




Vivekananda International Foundation

China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment

Aayush Mohanty

Selected Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Africa



Source: Various; THE BEIJING AXIS Analysis

China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment



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China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment

Preamble

China's growing economic role in Africa has met with mixed responses. Many in Africa support China's economic initiatives, but there has been some amount of resistance to the latter's aggressive business plans. Though China's economic engagement in Africa goes back to the 1970-1975 with the financing and construction of the Tanzam Railways (a 1,860-kilometer-long railway line in East Africa linking the port of Dar-es-Salaam in East Tanzania with the town of Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia's Central Province) as its most prominent accomplishment, it has played a limited role in that continent well into the 1990's. However, in the past fifteen years, China's trade, investment, and development financing has risen manifold.

Africa-China Economic Engagement

In September 2018, while delivering the opening address at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, President Xi Jinping pledged 60 billion dollars as government assistance, investment and financing through financial institutions and companies. This will include 15 billion dollars in grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans, 20 billion dollars as Lines of Credit, a 10 billion dollar Special Fund for development financing and a five billion dollar Special Fund for financing imports from Africa.¹

President Xi announced eight initiatives which focussed on deepening China-Africa cooperation. These were industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, green development, capacity building, healthcare, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security. Beijing also announced plans for ensuring food security, a one million RMB (Renminbi) assistance in case of a natural disaster, providing expertise in agri-science and agri-business, local currency settlements through the China-Africa Development Fund and the China-Africa Fund for Industrial Cooperation, facilitation for issue of bonds by African countries and their financial institutions in China through funds provided by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank and the Silk Road Fund.

Under the environment initiative, 50 joint projects will be undertaken to protect Africa's ecology and environment, covering animal protection, climate change, oceans, desertification prevention and control, and green development. China is also training medical personnel and setting up health centres keeping Africa's needs in mind. Tourism is being seen as one of the sectors having the potential to increase people to people exchanges. President Xi in his speech called upon African educational centers to host Confucius Institutes.²

In 2017, China's trade with Africa was worth 180 billion dollars. *Mckinsey & Company*, in its 2017 evaluation of Africa-China economic relations in the report titled '*Dance of the Lions and Dragons: How are Africa and China Engaging, and How Will the Partnership Evolve*' covered five dimensions of trade, investment stock, investment growth, infrastructure financing, and aid. When compared with the United States of America, India, and the European Union, China leads in four of these five dimensions. According to Mckinsey & Company, no other nation has this kind of engagement in Africa. The report gives two different scenarios of the Africa-China relationship over the next decade.³

The first scenario suggests a steady growth of economic partnership between China and Africa in manufacturing, resources, and infrastructure, with trade estimated to be around 250 billion dollars. The second scenario visualises China becoming more aggressive and investing in more sectors. It has already established itself and expanded into other sectors, which could make trade worth around 440 billion dollars.⁴ These scenarios are a part of China's "going global" initiative and fits into the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In Africa, India presently lags behind China with 70 billion dollars in annual trade Africa in 2017.⁵ However, India's economic growth according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will be 7.4 per cent for fiscal 2018-19 and grow to 7.8 per cent in fiscal 2019-2020. China's economic growth, on the other hand, will slip in the coming years.⁶

Meanwhile, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has since 2016 been working on an initiative called 'High 5's'. These encompass agriculture, industrialisation, integration, and energy, and call for more sustainable development and industrial strategies.

China's Rise in Africa

As mentioned above, Chinese investment in manufacturing, resources, and infrastructure in Africa amounted to 180 billion dollars in fiscal 2015-16, and at the current rate of growth, it will reach 250 billion dollars by 2025. We must take note that China is expanding its reach in sectors like agriculture, banking, insurance, housing, information, and communication technology (ICT), and transport and logistics, where returns are expected to be high and investments could more than double in the coming years for the Chinese. Most African states and people see Chinese firms in a positive light. According to some experts, an average 89 per cent of workers in Chinese firms are African, and 64 per cent of Chinese firms operating in Africa send their local employees for skills training.⁷

However, other international observers and states have a different view on China's role in Africa. Former United States President Barack Obama had said in one of his addresses in Ethiopia in 2015, that, *"Now, the United States is not the only country that sees your growth as an opportunity. Moreover, that is a good thing. When more countries invest responsibly in Africa, it creates more jobs and prosperity for us all. So, I want to encourage everybody to do business with Africa, and African countries should want to do business with every country. Economic relationships can't simply be about building countries' infrastructure with foreign labor or extracting Africa's natural resources."*⁸

This statement was a subtle jibe at the massive Chinese investments in Africa and fueled by the belief that the Chinese are sending their workers not hiring the local population. This is based on the impression that Chinese investments are self-serving and just about grabbing natural resources.

