The Baloch people must have followed with interest and some level of satis-faction the successful Operation Sindoor launched by India on Pakistani soil. While Balochistan has for long agitated against the Pakistani establishment, over the past some years it has upped the ante through the words and deeds of its activists, demanding nothing less than secession from Pakistan. India’s strike will have gladdened their hearts because it has left Pakistan more vul-nerable.

A prominent leader of Balochistan, Mir Yar Baloch recently reiterated the old position that Balochistan was independent and never a part of Pakistan. ‘We have already declared our independence on 11 August 1947 when Britishers were leaving Balochistan, and the subcontinent’, he said, and requested the In-dian media not to refer to the Balochs as ‘Pakistan’s own people’. Mir Yar is not the only Baloch leader to underline this independence from Pakistan; other leading activists such as Bashir Zaib, Brahumdagh Bugti and Mehran Marri too have voiced similar sentiments.

Unnerved by the realisation that Islamabad was increasingly losing ground in Balochistan, that the Baloch no longer trusted the Pakistan government, and that the militant movement for the ‘liberation’ of Balochistan was gaining momentum, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said that, if there were differences, ‘brothers should sit together and resolve them’. Speaking at an event in Quetta recently, he added that those who had ‘gone astray’ should be brought back into the mainstream.

The problem with his remarks is that the Pakistan government never consid-ered the Baloch people as ‘brothers’. Instead, they have been treated as sec-ond-class citizens: harassed, tortured and killed in the hundreds by Pakistan’s armed forces or by non-state elements backed by the establishment. Even Baloch women and children have not been spared. Sharif’s lip service to the Balochs’ grievances is unlikely to impress anybody in Balochistan.

One of the reasons for the Pakistani government’s eagerness, even if hollow, to mend fences with Balochistan, is that it cannot afford the continuation of a conflict that it cannot win. More so, at a time when it has been battered by Op-eration Sindoor; when its economy is on the precipice of disaster; when inter-nal troubles in regions such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) continue to test its competence; when its apprehension of losing grip over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir gets more amplified; and, when it faces a Taliban government in neighbouring Afghanistan that is not only not very friendly towards it but is also warming up to India.

But more than all these, it is the fear of altogether losing Balochistan that is giving the Pakistani leadership sleepless nights. Pakistan had already faced a split in 1971, and any further dismemberment would spell doom for the idea of Pakistan itself. When its founder M.A. Jinnah had complained at the time of partition that he had been given a ‘moth-eaten’ Pakistan, he must not have im-agined that the moth-eaten entity would shrink even more in size. Now, the prospect of Balochistan ceding threatens to further reduce the country’s terri-torial space. Besides, it would greatly damage the narrative—already under question—of the Muslim unity concept on which Pakistan was created by its founder.

Besides, Balochistan is not just another province. It accounts for close to 44 per cent of Pakistan's total territory; it is Pakistan’s economic lifeline; and it is critical to its business relationship with China, which has invested heavily in the province. Yet, decades of official neglect has left the region and its peo-ple disenchanted, angry and rebellious. According to one estimate, nearly 70 per cent of the people in Balochistan live in poverty; the maternal death rate is 758 (out of 100,000); the literacy rate is 42 per cent (with female literacy rate at an even poorer 32 per cent); and the infant mortality rate is close to 55 per 1,000 live births.

Any sensible government in Islamabad would have given greater attention to people-centric development in Balochistan, especially when the region is so crucial to Pakistan strategically. The province shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran, and also with the restive KPK and Sindh. The Gwadar naval base is situated in Balochistan, and the Gwadar deep sea port is being developed by China. Gwadar port is an important component of the China-Pakistan Econom-ic Corridor (CPEC). According to Bloomsbury Intelligence Security Report, roughly 90 per cent of the Chinese investment in Balochistan under the CPEC is concentrated in the Gwadar port.

