U.S National Defense Strategy – 2022: Old Wine in New Bottle?

Introduction

On October 27, 2022, the US government published the unclassified version of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), along with the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR)^[1]. It is a much-anticipated document which shows how the Biden administration plans to counter threats from adversary nations at a time when war and the threat of compound conflicts are escalating. The last NDS was published in early 2018 by the Trump administration.

The NSS defines all US government agencies' overall strategic priorities and guidelines. It is a foundation for agency-specific strategic documents, like the classified National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the not-yet-updated National Military Strategy (NMS).

The process of making NSS to Joint Operating Concepts to Field Manuals is explained in the following diagram.

To define the overall strategic priorities and guidelines for all US government agencies, the White House issues the unclassified NSS as a foundation for agency-specific strategic documents, like the classified National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the not-yet updated National Military Strategy (NMS). Earlier, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) used to be published. After Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the NDS replaced the QDR. Now, the NDS is issued every four years and is required to consider the "global strategic environment, force posture, and the role of the USA in global security.^[2] "

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) was released eight months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and followed recent threats from China to bring Taiwan under its control. This NDS-2022 builds on the framework made by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. This document is an iteration or update of that earlier document.

This document gives out priorities for the DoD^[3]:

• Defence of the homeland.
• Deterring strategic attacks on the United States, allies and partners.
• Deterring Chinese and Russian aggression while simultaneously maintaining readiness for conflict.
• Building a resilient Joint Force.

The NDS-2022 connects the vision laid out in the NSS to action for the DOD. NDS guidance affects plans for force structure and modernisation, including investments in different systems and the processes for acquiring additional capabilities.

The NDS-2022 includes two detailed annexes: a 2020 Nuclear Posture Review and a 2022 Missile Defense Review. These annexes present valuable details about future national plans to improve nuclear deterrence in the face of Russian and Chinese increases in nuclear capability^[4]. The DoD also issued several fact sheets shortly after it issued the National Defense Strategy.

The NDS-2022 highlights the past USA emphasis on the Russian and Chinese threats and lesser threats from states like Iran and North Korea. It specifies future priorities and force planning to shape and improve its military capabilities. The NDS identifies the capabilities the US armed forces require to support the strategy outlined in the NSS. It establishes a framework for strategic guidance, including campaign and contingency planning, force development and intelligence.

To ensure tight linkages between the strategy and the resources, the NDS, NPR, and MDR were published together for the first time.

Closely reading these fact sheets often provides a clearer picture of USA plans and intentions. It shows that the United States remains firmly committed to arms control efforts but is actively matching Russian and Chinese increases in nuclear capability and modernisation, reviving extended deterrence and theatre nuclear options. They also highlight that the United States is seeking to develop advanced new missile and air defences to deal with even the most advanced new strike systems in ways that will defend the United States and protect its allies and partners^[5].

However, the NDS does not pronounce a complete USA strategy. There is:

• No meaningful net assessments of critical threats like Russia and China.
• No eloquent content describing future goals for defence spending.
• No clear definition of how it will develop an integrated strategy.
• No discussion of future force plans.
• Little discussion of any significant new programs.
• No specific plans to improve USA strategic partnerships.

Nevertheless, many of the broad policy statements in the new strategy are positive. The US wants to work closely with its strategic partners and allies and there is no effort to shift the burden to allied states or weaken existing USA commitments. It is clear that the US will continue to make significant advances in military technology and joint warfare.

It is not clear how this strategy will finally be implemented across DOD. The leadership recognises this, as the NDS states, "this strategy will not be successful if we fail to resource its major initiatives or fail to make the hard choices to align available resources with the strategy's level of ambition.^[6] "

What is there in NDS-2022

NDS-2022 states it "directs the Department of Defense to act urgently to sustain and strengthen US deterrence, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the Department's pacing challenge." Key objectives of the NDS are^[7]:-

• To dissuade the PRC from considering aggression that threatens vital USA national interests. Conflict with the PRC is neither inevitable nor desirable.
• Account for the acute threat Russia poses, demonstrated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Will support robust deterrence of Russian aggression against vital USA national interests, including treaty Allies.
• Work closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and partners to provide USA leadership, develop critical enabling capabilities, and deepen interoperability.
• Accept measured risk but remain vigilant in the face of other persistent threats, including those posed by North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organisations.
• Build resilience in the face of destabilising and potentially catastrophic transboundary challenges such as climate change and pandemics.