In early 2017, Peter Navarro, Head of the United States National Trade Council reiterated American fears in his book 'Death by China.' He wrote, "China's million-man army is moving relentlessly across Africa ... locking down strategic natural resources, locking up emerging markets, and locking out the United States."⁹ Rosa Whitaker, Former Assistant US Trade Representative for Africa under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, writing for Al-Jazeera around the same time as Navarro's book came out, countered his argument. She said that unlike the British East India Company in the 18th and 19th centuries, Chinese investments were empowering African governments to prioritise their needs and choose more partners. Some perceive China's investments from a Cold War lens

and want the US Government to recognise that with a young population and rapid urbanisation, Africa is going to be a future driver of global demand and growth.¹⁰

The *Mckinsey Report* on China-Africa economic relations points out three major benefits for Africans. Chinese firms hiring African workers are just not providing local Africans with jobs, but also skill training them and offering them apprenticeships, which is helping secure employability in Africa. The Chinese are introducing new products, services and technology, and slashing prices of existing products and services by as much as 40 per cent. A major reason why Chinese investments are encouraged and approved by African governments is that their deliverables are timely. Chinese investments are also creating jobs. According to research done by *Foreign Policy* on Chinese investments in Ethiopia, Chinese firms have mostly employed local workers, and some of them have been sent to China to attend management workshops and training. This fact mentioned by *Foreign Policy*, adds to the findings of the Mckinsey Report on Chinese investments in Africa. It says that in countries like Angola and Equatorial Guinea, the Chinese employ their workers in the construction sector but with the host government's permission.¹¹

The Mckinsey Report, however, points out the following:-

- On balance, we believe that China's growing involvement is a strong net positive for Africa's economies, governments, and workers. However, some areas need significant improvement.
- By value, only 47 per cent of the Chinese firms' sourcing was from local African firms, representing a lost opportunity for local firms to benefit from Chinese investment.
- Only 44 per cent of local managers at the Chinese-owned companies we surveyed were African, though some Chinese firms have driven their local managerial employment above 80 per cent. Other firms could follow suit.
- There have been instances of major labour and environmental violations by Chinese-owned businesses. These range from inhumane working conditions to illegal extraction of natural resources, including timber and fish.¹²

The attraction for Chinese loans stems from Beijing's apparent policy of non-interference in the internal matters of a state. The Chinese are willing to assist while Western countries and donors insist on human rights and liability norms, as well as seek a change in domestic economic policies for providing

grants and loans. American companies often complain about their Chinese counterparts bribing to get things done their way. This criticism is only rhetorical since no real alternatives have surfaced and the situation has gotten worse with 'USAID' facing significant budget cuts. At the same time, Chinese state-owned companies handling big projects are running against deadlines set by their government in Africa, but at the cost of gaining a notorious reputation for shoddy work.¹³

China's Growing Military Presence in Africa

Under the peace and security initiative mentioned in President Xi's speech, China is going to set up a China-Africa Peace and Security Fund to enhance cooperation in peace, security, peacekeeping and law and order. Military funding to the African Union (AU) by China is set to continue. Certain areas in Africa like the Sahel, the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea, China will continue to combat terrorism. China will launch 50 security assistance programmes to forward China-Africa cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), along with peacekeeping operations, maintenance of law and order and anti-piracy operations.

The process of protecting Chinese interests abroad became a foreign policy priority during the last years of former President Hu Jintao (2002-2012). Interestingly, this happened around the time when China overtook the United States of America as the most significant investor in Africa. To show their capacity as a military power and a future superpower, the Chinese have increased their troop contribution for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Africa.¹⁴ The China–Africa Cooperative Partnership backs Chinese military engagement in Africa.¹⁵

While China leads the pack amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been actively dealing with humanitarian crises in Africa like the Ebola outbreak. The PLA sent teams to deal with emergencies and also set up a mobile laboratory. Beijing has been actively supporting the anti-terror operations of the AU against Al-Shabaab in Somalia and providing training to defence forces in Nigeria and Cameroon as well. China's export of arms has grown exponentially in Africa. In the period 2012-2016, it had increased by 122 per cent when compared to the period 2007-2011.¹⁶

China changed its 50-year-old non-interference policy and set up a naval base in Djibouti and passed a law that allowed stationing of Chinese troops overseas. This move by China suggests more engagement with other countries, besides trade and investment. Before 2012, China did not send any combat troops as a part of UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa; they would send medical personnel and engineers, who were traditionally assigned to low-risk areas like Liberia. However, China is taking on a more significant role in the region by sending more combat troops into high-risk areas like Mali and South Sudan.

Appendix 1 is a representation of China's military engagement in Africa under the auspices of the UN or unilateral deployments along with significant military sales to countries.

Chinese Perception of Economic Ties with Africa

Since the beginning of 2018, the Chinese have accelerated the discharging of ten China-Africa Cooperation plans. They are moving fast to enhance regional connectivity in Africa. Chinese Communist Party leaders and the country's leaders have visited Africa, and have promoted people-to-people and cultural exchanges between China and various North and Sub-Saharan African countries. The promotion of Chinese projects in Africa has been through inter-governmental cooperation mechanisms. The Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) has had several meetings with its counterparts in Sub-Saharan Africa and also held their first bilateral Joint Commission on Trade and Commerce in 2017.¹⁷

MOFCOM estimates of China-Africa trade amounted to 170 billion USD in 2017, which was 14 per cent more than in 2016. Imports from Africa to China grew by 33 per cent in 2017, compared to 2016. It was around 75.3 billion USD. Exports to Africa from China increased to 94.7 billion USD, which is three per cent more than exports in 2016. Trade with China's biggest trading partners in Africa, South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria grew by 12 per cent, 45 per cent, 30 per cent respectively when compared to trade figures in 2016.

