The Sultanate of Brunei is among the smallest countries of ASEAN with a high GDP. It follows a quiet diplomatic style. Brunei is different from other ASEAN countries in that it is a sultanate where all decisions are made by the Sultan who is also the Prime Minister and holds the major ministries except foreign affairs.
It is a country friendly to India, having a common link of the British Commonwealth and familiarity with Indian administration; the Indian Penal Code was incorporated into Brunei law, and several sections are maintained, even after the introduction of Sharia law in 2014.
Brunei became independent from Britain in 1984 and promptly joined ASEAN as its sixth member. India and Brunei established relations in 1984 and set up high commissions in 1992-93.
The visit of PM Modi to Brunei in September 2024 brought fresh focus on Brunei [3]. This was the first purely bilateral visit by an Indian PM to Brunei. Earlier, Dr Manmohan Singh had visited Brunei in 2013 when Brunei chaired ASEAN and hosted the East Asia Summit. In 2016, the Vice President, Shri Hamid Ansari visited Brunei.
From Brunei, there have been periodic state visits by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah. He visited India in 1992 and also in 2008. Thanks to those visits, Bilateral Investment Promotion agreement, agreement for cooperation in ICT, culture and establishment of a joint trade committee ensued. An MOU for cooperation in the operation of the Telemetry Tracking and Telecommand (TTC) Station of ISRO were periodically renewed, including during recent visit of PM Modi.
Beside those two state visits, the Sultan visited India in 2012 to participate in the ASEAN- India Commemorative Summit to mark 20 years of the dialogue partnership. In 2018, he made his fourth visit for the India-ASEAN 25th Anniversary Commemorative Summit, during which he was, along with other ASEAN leaders, the chief guest at the Republic Day Parade.
The Modi visit achieved several goals. First, it marked the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Brunei, and thus had a salience around it. India and Brunei have long-standing historical linkages of seafarers, traders and the like, who traversed between India and the Southeast Asian civilizations, and this relationship needs periodic summits to keep up the momentum. Brunei is an important partner in India’s ‘Act East’ Policy [4] (AEP) and Indo-Pacific Vision and has an importance in this respect. The relationship is now an ‘Enhanced Partnership’.
Secondly, the role of the Indian community across various professions in Brunei, and their contribution to its development came to be acknowledged by the leaders. Nearly 15,000 Indians now live in Brunei, and they are well regarded in the country. The anticipated new direct flight from Brunei to Chennai will improve linkages.
Thirdly, PM Modi was received at the airport by the Crown Prince and senior minister Prince Haji Al-Muhtadee Billah.This was a good occasion for PM Modi to meet the next generation of Brunei leadership, since the Crown Prince does not normally attend ASEAN summits, where PM Modi and the Sultan often meet.
The most substantive result is that Brunei would now consider expanding cooperation, which is long standing among them, for India’s space programme. The Brunei facility, along with the facilities in Papua, in Indonesia and in Vietnam, are important for India's rapidly expanding space programme.
Another salient feature was that both India and Brunei expressed confidence in multilateralism to deal with contemporary issues [5]. With regard to maritime security, they respect freedom of navigation and overflight as per UNCLOS. In his banquet speech Modi mentioned a policy of development, and not expansionism, and sought the finalisation of a ‘Code of Conduct for the South China Sea which China is stalling [6].
With this visit and the forthcoming visit to Laos for the EAS and ASEAN-India Summits PM Modi would have covered some of the left-out countries of ASEAN and make the AEP fulsome.
The Sultan appreciated India's initiatives in establishing the International Solar Alliance, the CDRI (Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure) and the Global Biofuel Alliance, but Brunei has not yet joined any of these. India supports Brunei hosting the ASEAN Centre for Climate Change, as endorsed by ASEAN in 2023. [7]. Brunei has been a participant at the Voice of Global South Summits, which India has held since its G20 presidency.
Brunei is strategically located on the South China Sea, where it has 161 kilometres coastline. It is located on the Borneo Island, surrounded by provinces of Malaysia. It is less than 2500 square miles, but has established reserves of 1,100,000,000 barrels of oil and 13,800,000 mmcf of natural gas. [8]
In 2022 Brunei’s GDP was $17 billion, with a per capita GDP of about $38,400. The oil and gas sector provide 50% of the country's GDP. Since 2021 Brunei launched its economic blueprint, which guides its development and focuses on five sectors to go beyond the dependence on oil. It also has a ‘Wavasan 2025 [9]’ Outlook to develop 13 aspects including its infrastructure, which the Chinese claim is in consonance with the BRI.
