Introduction

After decades of externally driven agendas and persistent intra-regional fragmentation, the five Central Asian republics (CARs) have taken notable steps toward deepening their mutual regional engagement in the recent past. This shift is not merely symbolic; it reflects a maturing political will among Central Asian leaders to define their strategic space, collectively manage regional challenges, and assert their agency in an increasingly multipolar world. The implications of this development are significant, particularly in how these states recalibrate their relationships with traditional power centres such as Russia and China, emerging players like Turkey, Gulf countries and Western countries. India, in particular, finds itself at a complex juncture, facing both opportunities and limitations as it seeks to expand its Eurasian footprint amid changing regional dynamics.

The post-1991 period saw the Central Asian republics taking divergent paths of political and economic development, characterised by weak intra-regional connectivity and limited cooperation. Despite sharing deep historical, cultural, and linguistic linkages, their post-independence trajectories were shaped by varying levels of authoritarianism, differing economic models, and competing nationalist narratives. ^[1] External actors, primarily Russia, China, the United States, and to a lesser extent the European Union, stepped into this vacuum, offering economic assistance, security guarantees, and infrastructure investment. Consequently, Central Asia became a zone of strategic competition rather than regional integration.

However, over the past decade and especially after Uzbekistan’s leadership change in 2016 under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, regional cooperation has gathered momentum. High-level summits among the five states have become regular, producing frameworks for economic cooperation, trade facilitation, environmental cooperation, and collective responses to transnational threats. ^[2] The annual Consultative Meetings of Central Asian leaders, initiated in 2018, have fostered a greater sense of regional ownership over shared issues. Bilateral frictions such as border disputes or disagreements over resource sharing have seen substantial de-escalation through direct dialogue, indicating a willingness to prioritize collective stability over unilateral advantage. ^[3] The recent ratification of the border settlement between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan marks a significant step toward stability in the Fergana Valley, where long-standing territorial disputes have strained relations. This agreement not only clarifies borders but also establishes frameworks for cooperation in resource management and joint security, highlighting a mutual recognition of the need for sustainable peace to foster regional economic development. Additionally, this breakthrough reflects a growing willingness among Central Asian states to address challenges jointly, setting a positive precedent for dialogue and cooperation in a region that has historically been marked by tension. ^[4]

Uzbekistan has increasingly focussed on strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with its Central Asian neighbours, leading to significant regional transformation, particularly in terms of regional trade. Between 2017 and 2024, Uzbekistan's foreign trade with Central Asian nations expanded substantially, increasing by a remarkable 2.6 times, from USD 2.7 billion to USD 7 billion. Notably, exports surged 1.8 times, rising from USD 1.5 billion to USD 2.6 billion, while imports experienced a dramatic 3.5 times increase, growing from USD 1.2 billion to USD 4.3 billion. Trade with Kazakhstan doubled to USD 4.3 billion, Tajikistan tripled to USD 702 million, Kyrgyzstan rose 3.3 times to USD 846 million, and Turkmenistan soared 6.5 times to USD 1.1 billion. ^[5]

Another key advancement for enhanced people-to-people contacts and tourism is the implementation of visa-free travel agreements among Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, resulting from simplified cross-border movement. Furthermore, modernised border checkpoints, new crossing points, and electronic systems have enhanced regional connectivity. The establishment of joint trading centres and border trade zones promotes regional trade and production cooperation.

Regionalism and major power dynamics in Central Asia

This revival of regionalism is altering the way Central Asia interacts with major external powers. Traditionally, Russia has enjoyed overwhelming influence in the region through historical, linguistic, and institutional ties, including its role in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, Moscow's capacity to act as a dominant power has allegedly eroded due to its preoccupation with the Ukraine conflict, economic sanctions, and a deep penetration of China. ^[6] Nevertheless, it can be argued that Russia remains a significant and influential player in shaping Central Asian foreign policy, particularly serving as a crucial counterbalance to China's growing presence in the region. This dynamic underscores Russia's enduring geopolitical significance and its capacity to influence the strategic decisions of Central Asian nations. At the same time, while Russia retains a significant security role, Central Asian states increasingly diversify their foreign policies to avoid overdependence.

