Air and air defence warfare played up prominently during Op Sindoor. Stories about hordes of drones being unleashed by the adversary and their downing by our air defence warriors hogged most of the headlines. In this context, this work attempts to find answers to the following posers:-

1. What is the drone power of Pakistan?
2. Going forward, what needs to be done by ground based air defence to keep our shield against counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) strong

Part 1- The Drone Power of Pakistan

The Early Years

• Pakistan’s UAS journey started around 1997-98, a time when we were going in for Searcher Mk 1 UAS from Israel and the DRDO was a few years into making indigenous machines.^[1]
• The programme initially was driven by Public sector. Lead players were Air Weapon Complex (AWC) and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). As years rolled several private sector players came in - Integrated Dynamics, SATUMA (Surveillance and Target Unmanned Aircrafts), Associated Consulting Engineers (ACES), GIDS (Global Industrial & Defence Solutions), NESCOM (National Engineering and Scientific Commission) and more.
• Over the years, GIDS in particular came out with a large number of drones. Importantly, the Shahpar series (Shahpar I, II and III) reconnaissance (recce) and strike drones. Others included short range recce drones, Sarfarosh canister launched Kamikaze drone (range (r)-1000km, endurance(e)-2h) and the Turah stealth loitering munition.^[2]
• PAC made a beginning with Ababeel lightweight military drone (r- 5 km) and later a target drone named Bazz (r- up to 200 km). In 2007-08 PAC and ACES developed the Uqaab tactical drone (r-300-350 km, e- 5-6 h).^[3] The AWC around this time produced the Bravo (and Bravo +) UAS. This machine with a range of 80 km was capable of ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) missions.^[4]
• SATUMA developed Jasoos series of ISTAR UAS ( r 100km, e->5h)^[5] and Mukhbar ( r-50 km, e -1.5 h) and Flemingo ( r-200+km e -6-8 h) short range reconnaissance UAS.^[6] Another mini UAS developed was the Stingray, basically for 'around the corner' and 'over the hill' surveillance (r-45 km e-1 hr).^[7]
• Vector ISTAR UAS ( r-200km, e 4-5 h),^[8] Vision Mk I and II surveillance drones (r- 100 and 150 km, e-5 hours+), Shadow Mk II surveillance drones,^[9] Tornado and Nishan target drones, Border Eagle surveillance drone, Hornet surveillance drone and HUMA 1 etc. were other machines developed around this time.^[10]

The Foreign Hand

• A large portion of the Pakistani UAS arsenal was built up through direct import. Prominent among these were the Chinese machines ASN 105A (r- 155 km, e- 2h) and ASN 206 (r-200k, e-6-8h). Germany provided Luna (r-100 km, e-5 h). From UK Pakistan imported Snipe Mk II (r-8km, e-35 min) and Streak (r-not known, endurance 20 min). From Italy, Pakistan imported Falco UAS (range 200 Km endurance 8-12 h) while from South Africa there was Seeker (r -200 km, e- 9 h).

Towards Combat UAS

Pakistani quest for a combat UAS (UCAV)- a dedicated platforms capable of carrying a variety of warheads for precision strike, started as early as 2001 when it made a bid to acquire the Predator MQ9 from US on the plea to guard the Durand Line during the Global war on Terror.

When this did not succeed, its indigenous programme to develop the UCAV was awarded to NESCOM in 2009. The product that came out in Mar 2015 was called Burraq UCAV. This UCAV has a range of 1000 km is capable of carrying two air-to-surface laser guided missiles (Barq).^[11] It can also carry anti-tank missiles (r-10km) and guided bombs (Chinese -YC 200).^[12],^[13]

UCAVs from China

As early as 2018, there were reports of a likely sale of 48 Wing Loong II Chinese UCAVs to Pakistan^[14] Wing Loong II is gold class UVAV comparable to MQ9. (r- 4000 km, e- 20 h). This level of endurance is sufficient for the UCAV to loiter for a sufficiently long time before taking on its prey.