The NDS-2022 distinguishes between describing China as a pacing technological and military challenger and Russia as an acute threat but a declining power^[8]. The document focuses heavily on China and Russia. It prioritises threats to the US, maps out the military's response in broad terms and guides DoD policy and budget decisions on various issues, such as what weapons to develop and the shape of the armed forces^[9].

The NDS-2022 cited several new challenges to strategic stability, including hypersonic weapons, advanced chemical and biological weapons and emerging warheads and delivery systems for conventional arms and tactical nuclear weapons^[10].

The Pentagon will advance its goals through three primary ways: Integrated deterrence, campaigning and actions that build enduring advantages^[11]:

• Integrated deterrence requires developing and combining its strengths to maximum effect by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theatres, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of USA national power and an unmatched network of US Alliances and partnerships.
• Campaigning will strengthen deterrence and allow the USA to gain advantages against the full range of competitors' coercive actions. The USA will operate forces, synchronise Department efforts, bring into line DoD activities with other instruments of national power and develop warfighting capabilities with Allies and partners.
• Building enduring advantages involves undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, attaining the technology more quickly and investing in people who are our most valuable resource.

Building Enduring Advantages requires Congress, federal departments and agencies, the private sector and allies and partners to effect change in the following ways:-

• Transforming the foundation of the future force by solving key operational challenges through faster experimentation, procurement and fielding of cutting-edge technologies.
• Making the right technology investments, such as AI, advanced materials and hypersonics and to integrate and accelerate the delivery of their capabilities to the warfighter.
• Adapting and fortifying the defence ecosystem by strengthening the defence industrial base, including research institutes, small businesses and innovative technology firms, and supporting advanced manufacturing processes.
• Strengthening resilience and adaptability through assessing and incorporating considerations for climate change and extreme conditions at all stages—threat assessments, training and logistics.
• Cultivating the workforce by streamlining hiring practices, increasing the availability of growth opportunities, broadening the recruitment pool offering better incentives and continuing to counter harassment in the workplace.

The NDS emphasises two risk management areas^[12]:

• Foresight risk. It considers unforeseen developments from the USA's competitors, the possibility of over- or underestimated threat assessments and failure to anticipate what capabilities could change the USA's relative military advantage.
• Implementation risk. It involves failure to align available resources with the strategy's ambition, effectively incorporate new technologies, bolster the workforce and reduce barriers limiting collaboration with allies and partners.

Deterrence

Lloyd Austin, USA Secretary of Defense has been using the term "integrated deterrence." in speeches and policy documents since the summer of 2021. The same has now been put in NSS and NDS. As a concept, integrated deterrence is very complicated. However, it is better defined than "deterrence" in the NDS-2018.

Lloyd Austin wrote in a memo accompanying the NDS - 2022.

"Integrated deterrence is the centrepiece of the Pentagon's Strategy. It calls for the use of every tool at the Department's disposal, in close collaboration with our counterparts across the USA Government and with Allies and partners, to ensure that potential foes understand the folly of aggression. It's a whole-of-government and coalition approach to deterrence, which relies not only on the military but also the other instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement—to clearly signal USA intentions and capabilities to deter adversaries.^[13] "

Arguments for NDS-2022

As always, there are two schools of thought. Some think that the concept of integrated deterrence has some merit. Integrated deterrence is a mechanism to communicate the US government's intention to act in specific scenarios and parameters. It utilises all aspects of national power, not the military only. The idea is to ensure that USA signals are coordinated with those of allies and partners. Integrated deterrence is a valuable contribution to the defence policy discourse^[14].

