(June 16-30, 2016)
USA:
In an important development that could impact the US presidential election, FBI investigators interviewed Hillary Clinton for over three and a half hours on July 2. Ms. Clinton reportedly told the FBI that she did nothing wrong, and “never received nor sent any material that was marked classified.” But the FBI has yet to decide if she or her staff displayed a criminal breach of trust in their handling of classified information on her private email server while she served as Secretary of State. While the FBI meeting was read as a signal that the investigation might soon be wrapped up, but the FBI reportedly has yet to conclude its technical analysis of the material.
The question of Clinton's email server is one of the reasons that she is viewed as ‘unethical and untrustworthy’ in opinion polls. Talking to the media, she has acknowledged the challenge she faces. "I have said that I'm going to continue to put forth my record, what I have stood for, do everything I can to earn the trust of the voters of our country," she said. "I know that's something that I'm going to keep working on."
The timing of the ‘interview’ is significant–with just three weeks to the Democratic convention at which Clinton is to be formally nominated as the party's official candidate, she continues to be dogged by an issue on which the FBI's unresolved investigation has the potential to mess up her campaign's efforts to build momentum around the convention. If Clinton is indicted for her role in creating and maintaining her private email server, she would almost certainly be forced to leave the race and this can throw the presidential race off gear.
Russia & China:
Facing sanctions from the West after the annexation of Crimea, Russia has reoriented its policy toward China. In making the pivot, it has sought to break its diplomatic isolation, secure a market for its energy resources, and gain greater access to Chinese credit and technology. The results of the shift are mixed, but if trends continue, Moscow is likely to drift further into Beijing’s ambit. What seems to be emerging is an asymmetrical interdependence, something that will have global implications.
Many still view this emerging friendship as tactical with no real trust between the two. But the new Russian-Chinese rapprochement may be more serious. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the Russian leadership took a fresh look at many issues that had been blocking cooperation with Beijing for years. This process resulted in the removal of three key informal barriers.
First, Moscow decided it had been too reticent about selling advanced weaponry to China.
Second, Moscow chose to review a de facto ban on Chinese participation in large infrastructure and natural-resource projects.
Third, the Kremlin reassessed its relationship with China in Central Asia, which had hitherto been defined as largely competitive with very limited opportunities for collaboration.
The new approach adopted by the Kremlin yielded few successes in 2014 and 2015. But the deals concluded or under discussion may presage more meaningful developments in the future, putting Russia on a path where it ends up accepting the role of a junior partner in an increasingly asymmetrical relationship. Moscow may end up providing crucial resources that Beijing needs (such as military technology, natural resources, and access to new markets) to boost the latter’s ambition to be the next global superpower in exchange for an economic and financial lifeline.
One of the central factors that is propelling the new Russian-Chinese relationship is the personal connect between the two countries’ leaders, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
Europe:
Britain’s historic decision to leave the European Union continues to hog headlines across Europe besides exposing major fault lines within the bloc. There is an apprehension that uncertainty over when and how to negotiate Britain’s exit from the EU will lead to paralysis inside the bloc that Euro skeptic movements will exploit. EU leaders do not want to send a message of weakness that could be misconstrued that EU leaders are prepared to make more concessions to Britain. The yawning gap between citizens, leaders, and the EU institutions will widen. Also resentment could build up between the big and small member states.
The main fault line concerns the start of negotiating Britain’s exit. Most of the EU leaders—European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and European Parliament President Martin Schulz—want the process to begin and end as soon as possible. But it is not as simple as that. To initiate Article 50 of the EU treaty , which gives minute details about how an EU country can leave the bloc, Britain has to notify the European Council about the result of the June 23 referendum , in which nearly 52 percent of voters opted to leave the EU.
David Cameron announced his resignation as prime minister on June 24 but will continue on until October, when the ruling Conservative Party will hold its annual conference and decide on a new leader. He wants to leave the activating of Article 50 to his successor. But the EU institutions are in no mood to delay the start of Brexit negotiations. They will try to put pressure on Cameron to trigger Article 50.
Central Asian Republics
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit:
The anniversary summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on the 23rd and 24th of June 2016, celebrated the fifteen year history of this intergovernmental organization. The process for accepting India as a full member to the organization was finally initiated this year at Tashkent and is expected to be completed before the meet at Astana next year.
PM Modi, who attended the summit, stated that India would significantly benefit from the groupings’ strengths in energy and natural resources, and in turn, India’s strong economy and vast market could drive economic growth in the SCO region. He emphasized that India’s ties with the bloc will help protect the region from threats of radicalization and violence, asserting that it would adopt “zero tolerance” to terrorism. India, which is one of the largest energy consuming countries in the world, is expected to get greater access to major gas and oil exploration projects in Central Asia upon becoming a member of the SCO. In his address, PM Modi exuded confidence that India’s engagement with all SCO members will help build the region as an engine of economic growth for the world and is more stable and secure internally and strongly connected with other geographies.
