Editor’s Note

In the month of March 2022 Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) organized six expert group interactions with most of them being hybrid, the interaction of the strategic discussions group on the Ukraine crisis are for the first time being included in the report. All the interactions covered the most current of topics in the world and the region i.e Ukraine and Pakistan’s political scene, with their ramifications to the various countries, their groupings, regions and to India specifically. This edition contains views on issues affecting USA, Europe, Pakistan, the Indo-Pacific and West Asia.

In the West Asia experts group meeting discussions was on how the structure of global politics is changing and is impact on Israel’s role in the West Asian region. Thus the focus was on Israel’s increasing engagement in West Asia and impact of Ukraine Crisis on the region. The key speaker in the session was Amb. Dore Gold, President, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

The meeting of the Pakistan study group (PSG) was held in a hybrid format and the agenda’s main items were: Imran Khan’s position-Revolt in the PTI, position of allies, Imran Khan’s options, Civil-
Military relations, Opposition- No Confidence Motion, and the ‘Accidental’ launch of missile.

The Strategic group discussions on the Ukraine crisis over two meetings discussed a range of issues comprehensively affecting and touched by the crisis. The diversity and depth of views presented in both the interactions enriched the discussions. The first meeting held on 15th March was to review the ongoing developments and to deliberate on the future trajectories of the evolving geopolitical situation. While the second one was held on 25th March and was geared towards assessing and reviewing the impact of the ongoing conflict on several geopolitical and economic facets. It is a must read to understand the various actions of players through an Indian prism.

The Indo-Pacific expert group in its virtual discussions focussed on the ongoing Russia- Ukraine war and analysed its implications for India and the Indo-Pacific. Some of the discussion points was on how Russia is losing its international clout and goodwill by the angst against its actions and the humanitarian costs. Apparently, in the course of its military actions, the Ukrainian resistance was stronger than Russia’s expectations. The Russian military’s momentum has slowed down. To its credit, Russia had genuine security concerns, a convincing narrative to blame the West’s policies that precipitated this war.

The China experts group in its first hybrid format post March 2020 held discussions on “Bilateral and Multilateral implications of China–Russia relations in the Ukraine context as also its implications on India”. The China factor in Ukraine – Russian military conflict, which started on February 24, 2022, is a landmark global event with implications for the future world order and the situation is still developing. The ongoing military conflict in its second month
might become a global conflict and the Chinese role in this Russia-Ukraine military conflict has multiple implications. Russia, China and India are engaged through multilateral platforms like RIC, BRICS, AIIB and SCO, which are ignored by western media. The military standoff between Russia and Ukraine has brought a lot of uncertainty and has long term policy implications for India’s Foreign Policy. The discussion focused also on the impact of Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi’s visit to South Asian countries like India.

The coordinators and researchers associated with the expert and dialogue groups, think tanks and interactions have put unfaltering efforts to coordinate the meetings, to provide range and diversity of views as well as capture the discussion for the reports.

Naval Jagota

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Israel’s engagements in West Asia and beyond

Prepared by Hirak Jyoti Das

The West Asia Experts Group Meeting was virtually held on 7 March 2022 by the Vivekananda International Foundation, the discussion was focussed on “Israel’s increasing engagement in West Asia and impact of Ukraine Crisis on the region”. The key speaker in the session was Amb. Dore Gold, President, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; members attending and contributing were Amb. Anil Trigunayat (Coordinator); Prof. Kingshuk Chatterjee; Dr. Meena Singh Roy; Vice Admiral Satish Soni; Amb. Sanjay Singh, Lt. Gen. Ravi Sawhney and Director, VIF Dr. Arvind Gupta.

Israel’s Growing Role in the Region

The structure of global politics is changing that has deeply impacted Israel’s role in the West Asian region. Israel in the recent years has made significant inroads in the region formalising ties with key Arab states. Israel and Gulf states are united in their efforts in thwarting Iran’s growing capabilities in ballistic missiles. The rapid developments in Iran’s missile programme have forced Israel to rethink its missiles capacity and increase the range to cover Iran and other parts of the region. Israel is also cautious about Iran’s support for the Houthi movement in Yemen. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp. (IRCG)’s military integration with Houthis has major
security implications in the Red Sea and East African region directly affecting Israel’s security. Israel is highly concerned about the emerging Shiite Crescent allowing Iranian presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. It would be difficult for US to de-prioritise the region which would continue to remain strategically relevant due to Iran’s assertive posture. With regards to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) talks, it is closely monitoring the on-going developments. For Israel, the 2015 nuclear deal did not satisfy its security concerns and loopholes in terms of clauses of the agreement continue to remain in the present discussion. Israel is also seeking to strengthen arms control mechanism for Iran to limit its capacity to further develop its missile programme.

Besides West Asia, Israel is deeply invested to forge strategic engagement with African states to strengthen the security architecture. Israeli leaders have met with dignitaries from Uganda, Rwanda, Chad, Guinea etc. Among the African states, Algeria due to its strong support for pan-Arab sentiments and South Africa’s opposition to occupation of Palestinian territories have acted as stumbling blocks for Israel. Israel over the years however has managed to develop cordial ties with South Africa. Israel is also seeking to forge ties with South-East Asian states especially Indonesia and Singapore.

**Israel’s Position on Russia-Ukraine Conflict**

Israel in the early stages of the conflict expressed worry but avoided referring Russia as responsible for the crisis. It intended to maintain low profile. For Israel, the safety of large Jewish communities in Russia and Ukraine is a chief concern and in fact it has allowed the entry of Ukrainian Jews after conflict began in late February. Israel is dependent on coordination with Russia to enter Syrian airspace and neutralise bases of Iranian backed militias. Israel therefore enjoys warm ties with not only the US but also Russia and it is seeking to assume a mediating role to resolve the conflict. It is likely that Israel could engage in Shuttle diplomacy in the
coming days in case it is accepted as a credible mediator by all sides.

**India’s Foray in the Region**

Israel is one of the biggest proponents of India’s growing role in the region. The Abraham Accord should be seen as an opportunity by India to strengthen its cooperation in technology, arms production, trade, investments etc. Lastly, India should capitalise on the decreasing US profile in the region and attempt to fill the role.
Well over fifteen days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the VIF strategic discussions group convened on 15 March 2022 to review the ongoing developments and to deliberate on the future trajectories of the evolving geopolitical situation. The discussion was moderated by Dr. Arvind Gupta, Director VIF and was attended by Amb. P.S Raghavan, Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma, Lt. Gen. Ravi K. Sawhney, Gen. N.C. Vij and Brig. Vinod Anand.