There are reservations about this concept in strategic community. Some of their observations are:-

• What's new? In order to be effective, deterrence must be integrated with all other instruments of national power.
• Implementation of the NDS is not entirely the DoD's scope of responsibilities. The National Security Strategy and NDS imply that DOD, rather than the president is in charge of integrated deterrence. Do other government agencies subscribe to this concept of integrated deterrence? Is it appropriate to task the DOD with its implementation direction?
• Pentagon should focus on preparing to fight and win future wars. It should concentrate less on the inter-agency process and more on developing new operational concepts and changing US force structure and posture to keep pace with its main adversary.
• How will the DOD work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to protect the USA from non-military attacks? When and to what extent will the DOD support departments like DHS in defending critical civilian infrastructures like the financial sector, electrical grids, pipelines and water systems?
• DoD has little to do with economic sanctions enforcement.
• Overwhelming focus on the military to establish or strengthen deterrence may be strategically counterproductive. The military is a vital tool for communicating deterrence signals, but it is not the only or the most critical tool.
• There is a major problem with interagency coordination. Is the present national security apparatus designed to enable integrated deterrence meaningfully?
• Is it possible to effectively tailor integrated deterrence towards multiple strategic competitors? Or, in this process, does one weaken integrated deterrent signalling, undermining the strategy altogether?

Force Planning Construct

NDS-2022 Force Planning Construct sizes and shapes the military to defend the homeland, maintain strategic deterrence and simultaneously deter and prevail in conflict. The DoD will employ a variety of risk mitigation efforts like:

• Coordination with and contributions of Allies and partners.
• Deterrent effects of USA nuclear posture.
• Leveraging posture and capabilities like cyber and space.

The force planning would build strength and capability in critical operational areas. DoD will:

• Improve its ability to integrate and defend to maintain information advantage.
• Reconstitute surveillance and decision systems.
• Preserve command, control, communications and intelligence in a fast-paced battlefield.
• Enhance its ability to deny aggression and improve the speed and accuracy of detection and targeting.
• Develop concepts and capabilities to mitigate adversary anti-access/area-denial capability.
• Reinforce capability to mobilise and deploy forces quickly and sustain high-intensity joint denial operations.

The DoD will prioritise a future force that is resilient, lethal, sustainable, survivable: agile and responsive.

Some of the questions that are being asked are:

• Force-planning standard. What force-planning standard will be used to size USA military forces? Should the USA adopt a two-war force-planning standard for potential conflicts with China and Russia?
• New operational concepts. Are new operational concepts being developed particularly against improving Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces?
• Capabilities for high-end conventional warfare. In the current finite financial budget, are DOD's plans for acquiring capabilities for high-end conventional warfare vis a vis other DOD priorities appropriate and sufficient?
• Maintaining USA superiority in conventional weapon technologies. Are DOD's actions to maintain its conventional weapon technologies superiority appropriate and sufficient?
• Innovation and speed in weapon system development and deployment. Has a cost-benefit analysis been carried out between defence acquisition policy and the paradigm for assessing the success of acquisition programs and innovation and speed of development and deployment, experimentation, risk-taking and greater tolerance of failure during development?
• Mobilisation capabilities. What actions are DOD taking to improve mobilisation capabilities for an extended-length conflict against an adversary like China or Russia? Are these actions appropriate?
• Supply chain security. How much are Chinese or Russian components, subcomponents, materials, or software incorporated into DOD equipment? What actions is DOD taking to address supply chain security for Chinese or Russian components, materials and software?
• Hybrid warfare and grey-zone tactics. Do the United States and its allies and partners have appropriate strategies for countering Russia's hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine, Russia's information operations and China's salami-slicing tactics in the South and East China Seas?

It is unclear how the balance between building the force around smaller numbers of expensive and niche capabilities and larger numbers of smaller and cheaper systems will be obtained. How the defence industrial base will surge production exponentially in wartime has to be elaborated.

