Even though Donald Trump’s recent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement was not a surprise, the language used in a flurry of executive orders along with announcing “national energy emergency” has been anachronistic to his presidential campaign. The indefinite ban on new wind farms was couched in language concerned with “environmental impact of onshore and offshore wind projects upon wildlife, including, but not limited to, birds and mammals”. This is not in consonance with the silence on the welfare of birds and mammals in Alaska, or with his intentions in Greenland, and with drilling the Arctic. Trump’s inauguration has foregrounded these vulnerable regions yet again, and heated up the race for resources.

While access to Greenland has historically evolved from expansionist ambitions to resource-driven intentions, the idea of purchasing Greenland has sparked debates around sovereignty, international law, and geopolitical strategy. History reveals that such negotiations are not unprecedented in U.S. policy. Thomas Jefferson acquired the Louisiana Territory, John Quincy Adams arranged debt relief for Florida, and William Seward secured Alaska—all consistent with a tradition of sovereignty purchases, which account for over 40% of U.S. land today.

The earliest instance dates to President Andrew Johnson’s administration when Secretary of State William Seward pursued territorial expansion. Having successfully negotiated the Alaska Purchase in 1867, Seward turned his attention to acquiring Greenland and Iceland from Denmark. Reports suggested that Danish officials were open to selling these territories, prompting Seward to commission a detailed study on their resources. This report highlighted the immense potential of these islands, describing their acquisition as a path to American “greatness.”

A similar version of “American greatness" has been a crucial factor driving Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign and victory. Since 2019, the U.S. interest in purchasing Greenland has transformed from a speculative “real estate deal” into a pressing matter of “national security.” Greenland, with its vast reserves of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements, has become central to global ambitions for renewable energy technologies, electric vehicles, and low-carbon solutions. Various countries are trying to legitimize their Arctic interests by promoting their ‘Arctic-ness’, typically related to transport, logistics, collaboration, presence, trade, or others.

China, despite not sharing a boundary with the Arctic region, has been one of the most proactive nations in seeking to position itself among the eight Arctic states. The country self-identifies as a ‘polar power’ and has set its sights on becoming a ‘polar great power’ by 2030. To support its ambitions, China has developed various narratives to support its claim of being a “Near Arctic State”. These include portraying the Arctic as a "global commons" and a "window for observing global warming". Systematic surveys of Chinese academic and media commentary confirm that the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is, by a wide margin, one of the most discussed elements of China’s Arctic interests, aligning with the country’s Polar Silk Road. The NSR as an alternative maritime corridor holds immense strategic significance for China, offering considerable reductions in shipping distances. For instance, the journey from Shanghai to Rotterdam via the NSR is 24% shorter, while the route from Yokohama to Rotterdam sees a 37% reduction.

Growing Mistrust and a Golden Opportunity

China’s early involvement in the Arctic was met with optimism, as its perceived contributions to the region earned a measure of acceptance from Arctic states. However, this initial goodwill has given way to growing mistrust, fuelled by revelations linking Chinese research expeditions in the region to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), sparking fears of potential militarization. In 2020, the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC) opted not to renew its contracts with China, citing concerns that its facilities could be exploited for military intelligence and surveillance. Over the past decade, Arctic states have increasingly curtailed Chinese initiatives, citing mounting national security risks. The United States has raised similar concerns. A 2019 Department of Defense reportcautioned that China's civilian research activities could be repurposed to bolster its military presence in the Arctic. Likewise, the Biden administration's October 2022 Arctic strategy emphasized that China's scientific initiatives often function as dual-use projects, combining research with intelligence or military objectives.

In this evolving geopolitical landscape, China’s chances of expanding its Arctic presence through the West appear increasingly slim, with the focus thus shifting to a deepening partnership with Russia. For China, Russia has long served as a critical gateway to the Arctic. The two nations began formal dialogues on Arctic cooperation over a decade ago. However, Russia has historically been wary of China’s ambitions in its far north, rooted in the strategic significance of the region, where the Russian military operates some of its most sensitive assets, including ballistic missile submarines, strategic test sites, missile defence systems, and advanced radar arrays. In the past, Russia opposed China’s bid for observer status in the Arctic Council and blocked Chinese research vessels from conducting surveys along the Northern Sea Route. But it now has no other option but to engage with China due to its isolation by the Western nations, in context of the Russia Ukraine war.

India: A Strategic Alternative, Critical Stakeholder for Arctic

India, as a historic partner of Russia is now increasingly a focal point for collaboration in the development of the Russian Far East. Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently highlighted the Arctic's immense potential, particularly its vast natural gas reserves, and has extended invitations for India to invest in the region’s development. The Russian Far East offers India a strategic gateway to the Indo-Pacific, positioning it at the crossroads of energy, trade, manpower, and investment opportunities. This partnership aligns with India’s broader goals of diversifying its energy imports and strengthening its economic footprint in key regions. At the same time, India's presence in BRICS presents a unique platform for collaboration with Russia while also offering a diplomatic channel to manage its tense relations with China.

Crucially, the Indian monsoon system, the most active branch of the Asian monsoon, accounts for approximately 75–80% of India's annual precipitation. Recent research by the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR) analyzed decadal Indian Summer Monsoon Rainfall (ISMR) trends, revealing significant findings.

Research has shown that reduced sea ice in the Central Arctic leads to more rainfall in central India due to changes in atmospheric circulation. Additionally, decreasing sea ice in the Barents-Kara Sea affects the North Atlantic-Eurasia teleconnection, which in turn influences the timing and strength of the Indian monsoon. Locally, the study found more rainfall in western India but less in the northeast. This is tied to factors like shifting temperature differences between land and sea, warming of the western Indian Ocean, and changes in the Asian winds flowing from west to east. This highlights the complex relationship between Arctic conditions and India’s monsoon behaviour.

This holds immense importance for India, where rainfed agriculture accounts for approximately 51% of the country’s farmland and contributes nearly 40% of total food production. Any disruptions to the monsoon system have far-reaching implications for agricultural productivity, food security, and the livelihoods of those dependent on farming.

This emerging science challenges the conventional narrative that India’s tropical location excludes it from discussions on polar regions, highlighting the interconnectedness of Arctic changes and India’s climatic and economic stability.

Therefore, it is perplexing that the United States, one of India’s largest trading partners, has no significant Arctic engagement with India. The U.S. Arctic strategy, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Arctic Vision 2025, notably excludes India from its focus on bilateral relationships. It may be useful to consider expanding the QUAD’s agenda, which will not only foster diplomatic engagement with the two countries on the Arctic but also align seamlessly with its overarching goal of enhancing strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

As developed nations deliberate on utilizing Arctic resources, they often exclude developing nations from such discussions, a pattern reminiscent of Westphalian geopolitics. This inequity – now glaring in the Arctic – came through at CoP-29, with developed nations failing to meet climate finance commitments. India’s rejection of the climate finance goal, along with its statement at the International Court of Justicesupporting Vanuatu, underscores the growing frustration among developing nations, which bear a disproportionate share of the burden for climate action.

The Arctic landscape highlights such geopolitical disparities. Here, India has the opportunity to adapt its approach and contribute toward a more equitable and inclusive global framework. One that balances economic ambitions with environmental stewardship and advocates for the interests of the Global South.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>