Brunei favours free trade. It has associated with the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) since 1989, with the TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) from its inception and is now in the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership). It has part of the original cohort of countries which joined the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). It is also a member of the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) and the Commonwealth. It has chaired ASEAN five times, beginning in 1989 followed by 1995 and 2001.This was the period before the India-ASEAN summits were established in 2002. Subsequently, Brunei was the Chair in 2013 and in 2021.
China remains Brunei’s main trading partner at $26 billion, rapidly growing since 2018. In 2014 the Brunei Guangxi economic corridor was established. Chinese companies bid strongly for infrastructure projects in Brunei. The largest BRI project in Brunei is a joint petrochemical venture [10], which, since 2018 has a deep-water seaport in Muara, operated by Hengyi industries of China and Damai holdings of the Brunei government strategic development capital fund. This is the flagship of the BRI. This is part of the Pulao Muara Besar industrial park, s on an island in Brunei bay with the oil refinery and petrochemical complex. An investment of $ 3.5 billion is reportedly made by BRI into this project, whose second phase would require $12 billion. That appears to have slowed down. Other BRI projects include the Temburong Bridge, which is the longest in Southeast Asia.
Brunei, despite its strategic affiliation to the West, is the classic example of an ASEAN country balancing its strategic autonomy with the economic interests with China. [11]. It has a UK-Brunei Darussalam Strategic Dialogue and with the US it has a military and defence cooperation memorandum of understanding. Since 1994, the British Army has infantry battalion of Gurkhas and an Army Air Corps Flight of helicopters. The tropical terrain is used for jungle warfare training.
With a Western strategic orientation and heavy economic partnership with China, Brunei pursues quiet diplomacy with regard to claims in the South China Sea. Brunei is among the four ASEAN countries with claims to the Spratly Islands, within its exclusive economic zone. China claims those same islands under its nine-dash line. Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam or others, Brunei has never challenged China or dispatched boats or claims on those islands, but only https://www.mindef.gov.bn/Defence White Paper/DWP 2021.pdf [12]. Brunei has not joined Indonesia, Vietnam and Philippines when they went to the United Nations with position papers on the South China Sea.
Brunei remains the classic example of a country avoiding Sino-US rivalry, trying to steer its own quiet course, without inviting interference in how it runs its own affairs, which are run by the palace without any elections or people's participation. Brunei does not want China’s strategic dominance, Islamic radicalism or Western lectures on democracy. It may prefer the civilisational links with plural and non-interfering India for socio-cultural partnership.
Where does India go from here? The classic development cooperation model does not work with a rich country like Brunei where the ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation) programme and scholarships are not utilised. Trade is small. In 2022 Indian exports were $ 81 million, half of which were automobiles. Brunei exports were $307 million, most of it being crude petroleum. From $390 million of bilateral trade, it has fallen to $290 million in 2023-24.
There are efforts to enhance defence cooperation [13]. An MoU on defence, was signed in 2016 and renewed in 2021. It provides a framework for collaboration that covers military exchanges, visits by Naval and Coast Guard ships, training and joint exercises and participation in each other's exhibitions. A joint working group for cooperation in the area of defence is likely.
The options to open a strategic dialogue with Brunei need to be retained. Brunei is quiet but punches above its weight in ASEAN and the OIC where the Sultan’s stature is respected as a senior statesman. Greater people to people relations must be pursued to revitalise civilisational contact at track 2 level.
Since 1994, the Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA [14]) has directed economic engagement with Japan, Korea and China individually. India may consider associating trilaterally with this with Japan for instance.
(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>
Links:
[1] https://www.vifindia.org/article/2024/september/17/The-Importance-of-Being-Brunei
[2] https://www.vifindia.org/author/amb-gurjit-singh
[3] https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38253/Prime_Ministers_meeting_with_His_Majesty_Sultan_Haji_Hassanal_Bolkiah_of_Brunei
[4] https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38250/Prime_Minister_arrives_in_Brunei_on_an_Official_Visit
[5] https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38254/Joint_Statement_on_an_Enhanced_Partnership_between_the_Republic_of_India_and_Brunei_Darussalam
[6] https://www.eurasiantimes.com/chinese-lake-or-south-china-sea-beijing/
[7] https://accept.aseanenergy.org/country/brunei-darussalam/
[8] https://www.worldometers.info/gas/brunei-darussalam-natural-gas/
[9] https://www.wawasanbrunei.gov.bn/en/SitePages/home.aspx
[10] https://research.hktdc.com/en/article/MzE5NzY5NDc2
[11] https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/why-brunei-hedging-between-us-and-china
[12] https://www.mindef.gov.bn/Defence White Paper/DWP 2021.pdf
[13] https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/38247/Transcript_of_Special_Briefing_on_Prime_Ministers_visit_to_Brunei_and_Singapore_September_02_2024
[14] https://fulcrum.sg/bruneis-strategic-role-in-enhancing-china-bimp-eaga-cooperation/blank
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