Every administration talks about prioritising day-to-day force employment by a smaller force to reduce the stress on the force. The US has global interests, partners, and allies worldwide, and it is tough to do this^[15].

People's Republic of China

China has been identified as the most consequential strategic competitor of US, notwithstanding Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Unlike Russia, China has the global reach and the capability to reorder the international system. The NDS states:

"The most comprehensive and serious challenge to USA national security is the PRC's coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavour to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences. The PRC seeks to leverage its growing capabilities, including its economic influence and the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) growing strength and military footprint, to coerce its neighbours and threaten their interests. This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behaviour that stretches across the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control between China and India. The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department."

The PLA is rapidly advancing and integrating its cyber, electronic, space, counter-space, and informational warfare capabilities and expanding its conventional forces to support its approach to joint warfare. The PRC is also expanding the PLA's footprint globally and working to establish a more robust basing infrastructure overseas to allow it to project military power at greater distances. China is accelerating the modernisation and expansion of its nuclear capabilities.

To deter PRC attacks, the NDS states that the DoD will bolster deterrence by:

• Leveraging existing and emergent force capabilities, posture and activities to enhance denial and by improving the resilience of USA systems, the PRC may seek to target.
• Developing new operational concepts and enhanced future warfighting capabilities against potential PRC aggression.
• Collaboration with Allies and partners to strengthen joint capability with the help of multilateral exercises, greater intelligence and information sharing, co-development of technologies and combined planning for shared deterrence challenges.
• Building enduring advantages, undertaking foundational improvements and enhancements to ensure technological edge and Joint Force combat credibility.

Russia and Others

Regarding Russia, the NDS states:

"Even as the PRC poses the Department's pacing challenge, recent events underscore the acute threat posed by Russia. Contemptuous of its neighbours' independence, Russia's government seeks to use force to impose border changes and to reimpose an imperial sphere of influence. Its extensive track record of territorial aggression includes the escalation of its brutal, unprovoked war against Ukraine. Russia presents serious, continuing risks in key areas."

These include:

• Nuclear threats to the homeland and USA Allies and partners.
• Long-range cruise missile threats.
• Cyber and information operations.
• Counterspace threats; chemical and biological weapons.
• Undersea warfare.
• Extensive grey zone campaigns, targeted against democracies.

Russia has incorporated these capabilities and methods into an overall strategy that seeks to exploit advantages in geography and time backed by a mix of threats to the USA homeland and its Allies and partners.

To deter Russian attacks, the NDS states that the DoD will focus on the following:

• Reinforcing the iron-clad treaty commitments of US to include conventional aggression that can escalate to nuclear employment of any scale.
• Work with Allies and partners to modernise denial capabilities, increase interoperability, improve resilience against attack and coercion, share intelligence and strengthen extended nuclear deterrence.
• Concentrate on enhancing denial capabilities and critical enablers in NATO's force planning, while NATO Allies seek to bolster their conventional warfighting capabilities.
• Support efforts to build response options that enable cost imposition for Ally and partner countries that border Russia.

Russia has been described as an "acute threat" to the US. The Secretary of Defense Austin said, "We chose the word 'acute' carefully. Unlike China, Russia can't systemically challenge the United States over the long term."

Critics say that the NDS-2022 undersells the threat from Russia to the USA, putting Russia as the clear number-two priority. Russia has thrown caution and pragmatism to the wind in the ongoing Ukraine conflict, shown by its subversive energy policy, food-supply threats, economic warfare, nuclear threats, misinformation and sabotage. Many of these actions have worldwide effects with no signs of slowing.

The NDS-2022 also highlighted threats from Iran, North Korea and "violent extremist organisations".

It stated, "Iran is taking actions that would improve its ability to produce a nuclear weapon should it decide to do so, even as it builds and exports extensive missile forces, uncrewed aircraft systems, and advanced maritime capabilities that threaten chokepoints for the free flow of energy resources and international commerce."

