India conducted `Operation Sindoor’ from 07 to 10 May 2025, against Pakistan, as retribution for a terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam (Kashmir). Pakistan launched its Operation `Bunyan-un-Marsoos' in retaliation. Hostilities ended with the declaration of ceasefire at 1700h (IST) on 10 May.

Both sides strongly believe that they have delivered punitive strikes and defeated the other, and have been celebrating their victory with pride. PM Modi addressing the nation on 12 May 2025, said, “I salute the valiant forces of India, the armed forces, our intelligence agencies, and our scientists. Our brave soldiers displayed immense courage to achieve the objectives of Operation Sindoor…”^[1] Pakistan, going a step further has promoted its Army Chief, General Asim Munir, to the rank of Field Marshal – a first after Field Marshal Ayub Khan 65 years ago, for what is being branded as “extraordinary leadership and wartime achievement,”^[2] an endeavour to signal an `unprecedented victory’. In this entire gamut of competing narratives, the reality of terrorism continuing to be at the root of the conflict and instability in the region is lost.

Two Victories?

The outcome of the conflict is being perceived totally differently by both sides. India's belief in success is based on having achieved the objectives set for delivering appropriate retribution while consciously maintaining restraint. Indian armed forces demonstrated their ability to hit desired targets, through the entire geographic spread of Pakistan, with precision, calibrating actions at all rungs of escalation, in consonance with the course of action adopted. At the end of this phase, India has been able to set more assertive new norms for responding to acts of terror.

Pakistan’s yardstick for defining `victory’ still remains nebulous. It revolves around the rationale of a smaller nation and a smaller air force giving a `befitting’ response to India by striking its military and civilian targets, `claims' (unverified) of shooting down Indian aircraft, which had, in any case, remained within Indian air space, forcing India to `seek' cease-fire through external mediation, and getting the international attention back to Kashmir.

India’s Approach

From the Indian perspective, delivering a punitive response to the Pahalgam terror attack was an absolute imperative. It had to be done. In implementation, there were two options available:

1. One, to deliver quick but `measured retribution’ for the act of Pahalgam terror, and in doing so, strike, destroy, or cause maximum damage to known terrorist infrastructure. It was done with a clear understanding that while this `limited action’ may, for some time, change the behaviour of terrorist groups and their sponsors, but will not end terror or put an end to Pakistan’s proxy war. The justification for delivery of retribution was based on an immediate claim of responsibility for the Pahalgam attack (retracted later) by the TRF (The Resistance Front), an offshoot of the UN-designated terrorist group LeT (Laskar-e-Taiba); availability of adequate technical intelligence; testimony of survivors; and past experience of Pakistan harbouring and supporting terrorists. India did not get distracted by Pakistan dubbing Pahalgam a `false flag’ operation, or its proforma demands of seeking credible evidence with dossiers to assign attributability. Such tactics have run their course, post-Mumbai 26/11 (2008) and the Pathankot Airbase strike (2016)
2. The second option available was to deliver a much heavier and more lasting response to terror and military infrastructure to re-establish strategic deterrence over Pakistan. This, however, would have entailed a different level of force application and economic calculation. This option may have been considered, and discarded, probably, for larger politico-military, economic, or geopolitical considerations.

Having consciously chosen Option 1 i.e. delivering measured retribution against `terror infrastructure,’ India also chose not to order the `mobilisation' of its entire armed forces. Even the `offensive formations’ were not moved to their launch areas.

This intent was clearly articulated in the official Indian statement issued immediately after the strikes, in the early hours of 07 May which stated, “Our actions have been focussed, measured and non-escalatory in nature. No Pakistani military facilities have been targeted. India has demonstrated considerable restraint in selection of targets and method of execution.”^[3]

In the selection of targets - the strikes remained terrorist bases centric. In execution, however, `new normals’ have been set - of geographic spread of targets, going beyond J&K. These extended from Muzaffarabad, Bhimber and Kotli in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)- ranging from 10 to 30 Km in depth from the Line of Control (LoC) to those in Western Punjab, in proximity of Sialkot, Lahore (Muridke) and Bahawalpur (nearly 100 Km in depth). The targets in the vicinity of LoC were hit by long-range artillery using precision and loiter munitions, while the ones in greater depth in Punjab were engaged using stand-off precision weapons delivered from aircraft, from own side of the international border.

