The appointment of Lt. Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa as Chief of Pakistan army has set to rest the speculation on who would succeed Gen Raheel Sharif, but will intensify the debate about the future trajectory of tenuous Civil-Military relationship.

Although Gen Sharif had already said in February that he would retire at the end of his three year term, and would not be seeking extension, a lot of skepticism abounded. The transition of Army Chief in Pakistan is a big event preceded by prolonged spells of speculation and anxieties compounded by floating of conspiracy theories. General Sharif’s decision to bow out without seeking an extension is being viewed in Pakistan as extraordinary, and graceful because very few of his predecessors have followed this norm. If all of them had stuck to their tenures or not overturned their mandates, Pakistan would have had 24 Chiefs instead of 15 it has had so far. All the former chiefs, barring just two, got extensions, and four of them not only extended their stay but also sent the civilian governments packing and took over the country. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that Gen Rahil Sharif’s greatest contribution to the Army and the Country is that he has fulfilled his pledge and is leaving in time, and thus setting a precedent for his successors. This is indeed remarkable as there was intense speculation that he might use tensions with India to prolong his tenure.

What would be routine change of guard in any established democracy, in Pakistan the Chief’s transition carries as much significance, if not more, as a change in government. Despite all the frills of the democracy, the Army Chief remains the most powerful person of the Country.

Civil Military Dynamics

Now Mian Sahib has again made a Chief of his choice, second time in his current term, hoping that Army will be firmly under his control despite the troubled legacy. Nawaz Sharif intentionally overlooked the principle of seniority while making this appointment as Gen Bajwa has superseded four Lieutenant Generals. As reported in Pakistan media: “Prime Minister definitely wanted an army chief who is supportive of democratic system in the country, who believes in the supremacy of Parliament and who could work for the betterment of the country.” Furthermore, it is also said in the media that Gen Bajwa was among the corps commanders who advised restraint against military involvement, when violence erupted in the Country’s capital during the demonstration by Imran Khan in 2014; these were the most tenuous moments for the Nawaz Sharif’s government. So, Gen Bajwa gets all ticks necessary for a “safe General”.

However, inferring too much from the smooth transition will be treacherous, because Pakistan army is a professional army, with huge amount of institutional momentum, and when the chips are down personal predilections will not amount to much. This institutional momentum is imparted by:-

• Genuine concerns about safeguarding the security of Nation state – and the military leadership’s conviction that it is too serious a subject to be left to the civilian leaders;
• Ideological proclivities as being the conservator of fortress of Islam - as Musharraf had said: “Pakistan Islam ka Qila hai”; and,
• Very importantly the deep entrenchment of the military in the corporate sector of Pakistan, which means lots of vested interests.

Therefore, conclusions based on the perceived pre-dispositions of individuals will not take us very far. Nonetheless, given the context of the troubled Civil–Military relationship the propensity to choose “safe” Generals who will not challenge the civilian authority is understandable. But History bears testimony to the futility of exercising so called “safe” choices.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appointed Gen Zia known more for his religiosity than for his professional brilliance. As one of Gen Zia’s predecessor Lt Gen Gul Hassan Khan claimed that a superior had once termed Zia Ul Haq as being unfit even to be a military officer. Moreover Gen Zia not being a Pathan or Rajput, the two dominant communities of Pakistan Army, precluded likelihood of any dangerous liaisons. Therefore Bhutto found a docile and religiously inclined Zia Ul Haq, number 7 in seniority, as a safe bet and appointed him as the Chief of Army, and the rest is History.

In the past two instances Nawaz Sharif has also suffered at the hands of his choicest Generals. In 1993 following the sudden death of Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua, Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had appointed General Abdul Waheed Kakar, as Chief, superseding six generals. Subsequently the power struggle between the President and the Prime Minister Sharif was settled by the Army intervention, and Gen Waheed Kakar was pivotal in sending both of them home, and calling for fresh elections. Again in 1998, Nawaz Sharif reckoned that a Mohajir Army Chief will have only a tenuous hold over a predominantly Pathan and Punjabi Army, and would never be able to pose a credible challenge to the civilian leadership. Therefore he appointed Gen Pervez Musharraf, but in the following year Musharraf not only overthrew Nawaz Sharif, but also jailed him and then sent him to exile in Saudi Arabia.

