Wars are ageless and can indeed begin unannounced, as was proven in India-Pakistan context. On 22 April 2025, it could not be predicted that on 07 May, there would commence a modern shooting war. Four days of calibrated military action followed an understanding arrived at, on 10 May between DGsMO, India has declared Operation Sindoor is at pause. From a strategic warfighting perspective, implication is that India had an unambiguous military success.

Shattering Past Myths

In retrospective, Op Sindoor destroyed many internal-external myths and created five fresh contexts. First India demonstrated an effective civil-military and DRDO/ defence PSUs and industry synergy, negating the reining opinion of an ‘absent-dialogue’ or risk aversion! The much spoken off ‘whole of Government’ and ‘whole of nation’ approach was clearly evident, like in preparing the nation for civil defence response. Decision making at the apex level was clear and unambiguous, forceful and yet dynamic. Drawing clear redlines, there is clear intimation that for an act of terror like in Pahalgam on 22 April, strong decision-making and execution will not be procrastinated, or allowed to be buried in confirming Pakistan duplicity and attributability, or in seeking international support.

India showed that it comprehends utility of hard power, and the National Will to apply it decisively, mindful of the consequences that may follow. Placing IWT in abeyance is one of the strongest decisions ever made in Independent India, while accepting ‘act of war’ comment of Pakistan in its stride, and the likely international/ legal issues.

Second was of destruction of Apex Level terror Infrastructure. This was clearly achieved on night 07/08 May, with nine objectives targeted precisely by Air Force and Army. These included Bahawalpur, Muridke and Sialkot in Pak-Punjab and POK’s capital Muzaffarabad. Targeting was precise and accurate, both by Air Force and Army, and about 100 terrorists were killed. The expectation that India would hesitate in expanding conflict beyond LOC, was belied.

Third, establishment of clear modern military superiority and deterrence. While Indian military is still transforming, modern deterrence by punishment shone through the campaign. Indian Air Force’s strike at Muridke and Bahawalpur and later on strategically chosen 11 airfields/ radar sites/ UAV coordination hubs were executed with exceptional precision, to precisely hitting intersection of two runways of Sargodha airbase. This indicated technological, human intelligence and effective surveys, satellite guided targeting, with terrain contour matching, inertial navigation systems and Indian NavIC, (Navigation with Indian Constellation) which is India's own regional satellite navigation system, developed by ISRO. It is also essential to mention the coming of age of effective use of drones and loitering ammunition like Harpy and Herons. In an Army’s targeting of a terror hub in POK, precision was such that co-located mosque was unharmed and correct timing did not interfere with prayers!

Fourth, is that while offensiveness was clinical and faultless, deterrence by denial was very effective against Pakistan response to over 600 drone swarms and missiles. The layered Air Defence environment included direct firing L70s, ZSUsand Schillka, to newly fielded DRDO-developed Akash SAM system developed by the DRDO and Akashteer, India's fully indigenous automated Air Defence Control and Reporting System, that intercepted and neutralised inbound projectiles. Russian S400 and Israeli Barak protected Indian nation to perfection. Pakistan was unable to penetrate single defended area inside India.

While Op Parakaram was all about coercive diplomacy and 26/11 Mumbai attacks of diplomacy, surgical strikes of 2016 and Balakot Strike of 2019 had retributive character. Their efficacy in deterring Pakistan from sponsoring terror were limited. In Op Sindoor, India attempted to establish deterrence both by punishment and denial.

Fifth, enunciation of new security doctrine with reference to Pakistan and terrorism, and calling the nuclear bluff. The trio of ‘terror and talks don’t go together’, ‘terror and trade don’t go together’ and ‘water and blood cannot flow together’ are singularly focussed. Added to this, acts of terror stand equated to war, as a focused declaration of National Will and intent. These will eventually be translated into rules of engagement and become policy parameters.

‘India will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail’, puts to rest two-decade long Pakistan establishment loud-hailing that tactical nuclear weapons, with low threshold, are for conventional war fighting. Even post-Pahalgam attack, six Pakistan’s cabinet ministers had resorted to nuclear threats. India exhibiting utility of force in statecraft, called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, and intimated nuclear threat will not deter India.

Sixth, was Indian management of escalation control. While the force of Indian military might was brought to bear on Pakistan, it was precision operations with no collateral damage. There was constant information flow to Pakistan directly and through clearly and intelligently crafted official statements to control escalation. India did not order general mobilisation or cancel leave of its military personnel.

Military targeting was imaginative in its graduated upscaling from 07 to 10 May. In all this, a loose rope was constantly provided to Pakistan to initiate a step back, which it grasped on 10 May, consequent to the precise targeting of eleven of its air bases including Nur Khan in Rawalpindi. Appreciating that escalation control is not easy and risky proposition, the nation and military were prepared for escalation towards conventional war.