The key takeaways that emerged from the ensuing discussion are presented below:

**American Rebalancing and a Divided Europe**

The European security architecture has been in flux and the varying geopolitical strategies and grandstanding by countries pursuing their interests in the region has finally brought down this house of cards.

The Biden-Putin summit of June 2021 was an expression of American rebalancing which reflected a change in course from targeting Russia to focusing on China and disengaging from unnecessary conflicts in Europe and West Asia. Putin had been seeking security guarantees around the Russian periphery, with the main concern regarding neutralizing Ukraine militarily to maximize Russia’s security. This was more or less agreed upon between Biden and Putin and the subsequent talks illustrated that; both
states recorded great forward movement, particularly in the realms of strategic stability dialogue and cyber cooperation. To everyone’s surprise, Washington also turned course and advanced support for the Minsk Agreement. However, this change of course was short-lived. The strong Eastern European lobbies in Washington were disgruntled by the reversal in the course and subsequently applied pressure to revert to the status quo. The British destroyers entering the Black Sea, Turkish supplied drones attacking Donbas and the extensive training of the Ukrainian militia further contributed to the rising tensions.

This war arose largely because of a divided Europe and these fundamental divisions continue to persist. President Macron has been stressing strategic autonomy for Europe for quite some time now. The security architecture in Europe is in churn and the presently unipolar Europe may not last.

From 2003 onwards, America’s geopolitical and commercial interests have been to divide Europe. This can be attributed to the Iraq war wherein the ‘Old Europe’ opposed American action whereas the ‘New Europe’ spearheaded by Poland vehemently rose in its support. Since then, the US has wanted to consolidate Eastern and Central Europe to maintain pressure on Russia while shifting the centre of gravity of Europe from the Franco-German regions to the eastern part. Ever since it became a member of the EU in 2004, Poland has been working towards increasing its influence within the EU which happens to suit American interests as well. Therefore, American strategy has been geared towards including Ukraine within the eastern bloc and ensuring its membership in the EU in order to balance France and Germany in terms of voting strength within the EU. This is a strategy that the Americans have pursued from 2003 onwards in a systematic manner irrespective of changing administrations.

Biden’s move towards rebalancing was a major step away from this American strategy which unsurprisingly caused great domestic pushback from Congress, the military establishment and the Pentagon. Both Poland and Ukraine have a sizeable constituency in America in addition to a strong
Jewish lobby which further propelled the push back to this shift in strategy.

**Situating China**

China seems to be wary of western intentions of regime change in Russia as Putin presently suits Chinese interests and purposes. Also, any sudden change of guard within Russia will create domestic chaos or the new setup in Russia may happen to give more concessions to the west, which can pose problems for China’s interests. It is important to note that the Chinese are doing a lot of work with port construction in Ukraine while working towards developing the Trans-Eurasian railway therefore their interest in Ukraine is at par with their interests in Russia.

China is continuing to maintain a nuanced position. This conflict brings to the fore the question of security in Central Asia, with a possible reduced role opening space for increased Chinese involvement in the region. India has so far preferred a predominant Russian presence in the region. Also, a weakened Russia can result in possible Chinese action in Siberia. In such a situation, China can de facto take over these areas and subsequently emerge as a hydropower superpower. This is an even more concerning situation than a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

**Whither India?**

Within its current balanced approach, India should maximize opportunities and take advantage of the developing situation wherever possible. Wheat presents such an opportunity for India at the moment with Russia being the world’s largest wheat exporter and Ukraine at the 5th position; an impending steep hike in wheat prices is on the horizon. India needs to manage the emerging situation carefully and focus on not depleting its buffers. Similarly, there are several business opportunities as well; however, it is quite probable that India’s highly risk-averse businesses may not capitalize on these opportunities. Thus, in addition to India’s public stand, there is a need to educate domestic businesses as well. There is a lesson to be learnt for India from Russia’s abject lack of perception management as
it is also seemingly lacking in that department.

As a holder of a large volume of Russian military hardware, India will need to assess the impact of the conflict on this dependence; the supplies and support of this hardware may get impacted if Russia focuses on supplies for itself. Additionally, the efficacies of the present systems also need to be carefully assessed. The effects of India’s balanced approach via its abstention in international platforms on matters regarding Russia will need to be watched out for. It may impact India’s economic and diplomatic interactions with key partners.

Akin to Europe post-cold war which is yet to be established, East Asia also continues to be in churn. The present scenario with the American security umbrella over Japan, South Korea and Australia, now turned against China, is not entirely sustainable.

**Assessing the Russian Military Operation**

*The Russo-Ukraine war is not indiscriminate; rather, it is a discriminate war.*

Russia’s political-military objectives of its action in Ukraine include de-Nazification, de-militarization and the neutralization of the Ukrainian armed forces. The lack of relative success in Mariupol and Donbas for Russia can be attributed to the fact that the region forms the crux of the fighting potential of the Ukraine army. Mariupol is held entirely by the Azov battalion whereas the Donbas battalion is located at Donbas with the Dnipro battalion in support. It is important to note that these units are mostly populated with ultra-right, neo-nazis and have previously been charged by the UN OHCHR for war crimes, mass lootings, unlawful detention, torture and even rapes.

It is important to determine whether Russia’s main plan and objective was for an all-out war or simply coercion using limited combat war? In the scenario of an all-out war, Russia would have had to force a change in the government with the destruction of the ultra-right forces largely based in
Donbas and the eastern suburbs.

There is also an issue regarding the concept of the application of force. Determining the quantum of force an aggressor requires to apply is also a vital factor. For instance, even though Russia is ranked 2nd on the global firepower index, Ukraine seems to be relatively relieved with restricted use of Russian combat power. Russia has seemingly opted for military coercion coupled with discriminate use of force thus vying for early capitulation and presenting Ukraine with alternative sources of action. It appears to be a determined choice by Russia to not use its full combat power.

Assessing the Russian military action so far, on the southern side Russia seems to have succeeded in fulfilling its objectives. Russia wanted to break out of Crimea by establishing a land bridge. This bridge, in addition to a railroad bridge, has been successfully established.