Another significant aspect is that despite the professional logic of suppressing enemy Air Defence (SEAD) before launching air strikes, this was not done, a conscious decision to not hit military targets at this stage. This level of `strategic restraint (constraint)’ is akin to India’s directive to its armed forces of not crossing the LOC during the 1999 Kargil conflict, despite that curtailing its military options.

The course of operations is well known and not being reiterated. Pakistani military targets were only hit after they targeted Indian military facilities and civilian populace on 07 and 08 May with their drones, multi-barrel rocket launchers and artillery. Finally, the most significant development was of India firing 15 Brahmos missiles, which penetrated the Chinese-supplied Air Defence network and struck 11 Strategic air bases across Pakistan, including Nur Khan Air Base (Chaklala)- Rawalpindi, Sargodha, Rahim Yar Khan, Jacobabad, Sukkur, Bholari etc. and Air Defence (AD) sites causing severe damage. The `measured’ response would be evident from the limited number of Brahmos missiles actually used.

The New Normal

A significant lesson that has emerged is that India, deftly and strategically `carved a much larger space’ to deliver a conventional, measured, punitive response, through non-contact warfare, without its military formations crossing borders and without providing a `territorial, military, economic or domestic political trigger’ to justify Pakistan’s threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was a function of the level of restraint exercised, even while delivering `punishment.’

Further, another aspect that has emerged is the hierarchy of targets signalling the level of messaging in the conventional domain. In my assessment, the hierarchy that has emerged is: terrorist infrastructure – military targets – other value targets/ population centers - Critical national infrastructure (Ports, dams, refineries) – nuclear facilities and finally, the seat of the government. It is also clear that the strikes would be (geographically) non-linear.

The ultimate outcome, on the Indian side, is the enunciation of a three-pillar counter-terror doctrine (strategy) enunciated by the Prime Minister:^[4]

1. Decisive retaliation to any terrorist attack (construed as an act of war). To my understanding, this would include any stand-off attacks, by state or non-state actors, originating from Pakistani space.
2. No tolerance for nuclear blackmail
3. No distinction between the terrorists and their sponsors.

The actions taken have imposed considerable caution (if not deterrence) on the terrorists and their sponsors and lowered India’s threshold of delivering a punitive response. The higher levels of response, with shorter reaction times, expected in future entail a greater level of operational readiness on the part of Indian armed forces. For this, they will need to be equipped with adequate quantities of advanced technology platforms, as used during the current operation.

The Pakistan Narrative

Pakistan's effort was focussed more on `orchestrating narrative’ (for its own populace as well as for the international audience) than on `war-fighting.' The endeavour was to project delivery of the matching response, largely using Chinese-origin weapons blended with low-cost Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or lightly armed drones, which would not attract severe retribution. Endeavour also was to shift the narrative from the adverse impact of terrorism, on its own Pakistani populace and regional stability, to bringing Kashmir to the center stage. It was also to project India’s actions as unjustified and reckless and the region as a nuclear flashpoint (with a very senior Pakistani diplomat equating it to future `Nagasaki’ in a think-tank dialogue, recently). Endeavour also was to keep the threats of its `QPQ- plus’ and `full spectrum deterrence’ alive, and to draw in external players for negotiations on Kashmir.

Pakistan’s stated willingness to talk, expressed during some think-tank dialogues held close to the event was confined to issues related to water, trade, Kashmir and Nuclear CBMs. The fundamental issue of terrorism was `slickly' avoided.

Also on display was Pakistan's exaggerated sense of confidence in its partnership with China. The fact that Pakistan, today imports 81% of its arms from China is well known.^[5] Being China's largest customer (63% of Chinese arms exported to Pakistan), it has acquired several high-end Chinese-made weapon systems. The notable among these being the J-10C and JF-17 fighter aircraft; HQ-7 (FM-90) short range, HQ-16 (LY-80) medium range and HQ-9, long range Air Defence Systems; PL-15 Air to Air Missiles; Type 054 A/P Frigates ……… and more.^[6] Besides the Chinese-origin equipment used by Pakistan, operational collaboration in the form of cooperation in ISR and targeting, intelligence sharing and shared use of space-based assets was also been evident during the conflict. This development would definitely be factored by India in planning its capability development and force posturing for the future.