The People's Bank of China also made progress on internationalising the RMB. The bank has made countries like Nigeria, Mauritius, and South Africa incorporate RMB into their foreign exchange reserves. The RMB has also been able to make free exchange of local currency in Kenya. The first Chinese funded bank has opened in Luanda, Angola, and a joint-venture bank has opened in the

Republic of Congo to support mining, port and oil projects in its second largest city.¹⁸

In the last week of May 2018, seventeen central bank governors of fourteen African countries and officials of the AFDB met at a forum in Harare, Zimbabwe, to consider using the Yuan in their national reserves. Most of these bank governors were members of the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI), whose spokesperson made the following statement: *“Most countries in the MEFMI region have loans or grants from China, and it would only make economic sense to repay in Renminbi (Chinese Yuan).”* He added, *“This is the reason why it is critical for policymakers to strategise on the progress that the continent has made to embrace the Chinese Yuan which has become what may be termed (as) ‘common currency’ in a trade with Africa.”*¹⁹

According to the Global Times, the Chinese Communist Party's newspaper which gives a nationalist perspective, “FOCAC's five cooperative concepts of common, intensive, green, safe and open development correspond to the B&R's vision of innovative, coordinated, green, open and inclusive development.” In the same article, the Global Times sees the BRI as an “embodiment of China's wisdom, in which Africa, with abundant resources and huge potential, is a key participant.” A passing opinion on these statements by the Global Times could be that China wants FOCAC to be a part of the BRI. This opinion is resonated by a statement made by China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi. He said, *“Africa cannot be absent from the building of the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as from the Common development of China and the rest of the world.”*²⁰

President Xi since assuming power in 2013, has visited Africa on four occasions, reflecting the importance China attaches to its interests in Africa. There have been frequent high-level visits by China's top legislators and ministers in the recent past. According to the Chinese state-run media house Xinhua, the reaction of African leaders has been favourable, with one of them saying that China has won the hearts and minds of Africans.

The FOCAC Summit held in Beijing in September, 2018 gave a more unobstructed view of where the China-Africa comprehensive strategic relationship is headed. The Deputy Prime Minister of Namibia Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah believed then, “the summit will bring us closer.”²¹

African Reaction to Chinese influx

As investments are growing from China, African civil society trade unions and small business owners are critical of the projects undertaken. There was gradual excitement when China overtook the US in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2009. As investments and aid have grown, it has led to a smothering of small African businesses by Chinese small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Africans employed by the Chinese firms are not getting skill trained to set up their companies, and local African suppliers are not the ones providing material for projects undertaken.²²

Chinese firms are using the same model in Africa of exploiting low-cost labour, which involves long hours, unsafe working conditions, unstructured worker rights and lack of respect for environmental ramifications of projects undertaken. Finished products from Africa face significant tariff barriers, and if African firms can overcome all of that, then there are non-tariff trade barriers like the discretionary prohibition of items based on national security, health consideration, and environmental safety.²³

African leaders do get into these partnerships with the Chinese to gain political mileage and to show that work is getting done. China too has the expertise and money to get it done in Africa, while Western governments or donors are not so enthusiastic. One of the commonalities in the reports by Mckinsey & Company, Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand is the assessment that it is vital for Africa to have its infrastructure sector improve. However, help is still being sought from traditional donors in the form of expertise to deal with Chinese investors. Firms in the US, the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland are separately contacted to provide oversight on Chinese proposals to see whether they are meeting standards set by the African governments.²⁴

Afrobarometer, a non-partisan and Pan-African research network carried out a survey of people regarding business models their respective countries should follow and the African understanding of China. Some 30 per cent of the respondents wanted their countries to develop along the lines of American business models, while 24 per cent of them wanted their countries to follow the Chinese business development model. The survey also found most respondents welcoming China's economic and political influence. On an average, 63 per cent

of the respondents were somewhat or very positive about China's political or economic impact in Africa. Around 56 per cent described Chinese developmental assistance as satisfactory or very good, with the most favourable response coming from West and Central Africa (65 and 64 per cent respectively). On an average, 32 per cent of the respondents said Chinese investments in business and infrastructure was helping to create a positive image of China in Africa.²⁵

Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba, Director of the Kenya School of Laws, during an interview with the *Financial Times*, wasn't very sure about the rise of Chinese influence in the region. His main argument is that while the Chinese know what they want from Africa, it is the Africans who are unsure about what they want. Lumumba fears that this makes African countries, most of them indebted already indebted to China economically, politically also by extension.²⁶ Another issue is the quality of Chinese products. According to the *Afrobarometer* survey, 35 per cent of Africans say this issue contributes to a negative image of the Chinese.

The following tables capture African views on economic ties with China based on the *Afrobarometer* survey (*Afrobarometer* survey: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/dispatches/atchno/122_perceptions_of_china_in_africa1.pdf).

