Introduction

For the past few weeks, all eyes have been on a multibillion-dollar deal that was supposed to be signed early this month and would lead to the transfer of control of approximately 43 ports across 23 countries. However, it has instead found itself in the middle of a heightening geopolitical crisis between the US and China.

The agreement, popularly touted as the “Panama Deal” between Hong Kong-based conglomerate, CK Hutchison and a U.S.-led consortium spearheaded by investment giant BlackRock includes key facilities like the Balboa and Cristobal ports, positioned at the Pacific and Caribbean gateways of the Panama Canal, and covers 90% ownership of the Panama Ports Company, which manages the two ports on either side of the canal.

Reuters, citing Chinese state media, noted that the broader deal including many other ports worldwide could give BlackRock control of 10.4% of global container throughput^[1], thereby making it the world’s third largest port operator. ^[2] Further, both ports have been central to U.S. President Donald Trump’s increasing criticism of Panama has amplified his provocative claims, including an claims such as that China controls the Panama Canal. ^[3]

Against this backdrop, the Panama Canal has emerged as a new theatre of great power contestation. The deal has become heavily politicized, with the Hong Kong conglomerate caught in the middle of the intensifying U.S.-China trade war, heightening fears that Hong Kong's status as a financial hub may be severely impacted due to rising geopolitical tensions. This development occurs against the backdrop of U.S. President Donald Trump’s persistent calls for the canal’s return to American control, citing concerns over its management and strategic importance. ^[4]

The Panama Canal is vital to global supply chains, enabling the passage of around 6% of the world’s maritime trade. In 2023, 40% of U.S. container traffic passed through it. The canal handles $270 billion worth of cargo annually, constituting 5% of global maritime trade volume, with 72% of that transit linked to U.S. ports. Furthermore, in 2021, over 73% of all vessels navigating the canal were either enroute to or departing from the United States. ^[5] These statistics highlight the strategic significance of the agreement, in particular and Panama Canal, in general for Washington.

Over the years, Trump has accused Panama of imposing excessive charges on U.S. vessels utilizing the canal. He has also remained critical of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties of 1977, which facilitated the transfer of the canal to Panama, dismissing them as missteps that weakened American influence in the region. ^[6] Expressing his concerns, Trump stated, "We gave the Panama Canal to Panama. We didn’t give it to China, and they've abused it." He went on to underscore the importance of the canal, describing it as a "Vital National Asset for the United States" and essential to the country's economic stability and national defence. ^[7] When questioned about whether he could guarantee that military or economic coercion would not be employed to regain control of the canal, he responded, "The Panama Canal was built for our military." ^[8]

However, the deal has encountered regulatory hurdles. Chinese antitrust authorities have launched an investigation into the acquisition, reportedly delaying its finalization. ^[9] The State Administration for Market Regulation, China's chief market watchdog, confirmed that it had initiated the probe "in accordance with the law to protect fair competition in the market and safeguard the public interest." ^[10] The same statement was subsequently shared by China’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office.

Following this announcement, reports in the South China Morning Post indicated that CK Hutchison had postponed the official signing of the Panama ports deal. ^[11] The deal’s final documentation was initially expected to be signed by April 2. Further complicating matters, Bloomberg disclosed that Beijing had issued directives instructing state-owned enterprises to refrain from engaging in new business dealings with CK Hutchison and its affiliates. ^[12] Pro-Beijing media outlets have released multiple commentaries condemning CK Hutchison’s deal, portraying it as a betrayal of China and aligning with the U.S. effort to contain Chinese influence. Additionally, analysts believe that the delay could mean that the main parties involved in the deal, including CK Hutchison and BlackRock, will have to renegotiate the terms to accommodate both Beijing's and Washington's concerns. ^[13]

Additionally, Panama’s government has requested documents from CK Hutchison to complete an audit on the concession. ^[14] Panama’s Maritime Authority has also asked BlackRock and CK Hutchison to provide details of their deal, and it must ultimately be green-lit by Panama. ^[15] These issues highlight that the recent developments extend beyond the scope of the current deal, the outcome of which remains uncertain, and has broader geopolitical ramifications for the US and China.