Even with Gen Raheel Sharif the going was pretty tough. The Army perpetuated its dominance over its pet foreign policy subjects related to US, Afghanistan and India. One of the reason for the derailing of post Ufa Indo-Pak talks was the insistence by the Army to include the Kashmir on the agenda. The Pakistan Defence Minister almost lost his job, when he made certain critical comments during the treason trial of Gen Musharraf, and Army expressed its displeasure conveying the feeling within the military that continuation of Defence Minister may not auger well for a ‘smooth’ civil-military relationship. Gen Raheel Sharif publicly castigated the civilian government for its failure to implement the National Action Plan devised after the killing of students of Army Public School in Peshawar, in 2014. He cautioned against undermining the gains of military operation, in absence of matching initiatives by the Civilian government.

The military remained hyperactive in the foreign policy areas, as was witnessed in Pakistan’s dealings with India, apart from post Ufa imbroglio, nothing substantial happened on the investigation on the role of Maulana Masood Azhar in Pathankot attack, despite assurances from the Prime Minister himself. Replacement of the civilian National Security Advisor by Lt. Gen Janjua, is indicative of the fact that it is the military that has the last word. So it was not just a coincidence that the two Sharifs travelled together on several foreign visits, especially to Middle East and Afghanistan. The turbulence in relationship climaxed, when in October this year, Pak Media reported a confrontation between the Civilian and Military leadership, when the Pak foreign secretary told the military leadership to take action against the militants (Haqqani Netwok and India centric groups such as Jaish-i-Mohammad) or to face international isolation. Although the government denied the veracity of the report and sacked the Information minister, but the cat was out of the bag.

This is the painful saga of civilian leadership’s unsuccessful attempts at leading the successive Army chiefs by their nose into doing its bidding. Regardless of the individuals, it is the set of circumstances prevailing in the country, the disposition of the US and Pakistan’s allies in Middle East that determines the manoeuvrability of the military vis-à-vis the civilian authority. Off late, China is fast replacing the US as Pakistan’s strategic ally, so in future China would be playing a role in the domestic Pakistani dynamics as US has been doing so far.

Why the Military is the Winner?

In the recent past the Pakistan Army has allowed the civilian leadership a calibrated autonomy. However, it is firmly able control its traditional domains of national security, counter terrorism, and almost directs the foreign policy and more specifically Pakistan’s relations with India, Afghanistan and US. The civilian government is allowed to run the economy, and in the present case, to keep control over counter-terrorism operations in the prime minister’s home base of Punjab.

Civilian leadership needs to share a major part of the blame for the sorry state of the civil-military relations. Both India and Pakistan inherited the armies from the same mother institution the British Indian Army. So we need to ponder why in India the armed forced never entertained any political ambitions, and in Pakistan the army never missed any opportunity to dabble in areas beyond its mandate – the primary reason for this emanates from the quality of civilian leadership the two countries got. The Pakistani civilian leadership, since its inception, failed to establish its legitimacy due to variety of reasons. Thus the inept leadership provided enough opportunity and space for the smart Generals to overstep their limits. Gen Ayub Khan outmanoeuvred the Foreign office, years before he overthrew the government in 1958, when he took lead in steering the relationship with US that saw emergence of Pakistan as the US ally in 1954.

Similar balance of competence tilting against the civilian leadership can be witnessed now. The sham governance by the leadership incessantly facing corruption charges without lending itself to impartial probe, and dominance of the extended family over the higher echelons, completely flies in the face of any commitment to democratic norms. Pakistani experts have often expressed their disillusionment by saying that the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his team don’t have a clear agenda to steer the country out of crises. The resulting scenario ensures that the default preference of the public is for the military over the civilian leadership.

The above observations are borne out by the outgoing chief’s dominance not only in terms of coverage by the media, but also by the public adulation. There were occasions when the two Sharifs were together, and people were raising slogans hailing the General instead of the popular civilian leader. In the public perception whereas the civilian leaders flounder, and spend majority of their time and resources in perpetually defending themselves against charges of election malpractices, or allegations of financial bungling (‘Panama Gate’ being the latest one). The General’s stock steadily climbed after the launch of operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014. Post operation has seen a decline in the frequency of attacks by the Pakistani Taliban, thus taking the army’s popularity ratings to new high. This rise in ratings of the military comes at the expense of meagre political capital of civilian leadership.