Prospective Considerations

Hon’ble Raksha Mantri in Bhuj air base on 16 May 2025, remarked perceptively, ‘Op Sindoor was just a trailer’. Op Sindoor brings to fore, five prospective considerations for India. One, success of deterrence will have to be seen in longer term perspective. Pakistan is a security state, whose national identity rests on anti-Indianism and its Army’s control of the national polity. For Pak Army to redefine itself and mellow down, will be out of character and immense loss to its pecuniary interests. Hence its low-cost option of controlling proxy war in J&K will not be abandoned. Deterrence created by India in Op Sindoor may not be long-lasting, as Pakistan learns lessons and works to eliminate them in collusion with China. The threat from Pakistan hence may manifest in many ways and any complacency will be to Indian detriment.

The 2014 election manifesto of BJP referred to study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times. In 2016, Late Mr Manohar Parrikar, then RM suggested that there should be a degree of “unpredictability” when it came to the issue of nuclear weapons and India should not bind to ‘no first use policy’. Mr Rajnath Singh, the RM had in 2019 remarked that India’s no first use doctrine was not written in stone, and that it would depend on the prevailing circumstances. India’s enunciation that it will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail does mandate a re-contemplation of India’s nuclear doctrine.

Two, four days was a short period for full application of force. Pakistan did not utilise ballistic missiles like Ababeel, Abdali, Ghaznavi, Nasr, and Ghauri systems. Nor did India apply the Agni series, Prithvi and Pralay. The implications of ballistic missiles with conventional and nuclear compatibility and counter value nature, controlled their usage due to likelihood of large casualties.

This conceptualisation brings with it, the necessity of redefining missile and drone air defence shield, beyond airfields and air bases, to towns and cities. Despite Israel using layers of David Sling, Iron Dome, Patriot and the US carrier borne Aegis system, many a missile, rocket and drone from Iran, Hezbollah and Houthis was able to slip through. The US is planning a Golden Dome for its mainland. India needs a structural consideration for national air defence, including sensor fusion, shooter integration and automation for multi-vector targeting. The Akash and Akashteer Air Defence deployments along with India’s Integrated Electronic Warfare System must be completed soonest.

Drones are another matter, they are no longer force-multipliers, they are force themselves. Unfortunately, change in their technology and employment is dynamic and remaining abreast alone is Herculean. This necessitates serious consideration of R&D, especially in private sector like energising the Drone Federation India (DFI) that represents over 550 drone companies and 5500 drone pilots. As drones get more and more autonomous with AI and human out of the loop, soft kill by EW will become ineffective. India has made some advancement in direct-energy weapons, this ought to be taken up with full gusto!

There is lack of information in open domain regarding India’s current cyber operations, capabilities and campaigns. Without transparency, it is difficult to gauge progress in converting its latent cyber power into actual, operationally active cyber power. India needs improved cybersecurity, resilience, and cultivation of strong offensive cyber capabilities, as military tools. Cyber weapons are no more grey-zone non-attributable clandestine weapons degrading or defacing adversary’s websites! This is a domain of warfare that India can become a leading player in quick time.

Third is oft repeated issue of battlefield transparency (BFT). Collusivity between Pakistan and China is complete, with Beidou satellite constellation interoperable and Chinese satellites supporting BFT for Pakistan. Pakistan also effectively utilised the Chinese digital eco-system effectively.

On 07 May, India was able to achieve operational surprise. However, India's reliance on foreign companies, like Maxar and Sentinel, for satellite surveillance data is a strategic concern. It limits ability to conduct timely and detailed monitoring of its own territory and surrounding areas, particularly in high-resolution imagery. Indian SBS-3 programme for creating BFT infrastructure ought to move faster than the initial 4-year timeline.

Four, Pakistan is master of cognitive warfare, twisting facts, with blatant lies and half-truths, and utter fakery. Even half a century ago, in 1965 War, Radio Pakistan was termed “Radio Jhootistan” and “Radio Guppistaan”. Pakistan’s cognitive warfare aims to manipulate perceptions and influence behaviour in India and internationally, to target human understanding. The exploitation of international and national media and social media and availing of Chinese information-structures for elevating the fakery globally, is Pakistani way of life. Pakistan during Op Sindoor led a disturbing offensive in the information domain.

India's vulnerability is from the democratic environment and reliance on social media, making it vulnerable to narrative manipulation and disinformation. India needs to formalise a cognitive warfare policy and structures and train peoples to undertake this. Information Warfare with psychological and influence operations are very significant dimensions of future warfare, and cannot be allowed to be second fiddle.

Five and most importantly, India has to undertake contemplation of future war fighting trends of the adversaries with technological intake. Will non-contact kinetic operations of the beyond visual range (BVR) variety be the order of the future? In an era of total BFT and situational awareness, real-time sensor-shooter links, lethality and accuracy of precision weapons systems and air defence umbrellas, mechanised operations across borders mandate a rethink. The transformational planning, force modernisation and structures have to be imaginative and adaptive, responding to how wars will be prosecuted. In modernising the force, India must develop a strong overmatch against Pakistan and a credible deterrence against China! This is also imperative in an era of constrained defence budgets!

In sum, in Op Sindoor, India established new redlines, and enforced them. Op Sindoor drew on the National philosophy of strategic independence and autonomy in decision making and execution. In finality strategic success achieved was not about retribution, it was about imposing costs for desired political effect and about establishing deterrence.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>