China, on the other hand, has gradually emerged as the leading economic actor in the region, primarily through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese investments have apparently transformed regional infrastructure, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Yet, this growing economic presence also provoked resentment about debt dependency, political interference, and cultural influence. However, this anti-Chinese sentiment has been limited, and that too only among the local population. Central Asian elites have been pro-Chinese and have often ignored the anti-Chinese sentiments in their respective countries. Anti-China protests and growing civil society scepticism in several Central Asian countries pointed to a ceiling on how far Beijing’s influence can expand without pushback. Beijing has been actively engaging with the Central Asian population, especially the youth, to foster a positive perception of China. The use of Chinese soft power through scholarships, language training, Luban workshops, and Confucius Institutes has significantly improved its image in Central Asia. ^[7] China is deeply embedded in almost every realm of Central Asia, which is a major concern; however, for the time being, this issue is largely being overlooked. With increased cooperation among Central Asian countries, they will gain more negotiating power in relation to China and will also be able to lessen their dependence on Beijing.

The United States and the European Union, while important actors in terms of aid and normative engagement, have struggled to formulate a sustained and coherent strategy for the region post-Afghanistan. Their engagement tends to be episodic, focussed on democratization and human rights, with limited appeal to the fast-changing development priorities of regional governments. Moreover, the Western retreat from Afghanistan has created a perception of strategic withdrawal, thereby reducing the credibility of their long-term commitment to Central Asia.

However, the U.S. and the EU have renewed their interest in Central Asia following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, viewing it as an opportunity to counter Moscow's alleged declining influence. The U.S. is enhancing diplomatic efforts to cooperate with the region on more relevant issues such as energy diversification, critical minerals, etc, while the EU focuses on investments through initiatives like the Global Gateway to reduce reliance on Russian energy. This renewed engagement creates a complex dynamic, enabling Central Asian countries to leverage their regional cooperation to negotiate more favourable terms with both Western and non-Western powers, thereby highlighting their growing agency in the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Implications for India

Against the backdrop of shifting regional and geopolitical balances in Central Asia, India’s engagement with the region requires reassessment. Historically connected through cultural exchanges, trade routes, and spiritual links, India’s modern engagement with Central Asia has been constrained by geography and competing priorities. However, over the past decade, New Delhi has intensified its outreach, driven by a combination of geopolitical, economic, and strategic imperatives. India's Connect Central Asia Policy was recently revived following New Delhi's full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2017, the launch of the India-Central Asia Dialogue at the foreign ministers' level (2019), and the India-Central Asia Leaders' Summit, which began in 2022 and is scheduled to take place biannually. However, despite these substantial initiatives aimed at strengthening relations, they have faced delays. Connectivity still remains the major hurdle in India's geostrategic outreach to Central Asia and beyond.

The evolving regional cooperation among Central Asian republics provides India with both new opportunities and emerging constraints. On the one hand, India benefits from increasing regionalism, which reduces external manipulation and creates a more predictable environment for economic engagement. A cooperative Central Asia is more likely to invest in cross-border projects, harmonise regulations, and attract diversified partnerships with India. India’s inclusion in multilateral formats, such as the India-Central Asia Dialogue and the India-Central Asia Summit, indicates a growing appetite for diversified partnerships among regional states. For that to materialize into something substantial in geopolitical and geoeconomic terms, New Delhi must be proactive, keeping aside the diplomatic and geographical impediments. It must develop long-term solutions to address these challenges.