Panama’s Historical Relations with the US

In 1903, after failed negotiations with Colombia, the United States switched its approach by backing Panama's push for independence. President Theodore Roosevelt employed "gunboat diplomacy", the use or threat of military power to achieve foreign policy goals, to deter Colombian resistance and secure the success of the separatist movement. In return for U.S. military backing and diplomatic recognition of the newly established Republic of Panama, the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was signed. It granted the United States perpetual control over a ten-mile-wide canal zone in exchange for an initial payment of ten million dollars and an annual sum of $250,000. The United States also pledged to uphold and protect Panama’s independence.^[16]

The Panama Canal, constructed with significant American financial and human investment, still stands as a monumental engineering achievement and remains an essential artery of global trade. However, the 1903 political arrangement also fostered deep-seated resentment among Panamanians, who viewed it as a violation of their sovereignty.

Following an extensive construction effort led by the United States, the canal officially opened in 1914 and remained under U.S. control until its transfer to Panama in 1999 under the terms of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties was a set of two treaties - first, called The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, or the Neutrality Treaty, stated that the United States could use its military to defend the Panama Canal against any threat to its neutrality, thus allowing perpetual U.S. usage of the Canal. The second, called The Panama Canal Treaty, declared that the Panama Canal Zone would be dissolved on October 1, 1979, and the Canal would be handed over to Panama on December 31, 1999. These two treaties were signed on September 7, 1977. ^[17] However, these agreements have, till date, remained contentious among certain U.S. political figures, long after Carter. The handover has been regarded as a strategic miscalculation. ^[18]

Donald Trump’s recent rhetoric has reignited this debate - challenging the legitimacy of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. These agreements guaranteed the canal's neutrality and permitted U.S. intervention should its security be threatened. However, Trump has escalated beyond mere critique, openly advocating for the canal’s return to U.S. control should certain "moral and legal principles" not be upheld. Declaring, "If the principles, both moral and legal, of this magnanimous gesture of giving are not followed, then we will demand that the Panama Canal be returned to us, in full, and without question," Trump has underscored concerns regarding U.S. interests, particularly the high fees imposed on American shipping. ^[19]

Arguments against Washington stem from the accusation that despite the symbolic and strategic significance of the canal, Washington has not sufficiently prioritized its relationship with Panama since relinquishing control in 1999. The four-year absence of an designated U.S. ambassador from 2018 to 2022 exemplified the accusation of diplomatic neglect. Another argument against Washington’s claims of the canal is that Panama has invested considerably in the canal since it was given control in 1999. Contrary to the notion circulating in Washington that Panama merely inherited the canal in its original form, it is important to note that the latter has undertaken significant efforts to upgrade and expand the waterway through extensive dredging and infrastructure development. This is a crucial consideration in policy discussions, particularly those in Washington that reference the idea of 'retaking' the Panama Canal, as such rhetoric disregards Panama’s substantial contributions to its modernization and continued functionality. In recent years, Panama undertook a multibillion-dollar expansion project that effectively doubled the canal’s capacity, enabling it to accommodate the larger 'Post-Panamax' class of vessels. ^[20]

Since ships are usually designed to match the dimensions of the canal's locks with only minimal clearance on either side, when vessels eventually outgrew the original size like in the case of the 1914 canal built by the US, Panama responded by expanding its infrastructure to accommodate larger, deeper, and longer ships. This proves that Panamanian authorities have not only successfully maintained and modernized the canal but also improved its overall efficiency by doubling its capacity, reducing accident frequency, etc.

