3, 4 and 5) with Zone 5 held to have the highest level of seismicity and Zone 2 with the lowest. Kashmir, Punjab, the western and Central Himalayan region, the North-east Indian region and the Rann of Katch fall in this zone.

There is indifference in society. Only a few know as to how many our nuclear reactors are located or will come up in Zone 4 and 5. Narora falls within zone 4 which houses a nuclear reactor. There is lack of urgency in seismic preparedness in earthquake-tsunami policy. If “aam aadmi’s” indifference can be assigned to habits of mind, should those concerned with augmenting our seismic preparedness not address that indifference? Should they not be told in clear terms that non-scientists can understand, that are not self explaining but frank and consultative, as to how and why they need not worry about our reactors being located where earthquakes and tsunami are expected to occur. There is,
after all, such a thing as error. And that can include errors of judgment in the calculation of risk factor. Should they not be told how and why we need not be auxious about the safety of our reactors? And, if there is cause for anxiety, if not alarm, should the nation not be taken into confidence about those areas of anxiety?

**Erratic winds**

The erratic wind is becoming regular, the cycle is becoming erratic, whether on account of climate change or due to other causes. Cyclones, tornados and typhoons have become frequent visitors. Some years ago, the names of ‘Nargis’, ‘Katrina’ and ‘Aila’ would have invoked only feminine proper nouns, not so today. In the coming decade, global warming will elevate mean sea level to dangerous levels and when a swollen sea, lifted by regular tides rise even higher by another furious Aila, the Sunderban will be at huge risk notwithstanding the life saving mangroves there.

Nothing can be done in this space and time to check sea level rise or to stop cyclone furies in their tracks. So, another Aila, say, two, five or ten times stronger than the previous one, the human population of both the Indian and Bangladeshi Sunderban could well gravitate towards the relatively higher Kolkata, as our country’s most desperate climate refugees. Imagine, what the huge population influx would entail in a Mahanagar already past its endurance levels in terms of population infrastructure balance. The Maldives are thought of as a small country. They are highly concerned about submersion. India
is a big country. Is India thinking about it all?

Another area in West Bengal, adjoining the Sunderban, which is merely 30 metres above sea level, is Haripur in Medinipur district. It is the proposed site of a proposed nuclear reactor. Those interested may try to find out the elevations of the reactor basements in Fukushima and those proposed for Haripur.

The Prime Minister’s announcement that the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is to be a more autonomous and independent body to boost accountability and transparency in the functioning of the country’s nuclear power plant is timely and is to be welcomed. But this step needs to be accompanied by certain other steps like an independent, transparent safety audit of our nuclear facilities and these steps should be a part of a major re-assessment of engineering and architectural styles, and re-faishning of construction regulations in seismic zones with a view to long time learning from Fukushima.

**Bio-terror and Nano-terror**

Risks of nuclear error and terror are conspicuous. Let us not be unaware of these risks. Use of the nerve gas in a Tokyo subway in 1990s and of the anthrax in 2001
are well known. The horrors of chemical or germ warfare unleashed by non-state players from laboratories, held hostage by them is not a science fiction scenario. It is for real. If nature does not have a threshold, then terror, especially when twinned to death inventing creativeness, is also beyond thresholds. And one cannot believe that politico-technological systems that can purloin nuclear secrets are not incapable of stealing the far easier-to-transfer technical know how about biological warfare. As regards testing, nuclear weapons capability has to undergo trial-testing on the ground, or under it. In either case, not an easy proposition, one that can be hidden from the world. Biochemical devices can be tested clandestinely.

**Pandemics**

Blame it on the birds, on pigs or other creations, the fact remains that zoonotic diseases, that is infective diseases, carried into humans, sometimes through vectors, from animals, can be used by infernal minds to carry them into selected human hosts. In an early instance of biological warfare armies of the 14th century were recorded catapulting plague-diseased corpses over the walls of enemy towns in order to spread the pestilence.

Near modern times, plague was used during the second Sino-Japanese war by the imperial Japanese army and in 1940, the imperial Japanese Army Air service bombed Ningbo with plague-carrying fleas. With the international conventions now in place, we can expect that scenario to belong to past, but what of non-
state players? But terror apart, even otherwise, the world is becoming vulnerable to zoonotic pandemics as never before. If some common modern diseases, including epidemic diseases, started out as zoonotic diseases and the bubonic plague, measles, smallpox, influenza, HIV, and diphtheria came to us this way, the common cold and tuberculosis, it is said, may also have started out in other species.

Until recently only the world of medicine knew of leptospirosis. Now with rain waters flooding congested cities, the infection is transmitted to humans by water that has been contaminated by animal urine to come in contact with unhealed breaks in the skin, the eyes, or with the mucous membranes. The filth that is growing in cities is making conditions ripe for epidemic including plague.

The nightmare of Urbania villages are becoming towns, towns are becoming cities, cities are becoming metropolises, metropolises are trying to be second Kuala Lumpur if not third grade Singapore without requisite funds or the requisite vision. There are those who regard the urbanization as inevitable, those who regard it as a good thing and those who are simply horrified at the prospect. It would not have been horrifying if there would not have been mismatch of what is needed.
Water

Of all scarcities that can be expected to hit hardest will be that of water. How many water purifiers can be opened? If the monsoons fail us two years in row, as they are known to do, in cycles of ten years of so, the country will be in deep trouble. Every year the need of water is increasing, not just in terms of that many more thirsty months but that many more industries, heavy duty consumers of water. Water use efficiencies in agriculture are spoken of as a solution and of course they would be essential. But is anyone preparing the nation, the farming nation, to start readying for that shift, especially in paddy cultivation? No, on the contrary, emphasis is laid for increased acreages, high water-demanding commercial crops replacing traditional food crops.

The Maoist Phenomenon

Water use efficiencies in agriculture are spoken of as a solution and of course they would be essential. But is anyone preparing the nation, the farming nation, to start readying for that shift, especially in paddy cultivation? No, on the contrary, emphasis is laid for increased acreages, high water-demanding commercial crops replacing traditional food crops.

We need not doubt that Maoist operatives are going to take their attention further from their rural and wooded strongholds to suburban and urban centers, especially to our metropolitan showpieces. It requires no expertise to imagine that they will be focusing more on the headquarters and encampments including arrangements for manpower transfers of uniformed
personnel. Government offices as well as the premises of legislatures need to be extremely vigilant. Individual officials and politicians may expect to continue to face threats of violence and abduction against ransom claims.

**Jihadi groups**

What is the most nagging and most persistent human hazard to our communal amity, our national integrity, and to our progress in peace is posed by Jihadi groups from the soil of Pakistan. One might imagine that there is a lull in their activities, though this could change at this very moment. Let no one be beguiled. They get their sustenance, their motivation, their manpower, and their weapons from other sources. It is too early to draw long-term inferences from the statements recently made by the politician Imran Khan who addressed a mass rally in Lahore recently.

**Looking inward**

Legitimacy has taken up position against credibility, authority against authencity. The voice of authority in a democracy like ours is no ordinary voice. It has the stamp of popular endorsement obtained in free and fair elections. But the claim of authencity in a society like ours, is no ordinary claim either, for it has stature of ‘ghee’ against hydrogenated oil, of ‘gur’ against processed sugar. Government work through arteries. Movements
work through nerves. Neither is meant to diminish or dispute the other.

Anna Hazare’s movement has touched a very real and very raw nerve in our society. Some parties have governed us well, some not so well, some have given us great leaders some not so. But all have let corruption spread, take root, smother us. Now, for goodness sake, please, do something about this. We have suffered enough.

Why is this a hazard? It is a hazard because freedom without responsibility is not tenable. We may look forward to the wisdom of age being supported by the energy of youth to give to not just the state apparatus but the social stamina to the body which needs to face the social hazards. It is right and logical to be optimistic about finding the right leadership to take on the hazards being outlined, especially that of an impatient and angry population. I would reiterate that not just because we are a democracy which keeps throwing up and throwing out our representatives, but because we are also a nation of mature people who may lose their cool, from time to time, but who as a rule also know how to recover from the debris of their rages. And more, we are the people who have both skills—how to count and how to weigh.
The new strategic guidance for the US Department of Defence, issued on January 5th 2012, in an eight page document entitled “Sustaining US Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense”, merits careful study. It not only provides insights into the emerging global security challenges as envisaged by the US and its projected response thereto but also enumerates the primary missions for the US Armed Forces. It may be recalled that the last occasion on which a similar document was prepared was in 1992, in the aftermath of the Gulf War. At that time it was initially a secret document. As per leaks to the media it contemplated preemptive intervention, unilateral action and promotion of American values. Subsequently, a modified and toned down version was released to the public. As regards the new strategic guidance there was much debate in the Obama Administration on whether or not to make it public. The forthcoming elections were, perhaps, an element which impelled the Administration to place its essence in the public domain. It would be safe to assume that there is a more detailed version of this guidance which remains classified.

The document at the very outset acknowledges that it has been developed at an inflection point which marks the drawdown of the extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is witnessing a changing geopolitical environment which is throwing up newer challenges and is impelling lower levels of defence spending. Clearly, while US Defence Forces

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are set to become smaller in response to the reduction in defence spending dictated by economic constraints, the strategic guidance valiantly seeks to project that they will be better fitted to meet the emerging challenge. Indeed, the President in his transmittal message on the issue was at pains to point out that the US military would be “agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies” and would be the “best trained, best equipped fighting force in history.”

Global Security Challenges:

The section of the document on the global security environment is upfront in acknowledging that the US is faced with a complex set of challenges and opportunities across regions and on issues and sets out the manner in which it should address them. The following is the broad approach recommended in respect of the challenges posed by the major issues and in some of the regions:

1. **Terrorism:** Notwithstanding the fact that Al-Qaeda has been rendered “far less capable” the document recognizes that it, along with its affiliates, continues to remain active in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and elsewhere. It, furthermore, asserts that violent extremists will continue to threaten the US and the “primary loci of these threats are South Asia and the Middle East.” Accordingly, for the foreseeable future that US will “take an active approach in countering these threats” by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories and “directly striking the most
dangerous groups and individuals” when necessary. (Comment: It is evident, that the US does not discount further terrorist attacks against it and is prepared to resort to preemptive action abroad against them if necessary; The Defence Policy Guidance of 1992 also contemplated preemptive action but it was more in the context of conventional targets rather than terrorist outfits. Unfortunatel y, though the US recognizes that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates will continue to remain active in Pakistan it stops short of suggesting that the latter has been active in the promotion of terrorism and, therefore, must be dealt with sternly.)

2. Asia-Pacific: Since US economic and security interests are “inextricably” linked to the Asia-Pacific the document projects that the US will “rebalance” towards it. Existing alliances in the region will be emphasized and networks of cooperation will be expanded with emerging partners in the region “for securing common interests.” The US is investing in a long term strategic partnership with India “to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security” in the Indian Ocean region. The US would maintain peace in the Korean Peninsula and deter and defend provocation from North Korea. Peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of US influence in the region will depend in part on an “underlying balance of military capability and presence”. China has the potential to affect the US
economy and security. The growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intent. The US will make the necessary investments to ensure it maintains regional access. It will work with its allies and partners to promote a rules-based international order that ensures stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism and constructive defense cooperation.

(Comment: The US intent to seek to contain China comes through loud and clear. It will do so by enhancing its presence in the region and working through alliances and partnerships including new ones in the Asia-Pacific. The mention of India’s role as a regional economic anchor and provider of security is welcome and an indicator that it is envisaged as one of the partners of the US in the region. In contrast in the 1992US defence policy guidance India’s large army along with that of China, Vietnam and the two Koreas were pointed out indirectly as the reasons for maintaining the US armed forces presence in East Asia/Pacific. India and Pakistan were then being clubbed together and their nuclear programmes as a source of concern).

3. **Middle East**: US objectives in the region will be aimed at countering violent extremists, proliferation of ballistic missiles and of WMD, and Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon and “destabilizing policies”. In addition, the US will uphold its commitment to allies and partner states, stand up for Israel’s security and a comprehensive Middle East peace. In order to achieve this the US will maintain a presence in--- and support of--- partner nations in and around the region.

4. **Europe**: Since most European countries are now
producers of security rather than consumers thereof the US military would rebalance its investment in Europe “moving from a focus on current conflicts towards a focus on future capabilities.” While maintaining its commitment to allied security the US would work with NATO to develop a “Smart Defence” approach to pool, share and specialize capabilities to meet 21st century challenges. In addition a closer relationship would be forged with Russia in areas of mutual interest and “encourage it to be a contributor across a broad range of issues”. (While Europe would remain the principal partner of the US for the foreseeable future the latter would not need to make any considerable military investment therein. Security would be buttressed by interoperability. The intent to forge a closer relationship with Russia makes good sense both in the context of European security and wider global security and is a necessary corrective to US policies which have generally been overly hostile to that country.)

5. Rest of the World: The US will pursue new partnerships with like minded countries the world over for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. It will seek to achieve its security objectives through small footprint approaches relying on “exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities”. (Clearly budget constraints are forcing the US to rethink its go it alone policies and it now seeks to secure its objectives with the help of
partner countries. Significantly, it has shown no indication of reverting into its shell and its interventionist and pro active approach remains in place).

6. **Global Commons:** The document demonstrates the clear recognition that access to the global commons particularly at sea, in space and cyber space is under threat by both state and non state actors. It is unambiguous about the US determination with its allies and partners to ensure “access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.”

(Comment: This constitutes a thinly veiled notice to China from desisting from its disruptive activities in cyber space and from its anti access endeavours in the South China Sea.)

7. **WMD Proliferation:** Given the evident threat of WMD proliferation the document asserts that the Department of Defence would conduct “effective operations” to counter it.

(Significantly, there is no mention of the campaign for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons which once was high on the Obama agenda and which is critically important for effectively addressing nuclear proliferation. Obviously, this has been more or less been abandoned.)

**Primary Missions for US Armed Forces:**

1. **Counter Terrorism:** Defeating Al Qaeda and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven again (for terrorism) will be the major objective. Following the draw down in Afghanistan US global counter terrorism efforts will be more widely
distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance.

(Comment: The counter-terror mission, though one of the tasks of the defence forces was not one of the primary missions in the DPG of 1992; obviously the environment has changed much since then. It may also be noted that the current US policy of talking to the Taliban is not consistent with the objective of preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorism.)

2. **Deter and Defeat Aggression:** US Forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even while engaged in a large scale operation elsewhere. For this purpose US forces must be able to conduct a combined arms campaign across all domains—land, air, maritime, space and cyberspace. Wherever possible US forces will operate with allied and coalition forces.

(Comment: This constitutes a climb down from earlier projections, most recently in the February 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review, which envisaged US forces of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts in overlapping time frames and is further evidence of the intent to downsize the military.)

3. Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges: In order to deter potential adversaries the US must be able to project power in areas in which its access...
and freedom to operate are challenged. In this context, the document recognizes that states like China and Iran would seek to thwart US projection through “asymmetric means” and that proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology would extend to non-state actors. Accordingly, the US will invest so that its military is able to “operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.”

(Comment: Here quite clearly the China threat has been signaled along with that from Iran. Jointness in the Armed Forces also finds a reference and is in fact a constant refrain in the document. Finally, it is evident that though the US Armed Forces are set to decline in numbers they will become more sophisticated and high tech. Indeed, one wonders whether at the end of the day the US will actually be able to effect the budget cuts that they hope to achieve.)