Preparing to Respond Better

Op Sindoor has demonstrated the technology-based capability of the Indian armed forces, developed particularly after the mid-2020 Eastern Ladakh face-off. India is systematically enabling its armed forces for a unique blend of `moderately hi-tech war with boots on the ground.' This newly acquired capability enabled India to deliver a sharp, precise, and punitive stand-off response in depth, without mobilizing the majority of its armed forces. This pattern of operations should serve as a roadmap for future two-front (plus) multidomain capability development, with recommended priority as follows:

1. Developing Intelligence, Surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and Maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities, including for the island territories and in the underwater domain.
2. Development of integrated Air Defence, Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and anti-missile capability between the three services, including for depth areas (considering the non-linear nature of threats).
3. Employment of a whole range of (mil grade and COTS) UAS for surveillance, targeting and other defensive and offensive roles.
4. Development of military-related AI capabilities for target recognition, battlespace management, decision support and autonomy.
5. Development of more robust Cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.
6. Refining of technology related to long-range vectors, precision and loiter munitions.
7. Fielding of robust Integrated Command and control networks and decision support systems.
8. Development of Energy (Power) systems suited to employment in field conditions.

These capabilities must be directed at enhancing the combat effectiveness of: Special forces, defensive/holding formations, counter-insurgency forces, and offensive formations, generally in that order of priority.

In addition, with the advent of long-range stand-off aerial weapons and enhanced missile and drone threat, there is a need to explore additional options for exercising `Control of Air,' the primary role during conflict identified in the Air Force doctrine of 2022. Employment of more advanced Air Defence systems, use of missiles for counter-air operations and honing the concept of `Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA)' merit consideration to maintain primacy in skies. This also may be factored in for future force structuring.

Beyond the hardcore military capability development, there is a need to refine `operations’ conducted by media. While not underestimating the relevance of legitimate operations in the cognitive domain, the public frenzy evoked by provocative debates initiated in TV studios have the propensity to (adversely) influence decisions and actions. There is a need to correct this within democratic norms. Also, the politico-military leadership must assiduously insulate professional decision-making from ill-informed public rhetoric.

Conclusion

It is a sad reality that state-sponsored terrorism persists in the sub-continent, despite concerted actions to quell it. Despite Op Sindoor, and other similar actions taken earlier, there is no assurance of lasting peace. With this reality, the only prudent alternative is to prepare to impose a heavy cost on the perpetrators, professionally, and through the use of emerging technologies with adequate boots on the ground. The emerging lessons need to be absorbed `on the go.' The military needs to develop matching doctrines so that strong retribution can be delivered `responsibly' without taking the nation and the region to the brink. Also, in the larger context, it remains a `whole of a nation effort' with the responsibility of overall military capability development and orchestration vested in the national leadership.

End Notes

^[1] Ministry of External Affairs. English rendering of PM’s address to the Nation (May 12, 2025). https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-statements.htm?dtl/39498/English_rendering_of_PMs_address_ to_the_Nation _May_12_2025. Accessed May 24, 2025.
^[2] Mateen Haider. General Syed Asim Munir promoted to Field Marshal. The Nation. May 21, 2025. https://www.nation.com.pk/21-May-2025/general-syed-asim-munir-promoted-to-field-marshal. Accessed May 24, 2025.
^[3] Press Information Bureau. Ministry of Defence. OPERATION SINDOOR: INDIAN ARMED FORCES CARRIED OUT PRECISION STRIKE AT TERRORIST CAMPS. 07 May ,2025, 1.44 AM. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID= 2127370&reg=3&lang=1. Accessed May 24, 2025.
^[4] Op. Cit. PM’s address to the Nation (May 12, 2025).
^[5] SIPRI Fact Sheet March 2025. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, 2024. Pg 6. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf
^[6] Defense Express. How Pakistan Being Top Buyer of Chinese Weapons Plays Out in Clashes With India. 16 May https://en.defence- ua.com/weapon_and_tech/how_pakistan_being_top_buyer_of_chinese_weapons_plays _out_in_clashes_with_india-14533.html2025. Accessed 26 May, 2025.

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