Another reason for Pakistan Military’s centrality in the Pakistan’s power structure is due to emergence of Pakistan as US’ cold war military ally for the Middle East. The US and Pakistan Army share a very old and tested and relationship that has its beginning in 1954, fathered by Gen Ayub Khan, when Pakistan signed the ‘Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement’ with the United States, followed by joining the ‘South East Asian Treaty Organisation’ (SEATO) along with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. In the following year Pakistan joined the ‘Baghdad Pact’: a mutual defence grouping, with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq.

Majority of the financial assistance that the US provides to Pakistan is in the form of military aid, because US has always viewed Pakistan’s role in furthering US’ geopolitical objectives in the region, and hence the enhanced significance of Pakistan military. Following assertion of Bruce Riedel further supports this view that Pakistan-US alliance is primarily aimed at fulfilling US’ geopolitical requirements and not at actual transformation of Pakistan into a modern progressive democracy: “For decades these Pakistanis have asked America to do one thing, open our markets to trade from their country. Every Pakistani ambassador to Washington since 1991 has told me the same thing; trade, not aid, will help them build a modern civil society, empower women, strengthen the entrepreneurs who want to build Pakistan, and encourage peace not terror. Instead, Washington places tariffs on Pakistani textiles that are three times the rate applied to most countries”.

In sum, it is likely that the current model of operating, wherein exists a semblance of Civil-Military coordination, will continue; however, Army will not hesitate to flex its muscle when it thinks that the critical red-lines in its domain are being crossed by the civilian leadership.

What is there in store for India?

In India the general perception is that the civilian leadership wishes to have peace with India, and it is the military that is holding them back. Spate of militant attacks in last one year beginning with attacks at Gurdaspur, Pathankot air base, and Uri in September this year, that saw India retaliating with surgical strike across the LOC further reinforces the perception about the military’s role.

Post-surgical strikes LOC continues to be volatile and witnesses frequent ceasefire violations resulting in civilian and military casualties on both sides. Strong statements against India, referring to situation in Kashmir directly coming from Gen Sharif indicates that the Army might be using the pretext of unrest in Jammu and Kashmir to prevent the civilian leadership from making any moves at rapprochements with India. Even in his farewell speech Gen Raheel Sharif cautioned India against adopting an aggressive posture on Kashmir. Even though the incoming chief expressed hope about improvement in situation LOC, however, only a few hours before these statements were made in GHQ, there was a major militant attack, deadliest since Uri, at an army base in Nagrota, near Jammu, that saw seven soldiers, including two officers, being martyred.

Although it is being speculated that Nawaz Sharif’s intention of improving relations with India might find support from the new Chief, as Newspaper Dawn outlining Gen Bajwa’s worldview says: “Despite his extensive involvement with Kashmir and northern areas, he is said to consider extremism a bigger threat for the country than India.” However this is nothing new; the previous two Chiefs Gen Kayani and Gen Raheel Sharif also held similar views. Gen Kayani came very close to putting this on record when he said: “While the external threat to Pakistan continues to exist, it is the internal threat that merits immediate attention”. Gen Raheel Sharif was pivotal in developing the Pakistan military’s doctrine that did not recognize India as a principal threat. However the views held by the chiefs, hardly made any tangible difference, and the India-Pakistan relationship remained stalemated.

While discussing the challenges before the new Army Chief, the Pakistani media prominently cites the issue of dealing with India-centric groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. These reports suggest that these groups who once constituted military’s “assets” or “force multipliers”, might have lost lustre and so must be tackled or restrained. These reports go as far as to speculate that there could be already plans for bringing these groups into the mainstream; because there is a point of view that unless these groups are restrained, they could pose as a major liability for Pakistan in case of a major terror attack on India. But notwithstanding the speculation about change in threat perception by the top military leadership, the likelihood of changes on the ground will have to be preceded by changes in the geopolitics of the region. The spectre of threat from India has been the raison d'être of Army’s central role in the polity of the Pakistan. Therefore it remains a big question why the Pakistan Army will change its course unless it assessments of threat perceptions alter. As argued earlier that it is the institutional dynamics that will determine the future course, and personal predilections might at best play a peripheral role.

Now coming to India’s dilemma about duality of authority in Pakistan and the fact that managing the relations with India remains firmly in the domain of the Pakistan Army. The limitations of civilian leadership are public, and therefore highlighting the fault lines between the civilian and the military leadership is not only futile, but dangerous because it further accentuates suspicions when civilian leaders try to take shots at peace. It is very much evident that any Pakistani initiative, unless backed by its military, will remain fragile. Past stands witness to this syndrome - when the bus journey to Lahore eventually ended in Kargil. Notwithstanding as to who is to be blamed, it goes without saying that the marginal cost of escalation of tension with Pakistan is higher for India than for Pakistan, if not in blood but surely in treasure. Reason is that India’s economy is far more developed, almost ten times in size, far more integrated with the world economy, and growing faster on average by 3%. To put it simply, Moody’s or S&P will be more sensitive to what happens to India than to Pakistan.