4. **Counter WMD:** While the US will engage in all possible efforts to prevent the proliferation and use of WMD, including Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it would also invest in capabilities “to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use.”

5. **Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space:** The US will work with allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.
6. **Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent:** As long as nuclear weapons exist the US will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal. Its nuclear forces would “under any circumstances” confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure US allies and security partners that they can count on US security commitments.

The document, however, asserts that these goals could be achieved with a smaller nuclear force “which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in US national security strategy.”

*(Comment: While the US commitment to nuclear weapons and to the concept of extended deterrence remains unchanged some reduction in the US nuclear arsenal is on the cards as well as a possible further doctrinal progression in reduction of salience of nuclear weapons.)*

7. **Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations:** US forces “will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” of the type undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instability will be addressed by the US through non military means and military to military cooperation.

US forces would only consider limited stability and counterinsurgency operations if required operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. They will, of course, maintain a presence abroad.
including rotational deployments and training exercises designed to build capacity and interoperability.

(Clearly US military involvement in the Iraq and Afghan conflicts has hurt and there is disinclination to entertain similar large scale deployments of the military in future.)

8. **Defend Homeland and Engage in Relief etc Operations:** US forces will of course defend US territory from attack by state and non-state actors and engage in humanitarian and disaster relief operations as required.

To conclude, the Strategic Guidance for the US Department of Defence envisages a smaller but more sophisticated US military geared to take on all possible adversaries in more than one theatre. In the changed security environment, while the US is determined to project power it will refrain from engaging in operations requiring prolonged and large scale deployment of its forces abroad as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, as far as possible in overseas operations it will work in concert with allies and partners and for this purpose there is a stress on the need to develop interoperability with partners. The prime areas of interest for the US will be the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. While across the board containment of China is a thinly veiled theme of the Strategic Guidance, the US investment in India is highlighted as a regional anchor and provider of security. In sum, the Strategic Guidance is a welcome development and bodes well for India.
Internal Security – Need for Course Correction

- Ajit Doval

India is on a surge; a great destiny awaits it. If there is one single factor that could negate or retard it, it will be its failure to govern itself. Ensuring safety and security of its people, upholding the rule of law, managing change with order and ensuring legitimacy of power by those who wield it shall be critical components of that governance. Should it fail to happen, history will once again lament India couldn’t do what it could.

In post war period, internal security has become primary source of degradation, destabilization and retardation of the states as against external aggression. More than 80% of the states during this period faced state failure, disintegration, breakdown of their political or constitutional systems caused by internal conflicts and violence. The causative factors leading to internal security dysfunction ranged from political turmoils, sectarian violence, economic deprivation or social breakdowns. Significantly, while the internal fault lines provided the basic munition, the external factor often catalyzed the process to make it decisively unmanageable. Failure to address the external factor in internal security management made the states to lose their capacity to control the avalanche that initially appeared as a trickle. In the evolving security setting, the conventional law and order approach is increasingly proving to be grossly inadequate to meet the new generation Internal Security threats.

Management of Internal Security – New Realities:
India, in refurbishing the architecture of its internal security doctrines, systems and policy needs to factor in the following:

- Wars are increasingly proving to be cost ineffective

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instruments of achieving strategic and political objectives. With the emergence of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), a fight against an invisible enemy, hidden within the civil society, the consequences of wars can be highly unpredictable with no assured guarantee of success to the stronger. Defeat of Soviet Union by religious irregulars in Afghanistan, American experiencing in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistani army losing out to Shanti Bahini in Bangladesh etc. are illustrative of the limits of military power against Fourth Generation Warfare.

- Civil society has become the battle grounds whose control is sought both by the violent anti state groups and the state. It has given rise to the doctrine of proxy war. Hostile states, to bleed their adversaries, are increasingly patronising armed groups operating in their enemy countries. It has opened a new window of opportunity to weaker powers to take on their more powerful adversaries in what we call as asymmetric warfare. In these, weaker states can bleed their more powerful adversaries through Covert Action (CA) at a low cost, in a sustained manner and claim deniability.

In the Indian context, Pakistan that harbours compulsive hostility against India but lacks the capability to achieve its political and strategic objectives, militarily or otherwise, has made CA as an instrument of its state policy. Pakistan has leveraged its geographical proximity, radical Islam, India’s soft governance, nuclear blackmail, military alliances etc. as tools to capitalize over India’s internal security vulnerabilities.

- (a)Phenomenal up-gradation in capabilities, resources,
international linkages and support base of violent groups is another disturbing phenomenon. Countering them requires security infrastructure much beyond and complex than required for maintaining peace and order in civil society and enforcing the rule of law. With the emergence of large well armed and organized armed groups the states are facing erosion in their monopoly over coercive power. With the sophisticated weapons systems, modern communication equipments, huge financial resources, access to modern technology and support of rogue states, activities of these groups have placed internal security in a different orbit altogether.

In the Indian context, the Islamic terrorist groups not only are patronized and supported by Pakistan but maintain close nexus with gun runners, drug traffickers, organized crimes, hawala racketeers, currency counterfeitters etc.

- Diminishing efficacy of conventional response policies and systems and inability of states to keep pace with them is another infirmity. The conventional response, particularly in liberal democracies, treats acts of violence (no matter how gruesome) as normal crimes, punishable through due process of law, and not as acts of war. This jurisprudence is heavily weighed in favour of the wrong doer and is practically inoperable against those who operate from foreign lands. Instruments of state, its laws, police, judicial systems and even militaries, find themselves grossly inadequate to prevent, protect and penalize the wrong doers.

Besides above, in India, soft governance, political factor and corruption have further eaten into the vitals of state power. Political factor has started casting its ominous shadow, both over enactment of right laws and their enforcement with full political will. The withdrawal of Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act
(POTA), Centre’s reluctance to approve Special Acts against organized crimes in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh etc. are illustrative of politicization of internal security management.

- Role of non state actors like the Media, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), think tanks, etc., have also added to complexity of the situation. Publicity is the oxygen of terrorism and media inadvertently plays in their hands by giving them undue coverage. As perception management is an important aspect of internal security management, ability of these groups to influence the public opinion, without any corresponding responsibility, only confounds the problem.

India: Slow to Transform

India is not unique in experiencing this paradigm shift. What singles it out is the fact that having paid the highest price in battling against terrorism, insurgencies etc. in terms of over 90,000 human lives lost and nearly 14,000 security personnel killed and huge drain on its scare financial resources; it has been the slowest, if at all, to change. Globally, the response has been swift and decisive while in India it has been delayed, half hearted and often lacking political will. The systems, doctrines, methodology, laws, empowerment and enablement of security apparatus have by and large remained unchanged. Within 48 hours of September 11 (9/11) strike, the US took the policy decision to revamp the whole system and bring in the huge new infrastructure, concepts and laws to create Department of Homeland Security and institution of Director National Intelligence. President Bush announced that “It values individual freedom but should it get in conflict with supreme national interest, the latter will prevail”. Instead of systematic improvements we merely resorted to quantitative response hoping that enhanced force level without change in training, systems, equipment etc would be sufficient to counter terrorism and fight insurgencies.

The expenditure on state police forces and central para military forces cumulatively have increased in last few years from Rs. 15,092 crores nearly to Rs. 26,000 crores, depicting an increase over 70%. In terrorist and insurgency affected
areas 22% troops are tied on duties to protect themselves and other 45% on protecting the VIPs and vital installations. With 11% force personnel on leave and training reserves and 5% engaged on administrative duties; what is really left to mount field operations is less than 20%. For want of powerful laws, enhanced operational level intelligence, bold political decisions, lack of new strategic and tactical ideas, we have got entrapped in conventional stereotype of numerical response to internal security. The dogma of ‘time-tested methods’ has become a doctrine to resist change.

India’s internal security landscape in recent decades has undergone a paradigm shift. The conventional pattern of civil disorders, communal disturbances, social and economic turmoil, political conflicts etc. have ceased to be the nation’s primary internal security concerns. They have been substituted by externally sponsored covert offensives by hostile powers targeting country’s internal fault lines to achieve their strategic objectives. While country’s democratic polity, economic growth, and social transformations are steadily bringing down conventional threats, except probably the Left Wing Extremism, the external factor has been an important catalytic factor in promoting terrorism, insurgencies, espionage, subversion, cyber space violations, currency counterfeiting, Hawala transactions, demographic invasion etc. India considering its Comprehensive National Power (CNP), has failed politically and diplomatically leverage it to its best security advantage.

**Jehadi Terrorism:- Kashmir and Beyond**

Pakistan which, during the Afghan war through Western assistance, had acquired
formidable covert capabilities, repositioned the elaborate infrastructure to bleed and destabilize India through terrorism. It wanted to replicate Afghan model in Kashmir, hoping to make it a theatre of Jehad for all the Muslims and force India to a settlement acceptable to Pakistan. Though it failed to achieve this objective, over the years Jehadis have became integral part of Pakistan’s war-machine and a low cost instrument in its hands to bleed India. Pakistani researcher Sabina Ahmad in her report to International Crisis Group (ICG) calculated 11,500 Pakistani nationals having been killed in India in terrorist operations from 1990 to 2005. This is indicative of the scale and intensity of Pakistan sponsored Jehadi terrorism.

Growth of Jehadi forces, perceiving India as its target, both in India’s western and eastern neighbourhoods, is a serious security and ideological threat given India’s large indigenous Muslim population. While sizeable population of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh has come under its sway, desperate attempts are being made to spread its tentacles within India. Superimposition of this exported variant of Islam constitutes a high potential long term threat for India and will have to be countered – ideologically, politically and physically.

The 26/11 terrorist action at Mumbai depicted a new order of lethality in Pakistan’s unabated covert offensive against India. For almost three decades, India has passively accepted such provocations. It has failed to retaliate in a proactive manner that could raise costs for Pakistan and compel it to roll back its anti-India terrorist infrastructure.

Besides J&K, hundreds of Muslim youth drawn from other parts of the country have been trained and motivated for subversive activities in Pakistan. A large number of Pakistani youth trained by the ISI and disguised as Indians have been positioned as part of an intricately networked covert apparatus. Mushrooming of Madrassas and Islamic institutions in large numbers propagating an ideology of hate and exclusiveness, particularly in the border areas, is another disturbing trend. An imaginative policy initiative and counter
measures would have to be taken to meet this threat.

The 26/11 terrorist action at Mumbai depicted a new order of lethality in Pakistan’s unabated covert offensive against India. For almost three decades, India has passively accepted such provocations. It has failed to retaliate in a proactive manner that could raise costs for Pakistan and compel it to roll back its anti-India terrorist infrastructure. India ceded the strategic and tactical initiative to Pakistan some three decades ago and needs a course correction before it poses an existential threat. India’s tolerance threshold should not be unrealistically raised in the backdrop of nuclear blackmail as Pakistan has its own vulnerabilities many times higher than India and in its strategic calculus it cannot ignore the threat that India can pose should the conflict grow beyond a point. India also needs to revisit its no first use nuclear doctrine.

**Left Wing Extremism:**

Left Wing Extremism has emerged as country’s most serious internal security challenge. After its cyclic rise and fall, it assumed serious proportions after 2004 when PWG and MCC, along with other splinter groups, merged together to form the CPI (Maoists). The spatial growth of the LWE thereafter has been meteoric and alarming. Maoists for furtherance of their political objective of seizing power through gun have exploited alienations caused by issues like denial of social and economic justice to deprived sections of society, large scale displacement of tribal populations by major hydro-electric projects and extensive mining in tribal areas. This has led to their influence rising from 53 Districts in 9 states in 2001, to nearly 203 Districts in 18 states by 2010. Among these the core of insurgency is focused in Chattisgarh (Abujmar Region) and Jharkhand with significant activity levels in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa. The movement has been substantially militarised with 16,000 armed cadres, some 15,000 assorted weapons (including 900 AK-47 Rifles, 200 Light Machine Guns and locally fabricated Rocket Launchers), over 85 camps where they are able to impart training in tactics and field craft and strong financial back up to pay regular salaries to members of its so called ‘People’s Liberation Army’.
The Left Wing Extremism embodies many features that make the problem intractable. A large inaccessible and scantily governed terrain that is difficult to dominate or sanitize no matter what force levels are pumped is one major problem. Further, to their advantage, the Maoists have a large alienated population that has suffered decades of social and economic neglect and are easily susceptible to motivated propaganda of the Maoists who promise to establish an order that will deliver justice, freedom from exploitation, jobs and protection of their way of life. A corrupt and callous governance further makes the people an easy prey to Maoist propaganda. They are able exploit all local grievances and conflicts to gather support by promising different things to different people. It may range from exploiting caste conflicts in Bihar, resentment against landlords in Andhra, sentiment against forest laws and practices in tribal areas, unemployment among youth or Islamic sentiment among sections of Muslims telling them all that Maoism provided solutions to all their woes. Availability of large sums money to pay regular salaries; to their cadres in areas where there are large bodies of uneducated and unskilled who are not only unemployed but for most jobs unemployable.

However, they have some high vulnerabilities as well. Illustratively, like most ideology driven movements, Left Wing Extremism is controlled by less than a dozen top kingpins and nearly 30 commanders of its armed cadre. They determine the political line, control the resources and design the strategy. The bulk of 16,000 odd armed cadres and many times more supporters are only gullible tribals and poor people misled by vicious propaganda, frightened by the gun or lured by the money. For the leaders, who live in conditions of safety and comfort, they are easily replaceable commodities. Neutralization of top leaders and activists in four decade long history of Left Extremism has invariably led to ideological dilution, dissensions, and demoralization giving a blow to their image of invincibility and surfacing of doubts about viability of the movement to achieve its goals through violence. At tactical level, it has led to struggle for leadership, disruption in sources of funding and abandonment of plans in the offing. Further, the questioning of top leaders has often provided strategic and
tactical inputs which, when pursued imaginatively, substantially weakened the movement.

Devoid of its ideological plank the movement stands reduced to a problem of organized crime. A credible, focused and sustained psy-war offensive to expose the movement as anti-people will be hard for them to bear.

Money factor is another important element that is empowering the Left Wing Extremism to raise new cadres, procure weapons and expand their arc of influence. A freshly recruited youth is being paid rupees 2,000 to 2,500 per month, which in a poverty stricken area attracts many youth. It is estimated that the left wing extremist are able to collect nearly rupees 1200 crore a year, which is a huge sum of money resource in tribal and backward areas. Maoists raise these funds through extortions, collections from corrupt government officials, protection money, levies on rich landlords, businessmen, contractors, transporters etc. Paradoxically, increase in government outlays for development activities in affected areas has strengthened them financially as enhanced outlays are not backed up by effective and accountable administrative machinery. Their dependency on funds is a vulnerability and it is possible to take series of steps to minimize if not totally eliminate it though strong administrative and legal actions against the fund providers.