The much-touted amphibious landings, speculated early in February have not taken place. On the Donbas side, except for the first operation that the Russians carried out a week prior to 24 February, the progress has been excruciatingly slow. The distance between Crimea and Donbas is roughly 300 km. And the Russians are facing a tough time creating a link via this region largely due to the units stationed there giving Russian troops a tough fight. As far as Kyiv is concerned, it is safe to assume that Russia will not like to attempt a capture of the entire city to not repeat the Grozny debacle of 1994.

In the 20 days of the war, there has been no involvement in irregular warfare and urban warfare. No trains have been destroyed so far, and continue to move freely from Mariupol to Kyiv. There have been no instances of the internet being shut down or reported cyber-attacks from either side. The lack of Russian employment of cyberwarfare is quite striking when compared to past instances wherein Russia successfully brought down communication systems in countries like Estonia by simply bombarding them with emails.
It is apparent that Russia is not interested in the regions west of the Dnipro River. They haven’t closed any borders and have maintained focus on developing the land bridge to Crimea from Donbas while targeting the Azov, Donbas and Aidar battalions, and restoring water supplies to Crimea.

There is de-confliction between the ground surface-to-air missile batteries, a glaring lack of PGMs and a limited number of pilots. Despite the de-confliction, the Russian air force is quite capable and has the capacity of establishing air superiority if they want to do so, but by not doing so they may have weakened their deterrent capacities against NATO; an aspect that needs to be studied further.

The much-feared Russian army has largely failed to overwhelm the relatively smaller and poorly trained Ukrainian armed forces and there seems to be a heavy loss of several vehicles and tanks.

There were also several logistical weaknesses, issues in maintenance, poor communication, losses in men and material, inadequate tactics and poor techniques and procedures. There also seem to be serious integration issues, at the level of the ground and the air force and even amongst the ground forces. Thus, there is an abject lack of coordination evident at the joint forces level and between the army and the air force.

The Ukraine government’s unwavering resolve and strength have taken Russia by surprise. The Ukraine government has shown more strength, with the three battalions in the eastern regions giving the Russian troops a stiff fight. In addition to this, the Russian speaking population has not come in support of the Russian forces.

**What happens Next?**

It is highly unlikely that Russian forces will vacate the southern areas as the Crimean land corridor was a primary objective and has been stressed as vital to sustaining Crimea.
The Russians may invariably have to concentrate on the replenishment of their equipment, machinery and defence manufacturing thus impacting Indian preparedness in terms of receiving spare parts, servicing and pending equipment supplies. Some frigates may also be in trouble as the turbines primarily come from Ukraine.

There is also the superficial possibility of the West capitalizing on this opportunity to destabilize Russia from within and overthrow Putin.

Irrespective of the outcome, it is crucial to focus on the Russian dependency on China; will the unfolding scenario increase the dependence or will the two be pushed apart? This is an aspect that needs to be assessed further.

As far as Russia’s objective of demilitarization is concerned, they seem keen on removing all military installations and equipment from Ukraine. In case of a settlement or ceasefire, they will seek to put some limits on the number of armed forces and equipment in Ukraine. Ideally, Russia will prefer a Ukraine left with only a national guard instead of armed forces. However, there are continued arms transfers from western countries geared toward countering this Russian strategy. Thus, demilitarization will be tough to handle bilaterally between them, as long as the supplies continue.

The contours of a negotiated settlement should be clear before a ceasefire is announced. However, a snag here is that the very contours of a negotiated settlement cannot be clear without the clear participation of some vital external players. Thus, a bilaterally negotiated settlement may not be entirely successful and viable.

This negotiated settlement will also have to involve the United States as the greater war is between Russia and the US/NATO. Their involvement is imperative for a lasting solution. Unless there is direct or indirect involvement of the US in a negotiated settlement, the Russians will not be in a position to withdraw.

As the war expands and extends further, there seem to be no easy solutions for Putin.
The VIF organized a Strategic Discussion on the Review of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict on 25 March 2022 via hybrid-mode, with some participants joining in via web conferencing while the others attended the discussion physically at the VIF. The discussion was moderated by Dr Arvind Gupta who also delivered the opening remarks. Discussants included Amb. Kanwal Sibal, Amb. Arun K. Singh, Akshay Mathur, Amb. P.S. Raghavan, Gp. Capt. Naval Jagota, Brig. Vinod Anand, Dr. Gulshan Rai, AM Anil Khosla, Adm. GirishLuthra and Lt. Gen. R. K Sawhney. A month into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this discussion was geared towards assessing and reviewing the impact of the ongoing conflict on several geopolitical and economic facets.

Some key takeaways that emerged from the ensuing discussion have been encapsulated below:

**Situating the West**

Several European leaders strongly believe that the European security order is undergoing a decisive and lasting change. The conflict in Ukraine is likely to persist for some time and there seems to be no going back to the pre-February 24 situation. Europe will inadvertently be defining its relationship with Russia differently which will have subsequent global consequences. While they are supplying Ukraine with defensive weapons,
the greater effort is geared towards actively preventing the outbreak of a full-fledged war in Eastern Europe between Russia and NATO.

The process of economic decoupling from Russia has gained further momentum. However, Europe continues to be largely dependent on Russian oil and gas due to the threat of massive loss in jobs and inflation in case of an abrupt stoppage of these energy supplies. Thus, the economic situation is quite complex and needs to be carefully navigated. Nonetheless, in the longer-term perspective, they are looking to significantly curb imports and make a permanent shift to other viable alternatives. In a nutshell, presently Europe is primarily focusing on reducing energy dependence on Russia from a medium and long term perspective and finalizing its financial decoupling from Russia.

An important aspect of this process is generating pressure on China. It is believed that Russia will be looking toward China to compensate for the challenges they are presently facing and the Chinese may capitalize on this opportunity. Hence, a constant parallel effort is in motion to generate pressure on China wherein if China appears to be stepping in to help Russia, it would face secondary sanctions and corresponding reputational damage within Europe.