The NDS-2022 highlighted the threat of climate change to US and global security. It wrote, "Insecurity and instability related to climate change may tax governance capacity in some countries while heightening tensions between others, risking new armed conflicts and increasing demands for stabilization activities."

Irregular Warfare

NDS -2022 states on Competitors' Gray Zone Activities:

"Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the status quo using grey zone methods—coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for USA military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the USA Government."

Important issues are:

• The PRC employs state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States, its allies, and partners.
• Russia employs disinformation, cyber and space operations against the US and its Allies and partners and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries.
• North Korea, Iran, and other state actors use similar but more limited means.
• The proliferation of advanced missiles, uncrewed aircraft systems, and cyber tools to military proxies allows competitors to threaten USA forces, Allies and partners in indirect and deniable ways.

Much like insurgent adversaries, Revisionist states combine separate lines of effort to offset military weakness, weaponise narratives to ease strategic progress and exploit social and political contradictions to undermine and divide target societies. It allows for incremental gains that are less likely to face backlash and are more sustainable. It was exactly when Russia abandoned this playbook through its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For states seeking to contest international order, irregular warfare is likely to be the strategy of choice^[16].

Critics question whether the US and its allies and partners have adequate strategies for countering Russia's hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine, Russia's information operations and China's so-called salami-slicing tactics in the South and East China Seas.

Right Technology Investments

The NDS-2022 lays a lot of emphasis on emerging technologies. It talks about research and development for advanced capabilities, cyber, directed energy, quantum science, hypersonic, integrated sensing, biotech, advanced materials and clean energy technology. Each of these requires considerable investment. It discusses the role of technology in escalation dynamics and innovation in national security.

Today warfare relies extensively on data-driven technologies and the integration of diverse data sources. The DoD will implement institutional reforms integrating data, software and artificial intelligence efforts to speed up their delivery to the warfighter.

The DoD wants a closer partnership with the private sector companies, especially the growing commercial space industry, to leverage "its technological advancements and entrepreneurial spirit to enable new capabilities."

How will the DoD amalgamate these technologies into its strategy? These technologies progress faster than the movement by DoD. The market forces would be driving the commercialisation of relevant military capabilities, and DoD can only be a fast follower.

The 2022 NDS stipulates that the current system is "too slow and too focussed on acquiring systems not designed to address the most critical challenges we now face." If the acquisition system is not postured to meet the threats envisaged in the NDS-2022, the questions arise:

• What systems is the acquisition system buying today?
• Why is it buying them if they are not designed to address these challenges^[17]?

The NDS recommends linking up the acquisition system with the mission so that funds are spent most effectively. It states: "We will better align requirements, resourcing, and acquisition, and undertake a campaign of learning to identify the most promising concepts, incorporating emerging technologies in then commercial and military sectors for solving our key operational challenges… The Department will act urgently to better support advanced manufacturing processes (e.g., aircraft and ship building, preferred munition production) to increase our ability to reconstitute the Joint Force in a major conflict."

There are current challenges in the industrial base regarding the inflationary environment, workforce challenges and persistent supply chain restrictions as limitations to manufacturing at scale. The recent ongoing conflict in Ukraine has brought out certain limitations of the defence industrial base:

• Rebuilding and enhancing inventories are difficult at current production rates and funding levels.
• Ensuring that in the long-term industry has the incentives to invest in rebuilding that capacity. It takes a minimum of two-year time between when money is delivered to produce a particular type of missile and the first deliveries of the inventory. If the industry has to expand its production capabilities, the brick-and-mortar infrastructure would involve land at certain distances from the local population may take years.
• The USA defence industrial base is not ready, positioned, or stocked well enough to win long wars.

In a state vs state war, defence industrial bases are highly stretched. A state can run out of stuff, munitions, or systems, platforms break down, spare parts are needed, and they need replacement.

Advanced manufacturing processes are not the perfect solution. DOD has to ensure adequate industrial capacity and provide incentives to the industry for investing in rebuilding that capacity in the long term. The NDS-2022 covers the critical strategic issues of the acquisition process and defence industrial base perspective, which need to be resolved^[18].