**North-East:**

North East security discourse, of late, has been marked by good news of peace engagement with the rebels, improved security cooperation from Bangladesh, dissensions within insurgent groups etc. However, external factor in a region that has 5,215 kms contiguous international border with other countries and only about over 1% with the Indian mainland though pivotal is being glossed over. External factor has and will continue to remain a vital factor in our management of North Eastern security.
China, with which India has an uneasy security relationship, shares a border of nearly 1,561 kms with NE states. It also has a dubious track record of meddling with local insurgent groups till mid eighties. After a long lull, there is increasing evidence of China reviving its covert offensive in the North East. Chinese support to the rebel groups has waxed and waned depending on content and direction of bilateral relationship, their evaluation of the strength and grit of people in power in Delhi, viability and reliability of insurgent groups etc. It is also noteworthy that whenever assistance from erstwhile East Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, to NE insurgents became difficult, the Chinese stepped in to fill in the gap.

There are definite indications that, after a long lull, there is major policy shift in China. In October, 2007, on the invitation of Chinese authorities, Anthony Shimray in-charge foreign affairs of NSCN(IM), visited China and held meetings with Lee Wuen, head of intelligence of Yunnan province and Chang local intelligence head at Dehong Mansi near Kunming in China. Shimray handed over a letter to the Chinese authorities signed by Muivah, self styled Prime Minister of NSCN(IM), holding peace talks with government of India. The letter informed Chinese of appointment of Kholose, a Sema Naga, as their permanent representative in China. Chinese welcomed this institutionalized arrangement and wanted Nagas to keep them informed about (i) Activities and movements of Indian Army, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh, (ii) Intelligence regarding activities of Dalai Lama and Tibetans in India and (iii) Progress of peace talks with India. Chinese also tasked them to keep track of other NE insurgent groups and progress of their peace parleys with India. One of the major responsibilities of Kholose was procurement of weapons from China.

In April 2009, the self styled President of NSCN(IM), Isak Chissi Swu, leader of group talking to India, accompanied by Shimray visited China for which the Visa was arranged by the Chinese intelligence in Philippines. They held a high level meeting with one General Lee and three senior Chinese intelligence officers. The Chinese while assuring them of Military cooperation, again reiterated their
earlier requirement regarding information about army movements in Arunachal, activities of Dalai Lama etc. NSCN(IM) leadership subsequently initiated follow up actions in Delhi, Dharmshala, Arunachal Pradesh and NSCN(IM) headquarters to meet Chinese intelligence requirements. Steps in the meantime also commenced to ship 1000 weapons from South Chinese port of Beihei to Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh for the NSCN (IM).

Pareesh Baruah of ULFA after being pressurized by Bangladesh security agencies, also visited China in 2010. Reports indicate that he led a group of about 80 that after receiving training in Ruili in Yunnan was provided substantial quantities of weapons. It is significant that ULFA has been a source of procurement of weapons by Left Wing Extremists and possibility of some of the Chinese weapons reaching them through ULFA channels can not be ruled out.

Reality of Chinese renewed interest in NE insurgency can not be wished away in our security calculus. It assumes special import in the back drop of China’s emerging aggressiveness, military activities in border areas, claims on Arunachal Pradesh and linkages of Left Extremists with NE insurgent groups. The government in pursuing its policy of engaging the rebels in peace talks needs to display greater clarity of vision, well defined objectives and strategic precision. Mistaking the talks as an end rather than means to an end can push India into a self made strategic trap. While the rebel groups are enhancing their capabilities, establishing trans-border linkages, procuring new weapons and recruiting new cadres, the government appears to be calculating publicity mileage and possible electoral advantages as their sole gains. This can be a self defeating strategy.

**Illegal Immigration:**

The size geographical location and porosity of our borders makes large illegal migration to India from neighboring countries easy. People of all neighbouring countries share at least one important ethnic, religious or linguistic commonality with a section of the Indian population, which makes it possible for them to find easy shelters and go undetected. Economic opportunities afforded by relatively higher economic growth, freedoms of a liberal democratic
polity, corruption, shortcomings of Indian political, administrative and judicial systems etc. have all contributed to make illegal immigration a major internal security problem.

Demographic invasion from Bangladesh, has already assumed alarming proportions. In many of the bordering districts of Assam and West Bengal it has brought about a total demographic transformation, forcing the original inhabitants to sell their lands and flee. Instead of abating, the last two years have witnessed an unprecedented increase in the inflow – the new migrants becoming more abrasive and emboldened, considering their illegal migration almost a matter of right. Subdued though, voices in support of greater Bangladesh have started surfacing both in Assam and Bangladesh.

The illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, who well exceed 25 million now, are no more confined to bordering states of Assam, West Bengal, Meghalaya etc. but have found new habitations in the hinterland areas of the country. Most of them have been able to acquire identity documents with local political patronage and connivance of corrupt officials. The local Muslims in some areas are facilitating their settlements and helping them in procurement of ration cards, identity documents, jobs and political patronage.

This large scale migration is no more only a cause of demographic change, social conflicts, denial of economic opportunities and civic amenities to our own poor people but has become a security concern. The Islamic terrorists from Bangladesh readily find local shelters throughout the length and breadth of the country. These immigrants also bring with them deeply ingrained anti-Indian ideas and seeds of fundamentalism. The border is porous and the infiltrators get full support from Bangladesh Border Forces. This unending stream of migrants is likely to become much more pronounced in the times to come, given the push factor in Economic opportunities afforded by relatively higher economic growth, freedoms of a liberal democratic polity, corruption, shortcomings of Indian political, administrative and judicial systems etc. have all contributed to make illegal immigration a major internal security problem.
Bangladesh and the pull factor on the Indian side.

Illegal migration from Pakistan and Afghanistan is relatively small but its security implications are much greater. Pakistan as part of a long-term covert action programme, is trying to establish modules in different parts of the country with well trained and highly motivated Pak residents masquerading as Indians. A large number of Pakistanis who enter India with regular visas frequently go under ground and become untraceable.

Unemployment in Youth:

Though, essentially an economic and not a security issue if left unattended large scale youth unemployment can have serious security implications. India currently has a population of nearly 1.2 bn, 62.9% of which is in working age group. By 2026, India’s population profile is likely to grow even younger (68.4%in working age group) and the total population at 1.4 bn will overtake that of China. This translates into one billion people in the working age group that will need to be gainfully employed. Any failure will make large sections of unemployed youth vulnerable to forces of destabilization, disruption and destruction – both indigenous and foreign inspired. Channelised constructively, they can catapult India into a new power orbit making its human resource capital in the ageing world as a non-competeable CNP component for many decades ahead.

The total sum of jobs presently in India’s Public and private sector (including those in the unorganized private sector) work out to barely 300-350 million. India’s economic liberalization, so far is only producing the miracle of jobless growth. Most Indian industries have been imitating the Western corporate model – downsizing the workforce to maximize the profits. The Jamshedpur Steel plant of the Tatas that employed 80,000
workers some three decades ago with a production of 1 million tons per annum halved it to just 40,000 in the 1990’s and the output rose to 5 million tons per annum by automation. The plan is to further reduce the work force to just 20,000 but raise the production to 10 million tons per years. While to achieve global competitiveness India cannot afford to produce at high costs, it at the same cannot afford to keep its millions out of a job. A paradigm shift in over growth strategy is required and heavy investments need to be done in areas that can create large employment opportunities; nearly 700 million jobs by 2026. Man power intensive industries like ship building, infrastructure projects, rural employment schemes etc. will have to be accorded high priority. Generation of new and upgradation of existing skills through massive vocational training programmes need to be launched substituting the conventional educational pattern that churns out youth who are educated but unemployable. One of the ironies of Indian employment market is that while there are large numbers of youth with 10 to 16 years of formal education, most of the industries and employers find it difficult to get appropriate manpower that hardly requires training of two years or less beyond two years beyond basic 10 to 12 years of schooling. Non inclusive growth, large scale unemployment, huge income disparities etc. can be potential causes of internal instability and degradation. In national economic planning the strategico-security factors need to be given its deserved importance.
PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL CRISIS AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

- Sushant Sareen

The latest and arguably the most serious crises – memogate and the contempt of court case against Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani – to hit the PPP-led coalition government in its four years in office appear to have miraculously blown over, at least for now. At their height, these two crises seemed to be sounding the death knell of the government. The only thing that wasn’t quite clear was how the final blow would be struck – would the government be dismissed by the Supreme Court, would the army throw out the government on orders of the Court, would coalition partners be convinced or coerced to desert the sinking ship of the ruling coalition, or would top leaders of the government throw in the towel under the immense pressure that was being applied? Equally unclear was what would replace the PPP-led dispensation. Would a Bangladesh model be imposed (a government of technocrats backed by the army and supervised by the judiciary to set things right over a period of 2-3 years), would it be just a caretaker setup for three months which would hold elections and then move aside, would the army takeover and impose a ‘hard coup’, or would the Pakistani establishment come out with some innovative and ingenious constitutional scheme to run the country? As things stand, however, both the method of deposing the government and the question of what to replace it with, have become superfluous, and it now appears as though the current government is not only all set to serve out its term in office, but will also oversee a constitutional transition, the first in Pakistan's

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history.

Of course, given that a constitutional transition which takes place through an early general election that is part of a political deal and normal democratic process is still months away, a lot of things – some foreseeable, many unforeseen – could go wrong, especially in a country that lives from crisis to crisis. Given the crises ridden nature of Pakistani politics, predicting the possible future course of events in Pakistan has always been a rather perilous venture. In recent years this task has become even more arduous, what with the government being buffeted by one crisis after another. But in a way, the frequency of crises has in itself become a sort of measure of the state of politics and as such serves as a handy, if also imperfect, tool for analysing the possible future trajectory of events.

The normal rule of thumb in Pakistan is that the faster the frequency of crises – from a bimonthly crisis to a monthly to a weekly and, at the peak of the memogate scandal and the contempt of court case, daily – the smaller the time frame for which any prediction can be made and therefore the greater the chance of regime change or regime collapse. In other words, when any prognosis on Pakistan is valid only for the next 24 to 48 hours, it normally means that change in government is impending. This is exactly the situation in which Pakistan found itself in the middle of January. And yet, surprisingly, nothing happened. The sudden cooling down of the political temperature has therefore raised many questions about the whys and wherefores of the government surviving, albeit by the skin of its teeth. Questions have also arisen over the political role and influence of the army and its ability to manipulate the political system, the durability and longevity of the democratic order, the role played by new players like the media and the judiciary, and last but not the least, the extent to which the external players continue to determine the outcome of the domestic political crises in Pakistan.
Speculation is rife over what made the all powerful military establishment pipe down so quickly after all the aggressive statements by the military spokesman – he had warned the government of ‘grievous consequences’ after the Prime Minister accused the army and ISI chiefs of violating the law and constitution by submitting their affidavits to the Supreme Court in the memogate case without the permission of the government. For an army that can mount a coup with merely ‘one jeep and two trucks’ (as described so evocatively by the former Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussein) to back off with a whimper is somewhat inexplicable especially when it seemed all set to boot out the government.

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Moreover, since the army would most probably have acted in concert with the judiciary to get rid of the government, it would not have to run around seeking judicial or legislative legitimacy for its action against a lawfully constituted government.

The cynical explanation for the army not going for the kill is that the army’s poor image in the public eye has never stopped it in the past from carrying out a putsch – for instance, Gen Pervez Musharraf’s coup took place just months after the Kargil debacle – compared to the current government, the army not only comes out smelling of roses (at least as far as the media, most of it right-wing, reactionary and urban Punjab based, is concerned) but has also been projected once again as the sole saviour that will rescue the country from the ‘depredations’ of the ‘democratically elected’ government.

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it had more or less achieved what it wanted – i.e. getting rid of Hussain Haqqani and shaking up the government in order to make it even more dependent on the support of the army so that it doesn't move its little finger without the army’s nod (especially on issues like relations with US, Afghanistan and India and in deciding the national policy on the War on Terror and nuclear assets). But this argument doesn't really wash easily simply because the government was already totally subservient to the army on all the issues listed above and was going out of the way to stay on the right side of the top brass. Haqqani was at best an irritant and there was no need to create an unseemly and messy drama of the memogate variety to see his back. If anything, Haqqani was only a pawn in the memogate drama; the target was Zardari. So why then did the army stop short of getting its prey?

Another reason often proffered for the army wanting to see the back of the PPP government is its terrible governance record which by most accounts has virtually brought Pakistan to the brink of financial bankruptcy and administrative paralysis. But the problem with this proposition is that by keeping the government unsettled ever since it has come to power, the army has only contributed to the dysfunction of the government and has thus pushed the country to the edge of the precipice. Clearly, if there any truth in this proposition then it means that the army is totally befuddled since it is then pursuing completely contradictory objectives. On the one hand it wants to keep the government unsettled so that it can call the shots; on the other hand it wants the government to deliver on

The Pakistani political and economic analyst Dr Farrukh Saleem has succinctly summed up the army’s confusion: “the GHQ is surely being successful in keeping the PPP teetering on the brink all the time. But then the GHQ must be the only beneficiary of this living on the brink because this extreme uncertainty is just killing everyone else in the country”.

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governance which is not possible if the government is continuously destabilised and not allowed to take bold domestic and foreign policy decisions. The Pakistani political and economic analyst Dr Farrukh Saleem has succinctly summed up the army’s confusion: “the GHQ is surely being successful in keeping the PPP teetering on the brink all the time. But then the GHQ must be the only beneficiary of this living on the brink because this extreme uncertainty is just killing everyone else in the country”.

Notwithstanding the confused and contradictory objective of the Pakistan army, the question still remains as to why the army backed off from going in for the kill when the noose was all set around the neck of the civilian government? There are a few explanations doing the rounds. One explanation is that the army did not want to make a political martyr out of the PPP yet again. While there is some logic in this argument, it would have at worst come into play after a few years. In the immediate at least the ‘establishment’ would have gotten rid of the government. Another explanation is that the international community would have not taken kindly to any military takeover. But here again, any diplomatic repercussions would have been at worst short term. The Americans have so much at stake in the Afpak region that they would have easily reconciled to regime change by the army. And if such change came about under the veneer of some kind of constitutionality, howsoever dodgy, the US would have not belaboured over the regime change for very long and the rest of the international community would have fallen in line.

A third explanation is that better sense prevailed over the army and made it hold its hand. Some analysts believe that the army realised that deposing the government would take the entire political system back to square one and would end up creating a bigger political and constitutional mess than what the country was confronting currently. The Army is also said to have realised that it was already overstretched because
of its involvement in fighting the ‘bad’ Taliban and its security commitments on the Eastern front with India, and was therefore not really in any position to administer the country directly. Compounding the problem was the fact that unlike the past when it found ready and willing political allies, this time around, the situation was not very conducive to a prolonged military takeover. Not only would no major political party back a military dictated regime, the judiciary too would resist such a dispensation. At best what the army could hope for was support for a caretaker government that would hold general elections. But such an election, unless rigged to produce a ‘desirable’ result, would throw up its own set of uncertainties in terms of a hung parliament which would once again lead to the sort of political and administrative dysfunction that is currently being experienced. In the final analysis, therefore, instead of resorting to messy political engineering, a better option for the army was to allow normal political processes to work themselves out and throw up solutions.

