Introduction

After the success of his first book “Tiananmen Square: Making of a Protest”, Ambassador Vijay Gokhale has brought his decades of experience in dealing with our next-door neighbours to pen down how the Chinese view India when they engage in negotiations with us. Amb. Gokhale as one of the top sinologists of the country has been on the frontlines of Indian diplomacy with his illustrious career that began with him, being the third secretary in China at the time of the Tiananmen Square protests and then rising through the ranks to reach the top echelons of the foreign policy establishment as the foreign secretary from January 2018 to January 2020.

Amb. Gokhale brings his years of diplomatic and negotiating acumen to write a riveting account of how the Chinese negotiate with India. The writer adopts the format of analyzing Chinese negotiating behaviour through six seminal events that played a pivotal role in India’s engagement with China and the global fora. These six events are India’s recognition of Mao’s PRC, CCP’s annexation of Tibet, Indian nuclear tests in 1998, Chinese recognition of Sikkim as an Indian state, the 123 deal with the US where India sought a waiver from the NSG and the listing of Masood Azhar under the UN 1267 sanctions committee. The book takes you to the frontlines of diplomacy & negotiations and covers nuances like questions of style, use of proverbs, grammar, body language and the use of patient pauses and counter pauses.

What separates the book from other commentaries on the Chinese system from an Indian viewpoint, is that Mr. Gokhale does not just provide a commentary of his experiences but culminates the book with a last chapter on lessons that can be drawn in our future negotiations with China. Considering the current geopolitical order and the strained relations between India-China, it is evident that Indian and Chinese interests would continue to rub off against each other. As China’s military and economic strength vis-à-vis India rises, we’ll see more confrontations between the two sides which would need to be solved through negotiations. Extracting concessions from the Chinese would get more and more difficult as their relative strength rises. This is where Amb. Gokhale’s book will act as a guiding light for future Indian diplomats and policymakers to deal with the Chinese system.

Rationale behind writing this book: Why did Amb.Gokhale write this book?

In his research, the writer found that most accounts of negotiating with the Chinese were from an American perspective. In the US-China dynamic, the US is the superior power which made these works of literature irrelevant from the Indian context. In addition, there was no book that spanned the entire 70 years of relations between India-China. Thus, the writer selected six incidents as illustrations in which closure had been achieved. He did not pick live or unresolved issues as drawing insights from them would have been difficult.

The First Two Chapters: Initial Indian debacles in negotiation

The first two chapters of the book deal with how India committed mistakes and gave up its leverage in negotiating with the Chinese w.r.t establishing diplomatic relations with the newly formed communist party government in 1949 and the missed opportunity that India had, to settle the boundary question between India-China in exchange for India’s acceptance of the status of Tibet being an integral part of “One China”. The author in his analysis outlined two primary reasons that contributed to India faltering at these two junctures.

The first factor was that the Indian diplomatic corps of that time was highly inexperienced in negotiation tactics and was steeped in the colonial mindset of conducting diplomacy. Because China was never fully conquered by imperialists, they continued to have a diplomatic service that had extensive experience interacting with foreign actors, a privilege that the Indian side was bereft of. In China, Zhou Enlai had the foresight to remove the front-line diplomats in 1949 but retained them as consultants. On the other hand, Indian foreign policy decision making of that time lacked broad-based consultations and was driven by the instincts and thoughts of PM Nehru and his close coterie of advisors. Due to foreign policy being kept as the exclusive preserve of the PMO & MEA, differing opinions or voices of caution were not incorporated into our strategy to deal with China in the early years post our independence.

The second factor that led to India giving up its special relationship with Tibet without getting anything substantive in return was due to the absence of a strong institutional setup of think tanks, academia in India that is in sync with Indian diplomatic practitioners. This was the case post-independence and the Indian foreign policy establishment, to the present day suffers from this bottleneck. The author takes a bold stance by asking tough questions of the political and diplomatic leadership of that time of not consulting with dissenting political functionaries like Sardar Patel on crucial foreign policy questions, that had severe implications on the India-China boundary question.