Conclusion

The NDS-2022 outlines clear strategic priorities for the DoD. But it is not clear how this strategy will be implemented across DoD. Three key themes emerged^[19]:

• The NDS gives a nuanced analysis of the strategic and operational environments, offers a sophisticated discussion of deterrence and elevates climate change to the defence agenda.
• There are grave concerns about the implications of the NDS-2022 for international security, extending from USA-Chinese relations and regional stability in South Asia to security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.
• Some critical issues were either missing or underdeveloped, including women, peace, the protection of civilians in armed conflicts and security agenda and the risks that arms transfers pose to US allies and partners.

The war in Ukraine exposed deficiencies in the defence industrial base of the USA and its European partners and allies. Its depleted stocks of some weapon systems and munitions, Stingers, M-777 howitzers, 155mm ammunition, and Javelin anti-tank missile systems are the cause of great concern.

Some interesting questions emerge:

• USA defence companies do not want to take financial risks without a contract, especially multiyear contracts.
• There are constraints on workforce and supply chain issues for the increased demand for weapon systems and munitions.
• China has a near monopoly on some rare earth metals resulting in vulnerabilities.
• There are challenges with semiconductors, aluminium, titanium and microelectronics.
• Is there a need for a bigger defence-industrial base?
• Keeping in mind inflation is high, should the defence budget be increased?
• How does the USA reprioritise spending?

Geography plays a critical role in combat. In the "grey zone" between war and peace, rapid escalation to all-out conflict is not always the best option. If China occupies an uninhabited Senkaku island in the East China Sea without firing a shot, the correct response may not be to take military action. A blend of military redeployment and reinforcement, diplomatic efforts, and economic punishment of the aggressor may make more sense.

In this 80-page document, the word India figures only twice. India has been identified as a critical regional USA partner. However, this document is clear that this defence partnership is premised upon specifically enhancing India's capabilities to complicate and challenge China's rise. India would be happy about the "advanced technology cooperation with partnerships like (…) the Indo-Pacific Quad" and "co-development of technologies and greater intelligence and information sharing."

However, India would be wary of expanding US military access to partner facilities for anti-China contingencies. It could drag India into a primarily USA-China conflict and invite Chinese retaliation^[20].

The NDS-2022 does not mention Pakistan by name. But Pentagon will depend on Pakistan for counterterrorism operations like the over-the-horizon strike to kill al-Zawahiri. It is a potential indicator of the level of involvement with Pakistan^[21].

Integrated deterrence specifies the options of carrying out a multi-dimensional campaign against Russia or China for scenarios that fall short of hot war but demand a resolute response. The USA has to keep stockpiles of critical commodities, diversify supply chains for crucial technologies and prepare for a prolonged period of economic disengagement from China or Russia in case of a conflict.

The NDS-2022 builds on the framework established by the Trump administration's 2018 National Defense Strategy. It focuses on the importance of allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. However, the NDS calls for its allies and partners to provide vital enabling systems (airlift, sealift, aerial refuelling) and "conventional warfighters," signalling that the USA would not be sending large numbers from its own military into Europe. The prioritisation of China and the Indo-Pacific would be seen with concern in Europe.

The NDS-2022 indicates that Pentagon is thinking critically about how the US military can be used to deter and fight a war and as an effective instrument of foreign policy.