Furthermore, it will be safe to concede the fact that the Indo-Pak dynamics, for greater part of the period since Independence, has been propelled by the doctrine of ‘tit for tat’. Consequently, what we are confronted with is a stalemate. The net result being just the attrition of precious lives, without achievement of strategic goals. The situation is somewhat similar to trench warfare of WWI. Should India decides to break the decades of stalemate, we will have to evolve unorthodox methods of dealing with Pakistan. We can not change the power matrix of Pakistan, but we can certainly adapt our responses. We need to outgrow the narrative cantered on differences between India and Pakistan, viz. India is a Democracy, whereas Pakistan has remained under military rule for the better part of its existence, India is secular, whereas Pakistan is a state founded on religious identity, and so on. Looking through such ideological lenses breeds greater suspicions and hostility on both sides than what is merited by the strategic reasons.

We need to extricate ourselves from the trap of “democracy peace theory”, which argues that democracies do not fight with each other, whereas democracies and authoritarian regimes do so. In order to ensure desired strategic outcomes, with least attrition, it is imperative to comprehend Pakistan’s threat perceptions and the main drivers behind these perceptions. It is really necessary that we start looking at the relationship sans the prism of zero sum game, and evolve a discourse that objectively views the dynamics of the relationship. Notwithstanding the claims of being guardian of the frontiers of Islam (‘Islam ka Qila’ et al) and the associated ideological predisposition, Pakistani Army, being a professional institution, does adopt a realist approach in drawing its worldview, perceiving threats and devising its geopolitical strategy. Therefore its strategy towards India certainly originates from the real and credible threats Pakistan perceives from India.

There are primarily two factors that drives the Pakistan’s behaviour towards India. The first one, the most important one, is the great asymmetry, in every respect of the term, between the two countries. This asymmetry coupled with perpetual mistrust induces a sense of existential threat which Pakistan cannot address on a conventional plane. Secondly, Pakistan’s military alliances with West has allowed Pakistan to punch above its weight for the better period of its existence. Therefore the continuous patronage of the West has created an illusion of power that prevents Pakistan from reconciling with the asymmetries. This long dalliances underwritten by geopolitical commitments of the Pakistan military during the Cold War has played an important role in emergence of Pakistan as a ‘national security’ state with the military at its centre, rather than as modern social welfare state.

In this back drop, there are opinions in some quarters who suggest that the Indian interlocutors directly engage the Pakistan Army and conduct talks on all contentious issues such as Siachen, Sir Creek, infiltration of militants and even the situation in Afghanistan. All major powers directly engage with Pakistan military; not only the heads of governments separately meet the Army Chief, the Foreign and Defence Secretaries even visit the GHQ to meet the Army Chief, they point out. Direct communication will allow an opportunity to assess the strategic intents of each other, and could aid in lowering distrust and possibilities of miscalculation, they argue. The argument of engaging with the adversary’s military, howsoever well intentioned, is not only fraught with even more damaging fallouts, but also violative of the ideological construct of India’s democratic dispensation. Therefore, the practice in the US, where Pentagon plays an active role in its engagements with Pakistan, cannot be replicated in the Indian context.

Viewing within the realist framework, by stripping off the Islamic trappings, at its core the Kashmir dispute is also a dispute of resources. Pakistan is predominantly an agrarian society depending upon the waters from the Indus water system, and majority of their water either originates or passes through Jammu and Kashmir. So from the Pakistan’s standpoint, India sits at the vantage point that allows India the means to strangulate the Pakistani economy, and this scenario definitely constitutes a national security threat. Therefore ever since its birth, Pakistan uses non-state actors to achieve its strategic goals of getting Kashmir, as it knows that it cannot do so by directly confronting India. Now with the advent of nuclear weapons, it envisages to keep away the threat of conventional attack from India by the threat of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in case of war with India. So at the heart of the India-Pakistan troubled and tumultuous relationship are the Pakistan military’s threat perceptions arising out of great power asymmetry with India and its perpetual quest to get even.

(The author is a freelance analyst based in Switzerland)