The long and short of the army’s predicament is that its ability to manipulate the political system seems to have been drastically reduced. While the reasons for this probably lie in all of the above listed explanations, these can be distilled into two, perhaps three, broad categories: a) lack of acceptability among both political forces as well as at the institutional level (judiciary); b) lack of capability (not so much in terms of overthrowing a government but more in terms of running a government); and finally, c) a combination of the above two. The implications of these are: a) the army has failed to build political proxies and without them the
army will not have any real interface with the people of the country and could thereby end up alienating the people from the state in addition to earning opprobrium for undertaking tough economic reforms that make economic conditions worse before they get better, if at all; b) if the army finds itself incapable of running the country then it means that Pakistan is far more ungovernable and probably much closer to collapse or failure than previously imagined; and c) a combination of lack of capability and acceptability means that like every other institution, the Pakistan army’s effectiveness has been severely reduced and its reputation as a coherent and credible force that also serves as the final arbiter and decider of Pakistan's political landscape is not supported by its actual strength. The weakening of the army doesn't necessarily mean that democracy is finally here to stay; On the contrary, it means that the proverbial last bastion for staving off anarchic conditions in the country has also started tottering. More than anything else, it is this new tentativeness in the army that has helped the Zardari/Gilani government to pull through the latest set of crises. But clearly, while the government might have survived, it has been grievously damaged and its ability to function effectively and provide a modicum of governance for the balance of its term has been severely compromised. Even though the divide between the government and the military and judiciary has been papered over for now, the army is seething with rage and the judiciary remains hostile making the relationship between the various institutions extremely accident prone. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the current state of dysfunction and dangerous drift in the affairs of state can be sustained for another six months (the time frame being considered for an early election) or another year (when its constitutionally mandated term ends). The problem however is that on the one hand there is no clear flight-path for getting rid of the government and on the other hand
the ‘establishment’ is finding it very difficult to tolerate, much less afford, having the current dispensation continue in office for another 6 months or so.

As far as the PPP government is concerned, its political strategy for the coming months is clear: in the first stage it wants to get a majority in the Senate elections (due on March 2) which will give it a bit of a stranglehold over the legislative process for the next three years; in the second stage it wants to pass the annual budget (due in May/June). This will be an election year budget and despite the precarious fiscal situation, the PPP government is expected to throw fiscal prudence to the winds and announce massive freebies to cement its constituency. This means that regardless of who wins the next elections, there will be a massive fiscal hole waiting to be plugged by the next government. In other words, if the PPP wins the next election, it will have achieved its objective, but if it loses it will leave behind such a mess that the next government will spend all its energies in trying to clean it up and also earn the opprobrium that accompanies any tough reform measure.

Paradoxically, even though most analysts have practically written off the the PPP government in the next elections, the party leadership is showing a level of self-assuredness and confidence that doesn't quite gel with the political grapevine. Unless this is pure hubris that comes with being in power, the only explanation for such confidence is that the party leadership is convinced that if it can largely retain its traditional support base, then it might well have an outside chance of at least winning enough seats to play a pivotal role in the next parliament. This calculation
is based on a split in the opposition vote between Nawaz Sharif’s PMLN and the rising star of Pakistani politics, Imran Khan. The only fly in the ointment is that although Asif Zardari is a past master in court intrigues, he is yet to prove that he is also a vote catcher who can harvest the PPP’s traditional vote. If his arithmetic works in the elections, Zardari could well emerge as the most significant politician after his father-in-law, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; if his maths fails, then he might well end up presiding over what the Pakistan army has wanted to do for decades and failed – the demise of the PPP.
China’s Plans for Capturing the High Ground in Space

- Vinod Anand

China has been regularly coming out with white papers in many areas of its endeavour including defence and space activities. Promoting transparency is claimed to be one of the main goals of such an exercise. But largely such papers hide more and reveal less. Further transparency, at times can be a double edged sword especially in the military arena where one would like to both show off own competence so as to deter one’s likely adversaries as also be secretive about any exceptional progress made so as to not reveal too much; in addition at the same time one would like to hide own weaknesses.

Chinese space programme, for long, remained under the so called ‘bamboo curtain’. As part of its efforts in transparency the PRC released its third white paper on space activities in end December last year. This paper follows the pattern of the earlier two white papers released on the subject. Though, not very informative or descriptive the White papers do suggest the direction in which Chinese space programme has been moving forward. The papers also mention the likely plans for the future both in the short term and the long term perspective.

In the latest white paper of December 2011 and in the earlier two white papers of 2000 and 2006 on space the PRC avers that it will make “due contributions to the peaceful use of outer space, and to the civilisation and progress of mankind”. But then the PRC carried out a successful ASAT test in February 2007 which was directly in contradiction to its stated policy in the White paper on space. And thereafter it joined Russia in proposing an international treaty to ban the deployment of weapons in outer space. There can be no two views about the fact that Chinese capabilities in space are making exceptional progress and this would add to the rising

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comprehensive national power of China. This has several implications for India and our decision makers need to take a note of it and formulate appropriate responses.

While India has been reticent in making any linkages with its civilian and military space programmes China makes no bones about flaunting close linkages between the two. Though this linkage was mentioned in PRC’s white paper on national defence of 2006 vintage it has somewhat been omitted in the ensuing two white papers on defence of the years 2008 and 2010. The 2006 defence white paper states – “Major scientific and technological projects, such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, are being carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises combining military and civilian needs and to bring about overall improvements in defence-related science and technology….. As a result, a fairly mature scientific and technological infrastructure is taking shape, which is well-configured, multi-functional, efficient and based on close cooperation between the military and civilian sectors.” The 2010 white paper on defence just mentions that “Great importance has been attached to the peaceful use and development of nuclear energy and space technology”. Evidently after testing its ASAT weapon it wants other aspiring space powers to not emulate its example and therefore PRC’s proposal (along with Russia) to Conference on Disarmament for a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat of Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects.

China's space activities 2011 white paper reiterates that “China always adheres to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and opposes weaponization or any arms race in outer space. The country develops and utilizes space resources in a prudent manner and takes effective
measures to protect the space environment, ensuring that its space activities benefit the whole of mankind.” Such declarations, evidently, can not be taken at their face value.

In the recent years the Chinese have carried out a number of experiments with the satellites which could add to their ASAT capabilities. In January 2010, they experimented with two missiles being launched from different locations with the aim of engineering an exo-atmospheric collision. The U.S spaced-based sensors had detected two geographically separated missile launch events with exo-atmospheric collision. However, the Chinese failed to notify the tests as per the international norms. Between June and August 2010, two Chinese satellites, SJ-06F and SJ-12, were involved in orbital rendezvous maneuvers that gave rise to the suspicion that these could also be ASAT tests in some way or the other. Such activities could also have been useful for practicing docking between two satellites; however, in the absence of any advance information by the Chinese the international community is bound to assume the worst.

The 2011 white paper on space assiduously avoids mentioning the word ‘defence’ in its document. In the section on purpose and principles of space development the paper states that China's space industry is subject to and serves the national overall development strategy, and adheres to the principles of scientific, independent, peaceful, innovative, and open development. Contrast this with the white paper of 2006 “Maintaining and serving the country’s overall development strategy, meeting the needs of the state and reflecting its will. China considers the space programme as a strategic way to enhance its economic, scientific, technological and national defence strength, as well as a cohesive force for the unity of the Chinese people, in order to rejuvenate China.”

In the last five years, China’s Long March rockets have accomplished
67 successful launches, sending 79 spacecraft into planned orbits. These rockets have improved their launch performance parameters. It is a different matter that some of the technologies for this purpose have been acquired surreptitiously or through plain pilferage as the Cox report (The Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China) of May 1999 has testified; and these efforts have continued since then.

PRC has developed satellites for variety of purposes; earth observation satellites, communications and broadcasting satellites, Navigation and positioning satellites, scientific satellites and technological test satellites. All these lend themselves to be exploited for military purposes.

Development and launching of several Shijian (Practice) satellites and small and micro satellites though ostensibly meant for new technology demonstration can be used for variety of anti-satellites missions and also as platforms for covert military missions.

PRC has shown considerable progress in launching manned spaceship. In September 25 2008, China launched the Shenzhou-7 manned spaceship. In September and November 2011, China successively launched the Tiangong-1 and Shenzhou-8 spaceship, and carried out its first space rendezvous and docking test, in order to progress towards future space laboratories and space stations. In the coming years it is planning to launch Shenzhou-9 and Shenzhou-10 to achieve unmanned /manned rendezvous and docking with the orbiting Tiangong-1 vehicle. For deep space exploration China launched its first lunar probe Chang'e-1 in October 2007 and Change-2 in October 2010. Sun Laiyan the chief administrator of the CNSA had indicated that in the future, China would start deep space exploration focusing on Mars. India’s achievements in space, in comparison, are quite humble.

The space plans for next five years include development and acquisition of space assets at a very rapid pace. The Chinese version of GPS navigation system i.e. Beidou satellite navigation system is being developed in "three-step" development plan - from experimental system to regional system and then to global
system. China is expected to put in place a regional Beidou satellite navigation system by 2012. As of now, China has Beidou system consisting of five GEO satellites, five inclined geosynchronous orbit (IGSO) satellites and four medium-Earth-orbit (MEO) satellites. By 2012, the Beidou-2 constellation is expected to provide regional services with approximately 10 satellites. The PRC plans to complete the BeiDou-2 system by 2020, with 35 a satellite constellation offering global coverage. Undoubtedly, PRC seeks to be a predominant power in the space.

Seen from a military perspective, China’s space-based assets have expanded PLA’s capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, navigation, weapon guidance and command and control areas. Developments in the space have also improved the accuracy of strategic delivery systems as well as missile defense systems. In short, PRC is fast adding to its both space and counter space capabilities. As is well known Beidou system has both civil and military applications like the GPS and a wide variety of other satellites also have dual applications.

The PLA Air Force leadership has talked about the possibilities of militarization of space. And PLA’s doctrine of fighting the ‘local wars under the conditions of informationalization’ heavily relies on their space-based assets. PLA writers suggest use of both of offensive and defensive means in order to protect own assets and interfere with or destroy the adversaries’ space assets. Overall objective is to seize the initiative by attacking enemy’s weaknesses.

Buoyed by its economic growth, China’s ambitious space is gathering momentum at a time when both the U.S. and Russia’s space programmes are in decline. Obama administration has initiated cut backs both in space exploration and military spending...
due to economic difficulties and the economic burden of Iraq and Afghan wars. Meanwhile, China is seeking to achieve a degree of parity with advanced nations in its military and space efforts by 2050.

So far as Indian armed forces are concerned there is a Defence Space Vision-2020 document produced by HQ Integrated Defence Staff, which outlines the roadmap for the armed forces in the realm of space. However, the interaction with department of Space and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is very limited. Consequently, the armed forces are still some distance away from fully exploiting space for real-time military communications and reconnaissance missions, leave alone uses like missile early-warning and delivery of precision-guided munitions through satellite signals or jamming enemy networks.

There is a distinct separation between India’s civil and military space programme on account of which the Indian defence forces’ requirement for space assets has not received adequate attention. India also does not have a white paper on these issues laying out aims and principles of its space programme. Clearly, superiority in space would have concomitant impact in the military arena. Like China aims to erode the asymmetrical U.S military advantage through use of the space India could also follow same policy vis a vis China. While China and most of the other powers profess to use the space for peaceful purposes yet, they continue to add to their military assets in the space. Indian armed forces can usher in RMA to a large extent if they acquire a robust capability in the space. This would help us to meet very significantly the internal and security challenges.
Encircling the ‘Light of Asia’: the Lumbini Project

- Anirban Ganguly

Though he often lamented the extent and depth of Indian influence on Chinese civilisation in the past, Ambassador Hu Shih (1891-1962) scholar-formidable of China’s cultural renaissance nevertheless conceded India’s immense contribution to his country’s cultural and civilisational development in a paper entitled ‘East and West: The Indianization of China: A Case Study in Cultural Borrowing’ presented at the Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Science. Speaking in superlatives, Hu observed that ‘India conquered and dominated China culturally for two thousand years without ever having to send a single soldier across the border. ...Never before had China seen a religion so rich in imagery, so beautiful and captivating in ritualism and so bold in cosmological and metaphysical speculations. [And] Like a poor beggar suddenly halting before a magnificent storehouse of precious stones of dazzling brilliancy and splendour, China was overwhelmed, baffled and overjoyed. She begged and borrowed freely from this munificent giver. The first borrowings were chiefly from the religious life of India, in which China’s indebtedness to India can never be fully told.’

In fact the introduction of Buddhism in China has always been considered as one of the most important events in Chinese

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history. Since its inception into that country Buddhism continued to be a ‘major factor in Chinese civilisation, exercising a great influence on religion, philosophy, art, and literature.’ And at least in the past some Chinese have freely and gratefully acknowledged this cultural-civilisational debt by referring to India as the ‘Teacher of China’ and the Chinese Buddhist had always pictured her as a ‘Western Paradise, Sukhvatī.’ Of late the ‘pupil’ has begun overshadowing the ‘teacher’ in matters cultural while the ‘teacher’ appears to be systematically losing her past historical memory and abdicating her civilisational space and getting progressively dependent on other powers to formulate and implement projects that define her civilisational identity. At least that is what appears from China’s recent move in monopolizing the development of the birthplace of the Buddha at Lumbini in Southern Nepal, steam rolling issues of national sovereignty and regional religious sensitivities. It is a clear indication that ‘soft-

power has now entered China’s official language’ and that cultural diplomacy has indeed begun to play an increasingly important role in its scheme of things. The wielding of cultural power has in fact always been an important objective for the Chinese who see the use of economic power alone as having ‘severe limitations’ and of being incapable of giving it a larger standing in the comity of nations. Interestingly in the ancient world there appears to have been no dichotomy between commerce and philosophy. Buddhists legends apparently teem with stories of Indian and Chinese ‘merchants reputedly capable of discussing metaphysical questions.’ For them philosophy and trade were not ‘supposed to be incompatible.’ The Chinese, it seems have preserved this sense from the past and have begun to dexterously and effectively combine the twin diplomacies of commerce and philosophy (read culture) in the present.
The China based Asia Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation’s (APECF) ostensible purpose in investing $3 billion to build a ‘special development zone’ in Nepal by transforming the town of Lumbini into a mega tourist, pilgrim and education centre was to evolve a ‘strategic centre-point for promoting Buddhist culture.’ This was stated by APECF Vice-Chairman and a senior CPC leader Xiao Wunan who hoped that the project, which received the backing of the Chinese government at the highest levels, would also unite all three strands of Buddhism including the Tibetan. For a country that had unleashed an all-out war against Buddhism as part of its cultural revolution in the 60s of the last century, had imposed a ‘revisionist version of Buddhism’ on its adherents and had by 1959 destroyed as many as 6,000 Buddhist monasteries in Tibet alone and shipped most of their rare artifacts for melting in giant foundries in the mainland, this rather new found interest in developing the Sakyamuni’s birthplace is cause for concern. The national security angles to the project cannot be overstated, it has been pointed out that Lumbini is a mere two hour drive from India’s Gorakhpur and the project — if given the go ahead which for the time being looks to be stymied with the Nepal Cultural Ministry taking exception at not being consulted by the UNIDO and APECF — would in effect bring the Chinese across the Himalayas right up to the ‘lower foothills bordering India.’ The other cause for concern is that one of the Vice-Chairman of APECF is the Maoist leader Prachanda and one of its other members is the controversy-courting prince Paras. The other unstated fall-out of the project and one which is bound to be worrisome for the Indian security establishment is that a majority of the project contracts would be awarded to Chinese companies and pave the way for the entry of ‘PLA-affiliated sub-contractors’ and engineers.
ensuring a long term Chinese presence in the area bordering India.