At the outset of the American-led Indo-Pacific strategy, Europe was a reluctant partner and came on board relatively later. It is only recently that Europe is becoming wary of China and in the present context, if China happens to emerge as a rival akin to Russia, their approach to China could witness a distinct shift, particularly in the economic realm. In the long run, whatever challenges the economic links with Russia pose today, the links with China will pose tomorrow. With this, there is a parallel effort to see to what extent Europe can influence China’s behaviour.

The invasion has also led to further consolidation of NATO and the Trans-Atlantic partnership. NATO operational readiness and presence in Eastern Europe has seen some key enhancements; in addition to the existing four
battle-ready groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, four more have been added, totalling eight groups spreading across the four states. European leaders are now increasingly projecting a prime objective of a strategic defeat of Russia and a definitive change within the leadership. From their perspective, moving forward after the conflict and working with Putin and his government seems like an increasingly abhorrent situation. Several statements coming from the West have repeatedly stated that they seek a strategic defeat of President Putin. The argument also stems from underlying anxiety regarding what next could be inflicted upon the European security order.

In stark contrast to Russian expectations, the Zelenskyy-led Ukraine government has garnered a lot of support and sympathy from the West. Zelenskyy has been given access to the parliaments of several EU countries and Ukraine has also officially applied for the EU membership. Thus, the political structure in Ukraine has sharply increased its cooperation with both the EU and NATO, which is quite contrary to the Russian objectives.

**The Tale of the Two Scenarios**

There are two scenarios that can emerge at the culmination of the current crisis. In the first scenario, Russia is able to sustain its efforts and is eventually able to establish a presence in all of Ukraine. Even if over time some Ukrainians emerge who are willing to work with the Russians, there will continue to be expected challenges to the Russian presence on the ground. In this scenario, the West will find it increasingly difficult to politically engage with that structure and with Russia which controls the structure. Consequently, growing polarisation in the European context and a growing sense of confrontation at the global level can be expected.

In the second scenario, if the Russian effort doesn’t sustain there will be significant consequences both within Russia and in the framework of its periphery. In either situation, short of a major transformation in Russia, eventually, the West will work with whatever structures and leaders are
present in Russia.

Unless the bilateral negotiations between Russia and Ukraine succeed, this conflict is likely to go on. Any chances of success in the negotiations are primarily dependent on the US in addition to Poland, Baltic States and the other East European countries. It has become increasingly apparent that Washington is currently seeing a clear opportunity to bring about regime change in Russia.

**Whither India?**

For India, the challenge is great and is set to increase even further. It has critical equities on both sides; in addition to the equities with the Russian side, India also has significant equities with the US. A major reordering of the global supply chains has been on the horizon for some time now, with growing concerns regarding China and its critical position within the supply chains. While these concerns were sparked earlier, the pandemic and the Ukraine conflict have further accelerated the processes for moving towards alternative resilient supply chains. It will be ideal for India to focus on reaping benefits from the reordering of the global supply chains, an opportunity that India had missed out on earlier.

The inflow of capital is another aspect that will be impacted by the geopolitical uncertainties caused by the invasion. Global capital tends to shy away in the face of uncertainty, and thus capital is bound to leave India for safer havens in the West. Foreign Direct Investment is very important for India as it influences the prices of commodities which in turn has a direct impact on India’s current account balance and inflation.

As far as Indian trade goes, there are several Russian banks that are still functioning and trade routes that are continuing to operate via Abu Dhabi. A number of Indian businesses are increasingly seeing greater enquiries from Russia and it is imperative that India takes full advantage of these emerging opportunities. There are several sectors in Russia that haven’t been sanctioned yet, and where trade can continue to persist. Thus there
are several opportunities within the large sanctions regime, ripe for capitalization.

**The Economic Impact**

**The Sanctions Imposed**

There have been two kinds of sanctions that have been imposed, one by the Europeans and the other by the Americans. The Europeans have already sanctioned 877 oligarchs and 62 entities in multiple phases. They have also banned their capital markets from Russian use, as the Russians use European capital markets to raise debt and equity. Additionally, they have also banned Russian central banks. Financing via RDIF has been banned in addition to any Euro related transactions with Russia. On the trade front, there has been a suspension of the MFN status, a ban on iron, steel and the export of luxury goods. Whether Russia will be mooted out of the WTO is a development that will have to be seen. It is important to note that while Russia has been banned from SWIFT and several of its key banks have also been banned; Sberbank, which is used to make payments for Russian energy, primarily used by Europe, has still not been banned.

The American sanctions have also taken place across different phases; they have also banned several important Russian banks and have even gone one step further by disallowing Russian companies from doing IPOs and raising loans.

In the latest set of sanctions, there has also been a ban on virtual currency and cryptocurrency.

With respect to the ban on semi-conductors, telecommunications and hi-tech industry, the West has also received support from the East Asian economies in order to ensure that the supply chains are entirely blocked off.
Reactions of the Business Community

The scale of the business response has been unprecedented. Financial services such as Visa and MasterCard were the first to disconnect. The revocation from Microsoft is also a significant development as Russia uses a lot of Microsoft computers. International stock exchanges have also stopped trading. In a surprising and notable move, Jaguar which is owned by TATA has also stopped their sales. Several Korean and Japanese companies have followed the same trend.

The revocation by Big Oil, with Shell exiting its 27.5 per cent stake in the Sakhalin 2 and BP exiting its 20 per cent stake in Gazprom is a notable development, the financial implications of which will have to be watched out for. While Chinese banks have also stopped transactions, this restriction has not been extended to Yuan transactions.

Russian Central Bank Reserves

Russia has 630B USD worth of reserves out of which, 463B is in currency and 132B is in gold. While the gold is safe in Russian vaults, 60 per cent of the currency is in USD. For all practical purposes that is never going to be made available to Russia. 16-14 per cent of the currency is also in Yuan (RMB) which will be available to Russia. Therefore, approximately 90 per cent of the reserves are currently not available to them to support their economy. It is important to note that, Russia is a net creditor in the international markets as it owns more assets outside of its borders than others own in Russia. The large numbers of assets abroad make it much easier to sanction and seize by foreign governments.

Russia and China have a currency swap agreement which was renewed in 2017 for 20.5B. However, 50 per cent of Russia-China trade is always settled in dollars, it has so far never been settled entirely in Yuan. In the current situation, Russia will need Yuan to support the rest of the 50 per cent. There is a very narrow window between the 13-14 per cent of reserves and the currency swap of 25B, via which China can actually assist Russia.
in terms of finance.