China got the contract for the port project in 2013, and the idea is to develop Gwadar in order to provide an alternate shipping route to the Malacca Strait, which is policed by the US. Balochistan is also located at the Straits of Hor-muz, a choke point of the Indian Ocean, offering the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean. If the unrest in Balochistan assumes bigger proportions, then the very future of Gwadar and other projects will become uncertain.

Balochistan’s importance to Pakistan does not end here. The province is rich in reserves of coal, copper, silver, platinum and other minerals, as well as nat-ural gas. Much of these resources remains to be optimally tapped. Without Balochistan’s natural gas resources, Pakistan would face a major crisis in meeting its energy needs, since natural accounts for roughly fifty per cent of its energy consumption. If the flow of natural gas from Balochistan gets se-verely impacted due to the continuing agitation, Pakistan will have to depend more heavily on imports, which it can scarcely afford since its foreign ex-change reserves are running dry. Balochistan is also key to Pakistan’s security, especially considering that it faces an (for now) unfriendly Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Balochistan had been used by US forces to conduct strikes on the Taliban in the aftermath of 9/11.

For strategic reasons, in recent decades Pakistan and Afghanistan worked to-gether on a variety of issues, but geopolitical considerations have changed. Today the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Pakistan establishment are in an unhappy relationship. Afghanistan can, if it wants, revive its long-held re-jection of the Durand Line—that demarcates the borders between the two countries—and up the ante. This would cause a fresh set of problems for Paki-stan. As it is, Islamabad has accused the Afghan Taliban of training and using the militant group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), to cause unrest in Pakistan. Kabul has denied the accusation and has in turn charged Pakistan with inflicting militant attacks inside Afghanistan.

The enormous untapped potential and strategic importance should have in ide-al circumstances enthused the people of Balochistan and made them cooperate with the Pakistani establishment to usher in prosperity in the region. However, given the questionable record of successive governments in Islamabad in showing care for the Baloch people, it is not surprising that the Balochs view Pakistan’s development roadmap with suspicion. They interpret the so-called people-friendly projects as a thinly-disguised effort by the Pakistan govern-ment to strengthen its stranglehold over the Balochs, settle non-Baloch popu-lation in the name of providing manpower for the projects, and give a free run to the Chinese in the region. In other words, Pakistan is willing to exploit the resources of Balochistan any which way, but is not ready to share the gains with the local population.

The Balochs are right in their apprehensions. Although rich in natural re-sources, Pakistan’s largest province by area remains its poorest. According to the Multidimensional Poverty Index, poverty level in Balochistan overall is more than 71 per cent; over 84 per cent of the rural population is poor. It is obvious that the Pakistan government’s apathy to this region—marked by over-centralised planning and a neglect of social welfare measures—has taken a heavy toll on the local population.

Even as Pakistan fails to address the genuine grievances of the Balochs, it con-tinues to blame India, without evidence, of involvement in violent attacks that various Baloch outfits regularly launch against Pakistan’s armed forces per-sonnel. India has dismissed the charges saying that it is Pakistan’s ‘second na-ture’ to accuse New Delhi of everything that goes wrong. India has been care-ful not to get involved in Balochistan’s internal matters, though the prevalent sentiment in the country favours the struggle of the Balochs.

Naela Quadri Baloch, the ‘Prime Minister in exile’ of Balochistan, has made several visits to India and interacted with prominent people. She is a founding member of the Hind-Baloch Forum. While on one of her trips to India, in 2023, she sought Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s support at the United Na-tions for Balochistan’s freedom. She told media persons, ‘Balochistan, which was once an independent country, is under the illegal occupation of Pakistan, which is looting its mineral resources and subjecting its people to all sorts of atrocities. Baloch girls are being raped, houses and orchards are being set on fire. Pakistan is not doing it alone. It has also roped in China to perpetrate atrocities on the Baloch people.’

Things have gone too far and it is unlikely that the Pakistan’s government re-cent olive branch to the Baloch leaders will be accepted. The issue is no longer only about protesting against exploitation. As far as prominent Baloch activ-ists are concerned, Balochistan’s liberation from Pakistan is the only solution. Will that happen?

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