On the religious side the move appears to be made with the aim of neutralizing the Dalai Lama’s influence by encircling one of the most sacred and emotive Buddhist pilgrim spots in the world. Ever since 2006, when the CPC proactively attempted to rehabilitate Buddhism, such overtures have been periodically made. The interest the Chinese have evinced in the upcoming Nalanda University in Bihar is a recent case in point. But the ironies of history require periodic reiteration, at least for the purpose of preserving these in the collective civilisational memory. For example it would be instructive to recall that despite its magnificent contribution to the evolution of Chinese civilisation Buddhism and its adherents in China have historically faced persecution and suppression. This newfound concern of the Chinese, therefore, for preserving the Buddha’s birthplace seems to smack of rank opportunism. The ‘Fen-shu-keng-ju’ incident in which scholars were buried alive and books burnt occurred during the reign of the first Chin monarch and builder of the Great Wall, Shih Huang-ti (246-210 BCE). The reign of emperor Wu the ‘Warlike’ between 424 and 452 C.E. saw more prosecutions and attacks on Buddhists. Wu, it is believed, was the first sovereign to really ‘lay violent hands upon Buddhism’ when he decreed ‘that the monks should be put to death, and the Buddhist images should be burned or smashed’ and that ‘everyone who concealed a monk should be put to death, together with his whole family.’ Some of the decrees of that period enjoined upon the governors of the provinces to demolish or burn all Buddhist places of worship and to ‘throw down the precipices all monks, young or old’ who dared to follow the religion. Officials during the seventh century Tang dynasty questioned the need for the Buddhist religion and denounced the clergy as a ‘class of useless drones, idlers, and beggars,’ whose ‘religious work encourages waste of money, especially spent in the erection of temples and monasteries.’ Fù-Yi’s ‘Memorial against Buddhism’ made during this period and which saw wide circulation discussed the ‘fell effects of Buddhism in times past’ and proposed to altogether do away with the religion. In that sense, there have been in the China of the past several
precursors to its twentieth century ‘cultural revolution’, all of them with strikingly similar manifestations and expressions!

Losing civilisational memory incapacitates a civilisation to defend or preserve its cultural space. India’s civilisational links with Lumbini extend over eons and yet its memory appears incapable of moving us towards displaying an active interest in the area’s well being and growth. We appear to be losing it amidst the mist of centuries. When Emperor Asoka was ‘engaged in humanizing politics by incorporating the spirit of Buddha’s compassion into his administration’ China was just beginning to emerge as a unified state after a period of chaos, civil strife and conflict. In the twentieth year [250-249 BCE] of his reign the mighty emperor ‘visited in person the place where the Buddha was born and did worship there.’ It is said that the venerable Buddhist monk Upagupta who guided the emperor to the sacred grove – Lumbini Vana – addressed Asoka thus, ‘āsmin Mahārāja pradeśe Bhagavān jātah’ (‘In this place, O great king, the Blessed One was born’). To commemorate the event of the Divine birth, Asoka installed a pillar of stone, constructed stupas and made the village of Lummini (Lumbini) free of religious cesses’ and reduced its payment of other shares. The commemorative pillar edict records the pilgrimage of the Indian emperor, ‘By His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King when he had been consecrated twenty years, having come in person and reverence having been done – inasmuch as “Here was born Buddha, the sage of the Sākyas” – a stone bearing a horse was caused to be made and a stone pillar was erected.’ Historian Radhakumud Mookerjee, one of the earliest nationalist chroniclers of Asoka and his empire visited the area in 1927 and described the place thus, ‘...I rode through the village of Padaria to the site of the
Asokan Pillar about two miles distant...Within a few paces of the pillar stands a temple enshrining an ancient sculpture representing the Nativity of the Buddha, the figure of his mother Mahāmāyā, standing under the sāl tree after her delivery with three attendants.’ We seem to consign all of these into oblivion and to miss the symbolism of the fact that one whose reign became one of the defining periods of Indian civilisation chose to humbly commemorate the twentieth year of his reign at the sacred Lumbini.

While Asoka’s legacy was rediscovered, rescued and reintegrated into the mainstream of our national life, the significance, symbolism and uniting potential of this spot of Lumbini appears to have been ignored and remains obfuscated. India could have at least facilitated the implementation of a master plan drawn up by the leading Japanese architect Kenzo Tange (1913-2005) way back in 1978 on invitation from the Nepal government. The plan, which has since been gathering dust due to paucity of resources and facilitation, was to be implemented within seven years and proposed to involve other nations with significant Buddhist population such as Sri Lanka, Japan, Myanmar, South Korea, and Thailand apart from China. The facilitation of that plan would have perhaps been more in keeping with the spirit and message of Buddhism. Instead of making the whole project the sole show of a particular government through proxy foundations, the effort should have been instead to try and create a consortium of all nations with a strong Buddhist link, including the Tibetans and under the leadership of Nepal and the UNESCO - which has declared Lumbini as a world heritage site – to jointly develop the area and
consecrate it to humanity as whole with the message of freedom, peace and progress. India – being the cradle of Buddhism - should have extended a generous and munificent hand of assistance and not let the original plan, with its far greater aesthetic appeal, languish and fall by the way side. She could have, long back, initiated projects to transform her border districts with Nepal into a special cultural and religious zone. It might also be worth remembering that this entire zone once teemed with vibrant and robust self-governing republics. With the Nepal government rejecting last week the project saying that ‘it would not entertain any deal struck in a third country without the participation of the actual stakeholders’ the possibilities of renewing the original Kenzo master-plan can still be discussed and other nations be immediately invited to be part of what can be turned into a truly international project. India may unconditionally make her contribution towards re-initiating such an effort and thereby prevent the encircling of the ‘Light of Asia’. Had not the ‘Exalted One’ in his last sermon, directed the faithful to, ‘...be ye lamps unto yourselves. [And to] Betake yourself to no external refuge.”?

It was a millennial faith reposed in the Indian civilisation and on its capacity to tirelessly and selflessly irradiate its ways of life and thought.
Modernising the Motivational Context of the Indian Armed Forces

- Maj Gen(Dr) G D Bakshi

Dietmar Rothermund and Harman Kulke state that the non-revolutionary transfer of power from the British Empire to the Indian Republic enabled it to inherit intact the instrumentalties of governance like the armed forces and the civil and police bureaucracies. The new born republic was beset with the trauma of partition and the first war in J&K and thus forced to focus on immediate consolidation. It had little time or energy to transform the colonial instruments to the needs of an Independent Republic. Hence the basic structure and motivational ethos of the armed forces in general and the Indian Army in particular, has remained rooted in the colonial context. The British had organized the Indian Army on the basis of ethnicity/sub-nationality based Regiments. The trauma of the First War of Independence had led them to discontinue all recruitment from the present day states of Bengal, Bihar and most of UP. These native troops (who had once formed the backbone of the Mauryan Army that had first unified India politically in 330 BC era) were declared “non-martial” and excluded from further recruitment. Also dispensed were the troops from the South that had formed the backbone of the Madras Presidency Army. Lord Roberts of Kandahar propagated his martial race theory and the entire recruitment bias of the British Indian Army was switched to North and North West India. The Sikhs, the Punjabi Muslims and the Gurkhas (who had largely stayed out of the 1857 struggle) formed the bulk of this new colonial Army. We thus saw the formation of ethnicity based Regiments like the Sikhs, Jats, Marathas, Dogras Rajputs,

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Kumaonis, Garhwalis and Gurkhas who were deemed martial classes. The primary concern of the British Indian Army was to sanitise this force and ensure that no nationalist sentiments would ever arise in this colonial instrument. There would be no repetition of 1857 and this colonial army would faithfully obey orders to shoot at its own citizenry whenever necessary. To that extent the very idea of India as a unified entity was anathema to the British. Nationalism was a dangerous word in the ranks of the colonial military. The entire basis of military motivation was therefore focused around the Izzat/ honour and martial traditions of the sub nationality based Regiment. The pride in the “quam” (sub nationality) was the primary basis of the military motivational ideology. The history and achievements of the “quam” were used to inspire the soldiery. Such a motivational ideology by itself would obstruct the emergence of nationalist sentiments based on fashioning a pan-Indian identity. The critical question is that six decades after Independence why are we still fixated on a colonial model of military motivation designed to curb nationalism and encourage a plethora of regional, ethnic and sub national identities?

In practical terms the British colonial, martial race based recruitment model proved too narrow to support a large army. It broke down in the First World War when the colonial army had to be rapidly expanded from 350,000 to 1.1 million men. A large number of non-martial classes like the Mahzbi Sikhs, Mahars and allied scheduled caste ethnicities had to be per force recruited. In the Second World War the British Indian Army had to be expanded to an all time record size of 2.5 million men to fight the Japanese and also contribute troops for Europe and North Africa theatres. The martial class recruitment base completely broke down and very large number of “non-martial” class soldiers had to be recruited. The Bihar regiment was once more a part of the British Indian Army along with a whole host of castes and communities that had earlier been
labeled non-martial. The martial class narrative as a basis of military motivation had, in practice, failed to meet the needs of a very large army even before Independence.

**Post Independence Developments**

In theory the Martial Race concept was debunked after Independence but continued in practice to form the basis of Regimental motivation. Recruitment was thrown open on all India all class basis. However the legacy Regiments were retained to prevent organizational turbulence and the simple fact was that the Martial race oriented model had become deeply ingrained in the psyche of the Army. No need was felt to disturb functional organizations that had performed well in the war. Three types of Units were now retained:

* **Single Class Regiments** e.g. The Sikhs, Dogras, Jats, Marathas etc.
* **Fixed Class Regiments** e.g. the Grenadiers, and the Punjab Regiment etc with fixed class composition (like two Company Dogras, two Companies Jats and Dogra/ Sikhs combinations etc)
* **All India All Class** These had a heterogeneous mix of all Indian castes/ classes. All new Regiments e.g. Paras, Guards, Mechanised Infantry etc that were raised post independence were on this mixed model and have performed very well.

**Gen Rodrigues Era Reforms**

Post Operation Blue Star, mutinies in some battalions of the Sikh and Punjab Regiment sharply underlined the perils of over reliance on sub nationality or ethnicity based Regiments and systems of motivation in the present day context when insurgencies are largely focused on ethnic identities. However Gen Rodrigues attempts to breakdown existing ‘Fixed class’ Infantry Regiments into heterogeneous compositions by deliberately mixing sub units of different Regiments were deeply resented as they disrupted the historic continuity of organizational
entities with long histories of corporate existence and collective memories of inspiring battle performances. This experimental reform process was deeply resented in the Army and was revoked a few years down the line. Its basic flaw was trying to mix sub units of existing Regiments rather than trying to organically grow new units of mixed compositions. It missed the essential point altogether. The Basic problem was NOT with the composition but the emphasis on ethnicity for motivation. Units can be formed on regional basis to ease administrative/ functional problems. However what is of essence is their basic motivational philosophy. Is it based on regional chauvinism or on a larger theme of Nationalism and Patriotism – the aggressive promotion of a pan-Indian identity? The honest fact is that the colonial culture that was deeply suspicious of any Nationalist sentiment in the Army unfortunately persists as a historical anachronism. Some officers at the highest levels still claim that the Indian Army fights not for the country or any patriotic fervor but for the Izzat of the Paltan -the ethnicity based Regiment. Such an attitude is a clear hangover of the Raj period and its colonial narrative that emphasized regional identities to prevent the emergence of nationalism in a colonial Army. There is a need to understand and transform this cultural context and outgrow the anachronisms of a colonial Past.

**Nationalism as Basis of Combat Motivation**

The British had superimposed their own Regimental model based on regional/ethnic identities (Scots, Irish Guards etc) on the British Indian Armies. Most Western Armies base their Regiments on such regional basis and limit motivational narratives to the unit/ Regimental level. However the Germans and the Japanese and to an extent the Russians, based their motivational themes on a highly aggressive promotion of militant nationalism. The motivational focus was placed on the highest organizational entity – the Nation State itself and not anything lower. All else was secondary. The highest loyalty, the highest cause was the nation state. This served as a common theme for motivation across organizational boundaries – the Army, Navy, Air force and Marines all subscribed to a common motivational ideology
that stressed not regional but a pan-national identity. This facilitated Inter services coordination and synergy. Militant nationalism served as a highly effective basis of combat motivation in World War II. Post war evaluation of Allied and German /Japanese military unit performances indicated that the German Wehrmacht and the Imperial Japanese Armies( even though they lost the War due to overall asymmetry of industrial resources that the US entry into the war generated) proved to be the more efficient and effective armies. American studies have indicated that German units decimated to the extent of 80% still retained their combat cohesion in World War II. Field Marshal Slim had lamented that “We all talk of fighting to the last man and last round – the Japanese are the only ones who do it”. The Kamikaze suicide pilots bear testimony to the very high levels of combat motivation in the Japanese Armed Forces. Thus Militant Nationalism as a basis for combat motivation has worked in a most effective way in past wars. It generates tremendous organizational coherence and a high degree of motivation. It creates the inspirational climate that fosters extremes of sacrifice. It is a well tried and tested model with proven battle field validity.

In Mar 2006, a Vietnamese Army delegation had visited HQ Eastern Command of the Indian Army. One of the Vietnamese Generals was keen to know what the Indian Army did for Patriotism Training. The look of astonishment on his face when he was told that we do nothing of this kind but rely on the Regimental system to motivate our men, will long haunt me personally. The Vietnamese Generals insight deserves to be reflected upon. The organizational need is to outgrow the cultural context of colonialism and find our moorings as a nation.
state and future power to reckon with.

**An Alternative Indian Model: Learning From the INA**

Gen Shankar Roychowdhury, when he was the Chief, highlighted the need to transform the Indian Army’s motivational methodology to this militant Nationalism model that emphasizes Patriotism and aggressive championing of a pan-Indian identity. He suggested that the Indian National Army of Subash Chandra Bose provided a readymade model for the Indian context. It had tried to apply the German and Japanese techniques of military motivation to the Indian context with considerable success. The simple fact is that most of our Post–Independence efforts to Indianise the Indian Army are borrowed from the INA. “Jai Hind” our salutation comes from the INA. Gen Roychowdhury had decreed that the INA Marching Song of ‘Kadam Kadam Barhaye Ja ‘ be played at the Passing Out Parades (POP) of the IMA and OTA and at all POPs of the recruits at the Regimental Centers. This was a step in the right direction and the practice is still in vogue. The INA is a very vibrant and extant model that needs much greater study and analysis. Anton Pelinka writes “Bose was certainly always a nationalist. For him the Indian nation was an idea, the anti-thesis of the princely state and the caste system, the religious struggle and linguistic conflicts and above all the anti-thesis of Jinnaha’s theory of two nations”.

The INA is a very vibrant and extant model that needs much greater study and analysis. Anton Pelinka writes “Bose was certainly always a nationalist. For him the Indian nation was an idea, the anti-thesis of the princely state and the caste system, the religious struggle and linguistic conflicts and above all the anti-thesis of Jinnaha’s theory of two nations”.