Rising Chinese Influence and Trump’s Current Concerns

Besides the United States, China ranks as the second most frequent user of the Panama Canal, highlighting its strategic significance to Beijing. As highlighted before, there is a growing consensus that Washington has failed to address Panama’s pressing infrastructure investment needs. In recent decades, U.S. private enterprises have played no significant role in major Panamanian infrastructure projects, a notable example being the canal’s massive lock expansion, inaugurated in 2016. Constructed entirely by a European consortium, the project marked a conspicuous absence of American involvement. The symbolic importance of this void was further emphasized when a vessel owned by China’s COSCO became the first to transit the newly expanded locks, marking a major propaganda win for Beijing.

China has successfully and proactively capitalized on this gap, directing significant investments into critical Panamanian infrastructure projects. Further solidifying its position, a Chinese-owned firm was selected in 2018 to construct the fourth bridge across the Panama Canal—a project U.S. companies declined to bid on. ^[21]

The most striking indication of shifting allegiances came in 2017 when Panama formally switched its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, and becoming the first Latin American nation to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Since Panama’s diplomatic recognition of Beijing, Chinese investments have exceeded $2.5 billion, spanning strategic sectors such as ports at both ends of the canal, telecommunications, and road networks. ^[22] This move underscored growing Chinese influence in the region and served as a stark wake-up call for U.S. policymakers regarding the evolving geopolitical landscape in what the US considers its backyard.

Furthermore, given Panama’s geographical positioning, it has situated itself as a key anchor for China’s ambitions in the Latin America, thereby concerning Washington even further. Against this backdrop, Washington has become increasingly wary of Beijing’s influence in the region, particularly in Panama. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently warned Panamanian President Jose Raul Mulino that if immediate measures were not taken to curb what Trump perceives as Chinese control over the canal, the U.S. would "take necessary actions." ^[23] Necessary actions may include military intervention, which remains open for discussion, as was insinuated by the U.S. Secretary of State while voicing Washington’s concerns that Beijing could potentially exploit its control over key infrastructure in the event of a U.S.-China conflict. ^[24]

China’s deepening presence extends beyond just commercial influence; it encompasses political and security dimensions that could challenge U.S. strategic interests. The interlinked relationship between Chinese companies, Panama’s government, and key business entities provide Beijing with considerable leverage that could be exploited to disrupt canal operations in times of geopolitical tension. Companies such as Landbridge Group and CK Hutchison Holdings, which manage critical port facilities and have alleged ties with the CCP have further exacerbated the fear about the potential dual-use nature of Chinese-controlled infrastructure. The probability of these facilities being repurposed for military applications adds another layer of complexity to US’s growing concerns regarding how Chinese economic leverage could steer Panamanian policy in directions aligned with Beijing’s strategic interests, thereby shifting the balance of power in Latin America, and significantly altering the evolving security landscape in the region.

Beijing’s growing share in Panama’s infrastructure has not gone unnoticed in Chinese state media as well. The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office has amplified narratives depicting the sale of port asset near the Panama Canal to the US as acts of betrayal against China’s national interests. Such deals could grant Washington undue influence over strategic assets crucial to China’s trade routes. ^[25]

Scholars argue that China’s regulatory bodies, such as the State Administration for Market Regulation, possess extraterritorial jurisdiction that could be leveraged to challenge foreign acquisitions deemed detrimental to Chinese commercial interests. ^[26] The country’s security laws provide additional tools for scrutinizing foreign investments in sectors critical to national security, including infrastructure projects like those at the Panama Canal. ^[27]

China’s growing presence and influence in Panama goes beyond just economic engagement. Thus, it raises concerns about dual-use infrastructure, threat of espionage, and the subsequent strategic military implications. COSCO, an important Chinese logistics giant which has alleged ties with the PLA, has a longstanding relationship with the Panama Canal Authority. In this context, COSCO’s role as one of the canal’s biggest users has led to greater concerns with respect to the degree of China’s influence over vital logistical operations.