The machine has a payload 480 Kg. This may include, guided bombs, guided rockets precision munitions, anti-radiation missiles (ARMs), air-to-ground missiles, and laser-guided cluster bombs.^[15]

While the current status of 48 UCAV is not reported in open source, there was a report of 4 Wing Loong II being given to Pakistan for the protection of Gwadar port.^[16]Then there is the recent report of Pakistan purchasing 30 Wing Loong II drones^[17] Business Today dated 04 Jun 2025 reported that the said drones are already a part of Pakistani Fleet^[18] One other assessment puts the fleet strength of Wing Loong to 50. Reports also indicate the holding of 24x Chinese CH 4A and 4B drones (r-1000km, e-6-12 h) by Pakistan.

The Turkish Drone Connect

Besides all the countries from where Pakistan has imported drones Turkish support stands out far apart. Turkish drones showed up in a big way in the Indian skies during Op Sindoor. Some details:-

• Pakistan holds the Turkish TAI Anka drones. Anka has a fairly long combat range of 250 km and endurance of 30 h. It can carry laser guided rockets, long range anti-tank missiles, and other PGMs. Going by the claimed figures, it is a formidable platform.^[19]
• Bayractar TB2 is another very effective Turkish drone held by Pakistan. It has a combat range of 300 km and endurance of 27 h; this drone is an effective platform that can deliver a variety of warheads like laser-guided rockets, 81mm mortar, long range anti-tank missiles and laser-guided smart bombs.
• Pakistan also holds a small inventory of Bayractar Akinci drones (r-500km+, e- 25h). These are the high altitude (HALE) version of the Bayractar family. Akinici is gold class capable of delivering a diverse payload of rockets, bombs and missiles. Another Turkish drone used in large numbers is the Assiguard Songar drones (r -10 km, e -35 min).
• Large number of Turkish kamikaze drone YIHA-III are being locally produced in Pakistan by GIDS.^[20] These also showed up in large numbers.

Reflections on Pakistani Drone Force

Based on the aforesaid following points are made:-

• It was in 1997-98 when Pakistani drone programme made its beginnings.
• While the initial inventory was made up largely ex-import, over the years Pakistani Public, as well as, the Private sector have come of age and are capable of making an entire spectrum of drones.
• This range continuum of the drone spectrum extends from a few km to 300-500km while the endurance range is from a few minutes to some 30+ hours.
• As to the range, Pakistan possesses all the three types of machines, viz the ISTAR, the UCAVs and the kamikaze drones. As per one Pakistani assessment the ratio of reconnaissance/strike drones are 56:43 and the inventory range is 15 machine types.^[21]
• While a host of countries have contributed to Pakistani drone arsenal, the major enablement has come from China and Turkey.
• The numbers held from multiple sources permit Pakistan to launch a saturation drone attack on India in multiple layers.

Pakistan Drone Warfare Strategy

Pakistan followed a very predictable strategy for prosecuting the drone attack. The same roughly unfolded in this manner:-

• In Phase 1 launch a volley of small recce and ISTAR drones, sprinkled with machines that can carry small tactical explosive payloads in multiple layers with an aim to achieve the following:-
  • Force our air defence sensors to open up and engage the incoming threat thus giving away their locations.
  • Overwhelm the target handling capability of our air defence systems by saturating them with numbers and prepare the ground for Phase 2.
  • Get maximum intelligence on the order (and electronic order) of battle and layout of our forces.
• Launch Phase 2 with UCAVs coming in on the heels of Phase 1 and intermixed with it with no identifiable divisions.
• Attempt to take on air assets on ground in counter air operations (CAO) role and kill air defences compromised in Phase 1 ( Suppression Of Enemy Air Defence –SEAD)
• Combine drone strikes with attacks from conventional threat vehicles – strike aircrafts with long range stand-off weapons, cruise missiles, rocket artillery ( Fatah series in this case) or the Surface-to-Surface missiles ( Hatf series) to ensure catastrophic damage at the target areas revealed by recce drones and other intelligence sources.
• Besides military targets specifically choose the population centers and targets of religious sensibilities to cause panic and chaos in civil population and to divide it along religious fault lines.

Part 2: How to Keep the Shield Strong?