The summit was high on rhetoric and therefore more ritualistic in its approach, with most countries demonstrating their loyalties towards China than working towards solving common regional problems. Bilateralism was the dominant theme, contrary to the very spirit of the formation of the SCO. The meetings of the leaders of the Central Asian Republics with the Chinese President Jinping focused on cooperation and infrastructure construction, the Belt and Road initiate, energy cooperation, expansion of economic and trade ties, enhancing regional peace and stability and expansion of people to people and cultural exchanges. There were talks to intensify economic integration in the region, to the benefit of all member states.
In terms of further expanding the membership of the organization (with Iran being prominently considered given its geostrategic significance from the viewpoint of cross-regional connectivity), the CARs conspicuously expressed their reservations. Even India’s (and Pakistan’s) induction into the organization was not received very warmly by the Republics, who feared a shift in the balance of power in the organization which already hosts two other nuclear powers – Russia and China. While Kazakhstan’s main concerns revolve around the nuclear axis, Uzbekistan is particularly wary of further expansion meant to include countries like Afghanistan, a country it believes to be the export centre of major threats and challenges the region battles.
Major policy takeaways were the Action Plan for the Implementation of Development Strategies for the SCO until 2025 and the adoption of the SCO anti drug strategy for 2017-2022 and its programme of action. The summit thus focused its discussions on cooperation to counter terrorism, inculcating economic and humanitarian ties and supporting regional development.
The next summit is scheduled to be held from June 8-9, 2017 in Astana under the chairmanship of Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan Secures Seat on the United Nations Security Council
On June 28, 2016, Kazakhstan was elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, beating Thailand after a second round of voting to join Bolivia, Sweden and Ethiopia for a two year term beginning January 1st, 2017. It thus became the first former Soviet Republic to have a vote in the UN’s most important decision making body. This marks the end of a multi-year campaign by the country in which it aggressively promoted its (arguably) sterling credentials on matters of regional and international concern. Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov recently commented that his country is “ready to assume the responsibilities as a part of the global community” and invoked Kazakhstan’s contributions to nuclear non-proliferation and to resolving international crises in Ukraine and Iran as factors which strongly support the country’s candidature.
Kazakhstan, for long, has been on a quest to be recognized internationally as a leading country. This initiative has primarily driven support from the topmost echelons of political power – the President himself, who has left no stone unturned in trying to shape an image of his country as a technologically progressive and economically dynamic state. The strategies designed by the government – the Nurly Zhol Plan or the Bright Path – are meant to push the state into the top-30 economies of the world and accord it a prime seat in the centers of economic, political and diplomatic power.
But all may not be well for the Kazakh case. The country faces a severe international backlash as far its human rights record is concerned. In recent years, the government has introduced new or reinforced restrictions on freedom of association, speech and assembly, and on religion. Kazakh authorities limit peaceful dissent more broadly, including by trying to silence government critics using the vague and overboard criminal offence of “inciting social, national, clan, racial, or religious discord”, which it has used to criminalize behavior and speech protected under international human rights law. The adoption, in 2011, of a restrictive religious law, places unreasonable restrictions on the practice of religion by some religious groups, large numbers of which have been fined for peaceful worship, outside state control. Kazakhstan has been named as a Tier-2 country by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, which believes that while the government promotes religious freedom for “traditional” religious groups at the global level, domestic conditions continue to deteriorate for people of different faiths, nationalities and cultures inhabiting the land. This is in sharp contrast to the tall claims of multiculturalism made by the FM himself. Even Astana’s peacemaking abilities are deeply doubted at the international level, case in point, Kyrgyzstan. Paul Quinn-Judge, the Central Asia Project Director for the International Crisis Group, noting the inconsistencies in Kazakhstan’s earnestness towards addressing the crisis during Kyrgyzstan's second revolution in 2010, stated, “They seem to be mostly interested in burnishing their own image”.
One excuse frequented by the President himself is of “economy first, politics later”. But now that Kazakhstan has been accorded representation on the United Nations most powerful body, entrusted with matters pertaining to ‘international peace and security”, it would be hard for the leadership to ignore the recent economic downturn, nationwide protests and wider instability plaguing the country. While the actual use of a UNSC non-permanent seat took Kazakhstan may be limited, the symbolic significance of this achievement for Astana is undisputed. What remains to be seen is the extent to which the leadership undertakes proactive measures to deliver on its promises and furthering the cause of the region it represents.
