(Title of the article is taken from the Statement made by Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh at the Joint Commanders Conference in Lucknow, on 05 Sep 2024.)

Wars have remained ageless, timeless and a dynamic paradox, though they are messy, with no assurance as to their duration or outcomes and hinder national progress and socio-economic development. Not too long ago, it was opined that conventional wars of the force-on-force variety were passe and obsolete; views that have been pushed in the background with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza war and tensions across the Taiwan Straits! Indeed, though peace and morality are powerful thoughts, force-on-force wars are inescapable in the futuristic world, indeed even First and Second World War trench and urban warfare has reemerged parallel with modern warfighting.

It is a truism that “India is a peace-loving nation,” though with centuries of history of warfare. India faces stubborn border issues, with China and Pakistan. For China it is also a geopolitical issue like the sayings in “one Mountain cannot contain two tigers,” in Russian “two bears don’t live in one lair” and in English, "this town ain’t big enough for both of us." Pakistan, without crossing red-lines and exposing itself to the penalties and risks of escalation to conventional war, continually utilises proxy terrorists. Jammu and Kashmir as an identity issue that binds Pakistan as a nation.

There is no apparent distinct ‘Chinese way of war,’ PLA has fought wars far and few in between since its existence. Even Sun Tzu and Mao’s treatises do not express theoretical underpinnings of any exceptional Chinese way of war, only general principles. In any case, transformation in military technologies is so immense, that any preconceived way of war may be counterproductive. PLA’s doctrines of system-confrontation and system-destruction by multi-domain precision warfare, blends conventional precision strikes with emerging technology (big data, AI, quantum, etc) to target adversary operational systems, along with ground operations. Contextually ‘operational systems’ can be defined open-endedly, including intelligence, command, firepower, information, space, support systems and infrastructure.

Military capabilities are central to contemporary and future military challenges, contingent on adversaries’ potential and intent, way of conduct of war, ground conditions, as also own political aims translated into military objectives. NATO defines military capability as “the ability to create an effect through employment of an integrated set of aspects categorized as doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development, personnel, facilities, and interoperability.” Simply then, military capability is a basket of cumulated abilities to do something successfully. It is like the military capability to stop military invasion, which will involve developing large number of military capacities. While many military capabilities are necessary for India, this paper delves into three significant ones.

Military Capabilities

Battlefield Transparency: Of battlefield transparency, Gen Mark Milley had remarked, “the next war is highly lethal…with sensors everywhere, the probability of being seen is very high. And as always, if you can be seen, you will be hit. And you will be hit fast and with precision or dumb munitions.” Indeed, battlefield transparency is the most important military capability because it allows for a near-transparent view of the battlefield in real time, which can give forces a significant advantage.

To expand battlespace awareness, the PLA has invested in a number of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), space-based surveillance assets and electronic reconnaissance surveillance capabilities that serve as a critical component of a broader C4ISR architecture. Chinese “Space-Ground Integrated Information Network” is a mega engineering project creating an information-based “system of systems operations capability that forms an all-inclusive master network”. PLA’s efforts are directed at “the enemy’s information detection sources, information channels, and information-processing and decision-making systems.” PLA’s goals are information superiority, disruption of the enemy information control capabilities, and maintaining one’s own information systems and capabilities.

Sensors have replaced humans in the loop, with sensor networks in the sky looking down unblinkingly. It is very difficult to hide in the modern battlespace. The networks comprise of ground sensors, drones, radar, aircraft and multispectral sensing satellites. Camouflage, be it by hiding, blending in surrounding, disguising, disrupting or decoying will be ineffective against sophisticated sensors.

As the battlespace is transparent 24x7, with seamless linking to command and control and offensive systems, everything ‘visible’ can be targeted. The wide variety of multispectral sensors like optical on Bayraktar TB2 UCAV and thermal imaging used by satellite, unmanned systems, aircraft, tanks are difficult to mask. Electronic warfare (EW) systems on satellites, aircraft and UAVs detect radio-frequency emissions from radios, cell phones, mobile computer networks and the like, without emitting a signal.

The Ukrainian army’s recent stunning offensive into Kursk, Russia, was under a shield of advanced electronic weapons. Dominating electronic magnetic spectrum is now an imperative in warfare, an important frontier of combat. In the Ukraine war there have also been use of drones discerning, geolocating fire from artillery and even as forward artillery observers. Similar ground emplaced sensors can detect vibrations of tanks. Future also has quantum radars detecting stealth aircraft.