In order to keep our shield of air defence strong and ‘near’ impregnable, there will be a need to counter play the Pakistani drone game. Our actions should be along the following verticals:-

• Strengthen and diversify the detection capabilities.
• Diversify the kill potential.
• Optimise the air defence control and reporting system (ADCRS- air defence battle management system) for drone warfare battle control.

Strengthen and Diversify the Detection Capabilities

The USP of small drones has been their small radar cross-section (RCS) which has resulted in their defiance of conventional air defence systems. How?

Very basically, RCS is a measure of visibility of the target to a radar system. Higher the RCS easier and farther the target will be detected by a radar. Conventional air defence sensors optimized for mainframe threat (strike aircraft (less stealth), attack helicopters, cruise missiles, ARMs, SSMs etc. with RCS ranging from 3-5m2- Mig 21 - 3 m2, SU 30 MKI 4m2, F16 C - 1.2m2 ^[22]) cannot detect drone RCS now touching .01-03m2.

No detection/late detection means nil/sub-optimal response. This is the game we have to ace. How? Some points:-

• While conventional radars of old legacy systems may be partially/ fully incapable to detect drone threats, our country has several indigenous radars types that can detect small RCS drones.
• One of such radar is DRDO’s three dimensional low level light weight radar (LLLR Mk 1 Ashlesha). This radar is very compact and very mobile besides it features cutting edge features of contemporary radar technology (details not covered). Its detection performance of low RCS (.01-.03m2) is commendable. This has been validated by the author first hand. Following points are relevant:-
  • We need to proliferate this radar in large numbers in the Tactical Battle Areas (TBAs) especially along the likely drone/swarm avenues.
  • It will not suffice to simply sprinkle them around. Each of this radar will have to be connected upwards in the overall ADCRS chain and horizontally with the kill means.
  • Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) is currently the production agency for the LLLWR, we need to have more players in the private sector producing this critical resource to meet the demand of numbers.
  • The proliferation of these radars will become more critical when the adversary uses the FPV (First Person View) autonomous drones not dependent on GPS.
• Most of our air defence sensors give their hand out when they emit radar waves for detection of targets. The requirement is to for passive radars that do not emit radar waves.
• These radars not only enhance the survivability of air defence systems, these are critical when the Electronic Emission Policy (EEP) puts a cap on all electromagnetic radiations which will normally be the case in the pre-war/mobilisation period. Following points are relevant:-
  • Passive radar technology is nothing new. Indigenous capability exists. BEL has long developed the Passive Electronic Scan Array Radar (PESA) Rajendra for Akash Weapon System. The requirement is to develop light weight passive radars deployable in the TBA.
  • During Aero India 2025, Air Force demonstrated a passive radar developed in-house that is capable of detecting low RCS UAS. The radar is currently under testing.^[23] This is a very welcome development to be pursued further.
• Staying on radars, another capable drone detection radar (DDR) is the Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar of dimensions similar to LLLWR. This compact and modular radar has a drone detection range from 1-3 km.^[24] We need to build these radars in large numbers.
• The current mode of drone detection is mostly based on radio frequency (RF) based detection or the detection using the electro-optical (EO) sensors. In fact the EO sensors come fully packaged as EOFCS or EO Fire Control System. A typical EOFCS has a day camera, a night camera, a laser range finder and a fire control computing device that connects the detection to the kill systems. Going forward the action points are as under:-
  • The RF based detection must outstretch from the commercial frequency bands for drones (2.4 GHz, 5,8 GHz, 900 MHz and 433 Mhz) into non-commercial bands as the adversary will use these bands for drone operation.
  • For instance, the C-UAS system produced by a private sector Company Zen Technologies Limited operates in a wide band much outside the commercial range.^[25] This system proved its mettle in Op Sindoor.
  • The other issue is capability enhancement, the current range of RF/EO based detection of the currently deployed Integrated Drone Detection and Interdiction System (IDD&IS) is 5-8 km.^[26] There are AI powered cameras available today that can enhance the small drone detection range to 15 km (for instance long range multi-sensor optical platform camera, Hawkeye developed by Zen Technologies limited).^[27]
• Talking of sensor diversity, there is a need to add the acoustic sensors to the air defence drone detection suite. Despite all their shortcomings of low range and vulnerability of degradation due to battlefield noises, the acoustic option must be pursued further. In Feb 2024, IIT Jammu demonstrated sound-based drone detection technology.^[28] This needs to pick up pace.