Mr. Gokhale gives his assessment that India should have posed a condition of permanently settling the boundary question in exchange for accepting China’s sovereignty over Tibet but our inaccurate assessment of currying goodwill in the eyes of the Chinese stopped us from making this move. This perceived pursuit of goodwill did not help Pandit Nehru in enhancing his personal stature as a statesman or ensuring India-China bonhomie in securing the future of the Asian continent. At the end of it all, we gave recognition without settling the boundary question.

Lessons drawn by the Indian establishment from these two case studies

The book after elucidating what went wrong goes on to tell us that the Indian establishment learned from their mistakes and applied its learnings for future incidents. What were these firsthand learnings? The Chinese diplomat is ideologically inclined. He serves the party unlike his Indian counterparts who serve the government of the day and the Indian constitution. We need to approach the negotiation knowing that they are ideologically inclined and may not be rational. They have a party function to fulfill in addition to the national function. The author quotes “Words and gestures convey messages not emotion. The Chinese negotiator is not interested in making friends for the sake of friendship…They are driven by psychological manipulation.” (Gokhale,2021, p.137)

There is no level playing field between the two sides due to different systems of government followed. The Chinese have access to our open media, political leadership, academia, literature whereas we are shooting in the dark. We need to take cognizance of this and devise an effective counter strategy.

Punching above our weight: India takes advantage of China’s complacency

In the subsequent four case studies of Sikkim becoming a state of India, Masood Azhar’s listing, the Pokhran tests, etc. one recurrent theme comes to light that explains why India got the better of China on the strategy and tact front. This was due to ingrained Chinese thought of looking down on India as an inferior party which led to the Chinese underestimating us. They regard Indians with a degree of contempt. They look down upon us, which subsequently made them misread India. Another significant factor was that during the 1980s, Chinese scholarship on India languished, academic focus turned to the west and India fell in the foreign policy priorities of China. There was no assessment of the positive impact of the 1991 economic reforms. Chinese grew comfortable dealing with only the Congress and judged other political forces through the same lens.

The triumph of Indian diplomacy is brought out through the illustration of the aftermath of 1998 Pokhran tests when sanctions were imposed, and Indo-China relations nosedived as Vajpayee’s letter to Clinton terming the ‘China threat’ and the Chinese assisting Pakistan in their nuclear programme as the reason for India to go for the tests. The Chinese mounted an attack to isolate India on the world stage but for this instance, India chose elements from the Chinese playbook in 1964 in order to blunt the Chinese case against them. China referred to the US nuclear threat and transfer of nuclear weapons into the hands of another (to the West German ‘revanchists’) to justify their tests in Lop Nor in 1964.This fact was reminded to them. In these turbulent exchanges, the Chinese used the famous proverb “Whoever has tied the knot on the tiger’s neck must untie it” to suggest it was for India to make unilateral reparations by metaphorically untying the knot they had tied. India’s charismatic and formidable EAM Jaswant Singh was up to the task and replied with his own Rajasthani saying “Do not ask for the way to a village if you do not intend to go there” (Gokhale,2021, p.71).

The Sikkim case study is a good example of how China sees others’ problems as an opportunity to extract concessions or as leverage. Their dual strategy of deliberate ambiguity in drafting open-ended words and testing the other party’s bottom-line multiple times, until in sheer frustration they put a revised offer on the table, was effectively countered due to effective institutional memory. Civilian and military officers experienced in dealing with China provided their insights and suggestions that helped India sidestep all traps laid out by the Chinese.

Key Takeaways: What did I learn from this book (Why I loved reading it?)