As energy makes up 60 per cent of Russian exports, recently Putin has asked that these exports be paid for in Roubles. This will directly boost a rapidly weakening Rouble and will help support the Russian economy. This is a very interesting development as its enforcement can potentially hold Europe hostage.

Impact on Region and Global Economy

The elevated prices of commodities like gas, titanium, palladium, oil, aluminium and nickel directly impact several key downstream industries. Russia and Ukraine form 25 per cent of global wheat exports and 15 per cent of global corn exports. There are going to be further supply disruptions which will inadvertently further increase the risk of recession and global inflation.

The help for Ukraine and Moldova has been unprecedented, institutions like EBRD, EIB, IMF and World Bank, have put together impressive packages. EBRD and EIB have put 2B Euros each while the IMF has put out a package of 1.4B USD. This has been a relatively rapid response which goes to show how quickly they have been galvanized by the ongoing situation.

In a surprising move, both AIIB and MDB, where Russia is a key member, have put out statements calling for a temporary hold in their operations in Russia.

This is the first time that one is seeing economic sanctions levied against a G20 country, which is well integrated into the global economy, thus the implications and ramifications of this are new to the entire world.

Trade between Europe and Russia has been on a declining trend since 2014, this trend will perhaps be hastened in the energy sector. It is important to note that in addition to the Rouble, several Central Asian countries’ currencies closely linked to the Rouble have also depreciated.
Impact on the Energy Markets

A direct consequence of the crisis and sanctions that have followed has been on the energy markets. The future shape and trajectory of the global energy markets is cloudy. In the long run, European and American efforts will be geared toward denying Russian energy access to the global markets. The impact of Europe’s search for alternatives on the global energy markets will have to be assessed. US energy producers that may enter the markets at higher price levels will certainly rejoice if Russian energy happens to be pushed out. However, Russia will also stand to gain profits with prevailing higher prices. Thus, the energy picture at the moment is highly complex and will have to be monitored closely.

The Cyber-security Aspects

There are four aspects of technology and cyber operation between Russia and Ukraine; one is the supply of technological items, especially critical items like semiconductors. The second aspect is information warfare, the third is cyber-attacks, and the fourth is infrastructure. It is important to note that technology supply to Russia is largely from the West. 35 per cent of Russian tanks in Ukraine are currently immobile due to semiconductor failures, in response to which the Chinese have come forward and agreed to supply the requisite chips. The entire Russian technological communication equipment is of Chinese origin and the Russians increasingly feel that they need to upgrade to more sophisticated chips of 7-10 nm. It is only a matter of time before the Russian communication systems also begin to suffer.

Cyberwarfare between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing since 2014. Both parties have been attacking each other’s critical infrastructure. In light of the power grid attack by the Russians in 2016, Ukraine has been taking assistance from NCSCGSQ and both America and Europe to protect their infrastructure from future Russian attacks.

Prior to the 24 February invasion, there were some visible cyber-attacks on the arctic submarine cable which has since then been monitored by
the US and the Five Eyes countries. A major incident since 1 March has been on the satellite ground station of Ukraine and Germany where more than 30000 connections were impacted; the biggest impact being on the Ukrainian army intelligence. It must be noted that the so far Russians haven't gone on to disturb the internet, as they usually do. Ukraine has also carried out equally sophisticated cyber-attacks. The Ukrainian army has recruited about 2200 volunteers for carrying out cyber-attacks on the Russian army, indicative of the fact that Ukraine in collusion with the West has been actively planning effective cyber-attacks.

In terms of information warfare, Ukraine has decisively come out on the top as they have successfully carried forward their narrative via social media. They have been fully assisted by the West in this aspect.

**Conclusion**

Russia has made it very clear that they want Crimea to be recognized as part of Russia in addition to the recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics. They want Ukraine to be neutralized, denazified and demilitarized. They have explicitly stated that the occupation of Ukraine is not their objective. The primary objective is to get these guarantees.

From indication so far, it will be very difficult for president Putin to compromise on any of the demands and similarly on the other hand the US doesn't seem inclined to accept these demands. Stuck in the limbo of this strategic quandary, the current situation is expected to continue for some time.

The US is working towards a strategic defeat of Russia and is gradually going for the jugular. This brings to the fore a vital question, if Russia is defeated, what’s next? There is simply no guarantee that a regime change in Russia will play up to the expectations and ambitions of the West.

In this bubbling geo-political and geo-economic hotpot, it has become
increasingly pertinent that India undertakes a clear cut and comprehensive assessment of the overall situation.
Pakistan: Imran Khan and Political Crisis!

Prepared by Aakriti Vinayak

A meeting of the Pakistan Study Group (PSG) was held in a hybrid mode on 21st March 2022. The agenda’s main items were: Pakistan—Imran Khan’s position—Revolt in the PTI, position of allies, Imran Khan’s options, Civil–Military relations, Opposition—No Confidence Motion, ‘Accidental’ launch of missile.

The Meeting was attended by the following: Shri Arvind Gupta, Amb Satish Chandra, Amb Tca Raghavan, Ms. Shalini Chawla, Shri CD Sahay, Shri Sushant Sareen, Amb DP Srivastava, Amb G Parthasarathy, Lt Gen Ravi Sawhney(retd), Lt Gen Ata Hasnain(retd), Brig Rahul Bhonsle(retd), Shri Tilak Devasher, and Gp. Capt. Naval Jagota.

Pakistan

Imran Khan’s Position

A series of interesting developments took place in the month of March in Pakistan. On the internal front Pakistan is midst of an escalating political crisis. Imran Khan government seems to be on the edge of collapse. There is a strong wave against him. The opposition is united as around 100 lawmakers from the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML–N) and Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) submitted the no-confidence motion before the National Assembly Secretariat on March 8, accusing the Pakistan Tehreek–e–Insaf (PTI) government led by Khan for mishandling the economy and the
spiraling inflation in the country. It is pertinent to note that the opposition needs 172 votes in 342-member National Assembly to unseat Khan. It is clear that the odds are stacked against Imran Khan, as there is dissidence within the PTI. Dozens of PTI MNAs came out in open defiance against the ruling party ahead of the no-confidence motion vote in the National Assembly. Further there are reports suggesting that a “substantial” number of PTI legislators, housed in the Sindh House in Islamabad, are widely believed to vote against their own party exercising the “conscience vote”.