Denying First Strike Advantage

The most important facet of warfighting is achieving surprise, without which, warfighting is that much difficult, and attrition increases manifold. In his treatise Surprise Despite Warning, Richard K Betts had pointedly remarked, “Designing around the victim’s strategy is most devastating when the weaknesses to be exploited are ones not fully recognized by the victim. Most decisive are operational innovations that accomplish what the victim’s leaders consider impossible.” It is an historians curse that consequent to adverse events, tell-tale signs like on the LAC in 2013, 2014 and 2017, become evident as leading to 2020! It is false optimism that can lead to war, such events establish misperception, cognitively, psychologically and bureaucratically, to select incorrect military strategy from set of alternatives.

Chinese military deception doctrine is a tightly held secret. Sun Tzu has philosophically remarked, “all warfare is based on deception,” and that “let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night; and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.” From its antiquity and current doctrine, it is clear that China views deception as integral and highly valued, and will almost certainly apply it, to conceal or deceive its offensive preparations, forcing us to towards inaction or a specific action to its advantage. Assuredly, China has studied the advantages of overwhelming first strike, part of system-destruction doctrine executed under well conceptualised long drawn deception.

PLA is attempting to create multi-domain sensors and real-time intelligence, have created a transparent battlespace. Naturally, with effective sensor-shooter links, most dangerous will be addressed targets in first strike, with its very large and growing missile arsenal, cyberspace warfare, electronic warfare, and counter-space capabilities (including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites and directed-energy systems). There is also new reality of drone warfare. UCAVs, USVs, UUVs and UGVs are ubiquitous in the ongoing wars, multi-purpose platforms undertaking reconnaissance, undertaking electronic warfare, designating targets with on-board lasers, acting as robotic missiles and launching bombs.

A cost-effective means of precision attacks are loitering ammunitions deep behind forward lines like smart missiles with warheads and guidance that loiter, search for targets and then strike. PLA’s arsenal of long range, precise, lethal and powerful variety of weapons, will initiate unannounced surprise ‘system destruction’ to shock and awe, tactically and operationally. Such a preponderant first strike, attempting to get us unaware and under-prepared, can produce very significant advantages for the aggressor.

Combat Power: Establishing the Kill Chains and Kill Web

Acquiring military capabilities for the future are intensely aspirational, while appreciating transformational technologies. Kill web is one such. Ray Alderman in a blog said of kill web, “like a spider, we set up the web around a battle space and wait for the enemy to show up. Once they enter the kill web, they can’t get out.” As described by Christian Brose, in The Kill Chain, “The kill chains identify what is happening, decide what to do with it and take kinetic or non-kinetic action.” In the current kill chain of calling for artillery fire, the procedure from observation post officers selecting targets to bringing in effective fire will be time consuming in the face of the enemy. However, in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan War and the ongoing Ukraine War, drones and loitering ammunition were being impressively used, cutting time on target to few seconds in effective kill chain.

Kill web is a next level of AI enabled kill chains that connect sensors and shooters dramatically cutting time and space by automatically executing targeting at machine speed. The more intelligence we have about the enemy, the more we can cut time and space. Kill web as a concept will create a violent, deadly, and fast-paced war against moving targets (like tanks) and stationary ones (like enemy command/control/communications centres). The kill web will electronically feed targeting information to shooters like fighter planes, UCAVs, electronic warfare systems and the like.

A paper published in the Chinese academic journal “Radar & ECM” it was disclosed that AI significantly enhanced the PLA’s radar capabilities against the US EA-18G Growler. When an EA-18G launched an attack on a Chinese naval ship, it was immediately countered by nearby Chinese PLAN ships sharing information in a giant “kill web” and flexibly, actively, quickly, and intelligently countered the EA-18G. At this stage, similarity with PLA on territorial front, is unclear, though it should be anticipated.

Combat Military Capabilities: Pathways Forward

India has to steadily graduate to this next level of combat military capabilities. Five pathways are recommended. First, it is imperative to establish a systemic of common operational picture (COP), which should be single identical visual display of relevant (operational) information (for example position of own troops/ deployments and those of the enemy, position and status of important infrastructure such as bridges, roads, etc). The COP providing a shared situational awareness for troops on the ground, should include, multi-sourced intelligence, visualized data, communications network and actionable intelligence. The COP should allow both the lowest soldier and the highest commander to sense and act in a collaborative way towards the operational tasks. Indian Navy and Air Force have undertaken substantive work in creating Service specific COP, there is need for integration among the three Services and other inputs like from NTRO, Space and Intelligence Agencies. There will be need for reconfiguring a nation-wide secure, encrypted data-transmission backbone to be established.