Figure 1





Figure 2


Figure 11: Is China's economic and political influence positive or negative?
| by region | 35 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: In general, do you think that China's economic and political influence in your country is mostly positive, or mostly negative, or haven't you heard enough to say?


Figure 3

Figure 15: Factors contributing most to a positive image of China | 35 countries
| 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following factors contributes most to positive images of China in [your country], or haven't you heard enough to say?

Figure 4



Respondents were asked: Which of the following factors contributes most to negative images of China in your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?

China's development model has gained a considerable following in Africa. It is important to note that this development model is top-down and compromised on free and fair elections, and hence, cannot be replicated in African democracies. This development model is dependent on an autocratic style of rule. The Chinese Communist Party's latest move to remove the 36-year-old two-term limit from the Constitution puts China's role under question when it is in the process of expanding its economic model.²⁷ A political development model should be reliable, promote the welfare and, most importantly, be accountable to the people. This removal of the term limit also has eroded lines between the government and the party. Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount leader in the 1980's, had made efforts to ensure a distinction between the party and the state. This has been firmly set aside by President Xi. This political development in China guarantees faster growth but comes at the cost of transparency, lack of public accountability, substantial environmental costs and the suppression of labour rights.²⁸

In countries like Ghana, the People's Daily, in one of their pieces, mentioned how the Chinese are involved in the construction of hydropower

telecommunications, gas infrastructure, water supply projects and a joint venture airline company backed by the China-Africa Development Fund. The article concludes by saying these investments have 'propelled' Ghana's economic and social growth. But the reaction is opposite to what the Chinese mouthpiece claims it to be. Ghanaians like Kwasi Prempeh, Executive Director of the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development in Accra say Chinese projects in Africa only involve their labour and material. Recently, both governments signed a swap deal with a Chinese state company to build roads, bridges and other essential infrastructure, while the Ghanaians will be expected to supply refined Bauxite which is used to make Aluminum. Ghana has around 50 billion dollars' worth of Bauxite, which once refined, will be worth 400 billion dollars.

While the Ghanaian government has signed the deal, the decision of a swap of resources has not gone down well with the opposition in parliament, who claim the deal is opaque and will increase the country's already rising debt. While the contract of two billion USD has been given to *Sinohydro* and does not mean that debt will rise, a rating agency has pointed out that the deal could take a turn for the worse if Bauxite prices fall. Ghana's Auditor General Daniel Yao Domelevo in his skepticism of the deal has pointed out that swap deals could be problematic as there is no way to establish the price of goods traded. Another issue cropping up is that although the deal has been signed, a Bauxite refinery is yet to be commissioned. Will Ghana, which has electricity costs, be able to sustain a Bauxite refinery which is an energy-intensive process?²⁹

Chinese Economic Engagement Categorisation by Mckinsey

The Mckinsey Report has categorised a few African countries according to the engagement they have with China, namely robust partners, solid partners, unbalanced partners, and nascent partners. The investments and public reaction to them will be explored in this section.

Robust Partners (South Africa and Ethiopia)

According to Mckinsey & Company, South Africa and Ethiopia are reliable partners. A variety of investments, loans and aid have been invested, lent and given respectively. The Chinese have economic and political strategic interests.

In South Africa, the population is not too enthusiastic about Chinese goods flooding the market and don't consider them as quality products. But several

Chinese businesses have led to a loss of jobs. For example, the textile industry in South Africa is not able to compete against the influx of Chinese goods.³⁰

Solid Partners (Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania)

The 'solid partners' are those countries where the Chinese are steadily increasing their relationship but are not at par with the 'Robust Partners.'

In Kenya, the construction of a USD four billion railway line by China connects the Port of Mombasa to capital Nairobi. However, now there is public fear in Kenya as to 'how are we supposed to repay the debt?' China's Export-Import Bank has given 90 per cent of the amount for construction.³¹

Sanusi Lambda Sanusi, former central bank governor, wrote in an op-ed for the *Financial Times* that China should be seen as a competitor. Mr. Sanusi expressed his concern over African romanticisation of the Chinese model of development, considering that China is the second largest economy (the op-ed was written in 2013) in the world and can be exploitative like the Europeans were in Africa. His scathing criticism of Chinese economic involvement was that China takes primary goods from Ghana and sells it back, and called it "the essence of colonialism."³²

Unbalanced Partners (Angola and Zambia)

Chinese engagement according to the McKinsey Report is narrowly focused. In Angola, Chinese investments are in the oil sector. In Zambia, it is a private-public partnership, which is contrary to Chinese private companies operating since there is a lack of oversight and partnerships are primarily affected by corruption and or labour scandals.

When crude oil prices fell in 2015, Angola's President José Eduardo dos Santos asked China for a loan. Between 2002 (when the civil war ended) and 2015, China gave USD 27 billion in exchange for oil or funds went Chinese construction companies. Although Chinese assistance is indispensable, the Angolans are unhappy with their president, as they believe that only the Chinese are benefitting from these projects.³³ Following the oil slump of 2016, China stopped construction projects undertaken in Angola.³⁴

In Zambia, Michael Sata (1937-2014) won the elections in 2011 after losing three bids. His campaign was based on sharp criticism of Chinese

investments. In June 2017, Zambian authorities arrested 31 Chinese nationals on charges of illegal mining.³⁵ Around USD 295 million has been invested in Zambia, with the copper industry being the primary area of investment.³⁶

Nascent Partners (Côte d'Ivoire)

Mckinsey's evaluation of partners in this category is that the relationship is at an early stage and the development model is not explicit.