Civil military relations remain tensed, as Army, which earlier maintained a neutral position with regards to Imran Khan, has also turned against him. As far as the reports are concerned Pakistan army has asked Imran Khan to resign after the OIC conference. Pressure is building up against Imran Khan, as it is quite clear that the no confidence motion will take place probably on 27th or 28th March 2022. However he is trying all the tactics to muzzle his critics as there was passage in the National Assembly of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes (Amendment) Act (PECA) 2022 by Ordinance. In order to bolster the domestic support he is also planning to hold a public rally on 27th March 2022.

Uncertainty prevails over the political future of Pakistan. However one thing is clear that transition is going to be messy. Whether Imran Khan resigns, fresh elections take place in national assembly or he is ousted through no confidence motion, there are going to be tough decisions to be made ahead on Pakistan’s economy and security. Pakistan political future is fraught with risks. Especially on the economic front with both IMF and FATF swords hanging on Pakistan’s head the future seems hazy.

**Accidental Launch of Missile**

On 9th March 2022, an Indian missile, reportedly a BrahMos, crossed into Pakistani territory and landed at a location called Mian Channu, in Khanewal district, 124 kilometers away in Pakistan. The incident came to light when Pakistan’s Director General Inter Services Public Relations
Aakriti Vinayak

(ISPR) wing Director General Maj. Gen. Babar Iftikhar said that “a high speed flying object” came from India and landed in Pakistani territory slightly before 7:00 pm local time. The statement read - “On March 9, at 6:43pm, a high-speed flying object was picked up inside the Indian territory by the Air Defence Operations Centre of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). From its initial course, the object suddenly maneuvered towards Pakistani territory and violated Pakistan’s airspace, ultimately falling near Mian Channu at 6:50pm”.

India responded timely and a day and a half later released an official statement stating, “On March 9, 2022, in the course of routine maintenance, a technical malfunction led to the accidental firing of a missile. It is learnt that the missile landed in an area of Pakistan. The government has taken serious view and ordered a high-level court of inquiry”.

On March 15, in the Indian Parliament, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said that the Indian government is taking a ‘serious view’ of the lapse that led to the firing and has ordered a high-level inquiry, as well as a review of SOPs for ‘operations, maintenance, and inspection’ of systems.

However it should also be taken into account that India-Pakistan relations remain on the lowest ebb. Though both sides handled the situation maturely, the incident could have led to escalation between India and Pakistan. Though India and Pakistan have instituted some measures to mitigate dangers from military accidents there needs to be dialogue on such critical issues to prevent misunderstandings and misinterpretations and promote a stable environment of peace and security.
Russia- Ukraine war, its implications for India and the Indo-Pacific

Prepared by Amruta Karambelkar

The Indo-Pacific Experts Group of the Vivekananda International Foundation met on 24 March in hybrid mode. The meeting was chaired by Vice Adm Anil Chopra (Retd) and the attendees included Dr Arvind Gupta, Lt Gen Ravi Sawhney (Retd), Amb Anil Wadhwa, Amb Deepa Wadhwa, Mr Anil Devli, Dr Harinder Sekhon, Amb Skand Tayal, Gp Capt Naval Jagota, and Cdr Shashank Sharma. The objective of the meeting was to discuss the ongoing Russia- Ukraine war and analyse its implications for India and the Indo-Pacific.

Analysis of Russia’s actions

Russia is losing its international clout and goodwill, there is an angst against its actions and the humanitarian costs cannot be ignored. Apparently, in the course of its military actions, the Ukrainian resistance was stronger than Russia’s expectations. The Russian military’s momentum has slowed down. To its credit, Russia had genuine security concerns, a convincing narrative to blame the West’s policies that precipitated this war. But Putin has attacked without a clear strategy with no end game in sight. Russia’s military and political objectives are unclear. It is difficult to justify Russia’s actions from a humanitarian perspective. All the Indian journalists that have returned from Ukraine have nothing positive to say about Russia. This shows the negative perception of Russia among those who have been
on the ground.

With respect to the Russia air force, the ratio of 1:11 is in its favour. The events were orchestrated in a manner so as to not utilise its assets fully. Not all Russian assets are of high magnitude as are generally made to believe. On the question of quantum of precision warfare, historically Russia has deployed only 1-1.5 per cent precision weapons in its previous campaigns, hence there is a clear issue of constraints arising out of either capabilities, or technology or the willingness. Russia lacks technological sophistication. There was no coherent and cogent execution of political goals, which is a lesson for India too. Russia is likely to emerge weaker from this war.

The larger impact is that Putin’s action has led him to be more dependent on China economically, politically and diplomatically. Though the tilt to China has been shaping up for a while. Biden’s actions of demonising Russia; and the anti-Russia psyche is very deep in the West, hence Russia’s closeness to China is a build-up, not just caused by the Ukraine issue.

**Eurasian Response and Larger Global Impact**

The US and NATO will continue to raise economic costs for Russia but any measure on energy seems unlikely. Likewise, the US/NATO would continue to strengthen Ukrainian defences. The question arises is if any negotiations between Russia and Ukraine will cover sanctions.

When it comes to Europe, attention should be paid to Germany and this might be the single most significant development of the ongoing crisis. Germany has begun to re-arm itself; and two decades later one may witness a Germany-dominated Europe, and possibly a multipolar world with a weakened Russia, a strong US, a strong; German-dominated Europe and a very strong China.

From a systemic point of view, the old days of the Cold War have returned. The Western countries will keep ganging up against Russia in the UN and G-20. India may bevel at Western hypocrisy but it can do little given its
Russia- Ukraine war, its implications for India and the Indo-Pacific

economic and security imperatives. If the world turns unipolar, India will have to adjust suitably.

As far as positions of other regions are concerned, Central Asian countries are unhappy with the war. The response from UAE and Saudi Arabia was predictable given the state of their relations with Biden’s US. US is reverting its policy when it comes to Iran and Venezuela. US has reached out to Venezuela just as it has to Iran with the aim of offsetting the energy disruption; but how it plays out is unpredictable.