Diversify the Kill Potential

Following points are made:-

• During Op Sindoor while the IDD&IS and other C-UAS downed many of the drones using its their EO, RF, radar based surveillance and RF and laser based soft kill, the old vintage air defence guns also came good to counter the threat.
• The L-70 with its EOFCS on board to detect and track drones fired the PFFC (Pre-Formatted Fragmented Cubes) smart ammunition that splits into hundreds of fragments at the target end, each capable of destroying a small drone. The ZU 23 guns depended on their mobility and high rate of fire of 1600 rounds per minute proved effective. The Schilka system with high manoeuvrability (shoot-n-scoot) fired a whopping 3400 rounds per minute that saturated the drone target area with highly accurate and lethal fire.

Going forward, following will be required:-

• The current holding of IDD&IS needs to be scaled up significantly (present holding not stated). The approval of Rs 40,000 crore by the Defence Acquisition Council on 17 May 2025 under Emergency Procurement powers^[29] will have this procurement on board, is to state the obvious.
• There is a need to go in for the hybrid systems; the ones that combine the soft and hard kill on integrated platforms that can be operated simultaneously in near real time.
• The current range of our laser kill is currently restricted (800m-1km) mainly owing to power requirements. This range is required to be enhanced to 3 km keeping in mind the threat at hand. This challenge is very much within the reach of our indigenous capability.
• While the old war horses did well in Op Sindoor these are long past their obsolescence and possibilities of upgrade. The case for successor guns cannot be overstated.
• Talking of the successor guns, these must be really worthy. With effective ranges nothing less than 3.5-4 km and altitude ceiling not less than 4 km the guns must be capable of firing ‘smart ammunition’. It is understood that the weapons will have EOFCS on board to take on swarm threat. Low on crew requirements, the guns must be light weight and mobile to be deployable in the high altitude region. It is hoped that the successor guns coming up for trials in July 2025 will meet the above criteria.
• For the successors of very short range self-propelled guns and missiles (Schilkas, Tunguska, Strela, OSA – not explained further), Army is progressing the case for Carrier Air Defence Tracked (CADET) Systems. This programme needs to be progressed expeditiously.
• Besides the air defence guns for the hard kill, there is a case for integration of Remote-Control Weapon stations (RCWS) on board the hybrid anti-drone platforms. Many an indigenous RCWS were on display during the Aero India 2025. For instance the Barbarik and Parashu RCWS by Zen Technologies limited that combine the surveillance and kill on the same platform.
• Another requirement will be to make progress on the drone kill avenues based on directed energy weapons such as High Power Microwave (HPM) weapons. These, based on their power of pulsed RF cause an instant adiabatic burn out of drone swarms. In this context following points are relevant:-
  • DRDO must come good on the ongoing development of AUHPM (Anti UAS HPM) weapon both for narrow and wide beam operation. Earlier in Feb 2024, DRDO showcased a HPM developed by Microwave Tube Research and Development Centre (MTRDC). This must be built upon expeditiously.^[30]
  • Private industry must be encouraged to enter the directed energy kill domain in a big way.
  • In Feb 2025 there were reports of a Bangalore based company Tonbo unveiling their HPM weapon called Wavestrike with a range of 5 km. The system is meant for naval application.^[31]
• We actually require a safe and quickly deployable HPM weapons in the TBA which are not only lethal but also compatible with other electronic systems in the battlefield. It is a tall order.