The book ends with a wonderful chapter on lessons for India, which sums up Chinese negotiating tact. Reading it provided me with targeted pointers as a student of strategic studies on how to negotiate with the Chinese if one ever gets the opportunity to do so. The author’s observations like the Chinese use Mao’s dictum of counterattack in self-defence, their silence does not mean acquiescence, Chinese look at negotiation as a role play theatrical exercise as they have to put up a show in front of their domestic constituents, are vital tenets that need to be kept in mind. They demand explanations from the other side. Their most vulnerable aspect is projection. They are deeply conscious of their image back home and what it would project for their domestic audience. This is a chink in their armour that can be exploited by any entity that negotiates with them. The Chinese in addition to their foreign affairs ministry have instruments like the UFWD, ILD, global thinks, intelligence department, SCIO, CCP Propaganda office, Confucius Institutes that make strenuous efforts to penetrate societies and gather intelligence that would benefit the CCP in their engagements. They also influence thought leaders in their host countries to toe the CCP’s line directly or indirectly.

The final chapter divides the Chinese negotiating strategy into phases and provides an instrumental commentary on the activities the Chinese undertake and how can India or any interested party develop a counter to the said activities. This singular aspect of not just describing the Chinese strategy but also providing a counterattack prognosis puts Amb.Gokhale in a league of his own when it comes to assessing the prowess of the writer. He starts by outlining that pre- negotiation meticulous planning is done and personal info on the negotiator is gathered. Then the Chinese aim to set the agenda at the outset, which the other side agrees to, out of politeness which is precisely what the Chinese want. The Chinese before formal negotiations have already begun, aim to get advanced concessions as happened in India’s case in Tibet. Never concede any point in advance.

The Chinese through their pliant media and nefarious actors discredit the other side before negotiations, to apply psychological pressure. No heed needs to be paid to such posturing and mind games. An effective counter would be to call out these reports in the beginning and ask for an explanation from them. The Chinese hate when the tables are turned against them as it unsettles them. Putting them on the spot and giving them a taste of their own medicine is an invaluable suggestion given by the author. They also set the venue of the meeting to put the negotiator in an unfamiliar environment and resort to making allegations to deflect attention from the core issue. It is to put the other side on the back foot so that they spend time defending themselves and are not able to raise contentious issues of their own. They are obsessed with perception management. For instance, Chinese kept insisting that India talk to Pakistan on the Masood Azhar listing before raising the issue with the 1267 UN sanctions committee. A counter to this would be that there should be no precondition for talks, even if they threaten to withdraw. Public opinion/sentiment, media and opposition groups should be used to signal own redlines in advance.

The author’s description of the attributes of the Chinese negotiator are on point and thought-provoking. They are masters at manipulating time, would deceive you by showing they do not know your native language when in reality they are multilingual, use flattery & hospitality to soften the opponent, would repeat their position infinite times to test their adversary’s bottom line, have endless strategic patience and are frustratingly intransigent. Their oral concurrence holds no value, it is only their written word that counts. An important precept outlined by the author is that change in Chinese position can be assessed only through change in their written word. So, the other side has to be vigilant and alert in spotting such changes. They sometimes play the victim and rake up China’s century of humiliation and are a conniving lot when it comes to joint statements. They will embed something at the end to their advantage. The author gives a summary advice at the end of the book to triumph over the Chinese negotiator which is, to not be deterred by “fear of failure”, do not be under time-pressure and take the attack to the opposition.

Conclusion: A gap in the book and my Concluding Thoughts

A bottleneck that one found in the book is that it does not adequately address the role of China’s internal politics in how the Chinese negotiate. Chinese polity’s internal dynamics is something that is not discussed in the book. Secondly, the style of writing of the book, though lucid, can make a layman reader who is not fascinated by the Chinese system lose interest in reading the book in its entirety. The niche of the book works against it, but perhaps that is the case with all specialized titles. Overall, deep and granular understanding of how the Chinese negotiate with India comes out in the book. Amb. Gokhale deserves to be commended for the same. Practitioners, academics and think tankers would consistently have to go back to his book to understand Chinese negotiating strategy and use his guiding principles to come out on top and defend India’s national interest.