The INA had strength of 1500 officers and 60,000 men. It was organized into Three Divisions, Command Troops (to include Special Forces, Armored and Anti Aircraft units, Transport and Logistics troops). It had an Officers Training School and a Women Regiment (Rani of Jhansi Regiment). The First and Second Division saw action in
Burma and the Third was deployed in Malaya. In Burma the INA Division fought along with the Japanese 15th, 31st, and 33rd Divisions in Manipur, Kohima and Imphal respectively and then took part in the difficult retreat across Burma (especially the Battles of Mektila and Irrawaddy crossing) Morale and motivation across formations and Units was not uniform and some units formed of surrendered Indian Army POWs did not do as well as those raised de novo and trained by the Japanese. The best performance perhaps was at Mount Popa where an INA company fought bravely against a British Tank assault with petrol bombs. The astounding fact is that overall the INA took 26,000 casualties in World War II. This accounts for almost 43% casualties. Yet most INA Units had retained their combat cohesion till the end of the War. Sustaining morale in a retreat is a very difficult proposition. The INAs motivational philosophy clearly enabled it to do so. The INA had come too late when the tide of war had already turned. Nevertheless, its overall impact on the Indian Freedom movement was far greater than is realized and is deemed by many as instrumental in shaping the British decision to leave India. Even in defeat it inspired victory.

The INA Indianised many German and Japanese techniques of military motivation and emphasized militant Nationalism. Though both German and Japanese models do have a negative resonance and may appear somewhat anachronistic yet some of their concepts could be modified to suit modern Indian conditions.

Today there is a need to emulate the INA model with perhaps some modifications. We need the following:-

* Heavy emphasis on nationalism at the entry levels of the NDA, IMA and OTA which are foundational in their impact. The courses must commence with a Motivational Capsule of a week before main training commences. It must rely on a capsule of Indian History, Indian Military Traditions and Post-Independence achievements. It must rely upon motivational films and inspiring war movies to provide role models and include talks by Gallantry award winners.

* There is a motivation training capsule in the current Recruit Training Syllabus. It comes in the
middle of the training regime at Regimental Centers. This needs to be made the starting point of recruit training. Heavy emphasis must be laid on emphasizing the Indian ethos, the Regimental History and Films on Regimental military Heroes and award winners who can act as role models for the young soldiers. Heavy emphasis must be laid on Community singing of Patriotic songs, marching songs and singing with military bands. European armies have traditionally used community singing as a powerful motivational tool.

* Middle and Senior Officers must be encouraged to study Indian History (especially Indian Military History) and capsules on the organizational culture, ethos and motivational philosophy must be run at the basal courses at the Army War College and College of Defense Management.

* There is a need to outgrow the colonial context in our organizational culture and transit to a ‘Nationalism’ model that emphasises loyalty to the highest organizational entity of the Nation State. Such a similarity of motivational context across organizational boundaries will promote Inter-services synergy and coordination. Different services will then place the National interest above parochial service loyalties as a deeply ingrained habit of thought. This is a combat validated model that worked brilliantly in the Second World War and is still practiced by the Vietnamese and Israeli Armed Forces. In the INA we have a readymade model of motivation customized for the Indian context.
The Lok Pal Saga

- A. Surya Prakash

How Nine Governments Betrayed the Nation

The story of how leaders from across the political spectrum have, for over four decades, stalled the establishment of an ombudsman empowered to investigate the prime minister, his ministerial colleagues and other public servants in India.

While every political party in India has offered lip service to the idea of having an independent institution to probe allegations of corruption against members of the political executive and the top bureaucracy, the political class has dragged its feet whenever an effort has been made to make law in this regard. Politicians have tried to hoodwink the people into believing that despite their efforts, the law has not entered the statute book because of some legal tangles. Is this true? When the history of this legislation is written, many political leaders including some of India’s most powerful prime ministers will be judged harshly.

Here is a glimpse:

Though the debate of corruption has been dominating political discourse in India over the last twelve months, apprehensions about corruption and its impact on governance were first heard over four decades ago. The Santhanam Committee, that initially examined the issue in the 1960s, expressed its concern about corruption and the lack of an effective mechanism to deal with the corrupt. Thereafter, the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) appointed in that decade was tasked to examine “the problems of redress of citizens’ grievances, keeping in mind the need for ensuring the highest standards of efficiency and integrity in the public services and also for making public administration responsive to the people”. Specifically, the commission was asked to examine the adequacy of the existing...

* A. Surya Prakash - Senior Fellow, VIF
arrangements for redress of grievances and the need for introduction of any new machinery or special institution for the redress of grievances.

The ARC was so concerned about the growing public anger over corruption that it decided to put this issue on high priority. It felt that its recommendations vis-à-vis the establishment of an anti-corruption institution should not wait till it completed its labours in regard to the entire gamut of administrative reforms. Therefore, it submitted an interim report in 1966 titled “Problems of Redress of Citizens’ Grievances”, in which it recommended the setting up of a Lok Pal. The commission recommended that there should be a statutory machinery to enquire into complaints of corruption or injustice arising out of maladministration. The Congress Government headed by Indira Gandhi appeared to share the concerns of the ARC in regard to corruption and decided to implement the commission’s recommendations in right earnest. This led to the introduction of the first Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill in the Lok Sabha in 1968. Mr.Y.B.Chavan, who introduced the first Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill said this legislative measure had been thought of consequent to the recommendations of the ARC. However, the bill differed from the draft bill proposed by the ARC in that it sought to create a statutory machinery to enquire into complaints based on actions of all union public servants including ministers. The bill also sought to deal with maladministration, apart from corruption. Therefore, it empowered the Lokpal to enquire into actions of public servants which were actuated by “personal interest” or “improper or corrupt motives” or abuse of position. The Lokpal could also look into actions of public servants which smacked of “lack of integrity” or were “unjust, oppressive or discriminatory” or fell in the category of negligence or undue delay. The bill covered all ministers and public servants. The bill was considered by the Joint Committee of the two Houses and was passed by the Lok Sabha in 1969. While this Bill was pending in the Rajya Sabha, the Fourth Lok Sabha was dissolved and consequently the Bill lapsed. This bill fell by the wayside when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sought early dissolution of the Lok Sabha and a fresh Lok Sabha Poll in 1971.
Indira Gandhi’s Congress was returned with a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha that year and the new government she formed after the election lost no time in re-introducing the bill, which had been passed by the previous Lok Sabha. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the 1971 Bill noted that the bill, like the one introduced in 1968, differed from the draft bill proposed by the ARC in two major respects. However, even this bill was ill-fated. Although the term of this House was extended by year during the Emergency, it lapsed on the Lok Sabha’s dissolution in early 1977. The Indira Gandhi government could have no excuses for allowing this Bill to lapse because it could muster a two-thirds majority in the two Houses of Parliament and her government had introduced major constitutional changes which had upset the basic structure of the Constitution. Further, the Lok Sabha itself had an extended tenure.

**Non-Congress Governments Give it a Shot**

The non-Congress parties had their first shot at the creation of a strong anti-corruption institution after the Congress Party was trounced in the post-Emergency Lok Sabha Election held in March, 1977. It was now the turn of Mr. Charan Singh, the then Home Minister to introduce a Lok Pal Bill on behalf of the Janata Party Government. That government made major changes in regard to the jurisdiction of Lokpal and the persons who came within this institution’s ambit. Mr. Charan Singh had this to say in regard to past initiatives and about the new thinking within the government in regard to constitution of such an ombudsman: “The matter has been re-examined having regard to the recommendations of the ARC, the provisions of the 1971 Bill and other laws on the subject enacted in the various States from time to time and the experience of the
functioning of such institutions in the states where they have been set up. In the light of this re-examination, it is proposed to alter the scheme of the Lokpal as incorporated in the 1971 bill in material respects for making the institution of Lokpal an effective instrument to combat the problem posed by corruption at higher political levels. Under the scheme now proposed, the jurisdiction of Lokpal will cover any complaint of misconduct (pertaining to a period not exceeding five years prior to the date of the complaint) against a person who is or has been a public man as defined in clause 2(g) of the bill. The prime minister, members of parliament and chief ministers of states are being brought within the purview of the Lokpal”.

In the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to this bill, the minister said: “Allegations against civil servants will not come within the purview of the lokpal: and grievances, as distinct from allegations of misconduct, will be excluded from his jurisdiction”. Therefore, the Janata Party Government wanted the focus to be entirely on persons holding political offices like that prime minister, union ministers, chief ministers and members of parliament. Civil servants were excluded. However, Mr. Charan Singh ensured that the Lokpal had direct administrative control and an independent investigating machinery to assist him in the discharge of his functions. But, this bill too was doomed. It was also referred to a Joint Committee of Parliament, which reported back to the House in July, 1978 but even as the bill was under consideration, the Lok Sabha was dissolved and it lapsed.

After the Janata Party squandered the opportunity given by the people, Indira Gandhi returned to power with a thumping majority in 1980 but chose not to introduce this bill again. Despite her formidable strength in the two Houses of Parliament, she took no initiative to establish the Lok Pal.
to establish the Lok Pal. The Congress Party resumed its dalliance with the Lok Pal legislation soon after Rajiv Gandhi took over the reins when it went through the motions of introducing a Lok Pal Bill in 1985. At that stage, the Rajiv Gandhi Government was still in its honeymoon phase with the people and Mr.Gandhi was the “Mr.Clean” who was promising to cleanse the system and to finish the “power brokers” who he said were riding on the backs of poor people. Like his mother, Rajiv Gandhi had all the political strength to push through a tough anti-corruption law through parliament. In the election held in December, 1984, the Congress Party had inflicted a crushing defeat on its opponents and had bagged 410 seats in the Lok Sabha. Mr.Gandhi had such political and parliamentary strength that he could have passed this law without even a whisper of protest. But, he too backed out after making some tall claims. “Wisdom” soon dawned on the government that it was facilitating the creation of an institution that could critically examine its functioning, and therefore, without much ado, the government quietly withdrew the Bill!

Thereafter, a series of non-Congress governments tried in vain to bring in this law. Introducing yet another version of this bill in the Lok Sabha in 1989, Mr.Dinesh Goswami, the Law Minister in the V.P.Singh Government referred to the chequered history of the Lokpal Bill and said having studied the interim report of the ARC submitted in 1966 and all the four bills which were introduced in the parliament earlier, the government has come to the conclusion that such legislation for constituting the institution of Lokpal is imperative to combat the problem of corruption at higher political levels. The government was bringing this law, he said, because in the interest of democracy, it should be the endeavour of every public functionary at top political levels to maintain high standards of public morality. But the bill

The Deve Gowda Government brought a bill in September,1996, which too lapsed with the dissolution of the Eleventh Lok Sabha. The Atal Behari Vajpayee Government introduced the bill in August ,1998 and this too lapsed with the dissolution of the Twelfth Lok Sabha.
lapsed with the dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha.

The Deve Gowda Government brought a bill in September, 1996, which too lapsed with the dissolution of the Eleventh Lok Sabha. The Atal Behari Vajpayee Government introduced the bill in August, 1998 and this too lapsed with the dissolution of the Twelfth Lok Sabha. The Atal Behari Vajpayee returned to power after the Lok Sabha Poll in 1999 and a fresh attempt was made by his government in the Thirteenth Lok Sabha in 2001. This Bill, the government said, was meant to enable citizens “to have recourse to a convenient and effective forum for determination of complaints and thereby save them from pursuing their remedies through the process of courts”. The National Commission to Review the working of the Constitution (NCRWC), which submitted its report thereafter was very keen that parliament pass this law. It said in para 6.21.2 of its report that “the Lok Pal Bill needs to be expeditiously considered and passed by Parliament. If possible, it may be further strengthened by providing that its findings should be final and form the basis for action by government. The Commission thinks that a start should immediately be made on the basis of the Bill. Let experience be gained of working a high level body to enforce standards of rectitude and propriety in the conduct of public affairs”. However, the Lokpal Bill, 2001 too was ill-fated.

Public Pressure Brings Lokpal Into focus Yet Again

The Congress-led United Progressive alliance came to power at the centre in 2004. It however steered clear of the Lokpal idea in its first term and in the initial phase in its second term. However, a public agitation launched by social activist Anna Hazare and others shook the government out of its slumber. In order to pacify the agitators, who wanted a strong Lokpal, the union government constituted a joint drafting committee in April, 2011. The government thereafter introduced a the Lokpal Bill, 2011 in August, 2011.

This Bill was referred to the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice on August 8, 2011, followed by a parliamentary debate. A “sense of the House” was communicated to
the Standing Committee on the basis of discussions in the two Houses. The committee, after extensive discussion with all stakeholders, suggested several amendments and recommended that the Lokpal at the centre and Lokayukta in the States be conferred constitutional status. The government withdrew the bill introduced in August, 2011 and brought a fresh Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill in December, 2011, after considering the report of the standing committee.

In the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to this bill, the government claimed that India was “committed to pursue the policy of Zero Tolerance against Corruption” after it ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption May 9, 2011. This Convention imposes a number of obligations, some mandatory, some recommendatory and some optional on the Member States. The Convention, inter alia, envisages that State Parties ensure measures in the domestic law for criminalization of offences relating to bribery and put in place an effective mechanism for its enforcement. The obligations of the Convention, with reference to India, have come into force with effect from June 8, 2011.

“As a policy of Zero tolerance against Corruption, the Bill seeks to establish in the country, a more effective mechanism to receive complaints relating to allegations of corruption against public servants including Ministers; MPs, Chief Ministers, Members of Legislative Assemblies and public servants and to inquire into them and take follow up actions. The bodies, namely, Lokpal and Lokayuktas which are being set up for the purpose will be constitutional bodies. The setting up of these bodies will further strengthen the existing legal and institutional mechanism thereby facilitating a more effective implementation of some of the obligations under the aforesaid Convention”, the statement said.

When this bill came up for discussion and voting in the Lok Sabha in December, 2011, the
House passed the bill but rejected the constitutional amendment that would accord the Lokpal and Lokayukta constitutional status. When it went to the Rajya Sabha, the whole process was stymied by some who MPs moved dozens of amendments, while some others warned their parliamentary colleagues that they were establishing an institution that would jeopardize their political careers. In the end, the House was adjourned sine die because of the prevailing pandemonium. As a result, it is still hanging fire in the Upper House.

**Should The Prime Minister Be Kept Out?**

Apart from the general aversion to the idea of a strong ombudsman, the political class is divided on some key issues pertaining to the powers of this institution. For example, there has never been unanimity on the issue of bringing the prime minister within the Lok Pal’s purview. Similarly, there has never been an agreement on the mode of selection of the Lok Pal and the institution’s powers.

On the question of bringing the prime minister within the Lok Pal’s ambit, there has been an intense debate over several decades. Generally speaking, the Congress Party has been averse to the idea. It has felt that if the prime minister, who is the de facto chief executive, is placed within the jurisdiction of the anticorruption agency, it will weaken the office of prime minister. Non-Congress parties however have felt that the political executive would not be fully accountable if the prime minister were to be kept out. Hence, the Lokpal Bills introduced by non-Congress governments have sought to bring the prime minister within the ambit of the law.

The Lokpal Bill, 1977, introduced by the Janata Party Government, sought to deal with acts of corruption committed by a “public man”. The prime minister was included in the definition of...
“public man”. The bill introduced in 1989 by yet another non-Congress government headed by Mr.V.P.Singh, replaced the ‘public man” of 1977 with “public functionary” but kept the prime minister within the meaning of this term. The 1996 bill introduced by the United Front Government headed by Mr.H.D.Deve Gowda also brought the Prime Minister, ministers and Members of Parliament within the ambit of the term “public functionary”.