Second, indeed, ‘seeing’ enemy forces and denying being ‘seen,’ is the revolutionary battlefield transparency disrupter military capability that Indian Armed Forces require. Omnipresent sensors providing battlefield transparency (networked with precision firepower) will be a game-changer. Indian Armed Forces need to push for state-of-the-art multi-spectral equipment and sensors with networking to be in the game of warfare. Masking of own information from ever-prying eyes and ears, electronic and radio frequency systems is absolutely critical to survive and operate in future battlespace. Ground forces need to work in electronic silence, though its practicality is questionable. In an information-led environment, restricting to only essential electronic emissions, limiting emitters and decoy emitters giving false signatures, may be some answers.

The equipment and expertise essential for creating battlefield transparency has to be specific based on sub-sectoral profiles, depending on peculiarities of terrain and operational requirements. A brick-based authorisation will be unsuccessful. There also has to be decentralisation of relevant specialist equipment like drones, electronic warfare (EW) and close-in-weapon-systems (CIWS) (against drones) to sabre squadrons, artillery batteries and infantry companies.

Third, prevention and preparedness against first strike (and consequent ones) presupposes that we can forecast, with a very high degree of probability, the typology of threat, of what is likely to happen, anticipating it, stopping it proactively in time from happening by intervention. Preferably, this is to be done early, if possible close to the source as possible. An important tool for predicting is analysing and learning from past events, other wars or adversaries’ intelligence.

Preparedness is essential by taking proactive and pre-emptive measures to reduce the negative impact of first (and consequent) strikes through a set of planned precautionary measures aimed at strengthening (hardening) and resilience. In this context resilience will be the ability to continue operations even in the face of credible strikes and disruption. It may be necessary also to have modular structures of the ‘systems’ that the adversary may attempt to ‘confront’. Resilience would also have to cater for soft systems, like the supply chains sensed by the adversary’s sensing systems and dynamically targeted. Optimal use of technology - AI, machine learning and block-chains will facilitate in creating the requisite resilience. Indeed, hard and soft kills offensive weaponry like Missiles, Air Defence systems, Drones, EW, cyber security and cyber resilience and CIWS, linked to a sensor web will thwart offensive designs of the enemy.

Four, is establishing AI-enabled kill web that will connect all weapons and multi-domain effects including electronic warfare systems with the greatest speed, range and much shortened OODA loop. We have to create the system, where targeting data from targeting system like artillery, drones or air power quickly shifts to optimal one, through a collection of sensors netted with command and control. Passage of critical data to the optimal delivery system would rapidly achieve the operational intent. In this software technologies are key parts of the way ahead to allow for switching across multiple domains to provide for a secure operational web.

Five, the charter to create battlefield transparency, resilience against system destruction by first (and subsequent) strikes and creation of kill web will be wholesome and long drawn, and would indeed be expensive in terms of resources. It will be essential to contemplate and envision the finalised structure. Naturally, creation of such military capabilities will have to be modularly itemised and graduated in implementation on a planned prioritisation. There will be constraints of the defence budget, competing requirements of the revenue budget and the existing thrust on platform centricity – tanks, guns, aircraft and ships, for military modernisation. A balance will be imperative between big-ticket procurements at scale and modernity in warfare propelled by ingenuity and adaptability, as evident in ongoing wars.

The essential conditions must be to combat the adversaries in preventing them from applying combat power. The framework on which futuristic combat power ought to be founded upon should be: envisioned and well conceptualised design of the integrated forces, the application of modern military capabilities for warfighting and the modern abilities for the rank and file to fight in the envisaged environment.

In preparing for wars, the adversaries must not appreciate that they can achieve favourable outcomes by taking chances or calculated risk in initiating war. Hence, it is imperative that such military capabilities be created that it is clear to the adversaries they will not achieve the outcome in a war that they desire. It is incumbent on national security leaders to continue contemplation, to deter war, and if deterrence fails, to fight smart and win.

(The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct). (The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance... More >>