**China, Southeast Asia and others**

China’s role in this situation has come under scrutiny, over the speculation that Beijing had knowledge about Moscow’s military plan. China is in a dilemma, it also wants to maintain its relations with Europe in view of its strategic competition with the US, as well as with Russia since China has very few allies. Beijing will be concerned about collateral damage from the impact of sanctions on Russia. Russia-China partnership will continue over shared distrust over the existing world order. China’s ultimate interest lies in a quick resolution of this conflict.

The Ukraine war puts ASEAN members in a difficult situation. The organisation has still not set parameters for great power engagement. ASEAN countries have been sitting on the fence for as long as they could. It is getting increasingly marginalised. But in the process of balancing, the organisation is weakening, and great powers are offering lip service to ASEAN’s centrality. The US will continue to engage bilaterally in Southeast Asia. Eventually as great power politics intensifies, ASEAN will be divided by itself.

With respect to the impact on the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration would focus on AUKUS and the likes for regional security, the Quad has become a paper tiger of sorts. The Quad would nonetheless remain relevant to maintain pressure on China. China would also realise that action on Taiwan will invite repercussions (sanctions and more) and it is not in the
position to decouple from global economy. However, the Ukraine crisis has taught that logical or expected build-up of events can lead to unexpected outcomes. Therefore, the possibility of invasion of Taiwan cannot be ruled out.

There are opinions from Japan and South Korea that doubt American commitment to the region, and hence they argue for nuclear option for themselves. If this is ever realised then we would see six poles in the East Asia (US, Russia, the two Koreas, Japan and China) that would balance each other. This will be an explosive situation but people are talking about it. Generally, there is increasing pressure on countries that do not see the crisis in black or white.

**Indian Response to the War and, likely Implications for India**

Since 1950's it has been India’s policy of not naming and shaming any country, therefore, the stance on Russia is not an anomaly. India should continue its deft path. India’s statements are balanced, it has upheld the UN Charter and raised the issue of respecting territorial integrity and sovereignty but without condemning or voting against Russia. Nobody seems to castigate or be overly critical of India’s position. But pressures have been mounting on India, and it will increase more as Indian nationals have been evacuated from Ukraine. Yet, international pressure should not lead New Delhi to become paralysed, although, India has to worry about economic and technological fallout from this war and its impact on India. Some policy suggestions can be offered in the existing situation. India must continue its Indo-Pacific policies, without impinging on agenda of the Quad partners. India should engage with Russia on projects like the Chennai-Vladiivostok corridor without affecting its dynamics with Quad. India should ensure that the focus of the Indo-Pacific remains on China. India is in a unique position of being the only non-Western country to be in a group of US’s allies, and hence it can leverage its position to talk to ‘the other side’.
As an important Indo-Pacific power, India should evolve some strategies from the emerging situation. It is anticipated that as the situation develops further India's position will become more articulate. India should state that sanctions are acceptable to the extent of political messaging, but it cannot be destroying Russian economy. Sanctions affect ordinary people; women and children, hence India should speak on behalf of the affected and the voiceless. India must convert that while it understands power politics, it cannot turn a blind eye to human suffering.

The future of India–Russia ties post Ukraine war needs to be taken into account. India has been dependent on Russia for its military purchases but as Russia is embroiled in the war with high possibilities of its weakening, the question arises whether Russia can remain in the position to supply and maintain Indian war fighting capabilities. Russia is losing its technological edge. India has not been able to meet any of its economic goals with Russia. In the future, India should not continue its dependence on Russia, unless a cutting-edge technology like SSN/SSBN is offered. India has already begun to diversify its defence purchases from France and Israel, but that does not come cheap. Hence the ultimate solution is to become self-reliant in defence production. But self-reliance cannot be achieved absolutely. India may diversify defence procurement but its energy dependence cannot be wished away, hence those calculations will factor in its policy with respect to Russia.

Moreover, aside from contemporary geo-political pressure, as a civilisations state, India has an independent foreign policy and therefore India cannot ignore Russia. Despite its closeness with China, Russia had supplied spares during the Galwan crisis, Russia has also supported India in the UNSC. India cannot forget history, and needs to maintain a steady path. US’s friends keep changing; hence India’s policy should have consistency.

However, a critical perspective would raise the question whether India has genuine autonomy or strategic autonomy when it comes to Russia. Is it possible for India to take a stance against Russia on pure humanitarian
grounds? The other view is to examine what can be achieved by criticising Russia, and the answer is ‘nothing’. There is no clear benefit for New Delhi in calling out Russia.

**Ukraine war: observations and recommendations from the shipping sector**

The Black Sea has now become a de-facto Russian Lake. No cargo vessels are coming out of Ukraine. As a consequence of this war several ships and sailors are stuck; Russia has also attacked a few commercial ships from Moldova. The war has two fallouts for the seafaring community. One, many vessels have crew from both Russia and Ukraine, and managing these two nationalities on board is becoming very difficult due to tensions between these warring nationals. Second, many ports and airports have prohibited Russians from de-boarding, which has stranded Russians on board. Thus, self-sanctions are in place.

Prior to the war, the tanker market was in tatters because of over-supply, but now the situation has reversed with rising demand for tankers and chartered tankers because of sanctions and inability of Russian tankers to ply. Similarly, the demand for steel has increased, so the cost of vessel scrapping has gone as high as USD 700 for a tonne. In a positive development this will lead to old tonnage scrapped and new tonnage will enter the market. This will immensely benefit the shipping industry; particularly from China and South Korea that will gain from new tanker orders.

At 3000 vessels flagged under itself, the Russian merchant fleet forms 1.2 per cent of the global merchant shipping fleet. Besides, many ships are flagged under different nationalities but are actually leased by Russian financial companies. Such vessels are unable to find employment. The ‘classification of society to sail’ has been suspended for Russia, hence its ships cannot sail and thus are in the cold. This is a great opportunity for India to attract Russian investment. These ships are well-kept and trade-
able, and sanctions are not applicable to these. India can project to the US that Russian flagged vessels can be sold off to India to carry its trade, and can be also used for regional trade, for instance these vessels can be used to carry India’s trade to Africa, Iran, etc. Owing to container shortage, India must look at the opportunity to move Russian vessels under Indian flag.
The Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) organized a virtual discussion on “Bilateral and Multilateral implications of China–Russia relations in the Ukraine context as also its implications on India”. The discussion was moderated by Shri Ashok Kantha. The attendees were Shri Satish Chandra, Shri P. S. Raghavan, Dr. Arvind Gupta Director VIF, Prof Srikanth Kondapalli, Cmde Gopal Suri, Lt Gen Ravi Sawhney (Retd), Lt. Gen. SL Narasimhan (Retd), Air Marshal Rajesh Kumar (Retd), Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma (Retd), Brig Vinod Anand (Retd), Dr Sanjeev Kumar, Amb G Parthasarathy, Shri Jayadeva Ranade, Shri Anil Trigunayat, and Gp Capt Naval Jagota.