The Ivory Coast plans to double its energy capacity by 2020. It has already taken Chinese assistance to build the nation's most prominent dam, the four-turbine, four-kilometer-long Soubre Dam. Three more dams are in the pipeline, and the contract for their construction could be given to Chinese construction companies.³⁷

Investment Pattern

Chinese investments across Sub-Saharan Africa vary according to the source one uses. According to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa are worth USD 283.87 billion. If one corroborates all the investments according to the data given by the AEI sector-wise, significant Chinese investments are in energy and transportation. Chinese intentions on securing their voracious energy needs for the future has become more evident as they have invested over USD 20 billion in Ethiopia and Angola and more than USD 40 billion in Nigeria. Ethiopia is a classic example of the Beijing consensus political-economic model (an authoritarian form of government, no emphasis on human rights and state-controlled capitalism). Major oil exploration projects were doled out to China by Ethiopia after 2008.³⁸ Chinese investments in all sectors from 2008 till January 2018 have increased from USD 2.93 billion to USD 23.53 billion. Chinese investments in energy in Ethiopia have steadily risen from USD 2.87 billion in 2009 to USD 6.96 billion in January 2018. To access Ethiopian hydrocarbon reserves, China has, since 2010, consistently invested in transportation in neighbouring Djibouti to gain access to import of hydrocarbons from Ethiopia. The China Poly Group, in association with the Hong Kong-based Golden Concord Group, plans to start the import of natural gas by mid-2019 through a pipeline to a port in Djibouti.³⁹

Appendix 3 shows Chinese cumulative Chinese investments and construction contracts in Africa in various sectors from 2005 to 2017. The maps

show Chinese investments, including commitments, in 11 sectors, which are as follows:-¹

- Agriculture (5.41 billion USD);
- Chemicals (2.72 billion USD);
- Energy: oil, hydro, coal, alternative (85.98 billion USD);
- Finance: investment, banking (5.85 billion USD);
- Logistics (2.35 billion USD);
- Metals: copper, aluminum, steel (33.6 billion USD);
- Real estate: property, construction (30.88 billion USD);
- Technology: telecom (6.76 billion USD);
- Tourism (450 million USD);
- Transport: automobile, aviation, rail, shipping (96.84 billion USD);
- Utilities (7.15 billion USD);
- Other: textiles, timber, consumer, medical, education, industry (4.7 billion USD);
- Entertainment (1.18 billion USD).

International Response to Chinese Involvement in Africa

The USA might have taken an isolationist stand in global politics, but in Africa, it appears to be making a conscious effort to curb Chinese influence. While earlier, the US Department of Defense and the White House used to send delegations to Addis Ababa, now delegations from the US Department of Commerce accompanied by several businessmen go for these meetings to counter growing Chinese influence in the region. The US is also in the process of setting up an agency which will help facilitate investment of 60 billion USD, which is aimed to counter China's influence in the developing world. The Pentagon also is considering setting up a new base in Eritrea due to the growing Chinese influence in Djibouti with the newly established Chinese military base.⁴⁰

India, while behind China in terms of investments or loans granted, has a considerable economic foothold in Africa. In Ethiopia, Indian government-backed

1. The source of Maps and Investment/Commitments are from China Global Investment Tracker made by American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation.

Lines of Credit (LoCs) amounting to USD 1.004 billion have been extended with the main focus being on sugar production.⁴¹ India and South Africa are partners in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Groupings. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, Indian private businesses based out of India like Ranbaxy and Cipla (pharmaceuticals), Mahindra (automobiles), Tata (automobiles, IT and hospitality) have set up established businesses in South Africa. The South African private sector too has reciprocated, although the level of engagement is not at par with India's in Africa.⁴²

India is the second largest investor in Kenya, according to the Kenya Investment Authority. At least 60 private companies from India have invested and created thousands of jobs for Kenyans. LoCs worth USD 110 million have been given by India's EXIM Bank till July 2016. An additional 100 million USD for an agricultural mechanisation project was approved in January 2017.⁴³ India has dedicated LoCs worth 1.115 billion USD to Tanzania, the highest amongst African countries. India is Nigeria's second largest trading partner. India's private sector has established itself in Nigeria, with more than 100 Indian companies running businesses there. Our main trade with Nigeria is oil, as India is the largest importer of crude oil from Nigeria.⁴⁴