What exemplifies Washington’s concerns with respect to China is the strategic and security implications of Beijing’s Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) doctrine. This doctrine ensures that PRC investments, especially in critical infrastructure, is operated in such a manner that it serves both commercial and state objectives. As the name suggests, CMF majorly focuses on the elimination of hurdles between China’s civilian research and their commercial, military and defence applications. The U.S. Navy’s 2021 Chief of Naval Operations NAVPLAN cautions that China is expanding its global infrastructure to gain control over key maritime chokepoints. ^[28]

There is a growing concern that China may use these investments to deny infrastructure access to other nations at time of crisis. Even though there has been no incident of China overtly denying access as of now, there are concerns because of the nature of business model Beijing has created that advantage their partners over their commercial rivals. Such a competitive edge could encourage China-backed commercial firms to be able to establish themselves as a maritime infrastructure cartel or monopolize a specific market segment.

Dr. Geoffrey Gresh from the U.S. National Defense University highlights that two-thirds of the world’s top 50 container ports have received investments from the PRC. ^[29] In 2019, Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Port Holdings was the world’s second-largest container port operator, managing over 50 terminals globally. In third place, COSCO Shipping Ports operates fewer ports but handles a greater volume of cargo. China Merchant Ports Holding manages nearly 40 ports across about 20 countries. ^[30] Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defence’s 2020 China Military Power Report notes that the PRC concept of ‘Fundamental Domain Resource Sharing’ dictates that these maritime infrastructure investments are required to provide dual-use functionality, and thus will have important implications “as the PRC seeks to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power”. The report specifically mentions that China has likely explored the establishment of such military logistics hubs in Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands, with potential interest in Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Angola. ^[31]

In recent years, China has mustered a substantial stake by investing heavily in the control of global maritime infrastructure. The investments span from building new ports to upgrading and modernizing cargo handling facilities, as well as acquiring port management rights. Majority of the capital comes from China’s One Belt One Road Initiative, but some investments are also made by state-owned, PLA-linked, and other Chinese enterprises.^[32] Additionally, a 2024 congressional hearing underscored the strategic vulnerabilities posed by Hutchison’s control over the canal’s two major ports, warning that Beijing could leverage its position to disrupt U.S. supply chains or hinder military logistics in the event of a conflict, particularly in a scenario involving Taiwan. ^[33]

A broader look at the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region highlights the glaring fact that, in the last 15 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made significant advances in this region, significantly challenging U.S. strategic interests. What began with a seemingly harmless focus on economic interests and an insatiable appetite for commodities has swiftly transformed to include security partnerships, technological sharing, and the construction of vital infrastructure.

The PRC excels at using its multifaceted engagement, particularly its commercial ties, to create security advantages for itself. This is particularly evident in the realm of both digital and physical infrastructure. Scholars fear that China’s monopolistic influence over the economic and development infrastructure of developing countries can translate into coercion, with the aim of extracting concessions from borrower countries, making them unsustainably dependent and thereby eroding strategic autonomy and free will. ^[34]

Against this backdrop, Trump’s calls to reclaim the canal underscore Washington’s anxiety over China’s growing influence and its subsequent strategic implications. Washington remains vary of Beijing’s ability to reshape Panama’s geopolitical alignment through economic and strategic investments, irrespective of Beijing’s insistence over the canal’s neutrality, as outlined in the Neutrality Treaty.

Conclusion

A possible acquisition of CK Hutchison's port operations on the Panama Canal by American firm BlackRock has introduced new complexities into the already complex Sino-US strategic competition. While Washington has framed the deal as a geopolitical win, China's muted initial response and the subsequent regulatory roadblocks highlights the latter’s more calculated approach towards the issue. China is attempting to balance nationalist sentiments with broader geopolitical priorities, like averting escalating tensions with the US, which may have a spillover effect on their trade relations.