The Lokpal Bill introduced by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government in 1998 and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance Government headed by Mr.Atal Behari Vajpayee in 2001 also brought the prime minister within the Lokpal’s ambit. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill, 2011 introduced by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance Government headed by Mr.Manmohan Singh is the first Lokpal law brought by the Congress in which the prime minister is placed within the ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

Though the Congress Party was opposed to the idea, it gave in to the demand that the prime minister be made accountable, because of a nation-wide agitation led by social activist Anna Hazare. The law, it said, would provide for the establishment of a body of Lokpal for the Union and Lokayukta for States to inquire into allegations of corruption against public servants and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section 1 of Section 14 of the bill described a “public servant” and this included “any person who is or has been a prime minister”.

However, the Congress Party is not alone in having reservations about bringing the prime minister within the purview of the Lokpal. The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), which went into the working of the constitution since it was adopted in 1950, was also of the view that the prime minister should be kept out of the purview of the Lokpal. Another national commission that wanted the prime minister to be kept out of the purview of the Lokpal was the second Administrative Reforms Commission (Second ARC). This commission said in its 2007 report that the ombudsman should be a constitutional authority, but the prime minister should not be within its jurisdiction.
Mode of Appointment of the Lok Pal

The method of appointment of the Lokpal has been a matter of much controversy over the last four decades because of diverse and often conflicting opinion in this regard.

The first Lokpal Bill introduced in 1968 said the Lokpal would be appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People. The 1977 bill said the Lokpal would be appointed in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Chairman of the Council of States and the Speaker of the House of the People. In 1989, the bill said the Lokpal shall be appointed by the President “after consultation with the Chief Justice of India”. The 1996 bill suggested a three member Lokpal – Chairman and two members – and the selection committee to choose them was to comprise of the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Deputy Chairman, Rajya Sabha, the Leaders of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, Minister in charge of Home Affairs and the Minister of State in the Ministry of Personnel.

The 2001 bill however preferred a larger selection committee. It said the Lokpal should be selected by a committee headed by the Vice-President and including the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, Leader of the House other than the house in which the Prime Minister is a member, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha, Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha.

The Second ARC said the Chairperson and members of the Rashtriya Lokayukta should be selected by a Committee consisting of the Vice President, the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India. The 2011 bill, as passed by the Lok Sabha, also opted for a Lokpal and Lokayukta model. It
said the Lokpal should be selected by a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House of the People, the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People, the Chief Justice of India or a judge of the court nominated by him, one eminent jurist nominated by the president. The selection committee could appoint a search committee to assist it.

As regards composition of the Lokpal, initially governments preferred it to be three member bodies (Chairman and two members). The 2001 bill also preferred a three member body - Chairperson and two members. However, in the year 2011, there was a quantum jump in the size of the institution. The Lokpal and Lokayukta Bill, as passed by the Lok Sabha on December 27, 2011 provides for a Lokpal that comprises of a Chairman and up to eight members, fifty per cent of whom shall be judicial members.

Further, it provides for the first time reservation of fifty percent seats in the Lokpal for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, minorities and women.

This is a major departure from earlier bills, which never provided for non-judicial members or reservations of any kind for any category of citizens.

However, if there is one common thread among all Lok Pal legislations, it is the one pertaining to conditions of service of the Chairman and members of this institution. All bills have sought to ensure that the Lokpal is a truly independent authority and have stipulated that the conditions of service of the Chairman and Members shall be akin to that of the Chief Justice of India and judges of the Supreme Court respectively.

How Inflation has hit India’s Anti-Corruption Ombudsman

Finally, it must be said that there is an escalation cost to
fighting corruption as well! Fighting corruption does not come cheap. Or so it seems. The cost of having an ombudsman has risen astronomically over the years. The financial memorandum appended to the first Lokpal Bill introduced in 1968 said the bill provided for appointment of a lokpal and one or two persons to be known as lokayoktas. The new institution, it was estimated, would entail a non-recurring expenditure of Rs one lakh and a recurring expenditure of Rs nine lakhs a year. The Lokpal Bill introduced in the Lok Sabha in 1977 estimated that the institution would entail a non-recurring expenditure of Rs 2 lakhs and a recurring expenditure of Rs 20 lakhs a year. Further, it said that in case it becomes necessary to construct a building to house the establishment of the Lokpal, additional expenditure of a non-recurring nature of the order of Rs 25 lakhs will also be involved. The 1989 bill estimated the cost of lokpal as involving a non-recurring expenditure of Rs 7.5 lakhs and a recurring expenditure of Rs 35 lakhs per year. In case it becomes necessary to construct a building to house the institution of the Lokpal, “additional expenditure of a non-recurring nature of the order of Rs 75 lakhs may also be necessary”.

When the 2001 bill was moved in parliament, the cost of Lokpal had risen substantially to Rs 75 lakhs by way of non-recurring expenditure and a recurring expenditure of Rs 1.50 crore. The cost of constructing a building for Lokpal was estimated to be Rs 1.50 crore.

The cost of Lokpal however ballooned to hundreds of crores of rupees by the time the bill was introduced in parliament in 2011. The Financial Memorandum attached to the Lokpal and Lokayukta Bill, 2011 said the establishment of the Lok Pal would involve a non-recurring expenditure of one hundred crores of rupees and a recurring expenditure of two hundred crores of rupees in a financial year. In case it becomes necessary to construct a building to house the establishment of the Lok Pal, “additional expenditure of a non-recurring nature of the order four hundred crores of rupees may also be involved”.

This sum however did not include the expenditure involved in constituting Lokayuktas in every state. Despite the reluctance of the government to estimate the cost of having lokayuktas in every state, it is certain that these institutions
will cost the exchequer hundreds of crores of rupees every year. But, even at this cost, will we eventually have these institutions at the federal level and in the states? That is the moot question.

**What Lessons Do We Draw?**

What lessons can we draw from this? Undoubtedly, all the major players in the political field are guilty of dragging their feet in regard to the Lok Pal legislation. But, certainly, some political leaders and parties are far more guilty than the others. Till 2011, the Lok Pal Bill had been introduced eight times in the Lok Sabha. On seven occasions, it lapsed because of the dissolution of the House. On one occasion it was withdrawn by the government. Now the present government has introduced this bill twice. It brought a bill in August, 2011, which it withdrew and introduced a fresh one in December, 2011.

Under the Constitution, the government can introduce every bill, except money bills, in either House of Parliament. But the life of the bills varies from House to House. The Rajya Sabha is a permanent House. All members have a fixed tenure of six years but members retire in phases with one-third retiring every two years. These vacancies are filled through biennial elections to the Upper House. Therefore, this House is never subject to dissolution. Hence, a bill introduced in this House can have a longer shelf life. The government can introduce a bill in this House, wait for the opportune moment and push it through in the Rajya Sabha and thereafter in the Lok Sabha. So long as it is pending in the Rajya Sabha, it does not die with the dissolution of the Lok Sabha.

But, the Lok Sabha is subject to dissolution. A bill introduced in that House faces sudden death when the House is dissolved or when a bill passed by it is pending in the Rajya Sabha. We can gauge the intentions of the political class when we realize that the Lok Pal Bill, which lapsed on seven
occasions, has never been introduced in the Rajya Sabha.

The need for a strong anti-corruption institution like the Lok Pal was first mooted in parliament in 1963 when Jawaharlal Nehru was the prime minister. The first bill was introduced in 1968 when Indira Gandhi was the prime minister and passed by the Lok Sabha in 1969, but the government did not ensure its passage in the Rajya Sabha till the dissolution of the Lok Sabha in early 1971. What happened thereafter is even stranger. Indira Gandhi came back with a thumping majority in 1971 and quickly re-introduced the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill. This government imposed the dreaded Emergency, used its brute parliamentary majority to turn the Constitution on its head and even extended the life of the lok Sabha, but it did not ensure the passage of the Lokpal Bill!

Another prime minister who had humongous parliamentary strength was Rajiv Gandhi. He had more power in parliament than Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Yet, he lacked the courage to establish a Lok Pal and withdrew the bill which he introduced.

Among the non-Congress governments, the Morarji Desai government had the requisite strength in the Lok Sabha to begin with, but mid-way through its term it fell victim to internal desertions and collapsed and the Lok Pal bill went down with it. The Atal Behari Vajpayee government of 1999-2004 on the other hand, lasted a full term but failed to bring in this law after holding out much promise.

The ball is now again in the Congress Party’s court. The party seemed to develop cold feet when MPs in the Rajya Sabha moved amendments to the Bill passed by the lower House. A standard explanation that the party now offers is that it does not on its own command a majority in parliament and is therefore at the mercy of its coalition partners.

This may be true. But, can we forget history? Would we be discussing the Lok Pal bill in 2012 if the Congress Party had shown the courage to use its brute majority between 1971-77 and 1980-89 to establish this institution?
Internal Political Developments

Government’s Decision to Legitimise UCPN (Maoist)’s “Revolutionary Council” Creates Obstacles on Peace Process and Statute Drafting; Oppositions Obstructs the House Sessions: The opposition parties – Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) – have been obstructing the Legislature-Parliament meet protesting the government’s decision to legalise land and property transactions made through parallel governments run by the Maoists during the decade-long armed conflict. The opposition parties claim that that the decision taken by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai led government was against the spirit of the peace process and the Interim Constitution. Senior leaders of the two major opposition parties, addressing parliament session on January 17, 2012, raised serious objection to the move and demanded the government take back its decision. They also warned that they would neither let the House session resume, nor sit for talks with the United Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (UCPN-M) on peace and constitution unless the Cabinet scrapped the decision. As soon as the House session started on January 17, 2012, NC Parliamentary Party leader Ram Chandra Poudel and CPN-UML leader Madhav Kumar Nepal objected to the decision dubbing it as ‘loot’. “To accept the decisions of Maoist’s “people's government” would be to initiate parallel power in the governance. We cannot accept this. We will not let the Maoist capture the power,” said Nepal. Nepal further accused the Maoists and the Maoist-led government of working against the agreements made earlier.

NC leader Poudel said that the Maoists are trying to get away with their misdeeds by formally endorsing their robbery as legitimate. “We would not tolerate such a loot. I had told this earlier as well that the Maoist’s misdeeds would not be forgiven just because they are in power now,” said Poudel. They had also
boycotted the meeting of the major parties called by Prime Minister Dr. Bhattarai at the Peace Ministry on January 17. The NC President Sushil Koirala has made it clear that no new agreements would be made with the UCPN-M if they fail to execute the 7-point deal signed on November 1, 2011. “Legalising the transactions of the land during the insurgency is just a dream of the Maoist that would never be fulfilled. We are not scared of insurgency anymore. If they want to go back into hiding we would not stop them,” media reports Koirala as saying.

In fact, the protest comes amid the government’s plan to issue a 35-day notice calling such property owners to register the land transactions. Earlier this month, the Cabinet had decided to distribute land ownership certificates for plots purchased, sold and transferred by the "Revolutionary Council" through the Land Revenue Office. It is said that the UCPN-M’s Revolutionary Council brokered thousands of land and property deals in the country during the insurgency. According to a report, more than 12,000 such deals were made only in five mid-western districts, and many of these transactions took place under duress, wherein the sellers were unsatisfied with the price they received for their pieces of land and houses. During the insurgency, the districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Jajarkot and Kalikot were well-known Maoist strongholds, and the party had apparently proscribed the people of these districts from having recourse to the land revenue offices whenever they wished to sell a piece of land or their house. It was made mandatory that all the dealings pertaining to the sale of properties take place under the Maoists’ supervision. For that, the party used to charge Rs 500-700 per transaction.

In the meantime, the Supreme Court on January 19, 2012 has stayed the government decision to provide legitimacy to the properties purchased, sold, and distributed by “Revolutionary Council” of the UCPN-M during the decade-long conflict. A Single Bench of Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi has issued the order to this effect. Before that on January 17, a group of lawyers belonging to Democratic Lawyers Association had moved the apex court against the Cabinet decision. The court has, in its order, stated that the interim order is issued until January 25, 2012. The Bench also decided to send the case to the full
Bench of the apex court citing the gravity of the issue.

**Government Under Pressure from Madhesi Parties, including the Coalition Partners; Gupta Threatens to Quit the Government:** Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Nepal (MJF-N), which had supported the Bhattarai led government from outside, has warned that if the government does not promulgate the Constitution within the allotted time, or promulgates a Constitution against the sentiments of the Madhes, then the Madhesis would write a Constitution on their own. Addressing a program organised in Siraha, Chairman Upendra Yadav further said that they have already planned for protests and demonstrations, as there is no way that the current government is going to promulgate the Constitution on time.

In the meantime, Minister for Information and Communications and Chairman of Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Ganatantrik (MJF-G), Jaya Prakash Gupta said that there is no point in staying in the government if the four-point pact is not implemented. Defending the four-point pact signed between Samuykta Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha (SLMM) and the UCPN-M, Gupta claimed that the pact has played a crucial role in giving pace to the stalled peace process and constitution writing process. He added his party is ready for any kind of struggle to institutionalise the achievement of Madhesis’ agitation.

** Strikes against the Price Hike:** Once the Nepal Oil Corporation had revised fuel prices on January 18, 2012, thirteen students union affiliated to various political parties have been protesting against the government decision to hike the prices of petroleum products. The students union decided to intensify the agitation accusing the government of turning deaf ear to the 24-hour ultimatum given to withdraw the price hike. As per the new price, diesel and kerosene will now cost Rs. 85 per litre, up from Rs. 76. The price of petrol has been hiked to Rs. 115 per litre from Rs. 105 earlier. Similarly, the price of cooking gas has been increased to Rs. 1,500 per cylinder from the Rs. 1,325 earlier.

**Foreign Relations**

**Relations with India**
Deputy Prime Minister Gachhadar Visits India: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar arrived India on January 17, 2012 for a four-day official visit. It is said that it is Gachhadar's first visit to New Delhi after assuming the office of Home Minister on August 29, 2011. It is reported that Deputy Prime Minister Gachhadar met Indian Prime Minister Manamohan Singh on January 18, 2012. It is also reported that Indian Prime Minister Singh expressed his interest about the ongoing peace process and statute drafting process during the meet with the Deputy Prime Minister Gachhadar. “He has expressed concern about the situation of democracy, and if or not the UCPN (Maoist) was committed to the peace process,” Deputy Prime Minister Gachhadar said. According to the sources, the meeting also dwelt upon the recent visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, border security and the possible use of Nepali land against India.

Deputy Prime Minster Gachchhadar, who was accompanied by Nepal Police Chief Rabindra Pratap Shah, Nepal Army’s Brigadier General Daman Ghale and National Investigation Department chief Moti Gurung, met Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram, Foreign Minister SM Krishna and Defence Minister AK Antony. Home Secretary Sushil Jung Rana and AIG of the Armed Police Force Durju Rai had joined Gachhadar in Delhi who had reached New Delhi on January 15, 2012 for security talks.