On the other hand, as mentioned already, regional cooperation also empowers Central Asian states to negotiate more assertively with external powers. India, lacking the economic heft of China or the historical military presence of Russia, must find creative ways to position itself as a credible and non-intrusive partner. Furthermore, the rise of intra-regional mechanisms may reduce the urgency of external dependency. For instance, if Central Asia can develop its own logistics, transit, and trade corridors, the demand for foreign involvement, including from India, may be recalibrated. Central Asia can collectively engage in making India-led connectivity projects, such as the INSTC and Chabahar, fully operational, benefiting both sides. India's active participation in regional multilateral initiatives, such as the SCO and BRICS, also serves as a counterbalance to China.

India faces a significant challenge in its engagement with Central Asia: the absence of a proactive and strategic policy. Despite the advantageous geopolitical landscape that presents numerous opportunities, New Delhi has struggled to fully leverage its strengths and resources. As a result, the country has not capitalized on the potential to deepen and enrich its relationships with the nations of Central Asia. This situation has also presented an opportunity for more politically disruptive forces with specific geopolitical agendas to tighten their grip on the region.

That said, India still possesses unique strengths that can differentiate it from other actors. Unlike China, Turkey or the West, India is perceived as a non-threatening power with shared civilizational roots and no history of political domination in the region. Its democratic credentials, developmental experiences, and emphasis on human capital resonate with Central Asian aspirations for inclusive development. Moreover, India’s capacity to contribute in areas like IT, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and education matches the developmental priorities of Central Asian states.

To make the most of this shifting landscape, India must recalibrate its regional approach in line with three key imperatives. First, India must institutionalize its engagement with Central Asia through consistent high-level diplomacy, targeted economic investments, and sectoral cooperation. The India-Central Asia Summit format, inaugurated in 2022, should evolve into a regular mechanism with actionable deliverables. Second, India must prioritize physical and digital connectivity. While the INSTC and Chabahar offer long-term promise, India must also explore new opportunities. The use of satellite technology and fintech solutions could help India leapfrog traditional logistical barriers. Third, India must deepen its regional presence beyond elite diplomacy.

Expanding academic exchange, increasing the number and scope of fellowships, cultural outreach, and people-to-people ties can build durable constituencies in favour of long-term cooperation. Following the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam, India must increase its counter-terrorism cooperation with Central Asia, both inside and outside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In June of this year, the next edition of the India-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting will take place in Delhi. New Delhi can utilize this opportunity to discuss and elevate defence and security cooperation.

Conclusion

The emergence of a more cohesive Central Asia is reshaping the region’s relationships with external powers. Russia and China will remain influential, but their dominance is no longer uncontested. A more self-assured Central Asia seeks diversified partnerships and greater strategic autonomy, creating space for new actors like India. However, India’s ability to benefit from this window will depend on its agility, consistency, and ability to offer credible alternatives rooted in mutual respect and long-term commitment. In this sense, India is neither guaranteed success nor doomed to irrelevance. Its place in the region’s future will be shaped by its policy choices today.

References

^[1] Cooley, A. (2012). Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. Oxford University Press.

^[2] Beishenbek Toktogulov, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy Under Mirziyoyev: Change Or Continuity?, Eurasian Research Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 49-67, January 2022. https://erj.eurasian-research.org/yonetim/icerik/makaleler/101-published.pdf
^[3] Stronski, P, “Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic”, (2020), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/28/cooperation-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-russian-far-east-and-arctic-pub-75673

^[4] Gupta, p. “The Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Deal: A Step Closer Towards Regional Cooperation in Central Asia” VIF Article, March 17, 2025. https://www.vifindia.org/print/13430?via=Azure

^[5] Hyein Shim, “Uzbekistan and Central Asia in global changes”, May 16, 2025. Korea Post. https://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=44737

^[6]Owen Haywood, “How Russia Lost Its Grip on Central Asia”, The Yale Review of International Studies, November 3, 2022. https://yris.yira.org/column/__trashed/

^[7] Gupta, P.K., “Geopolitics of Eurasia and Its Strategic Significance for India”, VIF paper, 2024. https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/geopolitics-of-eurasia-and-its-strategic-significance-for-india.pdf

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