These recent developments surrounding the Panama Canal underscores its enduring importance in global trade and strategic competition. As operational costs rise and China's influence in the region deepens, debates surrounding the revival of doctrines like the Roosevelt Corollary, which were once used to justify U.S. interventions in Latin America, may resurface in Washington. However, analysts caution against such measures without carefully considering Panama’s sovereign rights and its demonstrated commitment to autonomous governance.

The Panama Canal remains central to U.S. foreign policy, necessitating a nuanced approach that balances American strategic interests with Panama’s right to autonomous governance. The canal’s future will be shaped by the complex interplay of great-power competition, economic considerations, and Panama’s aspirations to manage this critical waterway free from external coercion.

By leveraging legal frameworks, Washington may claim a short-term victory in acquiring the ports from China, but the broader contest for influence in the region is far from over. China’s long-term strategic ambitions in Latin America will continue to intensify and has the potential to shape the trajectory of regional power dynamics. However, at the end of the day, the most ideal way forward would be to follow a path of fostering transparency, good governance, and cooperative engagement between the U.S. , China and Panama. And this must not come at the cost of Panamanian sovereignty, which must remain paramount in any geopolitical considerations.

For China, the acquisition deal raises uncomfortable questions about the extent of its influence over overseas firms. In this context, for China, navigating backlash without further inflaming tensions will be a litmus test of its evolving foreign policy posture and perception management. For the U.S., it reaffirms the strategic centrality of the canal. However, Washington should remember that maintaining influence in the region should not translate into coercive oversight but rather a partnership grounded in mutual respect. Scholars predict that more likely or not, it will be a topic of discussion in an anticipated meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Mr Trump, expected to take place in the coming months. ^[35]

In this climate of intensifying competition, Panama has remained steadfast in asserting its authority over the canal, seeking to counter narratives that portray it as a pawn in great-power politics. Ultimately, a stable, well-governed canal benefits not only the region but also the broader international community by ensuring fair and unimpeded access to one of the world’s most critical trade route.