India is the third largest trade partner of Angola. Since the end of the civil war, economic relations between India and Angola have seen a rise. Angola is the second largest crude oil source for India. India's EXIM Bank and other public sector banks have given LoCs for assistance in various sectors.⁴⁵ India-Zambia relations have grown exponentially. The private sector is heavily investing in the copper mining industry, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), hospitality and beverages. India has however not invested heavily in (infrastructure. At the Third *India-Africa Summit* in December 2015, Zambia's Vice President Inonge Mutukwa Wina called upon investors from India to invest in energy projects in Zambia.⁴⁶ Indian origin Zambians are a part of the Zambian economy and government. There are also a growing number of Indian professionals in the light of more investments in Zambia.⁴⁷ The trade balance remains in favour of the Ivory Coast. There are several micro, small and medium enterprises. Private sector firms like Tata have invested in the mining sector.⁴⁸

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has constantly been warning African countries to reassess heavy borrowing from China. Even after these

repeated warnings and after being in debt, which is increasing, governments in Africa are insisting that deals provided by China are better than Western economic institutions. This becomes a bigger problem when countries approach multilateral economic institutions as they take more time to respond, while the Chinese are swift to respond. A matter of concern is that both the Chinese and Western economic institutions are locked in a debate regarding debt sustainability. Beijing insists on debt-fuelled growth for Africa as China's lower and longer-term rates makes it lucrative for debt refinancing but Zambia even after taking this deal, is still seeking renegotiation with Beijing.⁴⁹ The reason for China's swift response to finance projects or grant loans is because it lacks laws like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the United States.⁵⁰

An excerpt from an overview of the Act on the United States Department of Justice website says the following: *“Specifically, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit the willful use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of money or anything of value to any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to influence the foreign official in his or her official capacity, induce the foreign official to do or omit to do an act in violation of his or her lawful duty, or to secure any improper advantage in order to assist in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.”*⁵¹

Conclusion

In conclusion, the BRI and other infrastructure projects which China has taken up in Africa suffers from the same problems as Chinese society does, lack of accountability and transparency and complete disregard of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) while delivering projects.

Chinese economic development engagement is to ensure that its State-Owned Enterprises (SOE's) get new markets and make some money as they are under severe debt. China's Ministry of Commerce in its assessment of China-Africa trade relations is very optimistic about the growth of trade, and the recent FOCAC meeting was another push by China to be more involved in Africa. There is no proper consideration of IMF recommendations by the Chinese authorities,

but the implementation of the Chinese economic strategy in parts of Africa could lead to a significant financial crisis.⁵²


African countries like Ethiopia and Kenya have endorsed the BRI, but, the heat of repaying loans is going to fall on the local population. China is also flexing its soft power muscle, an example of that would be the distribution of Chinese pamphlets on the launch of the train line between Nairobi and Mombasa. The Kenyans are outraged because of overrunning costs and the increase in trade imbalance between China and Kenya because of the import of Chinese logistics and supplies needed to make the railway line.⁵³

While the Chinese government wants to step up more investments and is taking up initiatives in Africa, the Chinese Diaspora in Africa has significantly declined,⁵⁴ from one million expatriates in 2013 due to slow economic growth.⁵⁵ Sub-Saharan Africa just grew at 1.5 per cent in 2016, the slowest in two decades and the exchange rate is drastically falling, which is why Chinese expatriates from South Africa and Angola are leaving in large numbers as their businesses have suffered. The numbers, however, continue to grow in Ethiopia and Kenya due to BRI projects. The trend might change from setting up of businesses by entrepreneurs to being providers.

The Chinese are heavily investing in infrastructure in Africa which might facilitate future procurement of energy and industrial resources as there is a possibility of future resource for infrastructure 'swap deals' as in the case of Ghana. While the United States has accused China of using 'debt-diplomacy', Chinese investments or loans have received warm responses from the governments. However, it is the people of Africa who might have to endure difficult times in the future as debt grows and economic growth slows down.


The Sub-Saharan African countries must look at new developments taking place in Malaysia and Pakistan as Chinese investments have led to major corruption scandals and mismanagement of resources under the BRI. While China has definitely improved infrastructure in Africa and delivered projects fast, it is always advisable to be careful and verify the agreements signed to ensure economic growth, keeping in consideration, ecological changes, and social development.

China military personnel in Africa under joint cooperation and multilateral commitments and arms trade





(source: http://www.ecfr.eu/page//into_africa_china%e2%80%99sglobalsecurityshift_pdf_1135.pdf)


Chinese investments (committed and proposed) in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2005-2017. (Values are in USD)




source :<http://www.aci.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>



China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment



NAME	Energy
Angola	7,80,00,00,000
Benin	16,00,00,000
Botswana	1,07,00,00,000
Cameroon	3,12,00,00,000
Chad	1,59,00,00,000
Congo	1,93,00,00,000
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	2,04,00,00,000
Democratic Republic of Congo	1,34,00,00,000
Equatorial Guinea	1,09,00,00,000
Eritrea	10,00,00,000
Ethiopia	6,96,00,00,000
Gabon	60,00,00,000
Ghana	3,52,00,00,000
Guinea	1,83,00,00,000
Guinea Bissau	37,00,00,000
Kenya	5,43,00,00,000
Liberia	16,00,00,000
Madagascar	56,00,00,000
Malawi	71,00,00,000
Mauritius	110,00,00,000
Mozambique	5,29,00,00,000
Namibia	
Niger	5,12,00,00,000
Nigeria	11,96,00,00,000
Rwanda	34,00,00,000
Sao Tome	15,00,00,000
Senegal	57,00,00,000
South Africa	21,00,00,000
South Sudan	1,78,00,00,000
Sudan	2,79,00,00,000
Tanzania, United Republic of	2,17,00,00,000
Togo	39,00,00,000
Uganda	5,82,00,00,000
Zambia	4,60,00,00,000
Zimbabwe	6,29,00,00,000