In the meantime, Nepal and India have discussed a wide range of bilateral security concerns in an effort to strengthen mutual cooperation on addressing the challenges, during a high-level dialogue that began here on January 16, 2012. It is said that this is the home secretary-level bilateral talks which are being held after a gap of more than two years. At the meeting discussions were held on more than a dozen issues ranging from counterfeit currency to further facilitating information exchange between authorities of the two countries. According to reports, fake Indian currency was the major concern expressed by the Indian side. Also, Indian officials showed their concerns on the issue of illegal funding channelised to the Madrassas in Nepal, especially those in the bordering districts.
Relations with China

Chinese Ambassador Houlan Praises Nepal Government: Organising a reception in Kathmandu on January 18, 2012, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Yang Houlan has appreciated Nepal government’s hosting of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his official visit. Yang said joint efforts from both the sides made the visit a complete success. “The Chinese premier and the Chinese people were really moved by these efforts,” Yang said, adding that both the Nepali and the Chinese sides “now agree that the visit was a milestone in our bilateral relations...Although the visit was not a long one, it was fruitful,”. He also described the visit as holding great significance to Nepal-China relations.

It is said that this is the first official comment on the visit made by the Chinese side. Before that, there was a joint statement issued at the conclusion of Wen’s visit. Wen was in Kathmandu for around four hours on January 14, 2012, and the visit was the first official visit by a Chinese Premier to Nepal in a decade.

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Towards A Stable Afghanistan: The Way Forward

(A report of Joint Working Group of Vivekananda International Foundation and RUSI, the UK)

The experts from the two think tanks met in New Delhi and London during October and November 2011 to deliberate on peace and stability in Afghanistan. Both the countries have stakes in the emerging situation in Afghanistan and have contributed to peace and stability in Afghanistan in many ways. The report also took into account the opinions of a wide array of strategic analysts, many government officials, and academics.

A summary of recommendations of the report is given below.

**Summary of Recommendations**

1. An independent, democratic, pluralistic and viable Afghanistan, that does not provide shelter to any terrorist group remains the key objective shared by India and the UK.

2. The prospects for reconciliation with the Taliban leadership do not look good, particularly as a result of the assassination of former President Rabbani. The space for a negotiated settlement has narrowed. A dominant role for the Taliban in any future dispensation in Kabul is clearly not acceptable to the majority of Afghans or the international community. Reconciliation must lead, at a minimum, to the following three outcomes: the disarmament of all terrorist groups; breaking off of all links with other terrorist groups and their sponsors; acceptance of the Constitution of Afghanistan.

3. Any arrangement that results from the process of reconciliation must be respected not only by the Afghan parties, but also by Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours – in particular Pakistan. The international community must ask Pakistan to become part of
the solution to the Afghan problem.

4. We recommend the establishment of an international mechanism to monitor external interference or sponsorship of terrorism by any country, which will have the power to sanction violations of this commitment.

5. India and the UK share the objective of supporting the Afghan state, both militarily and economically, well beyond the 2014 deadline. We urge both governments to devote significant resources towards this end. With this in mind, India and the UK should urge the US and Afghanistan to conclude as speedily as possible a Status of Forces Maintenance Agreement for the period after 2014. We recognise that our two countries also have responsibility to support the efforts towards post-2014 stabilisation.

6. We welcome India’s Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, which envisages, among other things, ‘training, equipping, and capacity building programmes for the Afghan National Security Forces’. We believe that this agreement fits well with overall policy of the international coalition in Afghanistan and should be implemented in close co-ordination with other bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, which, in turn, should be implemented in co-ordination and consultation with India. We urge the Indian Government to at least maintain the current levels of annual development assistance to Afghanistan. We also welcome India’s commitment to increase the scale of its assistance in providing training and mentoring to the ANA, ANP and other security forces. We recommend that India should also be willing to deploy training personnel within Afghanistan, in addition to providing these facilities in India itself.

7. We welcome the UK’s stated willingness to continue its substantial contribution to
the security and development of Afghanistan after it withdraws its remaining combat forces in 2014. We recommend that the UK should make a long-term commitment of development funds to Afghanistan, with a particular focus on ensuring that the Government of Afghanistan is able to fund core administrative and development activities. We strongly support the UK’s commitment to build and support a new officer training academy for Afghanistan. We believe the Indian Army could make a valuable contribution to this effort and recommend that our two countries explore this option further.

8. The UK and India should take a proactive role in the international effort for a more coherent aid-sharing arrangement among national donors. It is important that countries pledging financial assistance to Afghanistan undertake tasks that contribute to a coherent effort and honour their commitments. A well-defined international structure for oversight and co-ordination of aid efforts, in consultation with the Afghan Government, is a high priority in this area; we therefore believe that both India and the UK should support the efforts of the UN and its agencies to strengthen their roles in this regard. The aid absorption capacities of the Afghan Government will need to be enhanced as part of this effort.

9. The ultimate shape and composition of the ANA will require careful consideration. While there is already some recognition of the need for a greater balance between light infantry and other combat arms (mechanised, artillery and engineers) further action to address this issue will be needed, always bearing in mind the need for any force structure to be affordable.

10. Developing a more effective police and justice sector – including courts, prosecutors and detention facilities – will be a key
priority for Afghanistan, and the UK and India should consider whether they can collaborate more closely in providing assistance in this area.

11. Both India and the UK should work together in order to assist the Afghan legislature and executive to continue the process of security sector reform, helping to ensure that the security sector is both effective and accountable to democratic authorities.

12. It is imperative that the international community agree to a ten-year plan for funding the ANA in order to ensure predictability of financing and the achievement of the right priorities. We urge India to consider making a long-term financial commitment for the development of the post-2014 ANSF. The UK should also make a substantial and predictable contribution to the post-2014 ANSF costs. Such commitments would be particularly valuable if India and the UK were to take a joint initiative in this regard.

13. There is a requirement to further develop NATO’s Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) and the Combined Security Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), led by NATO and the US respectively. While retaining their character and roles, the US and NATO members should consider whether the character of these bodies should be further developed in order to incorporate training contributions from non-NATO states such as India. Such a new body might take the form of an International Military/Security Assistance Commission for Afghanistan.

14. There is a growing and urgent requirement for the international community to develop alternative supply and logistics routes for ISAF. The Northern Distribution Network, which now accounts for some 40 per cent of the supplies, should be further developed and utilised. The Indian members of the working group felt that those ISAF member-states that are able to do so should also explore the possible use of Iranian
territory for this purpose, as it provides a good alternative. However, the members of the British working group were doubtful that Iran’s co-operation was either feasible or desirable at this stage, given the current state of relations between Tehran and key members of the international community.
Vimarsha: India-Slowing Down an Under-Heated Economy

Dr. Bibek Debroy, an eminent economist and member of VIF’s (Vivekananda International Foundation) Executive Council, delivered a perceptive talk, titled ‘India-Slowing Down an Under Heated Economy’ on December 30th, 2011 as part of the Foundation’s Vimarsha series of lectures. An august gathering, comprising former civil and military officials, scholars and diplomats attended.

Mr. Ajit Doval, Director VIF, introduced the speaker and the subject. His penetrating remarks set the tone for the talk and the ensuing discussion. He pondered about the success of India’s growth story in the context of potential bottlenecks. Rising inflation, devaluation of the Indian Rupee, volatility in the equity market, and a sharp fall in the industrial output were telltale signs of distress in the Indian economy. Moreover, ongoing economic crisis in Europe was unlikely to leave India totally unscathed and this necessitated course correction measures in the country. The Director however reposed his faith in strong political and economic fundamentals of the country, hoping that India will eventually emerge much stronger. He further opined that the title of Dr. Debroy’s talk exuded both pessimism as well optimism. While the slowing down of India’s economy was naturally a matter of serious concern, an under-heated economy meant India still had a great potential to grow.

Dr. Bibek Debroy began the talk in a somewhat reflective mood,
likening the present state of India’s economy to the prevailing damp and foggy weather. Continuing in the same vein, he said that there was no perceptible silver lining in the clouds, though the impact of global developments would be relatively limited for India. Presenting his diagnosis for the ills which have afflicted India’s economy over the past few years, Dr. Debroy indicated that the problem had very little to do with what was happening globally, and more to do with what was not happening internally. To that extent, he said that economic recession was being used by the UPA government as a red-herring to deflect the people’s attention from the real issues.

There is growing sense of skepticism, especially in other countries, about the future prospects of India’s economy. The dream that one saw with BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) a few years ago is almost over, in so far as India is concerned. The situation is really pretty dismal for India, evidenced by the fact that the GDP growth rate is currently pegged at 6.9 percent which is much lower than the expected growth rate of 9 percent. While expectations about India reaching a higher growth trajectory still persist in some quarters, especially the government, the fact remains that the country is settling down to a 6.5 percent annual growth rate for the next couple of years. Dr. Debroy reminded the audience that India had achieved consistently an annual growth rate of about 9 percent until a few years ago, and there was even speculation that it could reach the two digit growth rate trajectory. Dr. Debroy reminded the audience that GDP is not just about numbers. He wryly observed that at a 10 percent growth rate India was creating 15 million new jobs each year, a 6.5 percent growth rate would result in the creation of only 10 million jobs annually. Job losses of such magnitude would inevitably have a major negative impact on the country.

In a perceptive analysis, Dr. Debroy, drawing attention to the RBI’s assessment that the external sector was today contributing about 3% of India’s GDP, noted that this implied that the country’s present growth rate of about 7% translated into a 4% growth rate
which had prevailed in the period prior to the liberalization when the contribution of trade to GDP was negligible.

Criticizing the government for failing to enact the second wave of reforms, Dr. Debroy said that PPP, usually associated with Purchasing Power Parity, was being viewed increasingly in terms of Permanent Policy Paralysis! Government sought to account for its failure to push through important reform legislation by hiding behind the smokescreen of coalition politics. This paralysis had driven the Indian corporate sector which was sitting on huge cash reserves to invest not in India but abroad. Thus in 2010-2011 Indians invested as much as $44 billion abroad as against only $18 billion in the previous year.

Dr. Debroy pointed out the recent apparent decline in inflation was not due to government policies but was simply a factor of the current inflation rate being measured against the year ago high inflation rates.

He mentioned that apart from the government’s legislative inactivity the sorry state of the economy was also due to its executive decisions. For instance, environment and forest clearances critical for development of infrastructure had become avenues for rent seeking and bribery. Furthermore, ‘sanctity of contract’ so necessary for meaningful business activities had been abandoned as there was no finality to many of these contracts.

Dr. Debroy went on to suggest that regrettably some of the measures undertaken by the government, notably the MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes) and the Land Acquisition Bill were having an extremely deleterious effect on the economy. The latter would kill the land market and mining activities in the country. The blame for a sharp increase in labour prices in recent times could be squarely put on the MGNREGS. The scheme was not leading to any productive activities. It was hard to believe that a government which had so much economic expertise available to it simply failed to anticipate the effect MGNREGS would have on food price inflation. It was amazing that the government despite sitting
on a wealth of economic expertise simply had no idea as to what was required to kick-start the economy. The government had chosen to ignore the recommendations of various Administrative Reform Commissions which would made possible effective delivery of services and allowed important legislation relating to pension reform, FDI in retail etc to gather dust – legislation which could have unshackled the economy.

The policies of the government appeared to be increasingly led by electoral politics rather than economic prudence. While the economic situation of India today was reminiscent of the late sixties or the early seventies, especially in terms of government intervention, it was worrying that hardly anyone, including from the economic fraternity, was contesting the economic policies of the UPA government. What India should be aspiring for was not 9 percent but 12 percent economic growth rate. For a country like India with such huge untapped potential, it could easily be dubbed an under-heated economy.

Dr. Debroy’s stimulating presentation elicited a volley of questions from the audience. A few of those questions related to the impact of Right to Information Act on decision-making, the role of judiciary in environment and forest clearances, the proposed land acquisition bill, the interventionist role of the Reserve Bank of India in stemming further depreciation of the Indian rupee, the outward flow of Indian capital etc. The speaker sought to clarify that more often than not the judiciary intervenes because of bad legislation. To a pointed question whether the outward FDI should be seen as a positive development, he replied that normally he would not be bothered whether capital flowed in or out, but if the outflow of capital suddenly shoots up from USD 18 billion to USD 44 billion the next year, it should be seen as a worrying trend. He further suggested that Indian capital was moving out not because of ‘pull’ factor but because of ‘push’ factor.

*Report Prepared by Mr. Sanjay Kumar*
Round Table Discussion on 'Vision India 2025 - Issues of Governance'

On Jan 12, 2012, the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) held a round table discussion on the issues of governance. The discussion was held against the backdrop of an ongoing VIF project, Vision India 2025. A panel of eminent experts, including Mr. Vijay Kapoor, former Lieutenant Governor Delhi, Mr. Ajit Doval Director VIF, Ambassador PP Shukla Joint Director VIF, Ambassador Satish Chandra, Mr. CD Sahay, Mr. Trinath Mishra, among others, discussed a draft paper which was authored by Dr. M.N. Buch, Padmabhusan and a former civil servant. The discussion was moderated by Mr. Vijay Kapoor.

The discussion, which broadly covered the entire gamut of governance in India from a futuristic perspective, was kicked off by Mr CD Sahay, former Secretary R&AW and Distinguished Fellow at the VIF. He highlighted the broad objectives behind the foundation undertaking a project of this nature. It was succinctly highlighted through the discussion that while there is an overall need for reforms in the social, political, economic, and defence sectors, governance alone remains the keystone, which can ensure that reforms succeed in all other sectors.
It was brought out during the discussion that governance in India suffers from a whole range of systemic problems. The Director observed that over the past sixty years India has unmistakably moved away from system-based governance to personality-based governance. Looking over the horizon, he said that growing interplay between democracy and demography in India would further strain the issue of governance. He said that governance suffered from three sets of challenges: first, multiplication of the problem of governance; second, serious decline in the quality of people who govern, and finally, increasing political interference in governance. He laid emphasis on the fact that there is urgent need to prevent the system from decaying any further.

The discussants flagged their concerns about decision-making processes being unduly affected by unhealthy political influences. It is unfortunate that legally empowered people are either hesitant to take decisions or they look over their shoulders while taking crucial decisions. There was general consensus across the table that civil services in India are in crying need for reform. The discussion also hovered around the weakened positions of Prime Ministers and Chief Ministers in an era of coalition politics, leading India being increasingly perceived as a soft state. In this context, the Westminster model of democracy and the weaknesses in the Constitutions were examined. While a major thrust of the discussion was on electoral reforms in India, the panelists were almost unanimous that government interventions in the execution of policies should be reduced to the barest minimum.

There was considerable back and forth on the issue of whether systems or individuals are the determinants of whether the governance is good, bad or indifferent. The general conclusion was that the system could be devised in such a way as to incentivise individuals to take the correct decisions in the public interest. It was largely agreed that decision-making process in India should be made IT-enabled, so that the process moves faster and in a more transparent manner. Another significant suggestion put forth by one of the panelists related to the need for educating the senior management level employees by holding regular workshops, making them aware of
various legal provisions in the conduct of businesses. It was also felt that collective education of secretaries among various government departments would go a long way in inter-weaving the ministries.

The panelists made a number of key suggestions towards better governance which could find place in the final paper. However, it was largely agreed upon that recommendation made in the chapter on Governance should resonate with recommendations made in the other chapters of the ‘India Vision 2025’ document.

Report Prepared by Mr. Sanjay Kumar