Introduction

The China factor in Ukraine – Russian military conflict, which started on February 24, 2022, is a landmark global event with implications for the future world order and the situation is still developing. The ongoing military conflict in its second month might become a global conflict and the Chinese role in this Russia-Ukraine military conflict has multiple implications. Russia, China and India are engaged through multilateral platforms like RIC, BRICS, AIIB and SCO, which are ignored by western media. The military standoff between Russia and Ukraine has brought a lot of uncertainty and has long term policy implications for India’s Foreign
Policy. The discussion organized focused on the China factor in Ukraine – Russian military conflict and its impact on foreign policy implications for India. There was also a focus on the impact of Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi’s visit to South Asian countries like India in March 2022.

**China Factor in Russia–Ukraine Military Conflict**

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a diplomatic concern for China and has put it in an awkward position, resulting in a number of complications in the management of foreign relations as well as in its domestic agenda especially in the context of the 20th Party Congress of CPC scheduled in 2022. Some indication may have been given by Russian President Putin to the Chinese President Xi Jinping on the Ukraine invasion during his visit to China in February 2022. There is also some amount of domestic criticism of the Chinese position on the Ukraine issue, which is challenging. Russia and China did not anticipate the developments in the world after the Ukraine invasion leading to the strengthening of the USA and consolidation of U.S. led alliances, especially of NATO in the European theatre. Chinese support for Russia will remain as it is extremely important in the contemporary situation because of pressure from U.S and the West. China has not voted with Russia in UNGA but at the same has also not condemned Russia. Chinese support for Russia is nuanced and articulates support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and diplomatic solutions to the Russia-Ukraine issue. However, in reality, Chinese position is heavily tilted towards Russia. Similarly, China is hoping that Russia comes out as a winner and some kind of accommodation is reached on the Ukraine issue. There are limitations of the Russia-China strategic partnership like Russia choosing to be neutral in the East China Sea dispute. China has advocated that European security should be resolved by Europeans and embraced the idea that European security should not target Moscow nor the neighbourhood. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has increased Russian dependency on China. The support for Russia at multilateral platforms is selective for China and based on the situation. China projects the concepts
of sovereignty and territorial integrity in all its dealings and talks about rule of law on international platforms. The Russian invasion of Ukraine runs counter to the Chinese focus on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In context of the Ukraine situation, China is in a difficult position with Europe as its engagement with Europe is of strategic importance. Ukraine issue has accelerated the trends of increasing negative perceptions in Europe of China and trade deal between China- EU is kept on the back burner. On the Taiwan issue, China is unlikely to open up a new front and in the interim maintain peaceful engagement with U.S. On the domestic front, stability is the watchword this year, when 20th Party Congress is scheduled in China.

The diplomatic position of China and India on Ukraine has some common elements such as the support for a peaceful and diplomatic solution, as well as support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, China has kept the root cause of the Ukraine conflict at the doorstep of U.S and West and argues that the legitimate interests of Russia must be respected and accommodated. It is very important for India to project its different perspective on the Ukraine issue from that of the Chinese position. India would like Russia not to move too close to China and thus Indian support for Russia should be carefully calibrated.

On the economic sanctions related to Ukraine issue, Chinese companies are not doing anything to circumvent the sanctions. China has talked about normal trade engagement with Russia but has not indicated any economic support. China doesn't want to get into a sanctions regime as China has a trade surplus of nearly 400 billion US $ with U.S in 2021.

Similarly, China-EU relations are not rosy. Europe’s perspective of China on the Ukraine conflict is interesting. The readouts of diplomatic meetings between the Chinese and Europeans don’t talk about Ukraine. EU is not fully on board with the American view of China as an adversary.
Chinese Foreign Minister visit to India

Post-Russian invasion of Ukraine, the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi’s to India in March 2022 was not a standalone visit. Prior to the visit China made a strange request that Wang Yi’s visit should not be announced. There maybe two reasons for this request the first to sow suspicion in the minds of U.S. and West that India and China are colluding on Ukraine issue and the second to create dissension within India that some secret deal is being negotiated. In addition to the wider world, China will try and show that it is doing business with India.

China would like to project that its relations with India are moving in a positive direction by having the Indian Prime Minister for BRICS and RIC summits, while in reality not accommodating Indian interests. India should avoid in-person participation in BRICS and RIC summits for a number of reasons. China’s support for the 2005 agreement with India and the traditional role of India in neighbouring countries should be examined and require further discussion. However, there is no change on the India-China border and three items on the agenda during the last two meetings between both countries are still there. India has conveyed very clearly to China that resolving the boundary issue will resolve all other issues without any dilution of its position during the Chinese Foreign Minister’s visit in March 2022.

Low-cost containment of India and equating with Pakistan is a priority for China and the Chinese connection with Pakistan requires a closer watch.
About the VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

The Vivekananda International Foundation is an independent non-partisan institution that conducts research and analysis on domestic and international issues, and offers a platform for dialogue and conflict resolution. Some of India’s leading practitioners from the fields of security, military, diplomacy, government, academia and media have come together to generate ideas and stimulate action on national security issues.

The defining feature of VIF lies in its provision of core institutional support which enables the organisation to be flexible in its approach and proactive in changing circumstances, with a long-term focus on India’s strategic, developmental and civilisational interests. The VIF aims to channelise fresh insights and decades of experience harnessed from its faculty into fostering actionable ideas for the nation’s stakeholders.

Since its inception, VIF has pursued quality research and scholarship and made efforts to highlight issues in governance, and strengthen national security. This is being actualised through numerous activities like seminars, round tables, interactive dialogues, Vimarsh (public discourse), conferences and briefings. The publications of VIF form lasting deliverables of VIF’s aspiration to impact on the prevailing discourse on issues concerning India’s national interest.

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