NAME	Finance
Angola	
Benin	
Botswana	
Cameroon	
Chad	
Congo	
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	
Gabon	
Ghana	
Guinea	
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	
Namibia	
Niger	
Nigeria	
Rwanda	
Sao Tome	
Senegal	
South Africa	5,85,00,00,000
South Sudan	
Sudan	
Tanzania, United Republic of	
Togo	
Uganda	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	

China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment

Legend

Investments (USD)



Logistics

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Logistics (2005- 17)




NAME	Logistics
Angola	
Benin	
Botswana	
Cameroon	70,00,00,000
Chad	
Congo	
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	
Gabon	
Ghana	48,00,00,000
Guinea	
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	
Namibia	30,00,00,000
Niger	
Nigeria	
Rwanda	
Sao Tome	68,00,00,000
Senegal	
South Africa	
South Sudan	
Sudan	10,00,00,000
Tanzania, United Republic of	
Togo	19,00,00,000
Uganda	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	

Data Source:AEI CGIT(<http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker>) Map is for thematic representation only, it does not represent a legal survey.
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
Legend

Investments (USD)



Metals

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Metals (2005- 17)



NAME	Metals
Angola	
Benin	
Botswana	
Cameroon	66,00,00,000
Chad	
Congo	56,00,00,000
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	12,39,00,00,000
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	
Gabon	
Ghana	1,20,00,00,000
Guinea	2,56,00,00,000
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	
Liberia	36,00,00,000
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	50,00,00,000
Namibia	2,19,00,00,000
Niger	62,00,00,000
Nigeria	
Rwanda	
Sao Tome	
Senegal	
South Africa	3,15,00,00,000
South Sudan	
Sudan	
Tanzania, United Republic of	2,70,00,00,000
Togo	
Uganda	28,00,00,000
Zambia	1,61,00,00,000
Zimbabwe	60,00,00,000

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China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment


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Investments (USD)



Real Estate

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Real Estate (2005 -17)




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NAME	Real Estate
Angola	7,83,00,00,000
Benin	24,00,00,000
Botswana	
Cameroon	120,000,000
Chad	
Congo	1,33,00,00,000
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	50,00,00,000
Equatorial Guinea	
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	2,23,00,00,000
Gabon	
Ghana	36,00,00,000
Guinea	2,00,00,00,000
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	82,00,00,000
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	10,00,00,000
Mauritius	74,00,00,000
Mozambique	76,00,00,000
Namibia	
Niger	14,00,00,000
Nigeria	5,58,00,00,000
Rwanda	27,00,00,000
Sao Tome	
Senegal	14,00,00,000
South Africa	1,46,00,00,000
South Sudan	
Sudan	11,00,00,000
Tanzania, United Republic of	2,24,00,00,000
Togo	
Uganda	
Zambia	1,87,00,00,000
Zimbabwe	2,03,00,00,000

Legend

Investments (USD)



Technology

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Technology (2005 -17)



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NAME	1_Technolo
Angola	270,000,000
Benin	
Botswana	
Cameroon	75,00,00,000
Chad	
Congo	
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	
Equatorial Guinea	
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	3,47,00,00,000
Gabon	
Ghana	
Guinea	24,00,00,000
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	
Namibia	
Niger	
Nigeria	1,65,00,00,000
Rwanda	
Sao Tome	
Senegal	
South Africa	38,00,00,000
South Sudan	
Sudan	
Tanzania, United Republic of	
Togo	
Uganda	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	

China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment

Legend

Investments (USD)

32,00,00,000

Tourism

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Tourism (2005 -17)



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
NAME	Tourism
Angola	
Benin	
Botswana	
Cameroon	
Chad	
Congo	
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	
Equatorial Guinea	32,00,00,000
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	
Gabon	
Ghana	
Guinea	
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	
Namibia	
Niger	
Nigeria	
Rwanda	
Sao Tome	
Senegal	
South Africa	
South Sudan	
Sudan	
Tanzania, United Republic of	
Togo	
Uganda	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	

Investments (USD)

- 1,05,00,00,000
- 1,12,00,00,000
- 1,14,00,00,000
- 1,16,00,00,000
- 1,17,00,00,000
- 1,39,00,00,000
- 1,53,00,00,000
- 12,00,00,000
- 15,00,00,000
- 17,00,00,000
- 20,00,00,000
- 22,00,00,000
- 3,15,00,00,000
- 3,38,00,00,000
- 3,48,00,00,000
- 30,00,00,000
- 36,00,00,000
- 40,00,00,000
- 5,11,00,00,000
- 5,57,00,00,000
- 5,90,00,00,000
- 5,90,00,00,000
- 6,05,00,00,000
- 6,65,00,00,000
- 6,80,00,00,000
- 64,00,00,000
- 67,00,00,000
- 72,00,00,000
- 8,77,00,00,000