References

^[1] Container throughput is a crucial indicator of economic growth, measuring the volume of goods that pass through ports.
^[2] Reuters. “What Levers Do China and Hong Kong Have over CK Hutchison’s Port Deal?,” 2025. https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/what-levers-do-china-hong-kong-have-over-ck-hutchisons-port-deal-2025-03-19/.
^[3] Yuan, Shawn. “Does China ‘operate’ Panama Canal, as Trump Says?” BBC. January 22, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1km4vj3pl0o.
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^[5] Levy, Elie. “The Strategic Significance of the Panama Canal and U.s. Policy Concerns.” Sobel Network Shipping Co., Inc, December 23, 2024. https://www.sobelnet.com/the-strategic-significance-of-the-panama-canal-and-u-s-policy-concerns/.
^[6] Spetalnick, Matt. “Trump Vows to Take Back Panama Canal, Talks of ‘Manifest Destiny’ in Space.” Reuters, January 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-says-us-will-take-back-panama-canal-2025-01-20/.
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^[11] Lam, Jeffie. “Hong Kong’s Hutchison ‘Will Not Sign Panama Deal next Week’, Beijing to Launch Probe.” South China Morning Post, March 28, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3304328/hong-kongs-ck-hutchison-will-not-sign-panama-ports-deal-next-week.
^[12] Bloomberg News. “China Pauses New Deals with Li Ka-Shing Family after Panama Ports Plan.” Bloomberg News, March 27, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-27/china-said-to-pause-new-deals-with-li-ka-shing-family-after-panama-ports-deal.
^[13] Xiangwei, Wang. “Commentary: The Panama Ports Sale Isn’t over, but China’s Message to the Li Family Is Clear.” CNA, April 2, 2025. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/hong-kong-hutchison-panama-ports-deal-li-ka-shing-family-china-angry-5033861.
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^[15] “Could Panama Throw a New Wrench into BlackRock’s Ports Deal?” Economic Times, April 3, 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/could-panama-throw-a-new-wrench-into-blackrocks-ports-deal/articleshow/119933253.cms?from=mdr.
^[16] Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State. “Milestones in the History of U.s. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian.” Accessed April 17, 2025. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/panama-canal.
^[17] Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State. “Milestones in the History of U.s. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian.” Accessed April 17, 2025. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/panama-canal.
^[18] Meadowcroft, Micah. “Primer: The American Canal – the Case for Revisiting the Panama Canal Treaties.” The Center for Renewing America. Center for Renewing America, January 31, 2025. https://americarenewing.com/issues/primer-the-american-canal/.
^[19] AP. “Trump Threatens to Try to Take Back the Panama Canal; Panama’s President Balks at the Suggestion.” The Hindu, December 22, 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/trump-threatens-to-take-back-control-of-panama-canal/article69014967.ece.
^[20] Hoist. “Ports Invest in Post-Panamax Shipping,” February 23, 2023. https://www.hoistmagazine.com/analysis/ports-invest-in-post-panamax-shipping-10619716/.
^[21] Reuters. “Chinese Consortium to Build Fourth Panama Canal Bridge,” July 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/chinese-consortium-to-build-fourth-panama-canal-bridge-idUSKBN1KJ0MA/.
^[22] Robert Lansing Institute. “U.S. Strategic Interests and Potential Intervention in Panama: Risks and Probabilities,” January 21, 2025. https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/01/21/u-s-strategic-interests-and-potential-intervention-in-panama-risks-and-probabilities/.
^[23] United States Department of State. “Secretary Marco Rubio with Megyn Kelly of the Megyn Kelly Show,” January 31, 2025. https://www.state.gov/secretary-marco-rubio-with-megyn-kelly-of-the-megyn-kelly-show/.
^[24] Ibid.
^[25] Illueca, Alonso. “Ports, Power, and Politics: Behind the High-Stakes Battle over CK Hutchison’s Panama Deal.” The China-Global South Project. Accessed April 17, 2025. https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/ports-power-and-politics-behind-the-high-stakes-battle-over-ck-hutchisons-panama-deal/.
^[26] Briefing, China. “China Promulgates New Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Measures.” China Briefing News, February 8, 2021. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-promulgates-new-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-measures/.
^[27] Medeiros, Evan S., and Andrew Polk. “China’s New Economic Weapons.” The Washington Quarterly 48, no. 1 (2025): 99–123. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2025.2480513.
^[28] M. Gilday. CNO NAVPLAN. January 2021. https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/2467465/cno-releases-navigation-plan-2021/#.YIERS3QoZiU.link
^[29] Gresh, Geoffrey. To Rule Eurasia’s Waves: The New Great Power Competition at Sea. London: Yale University Press, 2020.
^[30] List, Lloyd’s. “Top 10 Box Port Operators 2019.” Lloyd’s List, December 2, 2019. https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1130163/Top-10-box-port-operators-2019.
^[31] U.S. Department of Defense. “China Military Power Report 2020,” 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2020/sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-dod-china-military-power-report-final.pdf.
^[32] Cimsec.org. “PRC Investments in Global Maritime Infrastructure: Implications for Port Access.” Accessed April 17, 2025. https://cimsec.org/prc-investments-in-global-maritime-infrastructure-implications-for-port-access/.
^[33] Homeland Security Committee. “Strategic Maritime Chokepoints,” February 11, 2025. https://homeland.house.gov/2025/02/11/strategic-maritime-chokepoints-subcommittee-hearing-examines-threats-from-chinas-influence-over-panama-canal-western-hemisphere-ports/.
^[34] Berg, Ryan C. “Combating Chinese Dual-Use Infrastructure: Bringing In the Private Sector.” CSIS, December 9, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/combating-chinese-dual-use-infrastructure-bringing-private-sector.
^[35] Bloomberg. “Li Ka-Shing Has Little to Lose as China Threatens Panama Deal,” March 14, 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-14/li-ka-shing-has-little-to-lose-as-china-threatens-panama-deal.

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