On ADCRS

To the credit of air defence warriors the seamless connectivity of Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) of the Air Force with Army’s Akashteer System worked excellently to achieve the smooth execution of air defence battle.
This ‘execution’ is a huge task requiring generation of Air Situation Picture (ASP), identifying ‘friend or foe’ in the ASP, prioritizing the threat based on immediacy and lethality, auto-selecting the most optimal weapon at a point in time, designating the targets to selected weapons in real time and inflicting successive and seamless punishment on targets- all in a matter of few fleeting minutes!
With hordes of swarm drones unleashed to saturate the air defence grid, following will become inevitable:-

• Management of drone traffic in the IACCS-Akashteer grid as to ensure the system capability does not get choked as aimed by the adversary.
• This will require selective de-centralisation of the air defence battle restricting drone-related battle management at the Corps level Air Defence Control Node; the Joint Air Defence Centre ( JADC).
• Certain selective areas will have to be earmarked for decision control at tactical levels still remaining under the ADCRS umbrella. Neglecting this will result in fratricide – a cardinal sin for warriors.

So what could be a suitable sign off line for this work- ‘Round 1 to you valiant vayu-rakshaks, prepare well for future rounds’.
Vijayee Bhav!

Endnotes

^[1] "A Complete detailed analysis of Pakistan made Drones and UAVs," at www.pakistanibychoice.worldpress.com. Accessed on 02 Jun 2025.
^[2] Swarm and strike : how Pakistani drones testred Indian skies,” at www.eurasiantimes.com. Accessed on 02 Jun 2025.
^[3] "GIDS - UQAB -UAV," at gids.com.pk. Accessed 02 Jun 2025.
^[4] "PAF UAV inventory", at https://www.defence.pk...Pakistan air force. accessed 02 Jun 2025.
^[5] 5 ibid
^[6] "SATUMA Flamingo" at satuma.co..pk. Accessed 03 Jun 2025.
^[7] "Stingray", at www.ruvsa.com. Accessed 03 Jun 2025.
^[8] Integrated dynamics", at wwwidaerospace.com. Accessed 03 Jun 2025.
^[9] "List of unmanned aerial vehicles- Pakistan," at www.en.wikipedia.org. Accessed 03 Jun 2025.
^[10] ibid
^[11] "Pakistan to show missile muscle," at www.defwnce .pk. Accessed on 04 Jun 2025.
^[12] “AR 1,”at www.deagel.com. Accessed on 04 Jun 2025.
^[13] "CH-3 Rainbow" at www.militaryfactory.com. Accessed on 04 Jun 2025.
^[14] "China to sell 48 high-end military drones to Pakistan," at www.economivtimes.indiatimes.com. Accessed on 04 Jun 2025.
^[15] ibid. Accessed on 04 Jun 2025.
^[16] “China to supply 4 attack drones to Pak..,” at www.hindustantimes.com. Accessed on 05 Jun 2025.
^[17] “Pakistan on shopping spree..” at www.indiatoday.in. Accessed on 05 Jun 2025.
^[18] “Chinese killer drones..”at www.businesstoday.in. Accessed on 05 Jun 2025
^[19] “Pakistani drone force” at www.warpowerpakistan.com. Accessed on 07 Jun 2025.
^[20] 9 ibid
^[21] “Pakistani drone force,” atwww.warpowerpakistan.com. Accessed on 07 Jun 2025.
^[22] “Radar Cross Section,” at www.global security.org. Accessed on 07 Jun 2025..
^[23] “AeroIndia 2025: IAF develops passive radar,” at www.janes.com. Accessed on 08 Jun 2025.
^[24] BEL develops customizable drone detection radar,” at www.bel-india,in. Accessed on 08 Jun 2025.
^[25] “Anti drone system”at www.zentechnologies .com.Accessed on 08 Jun 2025.
^[26] BEL’s D4 a game changer..” at www.idrw.org. Accessed on 08 Jun 2025.
^[27] “Hawkeye”at zentechnologies.com. Accessed on 11 Jun 2025.
^[28] “IIT Jammu prof develops sound based drone detection technology.”at www.hindustantimes.com. Accessed on 09 Jun 2025.
^[29] “DAC approves 40,000 Cr for defence forces” at www.timesof india.indiatimes.com. Accessed on 11 Jun 2025.
^[30] “A rare glimpse into DRDO’s HPM system.” At www.idrw.org. Accessed on 11 Jun 2025.
^[31] AeroIndia 2025:Tonbo unveils microwave based DEW,” at www.janes.com. Accessed on 11 Jun 2025.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>