Transport

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Transport (2005 -17)



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NAME	Transport
Angola	5,11,00,00,000
Benin	64,00,00,000
Botswana	
Cameroon	5,57,00,00,000
Chad	6,69,00,00,000
Congo	5,90,00,00,000
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	1,05,00,00,000
Democratic Republic of Congo	17,00,00,000
Equatorial Guinea	67,00,00,000
Eritrea	40,00,00,000
Ethiopia	6,80,00,00,000
Gabon	1,12,00,00,000
Ghana	1,14,00,00,000
Guinea	77,00,00,000
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	8,77,00,00,000
Liberia	17,00,00,000
Madagascar	1,16,00,00,000
Malawi	
Mauritius	30,00,00,000
Mozambique	3,48,00,00,000
Namibia	36,00,00,000
Niger	
Nigeria	5,590,00,000
Rwanda	22,00,00,000
Sao Tome	12,00,00,000
Senegal	3,39,00,00,000
South Africa	1,39,00,00,000
South Sudan	1,17,00,00,000
Sudan	3,15,00,00,000
Tanzania, United Republic of	
Togo	15,00,00,000
Uganda	1,53,00,00,000
Zambia	6,05,00,00,000
Zimbabwe	20,00,00,000
Djibouti	1,72,00,00,000

China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment

Legend

Investments (USD)



Utilities

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Utilities (2005 -17)




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NAME	Utilities
Angola	2,40,00,00,000
Benin	
Botswana	17,00,00,000
Cameroon	74,00,00,000
Chad	
Congo	56,00,00,000
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	
Equatorial Guinea	52,00,00,000
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	
Gabon	
Ghana	1,24,00,00,000
Guinea	
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	30,00,00,000
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	15,00,00,000
Namibia	
Niger	
Nigeria	
Rwanda	
Sao Tome	
Senegal	
South Africa	
South Sudan	33,00,00,000
Sudan	10,00,00,000
Tanzania, United Republic of	
Togo	
Uganda	
Zambia	60,00,00,000
Zimbabwe	14,00,00,000


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Investments (USD)



Other

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Other (2005 -17)



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NAME	Other
Angola	44,00,00,000
Benin	
Botswana	
Cameroon	
Chad	
Congo	
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	10,00,00,000
Equatorial Guinea	56,00,00,000
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	1,05,00,00,000
Gabon	
Ghana	
Guinea	
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	2,23,00,00,000
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	
Namibia	
Niger	
Nigeria	
Rwanda	
Sao Tome	
Senegal	
South Africa	
South Sudan	22,00,00,000
Sudan	
Tanzania, United Republic of	
Togo	
Uganda	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	10,00,00,000

China's Expanding Role in Africa: An Assessment


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Investments (USD)



Entertainment

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Entertainment (2005 -17)



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NAME	Entertainment
Angola	12,00,00,000
Benin	
Botswana	
Cameroon	32,00,00,000
Chad	
Congo	52,00,00,000
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	
Democratic Republic of Congo	
Equatorial Guinea	
Eritrea	
Ethiopia	12,00,00,000
Gabon	
Ghana	
Guinea	
Guinea Bissau	
Kenya	
Liberia	
Madagascar	
Malawi	
Mauritius	
Mozambique	
Namibia	
Niger	
Nigeria	
Rwanda	
Sao Tome	
Senegal	
South Africa	
South Sudan	
Sudan	
Tanzania, United Republic of	
Togo	
Uganda	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	

Investments (USD)



Total

Chinese investment(Committed/Proposed) in Total (2005 -17)



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NAME	Total
Angola	24,25,00,00,000
Benin	1,04,00,00,000
Botswana	1,44,00,00,000
Cameroon	11,98,00,00,000
Chad	8,28,00,00,000
Congo	12,32,00,00,000
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	3,09,00,00,000
Democratic Republic of Congo	14,50,00,00,000
Equatorial Guinea	3,16,00,00,000
Eritrea	50,00,00,000
Ethiopia	23,53,00,00,000
Gabon	1,82,00,00,000
Ghana	8,14,00,00,000
Guinea	7,40,00,00,000
Guinea Bissau	37,00,00,000
Kenya	18,19,00,00,000
Liberia	69,00,00,000
Madagascar	1,72,00,00,000
Malawi	81,00,00,000
Mauritius	1,15,00,00,000
Mozambique	10,59,00,00,000
Namibia	2,85,00,00,000
Niger	5,88,00,00,000
Nigeria	44,78,00,00,000
Rwanda	83,00,00,000
Sao Tome	95,00,00,000
Senegal	4,10,00,00,000
South Africa	12,44,00,00,000
South Sudan	3,60,00,00,000
Sudan	7,52,00,00,000
Tanzania, United Republic of	9,36,00,00,000
Togo	73,00,00,000
Uganda	8,55,00,00,000
Zambia	15,30,00,00,000
Zimbabwe	9,56,00,00,000
Djibouti	1,72,00,00,000

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