Jim Mitre, who served as executive director of the 2018 NDS and is now the director of the international security and defence policy program at the RAND Corporation, said, "Bottom line, regarding the strategy writ large, I'd say it's fundamentally sound and logically supported. The department did a good job of thinking through what problem it needs the military to focus on, and has a sensible, coherent approach togetting after it. The issue is, can the department execute this strategy and really do it in time? Can it modernize its forces, establish greater resilience to adversary attack, develop a more tech savvy workforce, et cetera, with alacrity? … In particular can it do so on a timeline that's sufficient to deter war with China, not just in some far-off future, but in the next few years?^[22] "

End Notes

^[1]Kelly A. Grieco et al., Experts React: The Biden Administration’s National Defense Strategy Was the National Defense Strategy worth the wait? Stimson, November 2, 2022 available at: https://www.stimson.org/2022/experts-react-the-biden-administrations-national-defense-strategy/ [3]
^[2]Brad Carney, Olivia B. Hoff, Summarizing the 2022 National Defense Strategy, Lawfare, November 18, 2022 available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/summarizing-2022-national-defense-strategy [4]
^[3]Our military insiders’ views of the new National Defense Strategy, Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, November 21, 2022 available at: https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/In-The-News/Article/3244923/our-military-insiders-views-of-the-new-national-defense-strategy/ [5]
^[4]Anthony H. Cordesman, The New U.S. National Defense Strategy for 2022, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 28, 2022 available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-us-national-defense-strategy-2022 [6]
^[5] Ibid
^[6]Our military insiders’ views of the new National Defense Strategy, Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, November 21, 2022 available at: https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/In-The-News/Article/3244923/our-military-insiders-views-of-the-new-national-defense-strategy/ [5]
^[7]2022 National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, USNI news, October 27, 2022 available at: https://news.usni.org/2022/10/27/2022-national-defense-strategy-nuclear-posture-review [7]
^[8]Eric Schmitt, David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, Pentagon’s Strategy Says China and Russia Pose Very Different Challenges, The New York Times, October 27, 2022 available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/27/us/politics/biden-military-russia-china.html [8]
^[9] Ibid
^[10] Ibid
^[11]Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy, U.S. Department of Defense, available at: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF [9]
Brad Carney, Olivia B. Hoff, Summarizing the 2022 National Defense Strategy, Lawfare, November 18, 2022 available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/summarizing-2022-national-defense-strategy [4]
^[12]Kelly A. Grieco et al., Experts React: The Biden Administration’s National Defense Strategy Was the National Defense Strategy worth the wait? Stimson, November 2, 2022 available at: https://www.stimson.org/2022/experts-react-the-biden-administrations-national-defense-strategy/ [3]
^[13]Kathleen McInnis, ‘Integrated Deterrence’ Is Not So Bad, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 27, 2022 available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/integrated-deterrence-not-so-bad [10]
^[14]Seth G. Jones et al., Press Briefing: Analyzing the 2022 National Defense Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 27, 2022 available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/press-briefing-analyzing-2022-national-defense-strategy [11]
^[15]David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks, Crafting Strategy for Irregular Warfare, National Defense University Press, September 2022 available at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/strat-monograph/Crafting-Strategy-for-Irregular-Warfare_2ndEd.pdf?ver=mFY-dJC9aRGKfjz0E0KK5Q%3d%3d [12]
^[16]Cynthia Cook, Is the National Defense Strategy Calling for Acquisition Reform? Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2, 2022 available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/national-defense-strategy-calling-acquisition-reform [13]
^[17]Ibid
^[18]Ibid
^[19]Kelly A. Grieco et al., Experts React: The Biden Administration’s National Defense Strategy Was the National Defense Strategy worth the wait? Stimson, November 2, 2022 available at: https://www.stimson.org/2022/experts-react-the-biden-administrations-national-defense-strategy/ [3]
^[20]Ibid
^[21]Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd), Killing of al-Zawahiri: U.S. Counter-terrorism Operations, Future of Al Qaeda and Implications for Taliban, Pakistan, other Stakeholders and India, Vivekananda International Foundation, December 21, 2022 available at: https://www.vifindia.org/monograph/2022/december/21/Killing-of-Al-Zawahiri [14]
^[22]Valerie Insinna, The Pentagon’s new defense strategy is out. Now the real work begins, experts sayon, Breaking Defense, October 28, 2022 available at: https://breakingdefense.com/2022/10/the-pentagons-new-defense-strategy-is-out-now-the-real-work-begins-experts-say/ [15]

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>

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